The Rt. Hon. Sir John Major KG CH

Tag: 2013

  • Sir John Major’s Speech on the 20th Anniversary of the Downing Street Declaration – 11 December 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech marking the 20th anniversary of the Downing Street Declaration. The speech was made in Dublin, Ireland, on Wednesday 11th December 2013.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It’s always a pleasure for me to come to Dublin – a city of which I have very fond memories, in a country for which I have great affection.

    Eighteen years ago, I was here to discuss a key piece of architecture in the Peace Process – the Joint Framework Document. That evening, in the margins of my discussions with John Bruton, Norma and I went to the National Concert Hall with John and Finola to catch the second half of Handel’s Messiah.

    On arrival, we received an overwhelmingly warm reception from the audience: This, I am sure, was due to John’s popularity, but it reinforced my determination to end the friction that had bedevilled Anglo-Irish relations for too long. That night is one of the most treasured memories of my years in Office and it’s good, yet again, to be back here in Dublin.

    Twenty five years ago it would have seemed improbable – to some inconceivable – that a former British Prime Minister would be invited to celebrate the anniversary of a political agreement that was a staging post in making the UK and Ireland more contented neighbours than at any time in their long and tortuous history.

    Yet it is so – and British and Irish alike can now focus on our present and future relationship instead of all the disputes, conflicts, rights and wrongs of the past that poisoned it for so long. It’s time to put them behind us. Of course, the past will remain in the memory, but it mustn’t stand in the way of the future.

    Britain and Ireland are the closest of neighbours. Our cultures intermingle: we share a taste for Shakespeare and Shaw; for Milton and Beckett. We enjoy the performances of Judi Dench and Kenneth Branagh; of Maggie Smith and Peter O’Toole.

    Irish citizens with residency qualifications can vote in UK elections. Our trade and investment flows are huge. British exports to Ireland exceed those to India and China collectively or, alternatively, to the whole of Africa – added together: In return, Britain is Ireland’s largest market. We are both members of the EU and share sporting ambitions with the Lions, the Barbarians and in the Ryder Cup. We steal Eoin Morgan, Ed Joyce and Boyd Rankin to play cricket for England, and you send an unending stream of Irish jockeys to ride to victory in our classic races.

    When Ireland faced financial problems, the British Government was swift to help. It is a new (and better) relationship, sealed in May 2011 by the first ever State visit made by a British Monarch to Ireland. And next Spring, President Higgins’ State Visit to England will further enhance our mutual interests.

    The gateway to this new partnership is the success of the Peace Process. This had no single architect, no single event, no single hero. Many people, known and unknown, contributed over a long period – including, above all, the men and women of Ireland who became impatient at the delay in resolving the troubles; angry at the senseless violence that marred daily life; and frustrated by the failure to resolve an essentially political dispute. Their voice and actions made the extremists in both camps realise that the Irish people expected something better from them and, in this, both Protestant and Catholic clerics played a vital role.

    In December 1993, the Downing Street Declaration set out principles that both the British and Irish Governments were agreed upon: no-one could claim that it’s an easy read. In fact, to let you in on a secret, I did win an award for the Declaration which I failed to share with Albert Reynolds. It was a tin of rhubarb … from the Campaign for Plain English – their annual award for gobbledygook.

    But language is important in the land of James Joyce, and the medium was part of the message. The Declaration pointed up agreements, set a direction, and opened up a future that had once seemed impossible to unlock.

    “No heroes”, I said, and I shall stick to that. But I want to say something about my counterpart in agreeing the Joint Declaration. Albert Reynolds is not well now, and his illness is a cruel trick of fate for a man who gave so much to break the Gordian knot of Anglo-Irish distrust. Although I’m sad Albert cannot be with us this evening, I’m delighted that Kathleen is here – and it was a real treat for me and Norma to spend some time with the Reynolds family earlier today.

    I like and admire Albert very much. He is – quintessentially – Irish: most at ease philosophically in the wearing of the Green. One of the most mortifying experiences I endured as Prime Minister was to sit between Albert Reynolds and Dick Spring – both howling like dervishes – at Twickenham in 1994 when Ireland won by a single point [13-12]. In negotiation, Albert fought like that rugby team – fought and fought again for the Irish point of view but, above all, he sought a way to end the bloodshed and open up a new future for the country he loved so much. He came looking for agreement, not an argument, and was prepared to take risks and make concessions to achieve that outcome. The more I saw of him – despite all the hurdles, despite all the frustrations – even the rows! – the more confident I became that we could and would find common ground.

    Albert and I were both helped by some remarkable civil servants – most especially Martin Mansergh in Dublin and Roderic Lyne in London: their work behind the scenes – and with one another – was untiring. Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring were also crucial to the agreement, and I’m delighted to see Dick here this evening. There are, of course, many more names that merit recognition, but time forbids me from mentioning them all. But they know who they are and what they did – and that is the most important thing.

    Of all nations, the Irish love history – and family. And Albert’s as-yet-unborn great great grandchildren can be proud of their ancestor’s role in building a momentum that gave peace a chance.

    Albert, I see you too rarely, but think of you often: I am proud to call you my friend.

    The agreement reached between the British and Irish Governments was crucial in putting pressure on the violent fringes in both the Unionist and Nationalist communities. It did box them in. It did cut down their support. It did begin to cut off their financial lifeline. In the eyes of many of their former supporters, they were no longer seen as fighters for a political cause but, instead, as a barrier to peace, responsible for so much misery, so many deaths – often of innocent bystanders, unconnected to any political struggle.

    By the early 1990s, a number of instincts were coming together that made a peace process more likely. War weariness was setting in – crucially, even among the Provisionals. Throughout their adult lives they had fought – and achieved nothing towards their cause. Without a political settlement, they foresaw their children and their children’s children facing an equally bleak and violent future.

    Public opinion was swinging in the same direction. Moreover, British and Irish membership of the EU was throwing Ministers from London and Dublin closer together in a common cause. Against that background, Albert and I saw opportunities. He knew violence would not change British policy – indeed, it would only serve to harden it.

    I knew that a British policy of no talks until the Provisional IRA gave up their weapons and ended all violence would very likely mean that the dance of death would continue. And that dance seemed unending: 632 deaths from 1987 to 1993 – including Enniskillen, Ballygawley, Warrington, Shankill Road. It’s a roll-call of horror.

    But the decision to proceed was not a comfortable one, for either side. Easy – because it was right – but not comfortable. We both knew that we were taking a risk. We knew we would face opposition and the profound scepticism bred by two decades of stalemate. Many asked: “How can you possibly talk to an active armed militia?”. Many, looking at history instead of changing circumstances, forecast failure.

    Plainly, success depended on the leaders of the IRA engaging in the process. We believed they would, and were prepared to gamble on it. Let me now say something that may surprise you. Throughout the process, I was acutely conscious that IRA leaders were taking a risk, too: if Albert and I upset our supporters we might – as Albert cheerily put it – “be kicked out”. That was true – but the IRA’s supporters were more deadly than our backbench colleagues – and their leaders were taking a risk too – possibly with their own lives.

    From the moment the process started, I spent countless hours trying to think myself into the mind and tactics of IRA leaders: what were their aims; their constraints; their motives? What would tempt them into agreement?

    We knew we had to agree objectives between London and Dublin. We had to address grievances and contradictory ambitions. We needed to offer an end-product, and reassure two communities that had different fears and different ambitions.

    The Joint Declaration, agreed with Albert Reynolds, did so: it was the beginning of the end of conflict. For the first time, we had a set of principles on which not only the two Governments agreed, but also the leaders of the two largest parties of the day in Northern Ireland, the SDLP and the UUP. Much credit is due to the untiring efforts of John Hume and Jim Molyneux for the courage they showed in lining up with us.

    It was a set of principles strongly supported on both sides of the divide. It demonstrated that there really was an alternative to endless conflict.

    The Framework Documents, agreed with John Bruton – who faced great internal opposition but overcame it – carried us forward – and our political successors continued along the same path. I congratulate them warmly upon what they did. In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement condemned the past to history and opened a better prospect for both our countries. Let me now look to that future.

    First, a word about Northern Ireland. While the success of the peace process has transformed life there, the task of building a normal society is still work-in-progress. The British and Irish Governments need to continue working together to help Northern Ireland become the tolerant, inclusive, shared society we all wish to see.

    For too long the “Northern Ireland Question” was the only agenda item between the UK and Ireland: no longer. Last year, David Cameron and Enda Kenny agreed to a future of intensified co-operation across the whole range of Government business.

    Work is progressing with a focus on jobs and growth – both vital for living standards and for the long-term future of both countries. Within a few days, Ireland will be exiting its IMF/EU programme which it has executed with great courage and skill. In her handling of the financial crisis, Ireland has been an example to all of Europe.

    It hasn’t been easy – or painless. Tax rises and spending cuts are not abstract economic potions: they hurt people’s lives, and Ireland can be proud of how social cohesion has been maintained and the country prepared for a return to better times.

    But, in a global market, an open economy such as Ireland’s requires more than domestic economic virtue: in particular, it needs its main trading partners – the US, EU and, above all, the UK – to grow as well.

    The US, despite her huge debt, is in growth and, despite her much vaunted “pivot to the East” will not neglect her Irish market: both logic and affection bind Ireland and the US together.

    The UK, too, is beginning to recover and – I think – may do so faster than expected. For two decades, the swing towards either recession or growth has been greater than forecast, and I believe the present return to growth will out-perform expectations once again. As it does, the Cameron-Kenny agreement will help both economies.

    Europe, I fear, will recover more slowly, and its future policy is less clear. Nonetheless, I do not expect the Euro to collapse – it has too much political will behind it for this to happen – but a Eurozone recovery may be slow and muted. One aspect of UK/European policy is, I imagine, of deep concern to Ireland: will the UK remain in the EU following the referendum on membership?

    The reasons for Irish concern are potent. Would a UK withdrawal diminish UK/Irish mutual interest and undercut the improved relationship? Would the UK pay less attention to Ireland if the two countries were not working together on EU trade and competitiveness issues? And – above all, perhaps – would the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland harden with new border controls for the movement of goods or people? And, if so, would this unsettle the Catholic community in the North?

    These are rational concerns but, I believe, they are phantoms: I do not expect the UK to leave Europe. It is not the moment for a complex explanation of why I take that view but – in brief – departure would hurt, isolate and weaken the UK, and diminish the EU. It’s easy to demonise Brussels. The EU can be irritating and frustrating: believe me, I know! But those in the UK who want us out have never articulated a viable alternative, let alone a better one.

    This is the black hole in their argument – because the truth is that the alternatives would be bleak. As for the EU – it would lose its second-biggest economy; the nation with the longest foreign policy reach; and one of only two member nations with a significant nuclear and military capability. Whilst the rest of the world is binding itself more closely together, if the UK were to leave it would fly in the face of commonsense, self-interest and the drift of history. I cannot believe we would be so foolish.

    Let me touch on one further contentious issue where the UK and Ireland must put right an old injustice. Next year is the 100th Anniversary of the beginning of the First World War. That war prompted the suspension of efforts to introduce Home Rule. It was the backdrop to the Easter Rising, its military suppression, and the moves – eventually abandoned – to introduce conscription to Ireland in 1918; all of which had a profound influence on the course of Irish history once the war ended.

    As we mark this Anniversary, we must be prepared to face the past in as open and honest a way as possible, however uncomfortable some of it may be. As Santayana said, 150 years ago, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”. So, in the UK, young people will be at the centre of these commemorations. Our hope is to build an enduring legacy, so that future generations remember the war and how it came about.

    In Ireland, the challenge is slightly different.

    Your former President, Mary McAleese, who did so much to promote peace in Northern Ireland, called the Irish soldiers of the First World War doubly tragic.They fell victim to a war against oppression in Europe. Then, at home in Ireland, their memory fell victim to a war for independence.

    The failure to remember them in Ireland is all the more remarkable when one considers the huge numbers involved. Well over 200,000 Irishmen fought in the British army in the First World War and, of these, some 50,000 were killed.

    Those figures mean that most Irish families will have had a grandfather or a great uncle who fought in the war. It is therefore no surprise that, in these less inhibited times, there is so much interest here in Ireland in finding out more about this lost generation.

    Our two governments in Dublin and London are working closely together on the Great War Anniversaries, which form part of a wider decade of commemorations of the events that led to Ireland’s independence.

    As emotions have cooled with the passage of time, I am hopeful that these commemorations will provide an opportunity to reflect on the tumultuous events of a century ago in a calmer, less emotive way.

    Of course, there is a risk that people of ill will might try to use this opportunity to re-open old wounds and deepen divisions. But we must not let our shared history be hijacked for nefarious purposes when the two Governments are working so closely together in a spirit of historical accuracy, mutual respect, inclusiveness and reconciliation. Twenty years ago, that might not have been possible. But today, thank God, it is.
    Conducted in the right way – and the Taoiseach’s and Tanaiste’s presence at Remembrance Ceremonies in Northern Ireland last month were exactly the right way – these commemorations should allow us to honour different traditions, overcome any divisions that remain, and inspire harmony in our future relations.

    Let me sum up my message with a quote from that great Irish author, clergyman and satirist, Jonathan Swift:

    “A man should never be ashamed to own that he has been in the wrong, which is but saying …. that he is wiser today than yesterday”.

    At times in the past we have all been in the wrong. And today, I believe we are wiser than yesterday.

    That is why I have such optimism for the future, and why it gives me such enormous personal pleasure to be here twenty years on from those first steps towards peace. The full fruits of this peace may lie ahead, but the path has been set and, I hope, future generations in Britain and Ireland will enjoy a relationship that – although once thought to be impossible – is now fact.

    Ireland’s relationship with the UK and its future – both North and South – has never looked so bright as it does here this evening.

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Institute of Directors Annual Dinner – 28 November 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech made at the Institute of Directors Annual Dinner on Thursday 28th November 2013.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Many years ago, your Director General, Simon Walker, was a much valued member of my Policy Unit so – when he invited me to join you this evening – I was delighted to accept.

    I wish to talk of three events that will shape our future:

    • The Referendum on Scottish Independence

    • The likely Referendum on our Membership of the European Union

    • The General Election

    Let me start with Scotland.

    Next September, Scotland will vote on whether to break the Union and become an independent State. Such a vote would cut Scotland loose, and her loss would be felt across the UK. In their campaign, the SNP assert that the Pound Sterling is as much Scotland’s currency as it is England’s; that is true now but not if Scotland left the UK.

    Independence means Scotland walking away from the UK and its institutions. This must include the Bank of England, and Sterling.

    The whole point of independence is to enable Scotland to take her own decisions – yet she cannot do so if, upon a central economic matter, she has no control over monetary policy and no lender of last resort. That cannot be the Bank of England: the Bank is answerable to the UK Government and Parliament – not any future Scottish Government.

    A currency union – which the SNP assume is negotiable – would require the UK to underwrite Scottish debts: that cannot – will not – happen if Scotland leaves the Union. There can be no halfway house: no quasi-independence underpinned by UK institutions.

    Scotland could perhaps – in time – adopt the Euro. But first she must apply to join the EU, where many States would have concerns about the accession of a separatist Member. Spain: how would Spain feel – with breakaway movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country? Spain uses uncertainty over EU membership to deter Catalonia from even holding a referendum on independence. It is hardly likely she would happily wave in Scotland. Spain will not be alone in being wary of separatist tendencies.

    And, even if Scotland were to enter, she would discover that within the EU the clout of the smaller population nations is …. small. Time and again, she might regret the loss of automatic British backing. Scottish voters need to know the chilly reality of what is being offered to them.
    But what of Britain? It is simply not possible to have a large chunk of the UK break away – without weakening what is left. British influence would fall in Europe, NATO, the UN and all international gatherings.

    There would even be some very unpalatable consequences for our nuclear deterrent. If an independent Scotland ejected it from the Faslane Base – as the SNP have threatened to do – it would be extremely difficult and costly for the Ministry of Defence to replicate it elsewhere.
    If Trident were to be dismissed from Faslane, it is likely that the Ministry of Defence would remove from Scotland the whole of the submarine enterprise – including the Royal Navy’s attack submarines and the submarine centre of excellence. Would Faslane survive? One can only guess. But without contracts from the Royal Navy I doubt it.

    It is also doubtful the SNP would be able to enter NATO – as they wish – since their opposition to nuclear weapons is inconsistent with membership. Scottish electors must know and understand what independence may cost them.

    The SNP’s “ace in the hole” has always been the North Sea Oil and Gas reserves. But their estimate of reserves is twelve times greater than that of the Office of National Statistics. Who is right? I don’t know. But voters may wish to be wary of promises based on false optimism.

    Be in no doubt: in politics, commerce and the Armed Forces, Scottish influence is important to Britain. Of course, anti-English sentiment from separatists irritates and enrages – as it is intended to do – but across the UK people know and value Scots as partners, work colleagues, friends and neighbours. It is hard to imagine Scots becoming – “foreigners”. But, if they do, nothing will ever be the same again.

    For three hundred years, the Union between Scotland and England has served Britain well. Together, we have become safer, richer, more influential. Surely it is wiser to celebrate what we have achieved together, than to allow grievances – some imagined or exaggerated, others simply manufactured for political purposes – to tear us apart?

    The SNP have chosen the ancient anniversary of Bannockburn for their Referendum. Yet a greater anniversary looms. Next year sees the Centenary of the beginning of the Great War, in which the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish – the whole of the United Kingdom – fought together for freedom – as they would again 25 years later. Many thousands of Scots fought and died in these conflicts. Would it not be a tragedy if – as we honour their sacrifice – we do so as separate nations?

    The European Union continues to divide public opinion in the UK. Even where it appeals to our head, it consistently fails to appeal to our heart. We need to sort this out. That is why the Prime Minister is absolutely right to re-negotiate where he can, before holding a referendum on Membership. Let our Sovereign electorate decide: that is the right way to secure Britain’s place in a reformed EU.

    Yet, suppose we left:

    (i) we would have to negotiate our exit which could cost billions;
    (ii) we may have to pay for access to the Single Market: Norway, a non-member, pays 80% as much per capita as we pay as a full member;
    (iii) we would lose inward investment – ask Japan or Korea, or even America;
    (iv) we would still have to implement EU regulations, yet would have no part in framing them; and
    (v) we would be unable to protect the City – or any part of our industry – from harmful legislation.

    Of course, we would survive – but there would be a severe price to pay in economic well-being, in jobs, and in international prestige. In a world of 7 billion people, our island would be moving further apart from our closest and largest trading partners, at the very time when they, themselves, are drawing closer together. This makes no sense at all.

    Nor would a UK exit make any sense for the EU, which would lose:

    (i) one of its biggest economies;
    (ii) the long and historic reach of British diplomacy;
    (iii) the nation with the most significant military capacity.

    The EU would be diminished. The UK would be isolated. I am no starry-eyed Europhile but it would be a lose/lose scenario: a truly dreadful outcome for everyone.

    Before the referendum will come negotiations. I believe the British position is far stronger than many believe – not least due to the significant personal alliances the Prime Minister has formed with his European counterparts – though the manner of our negotiation will be key. We need to negotiate with the grain of evolving views across the EU. We need to hoover up the allies that already exist on many issues. We need to be smart enough not to ask for the impossible.

    The route to full federalism for the Eurozone members is banking union; fiscal union and – ultimately – political union. There is no silver bullet to achieve this swiftly, and the Eurozone will edge towards it slowly, uneasily and haphazardly. As they do, they will face many setbacks – not least since full federation across nations is profoundly undemocratic, and public opinion across the Eurozone may well thwart their best laid plans. As for the UK, we have no obligation to join this escalator – even if it begins to move.

    After the financial crash – even a “watered down” banking union is proving difficult to agree across the Eurozone. Fiscal Union – once assumed to be inevitable – now looks a long way off as European electors examine its democratic shortcomings. And full political union (the Shangri-La for many) is barely even talked about – except negatively.

    Even the Dutch, once core federalists, now shy away from it, and seek reforms. Their Prime Minister says “the EU must become leaner and meaner”. The Germans say “we don’t have to do everything in Brussels”. These are hardly siren calls for a dash towards political union. Nothing is forever but, for the foreseeable future, “ever-closer union” and “full political union” – expressions that call many Britons to man the barricades – seem very, very far-off indeed.

    Unusually, we know the date of the next General Election. We know also the recession is behind us. A brave policy, an unpopular policy, has proved to be right. Our economy is recovering and – although there is no room for complacency – I believe it will swing to growth faster than expected.

    As it does, I hope that the electors will remember that, however well-intentioned their motives – however seductive their message – every single Labour Government we have ever had has left behind a ruined economy – the most recent one in spectacular fashion. And David Cameron and George Osborne are the pilots who have weathered that storm. No-one should forget that.

    As the economy recovers, policy initiatives will begin to bear fruit: like many millions of others, I have a stake in the next generation and the one beyond that: and I welcome the Government’s long-term reforms for the future.

    Opponents may criticise proposals on social policy, education and housing but few can deny that reform is necessary.

    And it is not only social problems that need action. Our infrastructure is tired and inadequate. We need more air and sea port capacity.

    Upgraded roads. And, even though private capital has poured billions into our railways, more needs to be done.

    And it is no use demanding better infrastructure and housing if we oppose schemes to deliver it. I know some members of the IOD oppose high speed rail. I believe they are wrong. We need more growth in the North if we are to bequeath an economy that enables future generations to thrive. And, unless we wish our children to endure a lower standard of living, we must build more homes.

    I was in politics for many years. I can look back and acknowledge my mistakes and urge others not to repeat them. These days, I travel the world but always return home to a country that – taken as a whole – has few, if any, equals in the freedom, liberality and kindliness that are its essential characteristics. We must never lose those qualities: no nation can be great if it is inward-looking and small minded.

    For all the frustrations we face, our country offers a way of life that most of the world looks at – and envies. I had hoped to build a country that was at ease with itself. I failed to deliver that. But it can be done … to ensure we live in a country that – whilst striving to be the strongest – has the compassion to care for the weakest.

    Political messages can often be coded, imprecise and ambiguous. Not tonight. I am clear that both Scotland and England gain from being joined together in one United Kingdom; clear that the UK is better off in the EU, but not the Eurozone; and clear that we should not change our economic leadership. If you are finally being hauled out of a deep, dark hole, it’s not wise to let go of those pulling you out.

    And – in this gathering – let me add one final thought. We cannot leave everything to Government.

    Here, tonight, are representatives of many leading companies. You care about our country, too. You have a stake in its success. And you have the power – and, I would argue, a moral responsibility – to work towards the future wellbeing, not only of your workforce and shareholders, but of our nation as a whole.

    In the North, South, East and West we need growth. To provide jobs. To yield taxes. To build prosperity. To offer hope and opportunity to those who do not, at present, have it.

    This requires a unity of purpose. A national unity – in the national interest. And, in that, we all have a part to play.

  • Sir John Major’s ITV Interview following the death of Baroness Thatcher – 8 April 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s interview with Alex Forrest, for ITV News, on 8th April 2013 following the death of Baroness Thatcher.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked whether Baroness Thatcher had been divisive]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    There are many different Margarets, there is the Margaret of legend and there is the Margaret who really existed, who in terms of being a politician was very forceful, but she could also be pragmatic when she needed to be. She knew when to move away and when to come back and attack again.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked what Baroness Thatcher’s biggest weakness was]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think all politicians who are in Parliament for a while, and in particular if they are Prime Minister for a while, they lose the inner ear that connects them to the electorate. After three election victories I think it faded away a little, and things began to go wrong in the last couple of years.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if Baroness Thatcher rowed with him openly]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Quite openly. And on many occasions and on many issues. We began our relationship in Parliament with a row. I was the Treasury Whip and I expressed a view that she didn’t like and there was a fierce row. Three weeks later she made me a Minister.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if Baroness Thatcher had made his time as Prime Minister difficult]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    On this day I wouldn’t say anything of that sort. On this day I want to look back on the things which were really good for this country.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if she was a strong leader to follow]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    She’s a very big measure to be measured against. I think, whatever the divisive points are, she will be seen as someone who was a very great Prime Minister. Margaret was right for her time. I don’t think that Margaret would be right for the consensus politics of today.

  • Sir John Major’s Interview following the death of Baroness Thatcher – 8 April 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s interview with the BBC on 8th April 2013 following the death of Baroness Thatcher.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked about the news of Baroness Thatcher’s death]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it’s a very sad day for this country. She was a remarkable Prime Minister and she did some extraordinary things. In many ways she was exactly the right Prime Minister for the time she achieved that office. I think as a result of that, and what she did, that we owe her a great deal.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if she would have been the right Prime Minister for a different time]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well, I can’t say that. But I can say that her particular abilities, her capacity to fix single-mindedly on a desirable objective, and achieve that objective despite the odds which were against her was exactly what was needed at the time.

    I think Margaret was at her best when she had a definable enemy and a definable goal. And in the 1980s there were a rich selection of those, and she pursued them and we are the beneficiaries of that.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked what the impact of Thatcherism was on Britain]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think she changed it in many remarkable ways. Self-evidently the recovery of the Falklands did an enormous amount for British prestige and British morale and that was a very remarkable thing for her to achieve.

    But I think even longer-term than that were the structural changes she and her colleagues made to the economy. The economy was in a frightful mess in the 1970s, nobody believed it could be reformed, nobody believed we could move from a neo-socialist economy to a free-market economy, and that’s effectively what she achieved in the first eight years of the 1980s.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if Baroness Thatcher had been a divisive Prime Minister]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    She was divisive in public, that is certainly true. There are many people who will speak enormously warmly of her, and others who, frankly, won’t.

    But in private she was very different from her public image. I mean she could in private be extraordinarily kind to people who were in difficulty or in trouble and I never heard her speak harshly to anyone who couldn’t answer back. She had very rough discussions with her colleagues, she liked a row.

    My relationship with her began with a really fierce row, and she enjoyed that, provided you answered back and you had something to say. But for people in a subordinate position who weren’t able to answer back I never heard her treat them harshly, ever.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked about what his argument with the Prime Minister had been about]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    That was in the whip’s office, I was the Treasury whip in the early 1980s and I was asked to report at a whip’s dinner with the Prime Minister what the party thought of current economic policies. So I told her, I set it out very robustly, the party didn’t like them, we were losing support, they thought it was divisive. And she attacked the messenger rather than the message, and I responded, and we had a really furious row.

    I remember the then Chief Whip putting his hand on my shoulder and saying, “that’s the end of your career then”. Two days later, no – the next day, she came and sat beside me in the House of Commons on the bench and said we’d better talk further about what you said. And three weeks later she made me a Minister.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked what Baroness Thatcher was like as Prime Minister during his own period in her Cabinet]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I joined her Cabinet in 1987, after the 1987 General Election, and she was a dominant figure then, she had won three successive General Elections. She was a very dominant figure with a very clear view of what she had to do. But I think that perhaps she didn’t think through the consequences as carefully after 1987 as she had done before.

    Several things happened after 1987 that were remarkable. Firstly, her role of course in the collapse of communism. She wasn’t alone in that, but she played a significant part in that. But also of course the economy went sour and the poll tax caused her great difficulty.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if there was a betrayal in the 1990 leadership election]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Do you mean by colleagues voting against her?

    INTERVIEWER:

    [The interviewer confirmed this]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    No, frankly I never saw it. Margaret, as you indicated a moment ago, could be very divisive and she had been very divisive within the Conservative Party. And the Conservative Party, the backbenchers, I think were very worried about two aspects of policy, particularly the poll tax, and I felt strongly about that too because I had been at the Treasury, and the Treasury had warned continually, under Nigel Lawson the Chancellor, that the poll tax was a mistake.

    So there were big issues at stake, it wasn’t a personal opposition at all, it was an opposition to policy within the party.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked about her impact on the Conservative Party]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Her shadow is very long, and a great deal of it is very beneficial. She brought conviction back to politics. She persuaded people, she showed people, by her own example, that the will of somebody can prevail if it is stern enough, and if it continues to be stern. She did that, and that’s an important lesson for politics and she brought it back.

    It seemed for much of the 1960s and the 1970s as though Governments were inevitably blown apart by the wind, whatever happened. She changed that, she made the wind instead of being bent by it.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked if the Conservative Party struggled to come to terms with her leaving]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Matricide is always difficult to overcome. Of course, the way in which Margaret left, rather than being defeated in a General Election, left a big scar on the Conservative Party and no-one can deny that. And that scar continued to impact upon the party internally for a very long time.

    INTERVIEWER:

    [Sir John was asked what Baroness Thatcher’s legacy would be]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think her legacy is that she was absolutely the Prime Minister who changed Britain’s perception of itself. Britain that I remember, as I ran up to being elected at the 1979 election under her leadership, was a country without confidence and a belief in continuing decline. The Britain she left felt quite differently.

    That is a very remarkable legacy.

  • Sir John Major’s Statement on the Death of Baroness Thatcher – 8 April 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s statement following the death of Baroness Thatcher, issued on 8th April 2013.

    STATEMENT BY THE RT HON SIR JOHN MAJOR KG CH ON THE DEATH OF THE RT HON THE BARONESS THATCHER, LG, OM, FRS

    Margaret Thatcher was a true force of nature, and political phenomenon.

    In Government, the UK was turned around under – and in large measure because of – her leadership.

    Her reforms of the economy, trades union law, and her recovery of the Falkland Islands elevated her above normal politics, and may not have been achieved under any other leader.

    Her outstanding characteristics will always be remembered by those who worked closely with her: courage and determination in politics; and humanity and generosity of spirit in private.

    8th April, 2013

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at Chatham House – 14 February 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech held at Chatham House on 14th February 2013. The speech was entitled “The Referendum on Europe : Opportunity or Threat?”. A PDF version of the speech is also available.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    A short while ago, the prime minister offered the nation a referendum on whether to remain in the European Union – or leave it, and I believe he was right to do so.

    As a general principle, I don’t like referenda in a parliamentary system. But this referendum could heal many old sores and have a cleansing effect on politics. It will be healthy to let the electorate re-endorse our membership, or pull us out altogether. At present, we are drifting towards – and possibly through – the European exit. We need a renegotiation – and a referendum endorsement of it, and if that is denied, the clamour for it will only grow.

    But it is a gamble – for the country and for the Conservative Party. The relationship with Europe has poisoned British politics for too long, distracted Parliament from other issues, and come close to destroying the Conservative Party. It is time to resolve the matter.

    If the referendum were held now, some polls suggest electors may vote to leave. In 2017, their decision may depend upon the outcome of the negotiations, and success in those might involve repatriation of powers, or opt-outs, or reform of existing policies, or safeguards against unwelcome developments. It will, most likely, be a combination of all these – and perhaps more besides. None of this will be easy. On many issues, there will be no natural meeting of minds.

    To what the French call the Anglo-Saxon mind, the case for reform is very strong: unanswerable, even. To many Continental minds, there is a very different perception. The French already believe that sterling has a competitive advantage over the euro. They now fear that the UK will opt out of social and employment provisions to give our economy a further competitive boost. They will not readily concede that in negotiations. We need to prepare our own proposals without delay, negotiate courteously and with understanding and the manner in which these negotiations are conducted will be vital.

    If we enter them without appreciating the position of each of our European partners, we will fail.

    If we enter them without engaging with each of our European partners, we will fail.

    If we enter them with the aggressive attitude of ‘give us our way or we quit’, we will fail.

    We British would regard any such approach from our European partners as a threat, an attempt to bully; and, just as we would take a dim view of that, so would they.

    When the end game approaches, the prime minister will need to conduct the negotiations personally – and when he does he will find that more concessions will be won in relaxed, personal face-to-face discussion than in formal talks. But long before that, much preparatory work must be done, and that preparatory work is so substantial it wouldn’t be physically possible for the prime minister himself to do it.

    I believe therefore that he should appoint a lead negotiator who sits in the cabinet. And if the Liberal Democrats oppose such an appointment – which is possible, since they oppose a referendum – then the prime minister should over-rule them. On a matter of this national importance, the tail must not wag the dog.

    It is essential that this negotiator is seen as the prime minister’s personal emissary. He, or she, must visit and re-visit every European capital to explain our case, seek allies, set out our aims, and – crucially – emphasize the damage to the European Union as a whole if the negotiations fail and the referendum is lost.

    The prime minister cannot afford to ignore the home front. He must carry public opinion with him. In Parliament, I have no doubt he will continue to receive unsolicited ‘advice’ about what powers he must repatriate. Some of his colleagues in offering this advice will think it’s helpful, and that our partners will hear the strength of feeling – and immediately capitulate. That is quite wrong. They will not. Such advice – given publicly – will undermine, not strengthen, the prime minister’s negotiating position. And it will do so, because he will be seen to be acting under political duress, rather than principle and conviction – and his hand will be correspondingly weakened. And I know that because I have been there: advice, yes – that is a proper role for parliamentarians – but the truly well-meaning will give that advice in private.

    Many colleagues will be instinctively loyal, but not everyone. Rebellion is addictive, and some members may be getting a taste for it. I learned 20 years ago that the parliamentary party includes irreconcilables who are prepared to bring down any government or any prime minister in support of their opposition to the European Union.

    Some have softened their views with age. Others have not. The present Parliament contains members whose opposition to the European Union is fundamental.

    Members with Conservative heads and UKIP hearts cannot be placated. Whatever is offered to them will be insufficient. They will demand more. They will only be satisfied by withdrawal. It is, therefore, essential for the prime minister to rally the persuadable majority of the parliamentary party.

    And if the negotiations fail, and the referendum is lost, we could slip out of the EU in frustration and by default. The prime minister should be prepared for the likelihood that the irreconcilable amongst his parliamentarians, including perhaps some ministers, will campaign for a British withdrawal.

    I am neither a Eurosceptic nor a Europhile. As prime minister, I vetoed the appointment of the president of the Commission because the candidate – an able man in every way – held views inimical to our national interest.

    At Maastricht, I obtained opt-outs from the Single Currency and the Social Chapter. And I did so by explaining in innumerable private meetings why I could not accept those policies and that, without an opt-out, I would have no choice but to veto the whole treaty.

    I judge our membership of the European Union upon one overriding criterion: is it good for Britain?

    Is it good for our economic well-being? For competition, and jobs? For our general quality of life? Is it good for our security, our diplomacy and our standing in the world? All of these elements are relevant to the value of our membership. And now, after 40 years, the referendum raises new questions:

    • What would it cost us to leave?
    • What would we lose if we left?
    • And, if we stay, how can we carve out a leadership role?

    Firstly, some process. We cannot – legally – simply walk out of the European Union. We are obligated by Treaty to negotiate our exit, and also to meet liabilities that will crystallize at a later date. The costs could be substantial. No-one knows how substantial.

    If we left, a swift glance suggests we’d be freed of budgetary contributions, regulations, directives, interminable meetings, unwanted lectures and multiple frustrations. Sounds pretty attractive. But closer examination returns us to the world of realpolitik.

    One presumption from those who advocate leaving the European Union is that we could remain in the Single Market of 500 million consumers. That is, probably, true: but there would be a price. Norway – as a non-member – pays two-thirds as much per head for access to the Single Market as the UK pays as a full member of the European Union. We could accept similar terms if outside and that price would be likely to rise with every opt-out we achieve that our partners believe would give us a competitive advantage.

    Moreover, trade policy is a European Union prerogative: as a non-member we would have no national trade policy in place, and would need to negotiate our own free trade agreements. At worst, this could take years. At best, we might be able to piggy-back on existing European Union agreements. Either way, we are likely to face tariffs.

    And one example, I think, will suffice. At present, we export five out of every six cars made in the United Kingdom but – as a non-member – we may have to pay a 10 per cent external tariff on exports to the European Union, and a 5 per cent tariff on components. And that raises a question: would Nissan, I wonder, and BMW, Honda, Toyota, Ford continue to build at Swindon, Deeside, Dagenham, Bridgend or Oxford – or would they relocate and place future investment inside the European Union with no tariff on their cars? Many livelihoods in the UK depend upon that answer.

    And then tariffs are not the only – or even the worst – threat to competitiveness. Most trade barriers are regulatory and – for us to continue to sell in Europe – UK exporters would have to conform to European regulations. As a non-member, we would have no input into them, but if we wish to export we would have to meet them.

    Now, would this hurt us? Certainly. In the crucial area of financial services, we can anticipate that regulations could – and would – be designed to undermine UK competitiveness. Many would argue that in some areas this is already happening – and I would agree: but, whilst inside the European Union, we can mitigate the worst of the excesses. Outside, we could not.

    The European Commission, generally, is very unpopular in the United Kingdom – sometimes, rightly so. It can be insensitive and seem bullying. But we shouldn’t ignore its virtues. In alliance with the Commission, the UK has driven policy on the Single Market for many years. And in the negotiations to come, the European Commission may often be our ally. They know that a Europe without Britain would be more vulnerable to a move towards protection – and they know how damaging that would be.

    And then, of course, there is inward investment. Inward investment may also be at risk. Another question: would companies from around the world who invest over £30 billion a year in the United Kingdom be more – or less – likely to do so without unfettered access to the European market? To me, the answer is self-evident, but any doubters should ask those foreign investors – and then reflect upon the half a million jobs those same investors have created in the United Kingdom in the last decade alone.

    The impact of a withdrawal goes beyond trade and investment. In a world of global markets, countries are increasingly banding together. It would be a brave decision for Britain to go it alone. I bow to no-one in my pride of our country, but we should see ourselves as others see us. We are 70 million in a world of 7 billion, with countries like China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia all rising in economic and political importance. Do we wish to become less relevant in their eyes, or face the future as a leading voice in a block of 500 million people? To leave would be to march against history.

    Many of those who wish to withdraw from Europe do so on the assumption that we could enhance our relationship with existing allies: most obviously, the United States and the Commonwealth. They are mistaken.

    Economically, the United States looks increasingly to the East, where the market is growing. Politically, every American president I have known wishes to see the United Kingdom at the heart of Europe, because that is what is in America’s own interests. Outside, we would be of far less relevance: we could no longer advance the argument for free trade in Europe or – as recently – help develop sensible rules on data protection, or digital rules that accommodate American counter-terror objectives. Nor could we push for sanctions on Iran – a policy largely driven by the United Kingdom.

    So, be certain of this if nothing else: America does not want the UK to cut her ties with Europe. As for the Commonwealth, two facts suffice: we sell more to North Rhine-Westphalia than to India, and more to France and Germany than the whole of the Commonwealth added together. And incidentally, overall, we export four times as much to Europe as we do to the United States.

    Being inside the European Union can often be frustrating; but outside, we would be at a serious competitive disadvantage. The tens of thousands of UK companies who trade with the European Union should think long and hard about the consequences of exit. And so should their employees, numbered in millions. To leave would be a jump into a void.

    Now of course, the argument with Europe isn’t all one way. The prime minister’s negotiating hand is by no means empty. A British exit would seriously diminish the European Union itself. It would have suffered its greatest reverse. And this reality – well understood by our partners – strengthens our position, but must be deployed with care and sensitivity: clumsily handled, it could be counter-productive.
    If we left, Europe would lose one of her biggest economies. Her role as a global power would be diminished. So would her diplomatic reach. Her foremost free marketeer would have gone. Her main bridge with the United States would be broken. The Transatlantic Alliance would weaken. Even now, America, rightly in my view, complains that she contributes disproportionately to European defence: without the United Kingdom, the Continental European contribution – to their own defence in NATO – would be pitiful. Departure might be a leap into a void for Britain, but her loss to Europe would be palpable.

    None of the risks of separation mean the status quo is acceptable. Nor does it mean that it cannot be changed. I believe it should be – and I personally believe that it can be. What it does mean is that Britain and Europe must work to accommodate one another with goodwill and tolerance. Tolerance was once a great political virtue, and one that I would love to see restored to the body politic everywhere. With goodwill and tolerance, a deal can be done.

    At present, the eurozone is changing its relationship with the rest of the European Union: against that background I see no reason why we should not seek to do so, too. It’s not anti-European to fight for the British national interest. But we should not over-estimate what can be achieved.

    The prime minister can probably deliver safeguards for the City, less regulation, less bureaucracy, no more social legislation, enhancement of the Single Market and more besides. Beyond that, there are many areas ripe for reform, including a full repeal of the Working Time Directive, which a number of countries in Europe would welcome. We should also focus on tackling the democratic deficit and giving real muscle to subsidiarity. And we should do that because reforms that help Europe will also help the United Kingdom.

    Other European Union policies – CAP, fisheries, structural funds – are a constant frustration to the United Kingdom. But even if the prime minister were able to gain exemptions from these policies – does anyone imagine hard-pressed farmers and fishermen would welcome the loss of subsidy from Europe and not demand its replacement from the British Treasury? Does anyone assume for a second we would not need to replace the subsidies lost to poorer regions in our own country from our own resources?

    We know the answer to those questions: I daresay we could improve on European Union policies, but the net gain would be far more marginal than many people imagine. And whenever we out-competed Europe, they would react to offset our competitive advantage. And how do I know that? Because that is precisely what we did when we put tariffs on Norwegian salmon to protect our own industry in Scotland. As we did, so will they. And in our negotiations, it would be more productive in many areas for us to seek allies to reform core policies for everyone, than just to seek a British exemption from them.

    We will also improve the outcome if we take a proactive role in developing future policy: it would be fatal just to sit on the side-lines sniping. Many in Europe, rightly or wrongly, feel that we have lost interest in them: we should make it clear that we have not. We can – and should – carve out a leadership role.

    And some will say well – how can this be? Sterling isn’t in the eurozone, nor likely to join. Well nine other nations are not in the euro nor – although some have ambitions – are many likely to be admitted for many years. Denmark has an opt-out; Sweden and the Czech Republic don’t wish to join; others are far less enthusiastic than once they were. And their interests are often our interests. The Eastern Europeans for example were admitted to the European Union because we British – together with Germany – championed enlargement against the opposition of some others. We are a natural ally for their ambitions and for the reforms they seek. President Giscard d’Estaing has said our negotiation, and I quote, ‘opens the way for the indispensable reform of the European machinery’. He is right. There is an opportunity here and we should lead it in the negotiations to come.

    We must seek further reform of the budget, where we will have allies in Holland, Denmark and Sweden and, in many areas, would be able to make common cause with Germany.

    We should reengage the argument for completion of the Single Market. I’d like to see us advocate the appointment of a Single Market Commissioner to oversee this work across the whole range of services: financial, retail, medical, digital – the list is very long, and the potential gain is very large.

    We could seek to interconnect the energy market. We could widen trade agreements. We could try and create a true European venture capital market. There’s no lack of areas where we can seek to lead, and change, and improve European policy.

    We should continue to work with France in particular to develop policy on the Middle East and the North African rim. Stability in that region – with its trade and investment potential as well as its proximity to southern Europe – is crucial to Europe, and Britain and France are well-placed to lead policy. We have had successes with action against Libya and sanctions against Iran, but there are many more options.

    I believe a proactive role in Europe would pay rich dividends in policy and perception – both at home and overseas. It would also highlight our British value to the European Union, and by highlighting our value encourage acceptance of our demands. Our case is logical and can change minds, but it will require time and patience and commitment.

    What of the future?

    Why are so many of the British – perhaps especially the English – so cool towards the EU?

    Some blame Eurosceptic opinion, and that has been a powerful factor. As pro-Europeans have remained silent, anti-Europeans have become more vocal – and less tolerant.

    But that is far from the whole story. Europe is also culpable. Year after year, Continental leaders have told us that Britain is an essential and valued member of the European project. That is flattering, but their soft words are offset when they pursue policies they know to be anathema to us. For years, Continental leaders have denied a federal ambition, while their policies have moved us closer towards it. They have introduced a single currency, job-destroying legislation and excessive regulation. There has been a wilful refusal to complete the Single Market. Some have flirted with protection. All of these policies are against British advice and British interests. If we are seen to be unreasonable by some, we do have some cause for that stand.

    And emotion matters too, in this debate. Our electorate doesn’t like to see Britain dragged along at the tail of the cart: they’d much prefer to see us to be in the driving seat. I suspect that if Britain were seen to be proactive in policy, it would revolutionize British public opinion.

    And that is necessary: because at present, public frustration is very deep. Perhaps deeper with Europe than I can ever recall it being at any time in the past.

    We don’t know where ‘more Europe’ will end. Or how we can stop an ever increasing bureaucratic power grab into what Douglas Hurd memorably called ‘the nooks and crannies of our national life’. People fear: will we eventually be submerged in an undemocratic United States of Europe? For most of us, that is simply unacceptable.

    We need an end point, and we need to know what it is. And we need to be confident that it will not be breached. These are all matters for the negotiations to come.

    Let me summarize.

    When we come to the referendum, the public will decide. At present, affection for the European Union is minimal. Its virtues are denied, even ridiculed. Its drawbacks are emblazoned in debate. Years of negativity have sunk deep into the British psyche. Ill-feeling between pro and anti factions is worn by some like a badge of honour. Debate over Europe tends to be conducted at the extremes of opinion, with most of the country uninvolved. A single-issue party, dedicated to withdrawal, has grown in public popularity. Public scepticism about Europe feeds on an intense patriotism, and has become a reality our political system cannot ignore.

    Some see the referendum as merely a piece of party political management – but it is much more than that.

    It can be cathartic.

    It can end 40 years of political squabbles.

    It can allow our Parliament, undistracted, to put vital issues – such as the growing underclass and the disregard into which politics has fallen – where they should be: at the very forefront of our national debate and national agenda.

    The referendum can help reform the European Union, and for the better.

    It can resolve both justified – and unjustified – fears about our membership.

    And it can encourage the United Kingdom to take a more positive leadership role in the development of future policy.

    All this is possible.

    Let me close with a vignette. In 1990, in an attempt to head off a Single Currency, I advanced the concept of the ‘hard ecu’: a parallel currency that was market-driven and would co-exist with national currencies. Our proposal failed. It was – first – too late; but the more pertinent reason was explained to me by President Mitterrand. His response was simple. ‘Right policy – wrong country.’

    ‘Right policy – wrong country.’ All too often, that sums up how Britain has been regarded in Europe. The referendum gives us an opportunity to change that perception. It is in Britain’s interests – and Europe’s interests – that we take this opportunity and that we do so.

    Thank you very much.