The Rt. Hon. Sir John Major KG CH

Tag: IRA

  • Sir John Major’s Speech to Trinity College Dublin Historical Society – 21 November 2007

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech made to the Trinity College Dublin Historical Society on Wednesday 21st November 2007.

    Mr Chairman, Mr Auditor, Provost, Ladies and Gentlemen of College Historical Society, Ladies and Gentlemen.

    My privilege to propose “that the Best Thanks of the Society are due to the Auditor for his Paper”.

    Well done, Tim.

    Chancellor, Provost, Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen.

    It’s always a pleasure to come to Dublin and doubly so to be at this famous University.

    As you know, Albert Reynolds is unwell and can’t be with us this evening. However – the good news is – he’s recovering and will be out of hospital in a few days. I visited him this afternoon and he was in fine form. I know I speak for Albert Reynolds as well as myself in thanking you for the privilege of receiving this Award for our work on the Irish Peace Process. Timothy Smyth has presented a Paper full of insight and I am delighted to respond to it.

    Let me begin with a disclaimer: many people – some acknowledged, many not – contributed to the Irish Peace Process. They came from the Civil Services – I am delighted to see Roderic Lyne and Martin Mansergh here this evening – both of whom were pivotal figures in the whole process. They were crucial. When tempers heated, they cooled them. Tempers cool – they backed us in a way that rose them. They were magisterial. So were members of the Catholic and Protestant communities; the Churches; as well as figures from local and national politics.

    Paddy Mayhew, Peter Brooke, Dick Spring, John Bruton come to mind, as significant contributors. So – in different ways – do Jim Molyneaux and John Hume. And – it must also be acknowledged – individuals within the paramilitaries on both sides who realised violence was failing and opened their minds to a political settlement.

    Before I arrived at Downing Street, I had very little contact with Ireland – North or South – despite the presence of an Irish grandmother in my family. But, once there, Northern Ireland became a priority, and for long periods the priority. I held meetings beyond number in Westminster and in Belfast. Some were friendly. Some were rancorous. Some were full of hope. Some were interminable. Some ended in walk outs. It was a panorama of protest and progress. I knew from the outset that progress would be two steps forward – and one back: and so it proved.

    Invariably, I was struck by the disparity between the personal warmth and charm of those I met, and the depth and savagery of the rivalries that divided them.

    The roots of the Northern Ireland Troubles lay deep in history, and were made worse by generations of distrust, recrimination, hatred and outdated tribal attitudes. But, although the roots were ancient, the perceived inequity of the old Stormont Parliament, and the divisive gulf between Unionist and Republican aspirations, kept mutual loathing burning fiercely.

    And that loathing had led to carnage that, by the early 1990’s, seemed a permanent and irreversible way of life in Northern Ireland, with violence spinning off to the British mainland. Another atrocity. Another hooded victim. Another soldier dead. Such violence seemed to be so common-place, it often lost its place in the daily news. Shock receded to acceptance. Familiarity stilled the horror of butchery.

    But I did not believe the situation was irreversible. Nor, when I met him, did Albert Reynolds. I will now embarrass Albert. I’m sorry, Albert, but what I’m about to say is true. When I met Albert, I liked him instantly – not always the case among politicians. The man I came to know was a pragmatist with convictions – never an ideologue. He was a deal maker: a man who would offer something to gain something. It felt as though I was looking in the mirror. There was hope.

    At our very first meeting in No. 10, Albert and I agreed to put a peace process at the forefront of our political agenda. We knew we might well face hostility. Deep-rooted scepticism was certain. Political setbacks were likely. At worst, our careers might end. But at best, innocent people would no longer be killed. During the nearly seven years I worked on the Peace Process, that was the easiest decision I had to take.
    In his Paper, Timothy Smyth observed that there were lessons learned that might offer sign-posts to solving other conflicts. He is right: there is one, above all.

    Any Peace Process means dialogue: dialogue with the Government of the Republic of Ireland and dialogue – indirect at first – with the paramilitaries. That point about peace making is absolute: you cannot reach an agreement with someone to whom you do not – or will not – talk.

    That was my view – and Albert’s too. Yet it was not received opinion.

    For years, the IRA had sought a political objective through violence. For years, they had been resisted. It was a dance of death -interminable and pointless. It was also a stand-off that was convenient to the warriors of each side. The IRA could say they were not cowed by the power of the British – and would fight continuously for a United Ireland. The British Government could parade its strength by refusing to talk until the IRA disarmed which, without progress, they would never do. These so-called “strong positions” – these “positions of principle” – merely served to entrench the violence and the killing. And – as Mr Smyth observes – there was a cumbersome baggage of ideology on every side.
    Albert Reynolds and I approached the problem in the belief there would be a settlement because there must be. That ideology must give way to common sense. Some thought that was a triumph of hope over experience: we did not.

    It seemed to me the groundwork for a settlement was obvious:-

    (i) We had to agree objectives between London and Dublin for – if the two Governments had opposing agendas – the chance of a settlement was minimal.

    (ii) We needed to get inside the mind of the paramilitaries. People would be astonished at how many hours I spent trying to think myself into their minds – particularly those of the leaders of the IRA. What were their motives? Why did they act as they did? What constraints did they face within their own organisation?

    (iii) We knew we had to address the grievances that made it so easy for mischief makers to stir up hatred and foment disputes between the two communities.

    (iv) And we had to offer an end product that would encourage those within the paramilitaries, who had begun to realise violence would never succeed and were looking for a political settlement.

    (v) We also had to address contradictory ambitions and fears. Unionists feared a united Ireland. Nationalists favoured it. Both communities needed reassuring.

    Returning to Mr Smyth’s observation about lessons learned: the above approach, with modifications, has to be the bed-rock of any approach to end violent conflict.

    Putting together a Peace Plan in the early 90s was like playing multi-dimensional chess. It was a Rubik’s cube in Gaelic. What pleased London often worried Dublin. What was acceptable to the Unionists was anathema to the Nationalists. What was welcomed by some in Parliament was condemned by others. A peace process was never going to be a smooth ride – and it wasn’t.

    The Joint Declaration

    In his Paper, in a masterpiece of under-statement, Mr Smyth refers to “elements of mistrust” on both sides. He is absolutely right. Mistrust was a serious impediment to progress. Time and again committed advocates on both sides used leaks to the Media – often half-truths – to highlight fears and submerge progress. Everything that emerged from a Republican source (or was welcomed by Republicans) was poked at suspiciously and denounced by Unionists. The reverse was also true. The history of the Joint Declaration is a classic illustration of this tendency.

    In retrospect, the Joint Declaration stands out. But – in the early 1990’s – other avenues were being considered too.

    There was, of course, the three-stranded talks between the constitutional Parties; London and Dublin and North and South. They had many frustrations and deficiencies and ended up as a blind alley, but they were a source of ideas to determine what was acceptable to all sides, and what was a show-stopper. One point we learned was crucial for later: the political Parties would talk to the British Government but not to each other – yet we learned they would do so if elected to the same body. Years later, that led to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the unexpected partnership of Mr Paisley and Mr McGuinness. In the 1990’s that would have seemed impossible, yet it is only when extreme positions are isolated, or neutered or brought together that a solution is possible.

    There was also the “back-channel” communication between the British Government and the Provisionals – a crucial clearing house and test bed. It was politically risky for the British Government, but also – let us not forget – for the Provisionals as well. When a newspaper “leaked” the existence of this channel, many were affronted by its existence – but making peace is a messy business and neither then nor now do I have any apologies to offer on this score: it advanced the Peace Process; it spelled out to the Provisionals what was – and was not – on offer; it removed misunderstandings; it helped save lives. To my mind, that is ample justification for it.

    It was in February 1993, through this “back channel”, that I received the following message:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace. We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as a surrender. We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure that we were not being tricked.”

    In London, we gave this message a very restricted circulation. Even so, amongst close colleagues, some were suspicious. Some saw a political trap to lure the British Government into concessions. Few thought it would yield anything worthwhile. Doubt, as well as distrust, was ever-present on all sides throughout the process.

    The advice I received from the Security Services was that the message was from the Provisional Army Council – more specifically, they thought, from Martin McGuinness – although I should place on record that he has always denied sending it. This is a pity since – even in the darkest days – those words encouraged me to believe a settlement was possible. And there were many dark days.

    In his Paper, Mr Smyth reminds us of the bombs at Bishopsgate, Shankill Road, and Warrington to which he could have added the Loyalist murders at a pub in the village of Greysteel, in revenge for the IRA’s bungled bombing at Shankill Road. These atrocities were pivotal in hardening the public mind against violence, and boxing in the paramilitaries.

    I remember those bombs with the clarity of yesterday. I was in my garden in Huntingdon on a bright and beautiful Easter Saturday when I heard news of the Warrington bomb which fatally injured two little boys. It came only days after I had received assurances of progress from the Provisionals through the “secret link”. It was the only time I seriously considered breaking off the Peace Process. I did not – for two reasons: – firstly, I did not want any more loss of life – not least those of children: and secondly, I had begun to understand the psyche of the IRA. They believed they had to show themselves to be “strong” to placate their volunteers: that meant violence would accompany progress as, in their own way, they sought to show they were not making concessions, not – in their own mind – giving ground. Blood and progress marched together. It was a bitter assessment, but I believe it was the right one.

    The concept of a Joint Declaration had been around for some years. John Hume and Gerry Adams had pioneered the idea in 1988. Various private enterprise and Government texts had been floated but none was remotely likely to gain the support of the Unionist community. They were seen as too “Green” in complexion. Therefore – to the Unionists – they were flawed. Therefore, they were denounced. As so often in Irish politics, a sound idea was spoiled by its parentage – only a text jointly negotiated and agreed by the British and Irish Governments had any chance of acceptance North and South of the Border. And any negotiated text was bound to be very different from the early cock-shies. Nonetheless, the Hume-Adams’ dialogue was important and opened a window.

    It was not easy to agree a text. Officials – North and South – worked at it incessantly. Road-blocks were common. Disputes were frequent. I had innumerable hours of meetings with my own Officials, as no doubt, did Albert on his own side. Frequently we met – or resolved points over the telephone lines. I recall a meeting at a European Summit that dwarfed the importance of the Summit itself. And a stand-up row – in private – in Dublin Castle, when Albert and I deserted our Officials for one of the fiercest rows I ever had in Government. We survived it and returned to negotiation: that afternoon, I knew we’d reach a settlement.

    Albert Reynolds and I resolved the final points in the text of the Joint Declaration over the telephone on 14th November 1993 and announced it publicly sixteen hours later.

    What was the Declaration about? Was it worth all the effort?

    I believe it was. After 74 years of partition and almost 25 years of violent conflict, the British and Irish Governments – for the first time – had agreed principles upon which they could both unite.

    The Joint Declaration promised fair play to both communities. The Unionists were guaranteed there would be no imposition of a United Ireland, and the Republicans were guaranteed their traditions and aspirations would be respected. It was implicit that if there were ever to be a majority in the North for unification, that the British Government would not stand in the way. In addition – and crucially – the Paramilitaries were promised a full place in democratic politics once they abandoned violence. It was a powerful symbol that pointed the way to a very different future for Ireland.

    The impact of the Joint Declaration was immediate. It received massive public support at home – and worldwide. It isolated the men of violence. Encouraged the IRA to offer a cease-fire. And drained from all the paramilitaries the subliminal sympathy that earned them funding, recruits and public tolerance from their own communities. I believe, too, it offered hope where none previously existed.

    Much work still needed to be done. Political restrictions on the paramilitaries were eased. The Joint Framework Documents, negotiated with Albert Reynolds and finalised in 1995 with John Bruton, bridged a gap towards a final settlement. Indeed, re-assembled they were the basis for The Good Friday Agreement – when a new future was finally put in place for all Ireland.

    Prior to 1990, the Prime Minister and The Taoiseach met irregularly as sparring partners, often playing to their own gallery: today, the political relationship between London and Dublin is a relationship of allies – of friends; old opponents – once viscerally at war with one another – now work together.

    Ireland saw a new future and grasped it – putting an end to a black history that cost too many lives and dashed the hopes of too many generations. The pessimists were confounded. Reason prevailed – and the winner was – is – Ireland.

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Children for Peace Dinner – 23 June 2006

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech made at the Children for Peace Dinner, held at the Granada Studios in Manchester on Friday 23rd June 2006.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    [First section Sir John Major thanked everyone for coming and for Wendy and Colin for organising. Sir John Major explained why he was involved, he recalled the day he heard that Tim and Johnathan were murdered, and it nearly ended the peace process, but it didn’t because others might be killed.]

    In the interim I met Colin/Wendy and have seen their extra-ordinary response to a tragedy that, even now, is heard to come to terms with.

    They set up this Charity – and it has grown. They set up the Tim Parry Scholarship.

    They built a dedicated Peace Centre.

    They set up a range of learning programmes to meet the needs of 5-6 year olds up to young adults – and programmes working with adults.

    We will never end terror by force of arms or policing alone. We have to attack causes, win minds as well as territories.

    That’s what the Trust does: its learning programmes are focussed on understanding causes of conflict and resolving them peacefully.
    Governments can try and change attitudes but they need help: organisations like Children for Peace.

    Terror is at its weakest when the Community turns against it – rejects bigotry and violence – sets up “Ambassadors” for peace: this Charity does all of that. That is why I’m involved.

    When the Peace Process began in the early 90s, Albert Reynolds and I both shared the view that terrorism could not prevail and that the better aspects of human nature would be bound to win. I won’t reproduce all the many twists and turns of the Peace Process but let me simply say I believe we are nearly there and we need to build on what has been achieved in Northern Ireland. That is one of the reasons, of course, why the Peace Centre is so important although its remit is wider.

    Over the years, we have become used to Irish terror but now the threat is much wider.

    Terrorism is not new: it has been with us since ancient times; but now, like the economy, terror is globalising. Terrorism is Al Qaeda; Hezbollah, ETA, IRA, Hamas, Tamil Tigers, Kashmiri and Punjabi Separatists; Pattani United Liberation Organisation; GIA … the list goes on.

    Groups that are secretive, diverse, with their money, men and weapons hidden as effectively as their minds are closed.

    Today, terrorism is a threat we can’t ignore. It is not targeted only against the Governments of the West. Think of the bombs in Bali. Or Jerusalem. Or the school siege in Moscow. Or Sarin gas in Tokyo. Or atrocities in Kashmir. The signature of mass-casualty terrorism can be seen worldwide. Around the world – other Tim’s and Johnathan’s.

    Most people find violence abhorrent and yet, terrorism has never been short of apologists. Over many years, it has grown bolder and more deadly. Many nations have suffered.

    And for no purpose because terrorism has not been effective in the post-Colonial world.

    When Spain, Portugal and Greece dumped Fascism – it was not because of terrorism.

    When Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – it was not because of terrorist pressure.

    When Apartheid ended – terrorism played no part in its demise.

    Nor have the IRA gained from terror. Their political end is unrealised and their Community has seen through them.

    Terrorism can claim none of these victories – it exposes frustration but it often entrenches what it wishes to destroy: it is – ultimately – immoral.

    What is the purpose of terror? It varies. For many Terrorist Groups the predominant aim is to radicalise Islam; to set Muslim against non-Muslim; to play upon prejudice; to foster hatred. For others, as in Northern Ireland, it is to pursue specific political agendas or to unsettle democracies.

    In Northern Ireland, the intent was to absorb the North into a united Ireland. Always, the effect is to create chaos.

    And it does. The economic impact of terror is to de-stabilise markets and interrupt the flow of commerce. The political effect is to undermine Government by consent and civil order.

    So, whatever reservations there may be about how this War on Terror is being fought – these are sound reasons why it must be fought – and why it must be won.

    Terrorism and democracy are fundamentally opposed. They cannot co-exist. One must defeat the other. If democracy is to win, terrorism must lose.

    The oxygen for terrorism is hatred: hatred of specific countries and their values or – sometimes – resentment of long-standing grievances. We know, too, that social and economic marginalisation encourages political radicalisation.

    In considering terror, one question must be asked: can a war against terror be won at all? Is it possible that such a shadowy concept as terrorism can be identified, isolated and defeated?

    My answer is – Yes, it can.

    So, if democracy can win, how can it do so?

    The answer to that question is complex. It involves action against existing terror groups now, and political measures to prevent such groups obtaining support today and spreading their contagion tomorrow.

    To win, all those nations threatened by terrorism need to co-operate. This coalition of the willing must embrace every country that is – or wishes to be – democratic. These States must work together to deny terrorists their safe havens, cut off their financing, and stem the flow of recruits. They must deny them their causes. And, to defeat the ideological threat they pose, we must understand the motives that drive them and re-educate the minds of those who have sympathy with them.

    We must accept we cannot win by military power alone, but concede that we cannot win without it.

    International co-operation is vital: we will win more speedily if we co-ordinate action against terror; inhibit the movement of terrorists; outlaw them in every respect; attack money laundering; penalise States that are known to fund terror; act to reduce their supply of weapons; agree world-wide extradition of terrorist suspects. So much, I think, is obvious – although not all of it is done.

    But these measures are simply policing action against existing terror groups. We need to know – what motivates terrorism? What encourages non-terrorists to tacitly support them? What can we do to make terrorism so totally abhorrent that terrorists are utterly isolated?

    The answers to these questions are not always palatable – but they must be faced.

    Inequalities – poverty, AIDS; injustices – political repression, social exclusion. All these play a part.

    In much of the world ideological radicalisation has fed the perception that the religion of Islam is under attack. Al Qaeda assert this every day. Radicals use this belief as a recruiting sergeant to fuel their cause. Events such as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have fed this perception as has the failure to bring the Middle East Peace Process – or the Kashmir conflict – to a successful conclusion.

    The Radicals case is crude propaganda, and wrong, but it is effective. To rebut it, democracy must lessen the chance of demagogues exploiting hardship to promote terrorism. They must fight for the hearts and minds of those into whose ears radical poison is poured. Words alone will not do: they must accept obligations that illustrate the morality of democracy.

    One example stands out. Our world has six billion souls. Of these six billion, one-half live on less than US$ 2 per day, and one-fifth on less than US$ 1 per day. This cannot be acceptable. I daresay no-one here today would hesitate in spending that sum on a cup of morning coffee. It is hard to imagine the disparity between the life of these three billion people, with the life of someone in richer countries – even if that someone was on the lowest levels of social support.

    The rich nations do much to help – and, at the recent G8 meeting, pledged to do more. I welcome that. At present, the rich nations spend US$ 50 billion in total on overseas aid: an enormous sum. But less generous than it seems when you realise that Europe and America also spend US$ 350 billion on agricultural subsidies alone. A statistic that is even more bizarre when you realise such subsidies cut away the chance for poor nations to sell their agricultural produce – often their only export – into developed markets.

    I believe that common humanity suggests that – if we are right to wage war on terror – and we are – then it is right to wage war on poverty and hardship as well and fill bellies that are empty.

    In removing grievances, we cut away the resentment of the “have-nots” for the “haves”. Moreover, as we act, we increase demand, we begin to create tomorrow’s market – and we undercut the message of hate that fuels radicalism.

    There are many reasons why the action promised by the G8 must be delivered: undermining hate campaigns is only a side issue but an important one. If we under-perform, the problem will worsen. In the next 25 years, world population will grow from 6 billion to 8 billion.

    Of the extra 2 billion, 97% will be in that part of the world that has an income below US $2 per day. This is not sustainable if we wish to sustain a free market in a world free of conflict. Nor is it moral.

    But if the world acts early, acts now, acts out of conscience – not only will we foreclose on misery and hardship to come but we will undercut the breeding grounds of terror that, at present, is such a threat to our security and our prosperity.

    Over the years, terror has so unsettled the political climate that trust has gone and a lasting solution is elusive. This plays entirely into the hands of the terrorist for it gives this dispute a much wider fuse: it is used to justify terrorism elsewhere.

    Sometimes, it has been difficult to see how this could ever be brought to a peaceful solution. It is depressing beyond belief – but it forces us to face the reality: in Palestine, as elsewhere, political progress remains the only way forward.

    I want to say something here about politics and terror. It is based on my own experience in dealing with the IRA.

    For years, the IRA had bombed and murdered in Northern Ireland – and on the mainland of the United Kingdom. Successive Governments reacted strongly and gave no ground to terrorism. But – whilst not conceding their objectives – we did look for a peace process to wean them off violence and to undercut their support in the community.

    It took a long time – and there were many setbacks – but it was right. We are now near a political settlement, without conceding the united Ireland that the IRA sought through bomb and bullet.

    The lesson is clear: never negotiate from fear, but never fear to negotiate. It is tempting just to denounce terrorism. But if you wish to save lives, you must sometimes engage with them as well.

    That is what the Peace Centre does: why it is so vital; why it is important to continue.

  • Mr Major’s Article on Ireland – 15 August 2004

    The text of Mr Major’s article on Ireland, published in Future Ireland in August 2004.

    JOHN MAJOR:

    Once more the Irish Peace Process is stalled. The blame game will be back in vogue – so has all the hard work of the last decade been for nothing? I don’t think so.

    From the moment I arrived at Number 10, Northern Ireland was a priority for me: the issue kept bubbling to the front of my mind. And during my 6½ years as Prime Minister, it never fell from the top of my agenda. I held meetings beyond number at Westminster and in Belfast. Some were interminable. Some were friendly. Some were raucous. Some were hopeful. Some ended in walk outs. It was a panorama of protest and progress.

    Invariably, I was struck by the distinction between the personal warmth and charm of those I met, and the depth and savagery of the rivalries that divided them.

    The roots of the Northern Ireland troubles lie deep in history and have been exacerbated by generations of distrust, recrimination, hatred and outdated tribal attitudes. But, although the roots may be ancient, the perceived inequity of the old Stormont Parliament, and the divisive gulf between Unionist and Republican aspirations, kept mutual loathing burning steadily. Until the Northern Ireland Assembly was formed, politicians were literally irresponsible – they had no responsibility for decision-making at all – there was nothing to force them to reach a pragmatic rapprochement. The need for that was vital, which is why elections and the establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly was so important and its suspension such a setback.

    Despite continuing difficulties, I have always been an optimist about Northern Ireland. There will be a settlement because there must be. If one looks back through the avenue of the past three decades or so there are many positive moves to justify that optimism. The clamour for normality has grown ever louder.

    Of course, “the troubles” are not just political, and nor is the solution to them. There are those within the IRA and the Protestant Groups for whom the nature of the political settlement is all important: but there are many others for whom criminality, sheltering behind a political cause, is a way of life. Such men (and women) have no wish for a settlement, no wish for peace, will do everything in their power to frustrate it and, if it were achieved, might peel off to join ever-more extreme splinter groups. Certain in the knowledge they will be isolated by a political settlement, they will continue to oppose it. These people – forever arguing, disputing, deceiving and distrusting – are one of the fundamental reasons why political agreement in Northern Ireland has been so hard to achieve. But when that political agreement is finally reached – and it will be – these remnants of humanity will be seen for the violent criminals they are and be isolated, caught and punished.

    To many it is baffling that – so long after the Peace Process began – there is still no settlement but this should not be surprising: first, because of the people working from within against a solution; and second, because that elusive solution is wrapped in a mille-feuille of complexity.
    There are two words that bedevil a settlement: “distrust” and “decommissioning”. Historically, in Northern Ireland politics, nearly everyone has distrusted nearly everyone else. Distrust breeds fear. More especially, it breeds a fear of making concessions and encourages everyone to hunker down in their established positions.

    By far the biggest stumbling block is decommissioning: the removal of weapons from the political debate. For the paramilitaries this is complex. The Loyalists – whose very name is a misnomer for their loyalty is more to anti-Catholicism, anti-Republicanism and anti-Southern Irish sentiment than loyalty to the British Crown – embrace many splinter groups often at war with each other. When they offer decommissioning, it is primarily as a lure to the IRA. In practice, any disarming is a token gesture since any weapons surrendered can be replaced easily.

    The IRA has a deep-rooted conviction that equates disarmament with surrender. Their philosophy is that “the movement” never surrenders. They argue that no paramilitary group has ever given up its arms unilaterally, and many in the IRA bitterly oppose any move to do so. I once tried to make it easier for them by suggesting they could destroy their own weapons. No-one was insisting they should be handed over to the British Army or be destroyed in public. I would have been content for there to have been independent verification of destruction and would not have objected if they had used the twisted metal to fashion a statue of Eamon de Valera. But the IRA’s suspicion is deep-rooted and ever-lingering: the response from them has been minimal.

    Even so, the IRA – like the Loyalists – toy with token decommissioning for public relations purposes. Such gestures are helpful but much more will be needed – not least to convince Unionists to return to the Northern Ireland Assembly and remain there. The underlying situation is not easy: the paramilitaries of the IRA have a psychological block to de-commissioning and Unionists have no reason to trust them until they have disarmed. Decommissioning is, therefore, essential though movement towards acceptance of this truth has been as though one were viewing events through a slow motion camera.

    To achieve a final agreement, we need the end of all preparations for paramilitary activity by Loyalists and Republicans alike. The end of paramilitary will being enforced on the streets. Above all – again and again – the restoration of trust.

    This latter requirement means all may yet hang upon the destruction of Arms. When a family has suffered a loss of life the psychological effect is profound: often there needs to be a period of “closure” before life can resume its normal pattern and peace of mind be restored.

    The Irish peace movement needs “closure” too: in this case “closure” is the destruction of Arms. No-one knows how many weapons there are – especially in the hands of the IRA – but the sum total is significant. It is probable that there are many tons of explosives in secret caches, together with heavy weaponry, rifles and handguns. All are a threat to peace of mind as well as peace on the streets and must be verifiably destroyed or surrendered. Tokens are helpful – but insufficient.

    For the people of Northern Ireland, we must continue to hope that their desire for peace will soon become a reality. But the question still lingers – will the paramilitaries deliver?

    We have yet to hear the answer.

  • Mr Major’s Speech at the Children for Peace Lecture – 4 April 2003

    The text of John Major’s speech at the Children for Peace Lecture, held in Warrington on Friday 4th April 2003.

    JOHN MAJOR:

    There are some events seared into the mind and never forgotten. The Warrington bomb is one. I remember the day vividly: Saturday, March 20th, 1993, a warm, sunny afternoon and I was walking in the garden of my home in Huntingdon. It was a rare moment of peace of mind at a turbulent time. The sound of a ringing telephone interrupted that Spring day and in quiet despair I listened as Number 10 told me of the bomb and the likelihood of there being fatalities.

    And so it proved. Two little boys, wholly innocent of any political thought or action, had their young lives cut short by that bomb. 56 others – totally unconnected with Northern Ireland disputes, suffered injuries – many serious.

    The true horror of that Warrington day struck deep into the British psyche. The images of Tim and Johnathan are as vivid today as they were during that dreadful weekend.

    That bomb – with its pitiless destruction – was to have a lasting impact on the Peace Process.

    The process had begun over two years earlier. In 1992, Albert Reynolds had become Taoiseach, Prime Minister of Ireland. He and I knew one another from our days as Finance Ministers. We were at ease with each other from the start – and shared the same view about the Irish troubles: we both believed they could be brought to an end. An examination of history did not support our optimism. Initiative after initiative had failed: the Willie Whitelaw talks in 1972; the Sunningdale Agreement made by Ted Heath in 1973; Jim Prior’s Assembly proposals in 1982 and Margaret Thatcher’s Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.

    Albert and I knew that if progress were to be made it would require a joint approach by the British and Irish Governments: a solo effort would not be enough. Before 1990, contact between the two Governments had been minimal despite our mutual membership of the EU. Charlie Haughey, the then Taoiseach, and I had agreed we should meet at least twice a year bilaterally and be in regular contact between such meetings. Albert Reynolds was keen to do the same. Over the years our senior officials were to get to know one another well, too.

    From the moment I arrived at Number 10, Northern Ireland was a priority issue for me. I can’t rationally explain why: I can only say the issue kept bubbling to the front of my mind. And during the 6½ years I spent as Prime Minister, it never fell from the top of my agenda. I visited Northern Ireland more often than any of my predecessors and more frequently than any other part of the UK. I held meetings beyond number with leaders of the main Northern Ireland Parties at Westminster and special interest groups at Westminster and in Belfast. Some were interminable. Some were friendly. Some were raucous. Some were hopeful. Some ended in people walking out. All were necessary. It was a panorama of protest and progress.

    Invariably, I was struck by one common perception. It was the distinction between the warmth and charm of most of the politicians and community leaders I met, and the depth and viciousness of the rivalries that divided them. In Northern Ireland itself that perception was magnified. Yet, from Belfast to Derry, from Ian Paisley’s Antrim to Jim Molyneaux’s Lagan Valley to the SDLP constituencies of John Hume and his colleagues, there came a message demanding peace and a readiness to support action to achieve it. Only the evil of bigotry and deep-rooted hatred slowed down the process.

    From the beginning, Albert Reynolds and I had similar objectives, although our preferred means of achieving them were often far apart. We had many agreements and some rows. Both of us sometimes operated on a short fuse lit by frustration at the obstacles to progress. Sometimes the climate was frosty and mutual frustration evident. But our disagreements were political never personal and Albert became – and remains – a friend I cherish. As did his successor, John Bruton, with whom I enjoyed a more equable but equally fruitful working relationship.

    At the time of the Warrington bomb, I was optimistic about movement from the IRA. It was – ironically – the very day a message from me had been delivered to Martin McGuinness. The bomb was a bleak response and suggested my optimism was misplaced. I considered whether we should break off negotiations but decided against it for many reasons – some hard headed and practical, others more personal and emotional.

    If we abandoned our attempt at peace, I wondered, what legacy would that be for Tim and Johnathan? Would it not be a cop-out, a striking of an attitude, because to continue would be a political risk. If we did so, how many other innocents would have their lives cut short? How many other families would be left to grieve?

    Would breaking off negotiations simply lead to entrenched attitudes and encourage more violence?

    More positively, if we were to continue with our efforts, would not the instinctive reaction of horror following Warrington help box-in and isolate the men of violence? I thought so.

    So did Albert Reynolds and he, too, was keen to continue. We were both aware of the warped mentality of the hard men of the IRA: if they negotiated at all they guarded their backs by showing their volunteers they did so from “a position of strength”. In their coded language, this meant after an atrocity. In essence they were saying to their members “How can you think we’re going soft – we’ve just blown someone up.” The commonly held view after Warrington: that negotiations were failing and would not proceed, was a misjudgement. It was more likely that negotiations would make progress now that the IRA had shown their volunteers in the most violent way possible that they were not weakening. They hammered home their point with a further bomb at Bishopsgate a few weeks later which cost yet another life and much destruction of property.

    Perverse – of course. Cynical – certainly. Wicked – beyond doubt. But what motivated both Albert Reynolds and me was the hope that we might prevent more bombs and return normality to Northern Ireland and the mainland. The IRA had tried violence for 30 years. It had failed. It would always fail. They now knew bombs would never drive the British from Northern Ireland. They had no realistic choice other than to seek a political settlement.

    In the early nineties, the Peace Process was controversial. Many supported it. Many others – in and out of the British Cabinet – did not: they preferred the posture of “no talks until the IRA lay down their arms” which on the face of it seemed to be a strong and decisive position but in practice was not. Such a policy could only lead to a stand-off, with no progress at all, continuing violence and everlasting anti-British propaganda. I thought such a laissez-faire policy was short-sighted and wrong. In fact, it was no policy at all. I was fortunate that both my Northern Ireland Secretaries of State, Peter Brooke and Paddy Mayhew, shared my view – and continued to do so even after the IRA unleashed a mortar attack on Downing Street in 1991 in an attempt to kill the British Prime Minister and as many of the Cabinet as possible. The mortar landed in the Garden of Number 10. A few feet closer and there would most certainly have been fatalities.

    The Labour and Lib-Dem Opposition front benches were supportive of a peace process and, with rare forays into criticism, remained so throughout my term of office. In turn, I have supported the present Government’s efforts and have kept my counsel even when I believed mistakes had been made, as – no doubt – they did for me: maintaining the momentum for peace was – and is – the only objective.

    The causes of the Northern Ireland troubles lie deep in history and have been exacerbated by generations of distrust, recrimination, hatred and out-of-date tribal attitudes. Although the roots may be ancient, the perceived inequity of the old Stormont Parliament, and the divisive gulf between Unionist and Republican aspirations has kept mutual loathing burning brightly. Until the Northern Ireland Assembly was formed, politicians were literally irresponsible – they had no responsibility in government for decision-making at all – nothing to force them to reach a pragmatic rapprochement. That need was vital which is why elections and the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly was so important and its suspension last Autumn such a setback.

    Despite ongoing difficulties, I have always been an optimist about Northern Ireland. There will be a settlement because there must be. If one looks back through the avenue of the past three decades or so there are many reasons to justify that optimism. The clamour for normality from the majority of people in Northern Ireland has grown ever louder.

    The Women’s Peace Movement was conceived and led bravely, and showed both Loyalist and Republican hard men that the majority of people in their communities opposed violence and wanted a better, more peaceful future. Other grass roots organisations like FAIT – Families Against Intimidation and Terror – showed their distaste at the brutal behaviour of the paramilitaries. They were brave campaigners in a good cause. The public anger at atrocities – Warrenpoint, Greysteel, Warrington, so many of them – also drove that point home. The Downing Street Declaration, the Framework Document which laid the basis for the important Belfast Agreement, the ceasefires, the work of the Mitchell Commission, all were a response to the demand for normality.

    Of course, “the troubles” are not just political and nor is the solution to them. There are those in the IRA and the Protestant Groups for whom the nature of the political settlement is all important: but there are many others in these movements for whom criminality sheltering behind a political cause is quite simply a way of life. Such men, and women, have no wish for a settlement, no wish for peace, will do everything in their power to frustrate it and, if it were achieved, might peel off to join ever-more extreme splinter groups. They will be isolated by a political settlement. But until it comes they will oppose it. These people – forever arguing, disputing, deceiving and distrusting – are one of the fundamental reasons why political agreements have been so hard to achieve. But when that political agreement is finally reached – and it will be – these remnants of humanity will be seen for the violent criminals they are and be isolated, caught and punished.

    To many it is baffling that – so long after the Peace Process began – there is still no settlement. I am not in the least surprised. First, because as I have just said, some people are working from within against a solution; and second, because that elusive solution is wrapped in layer upon layer of complexity.

    There are two words that bedevil a settlement: “distrust” and “decommissioning”. Historically, in Northern Ireland politics, nearly everyone has distrusted nearly everyone else.

    The Unionists distrusted the Republicans.

    The Republicans distrusted the Unionists.

    Sinn Fein and the SDLP distrusted British Governments.

    The UUP and DUP distrusted Irish Governments – and one another.

    The paramilitaries distrusted most politicians and all authority.

    The authorities distrusted the paramilitaries and their political spokesmen.

    I could go on – but you get the picture.

    Distrust breeds fear. More especially, it breeds a fear of making concessions and encourages everyone to hunker down in their established positions.

    It is for this reason that successive British and Irish Governments have made policy changes aimed at confidence-boosting in the hope of encouraging reciprocal gestures. Sometimes they have met with success whilst on other occasions they have been rebuffed. Thus, the process inches along – often at a snail’s pace. It was always going to be that way.

    By far the biggest stumbling block is decommissioning – the removal of weapons from the political debate. Seemingly straightforward but, in fact, far from it. Decommissioning is – and this will seem contradictory – both essential to the peace process and a red herring. Let me set out why this is so by considering the divergent views.

    Protestant politicians and their communities must have decommissioning as a sign of good faith and a guarantee that the gun will not enter into Irish politics again in the future.

    The British and Irish Governments, responsible Northern Ireland politicians and the public as a whole share that view and would warmly welcome decommissioning.

    It is what they have long sought. For them, it would signal a certainty that the conflict which has haunted them for so long is finally coming to an end.

    For the paramilitaries, it is more complex. The Loyalists – whose very name is a misnomer, for their loyalty is more to anti-Catholicism, anti-Republicanism and anti-Southern Irish sentiment than loyalty to the British Crown – embrace many splinter groups often at war with each another. When they offer decommissioning, it is primarily as a lure to the IRA. Any disarming from them is but a token gesture and any weapons surrendered can be replaced easily.

    The IRA has a deep-rooted conviction that is difficult to overcome. Their philosophy is that “the movement” never surrenders. They argue that no paramilitary group has ever given up its arms unilaterally and many in the IRA bitterly oppose any move to do so. I once tried to make it easier for them by suggesting they could destroy their own weapons. No-one was asking them to hand them over to the British Army or to be destroyed in public. I was content for there to be independent verification of destruction and made clear I would not mind if the twisted metal was used to fashion a statue of Eamon de Valera. The present Government take the same position. But the IRA’s suspicion of the motives of British Government is deep rooted and lingers on: the response from them has been minimal.

    Even so, the IRA – like the Loyalists – toy with token decommissioning for public relations purposes. Such gestures are helpful but much more will be needed – not least to convince Unionists to return to the Northern Ireland Assembly and remain there. The underlying situation is not easy: the paramilitaries of the IRA have a psychological block to de-commissioning and Unionists have no reason to trust them until they have disarmed. Decommissioning is, therefore, essential though movement towards acceptance of this truth has been very stately: as though one were viewing events through a slow motion camera.

    The irony is that the surrendering of weapons, so vital to confidence, may turn out to be a red herring, for not all may be delivered up and, even if they were, more can be purchased readily. It’s a Catch 22: disarmament is a touchstone of good faith and yet, if it occurs, it may not turn out to be the guarantee of peace that is sought.

    One unintended – and unwelcome – side effect of progress in the Peace Process is the impact it seems to be having on voting intentions in Northern Ireland. As progress is made, voter support rises for the more extreme political alternatives – Sinn Fein and the DUP – and diminishes the political base of the UUP and the SDLP, who have striven hardest for an agreement. It is a perverse situation.

    The most obvious loser is the SDLP – for so long the beneficiary of support from the moderate majority of Catholic/Republican sentiment. As Sinn Fein becomes less extreme, more mainstream, takes part in the work of the Assembly, sloganises about peace, becomes a more visible daily presence, it begins to appear a more relevant political party than the well-meaning SDLP. The UUP faces the risk of decline for more complex reasons. First, internal disputes and continual sniping at their leader (always a recipe to turn off the electorate); second, the easy criticism that can be levelled at the inevitable compromises and pragmatism of Government. Evaporation of support for the latter point is particularly galling since – outside of autocratic dictatorships – pragmatism is an essential ingredient of democratic Government.

    And yet, in the 1980s and 1990s, a mode of argument arose that pragmatism was weak, had no spine, and that only unblinking pursuit of pre-determined motives represented strong Government. The argument is nonsense of course but it seduced many people to its cause and its divisive impact is apparent still – not least in the DUP’s assault on the voting support of the Ulster Unionists.

    The road towards peace in NI has been the work of many hands. Politicians from a range of political persuasions, men of religion – both Catholic and Protestant, Civil Servants in London, Dublin and Belfast, many brave individuals, distinguished foreigners serving on Commissions, the EU and successive US Governments. All have had an input.

    So have events, some of them tragic. I have spoken already of domestic tragedies but the wicked terrorism in Oklahoma, New York and Washington brought home to the US the pain and the horror of violence for political ends. So did the sight of the IRA being caught red-handed in collaboration with terrorists in Colombia. All this helped dry up funding for terrorist groups and helped push them towards a political settlement.

    Curbing economic deprivations is an important ingredient in cutting away the support structures of the paramilitary groups. What does terrorism feed on? Hatred and bigotry, of course. But not only that. It fuels up on resentment as well. It feeds on deprivations and poor living standards. People with little or nothing to lose can often be attracted to desperate causes. Terrorism gives a focus to their lives.

    So the pursuit of growth and success of the economy in the Republic of Ireland is vital in every way and the British Government needs to focus on the deprived areas of Northern Ireland that – perversely – so often provide comfort to the men of violence, whose behaviour frightens away the investment that can provide jobs and improve living standards for the community as a whole.

    Today – although there is still serious deprivation in Shankill and West Belfast, the overall economic situation is greatly improved – much is happening that is good. Unemployment – very high for decades – is now in single figures across the Province as a whole, with the centre of Belfast flourishing as it enjoys substantial redevelopment. All this should be engendering confidence.

    But an improving economy must by matched by political normality. “Normality” for Northern Ireland must include an active role for the devolved Assembly. This is vital.

    It is vital – because responsibility for policy breeds a responsible attitude. That is why I wished to see an Assembly established: I believed it would provide a vehicle for Protestant and Republican politicians to sit together and take joint responsibility for their society. The idea had already been in my mind when it was suggested to me by Ian Paisley; it was rejected as a “back-door Stormont” by John Hume; it intrigued the then Taoiseach John Bruton but infuriated the Foreign Minister, Dick Spring; it was deeply controversial and yet made a good deal of sense.

    Once established, the Assembly was moderately successful. Old opponents worked together, albeit often disagreeing face to face and using the Assembly for Party political purposes, but also delivering new policy and benefits to Northern Ireland. More important is what the Assembly could – and should – do: namely, frame fresh economic and social policies to curb the ills of generations, encourage inward and domestic investment, and bring together divided communities.

    Instead, the Assembly has been suspended following violence from all sides and a general lack of confidence in collective goodwill. As ever in Northern Ireland, the events leading to suspension had all the elements of Greek theatre: challenges to David Trimble from the ruling Council of the UUP, the raiding of Sinn Fein offices by the police investigating intelligence gathering by Republicans, and the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein figure accused of having documents of use to terrorists. It is easy to see why there was a collapse of confidence.

    The need now is to rebuild the Assembly which is why the British and Irish Prime Ministers have met twice recently at Hillsborough to plan the way forward.

    I understand these meetings made good progress although, as ever, the Parties needed time to consider proposals and consult their grassroots before giving approval. Soon, the two Prime Ministers will meet again to publish their proposals to finalise implementation of the Belfast Agreement and repair the damage to it of recent events.

    A settlement – with goodwill, and an outbreak of trust – could be tantalisingly close and, if achieved, would lead to the progressive withdrawal of troops from Northern Ireland, the monitoring of ceasefires, new policing arrangements, human rights changes and the return of the Assembly.

    We need also, the end of all preparations for paramilitary activity by Loyalists and Republicans alike. The end of paramilitary will being enforced on the streets. Above all – again and again – the restoration of trust.

    But all may yet hang upon the destruction of arms. When a family has suffered a loss of life the psychological effect is very great: often there needs to be a period of “closure” before life can resume its normal pattern and peace of mind be re-established. Almost everyone who has lived through the death of a beloved family member or friend understands that emotional movement: from agony – to acceptance – to normality.

    The peace movement needs “closure” too: in this case “closure” is the destruction of arms. No one knows for sure how many weapons there are – especially in the hands of the IRA, the dominant paramilitary group – but the sum total is significant. It is probable that there are many tons of explosives in secret caches, together with heavy weaponry, rifles and handguns. All are a threat to peace of mind as well as peace on the streets and must be verifiably destroyed or surrendered.

    There is a second element to closure. In 1991 I was sitting in the Cabinet Room of Downing Street on a grey November afternoon when a message was brought into me. It had come through a secret channel of communication opened in 1990 and was from the Provisional Army Council of the IRA. I was convinced then – and remain convinced – that it was approved also by Martin McGuinness – though I should add for the record that he has always denied it. In any event, the message was dramatic.

    It said:

    “The conflict is over but we need your [British] advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace. We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as a surrender. We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure that we were not being tricked.”

    The conflict is over. That message helped persuade me to continue on with the Peace Process and, in the following ten years under successive Governments, we have come to be in sight of the end of the Northern Ireland tragedy. The blood that has been spilled requires that end to be secured.

    So – we need such a statement again – this time open and acknowledged. The war is over. These are words that the people of Northern Ireland have waited too long to hear. I hope they will not need to wait much longer. There is a place in history for those Irish leaders prepared to turn those words into reality. I know the British and Irish Governments will respond to such a declaration and a new era can be ushered in for Northern Ireland.

    Let me return to Tim and Johnathan in whose memory we are here tonight. Were their lives wasted?

    In one sense – yes: for they should have been here today – young men on the threshold of life with so much to experience and so much to give.

    But, in another sense, the loss of these young lives – and the pain and agony of their families – bears another interpretation. It shook the world. Forced it to think afresh. Closed down options for the men of violence. Impacted deep on the demands for peace. Led to the foundation of this Peace Centre. They are both – forever – an important landmark in the agonisingly slow movement from a path of hatred and violence in Northern Ireland to a now probable future of tolerance, compassion and hope.

    Let that forever be their epitaph.

  • Mr Major’s Comments at the Grand National – 7 April 1997

    The text of Mr Major’s comments at the Grand National, made on 7th April 1997.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked why he come to the rescheduled Grand National]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well, I have two reasons for being here today. One, I would like to indicate to the IRA that they cannot stop great British institutions, and secondly, I’m looking forward to seeing the race.

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Cancellation of the Grand National – 5 April 1997

    The text of Mr Major’s comments on the cancellation of the Grand National, made on 5th April 1997.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    The perverted way in which the IRA think make it quite possible that they will believe that they can act in this fashion, as they did earlier this week, the M6 and the M1 and then suddenly and cynically declare a ceasefire and then expect to be received back into the peace talks in the near future. I hope they realise that they may think that way, but the British Government doesn’t, and the British public doesn’t.

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Wilmslow Bomb – 26 March 1997

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the bombs planted at Wilmslow, made on 26th March 1997.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We’re at the beginning of a General Election campaign and this looks like a two-fingered insult to democracy. Right the way across Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein are standing as candidates in nearly every constituency. I hope that without any delay at all, Mr Adams, Mr McGuinness and the other Sinn Fein candidates will condemn without reservation this outrage this morning.

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the IRA Shooting of a Soldier – 12 February 1997

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the news of a soldier being shot by the IRA, made outside the Hilton Hotel in London on 12th February 1997.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Tonight has brought the terrible news that a soldier has been shot dead in Armagh – presumably another victim of the murderous efforts of the IRA. My heart goes out to his family. How many more victims must there be before the evil men responsible recognise the utter futility of their terrorism?

    Meanwhile, the deadly hypocrisy of Sinn Fein’s talk of peace is yet again fully exposed. Let me make two promises tonight:

    – There will be no hiding place for the culprits – none at all.

    – And I will not be deflected from the real search for a lasting settlement and peace in Northern Ireland.

  • Mr Major’s Joint Press Conference with Malcolm Rifkind – 5 October 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s joint press conference with the Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, held in Dublin on Saturday 5th October 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Let me just say a word or two at the outset about the discussions we have had today. The purpose of today’s discussion was to look particularly at the Intergovernmental Conference and the progress that had been made thus far. As with any negotiation of course, the real substance of the negotiation is likely to be done pretty near the end. We agreed today that we would seek the end the negotiation in June next year under the Dutch Presidency. We have also agreed, on a suggestion that I had made some time ago, that it would be helpful to see a draft treaty, perhaps in many cases with alternatives clauses for examination, at the December meeting in Dublin.

    A number of purposes of the IGC: firstly, to prepare for enlargement; secondly, to make the European Union more accessible to its citizens; thirdly perhaps to improve the efficiency of the European Union. I am bound to say for different members of the European Union that tends to mean at the moment rather different things. For some of our partners that means more majority voting, it means more powers for the European Parliament and more powers for the European institutions at the expense of national governments. Others have a different view of what it means.

    Let me make this point to you. The British are good Europeans. By good Europeans I mean that our record in implementing European law, our dedication to a liberal trading policy and our leading role in European defence, in all of those ways, if we enter into a commitment, we deliver upon that commitment. But I think that “Look before you leap” is a far better watch-word for the European Union than “Leap before you look”. And I made the points this afternoon that upon many of the issues to be discussed, it is no good just simply saying what the aspiration is, and what people would like to achieve, it is necessary to examine how you would get there and what it would actually mean for the member states if you did.

    I have tried to attest some of the assumptions that our partners have made. Let me perhaps give you a couple of examples. There is some suggesting amongst some of our colleagues that we should have a European Employment Charter in the Treaty. I wonder whether that is a good idea? We already have in the European Treaties a commitment to a high level of employment. But a treaty isn’t just a declaration, it is not just a declaratory document. A treaty creates rights, it creates obligations, it is justiciable before the European Court. I believe it would be cynical to write in obligations that cannot be met, and I made that point to our partners this afternoon.

    The second example I will give you, there could certainly be others, but the second example I will give you is defence. We can have a European defence identity through the Western European Union and through NATO. And of course that is the only credible way in which we can use NATO defence assets to carry out European initiatives. If we made the Western European Union subordinates to the European Union – as some colleagues in Europe wish us to do – then those NATO assets would be denied to us. I must say, I want a real defence, not one on paper only. So clearly there are difficult hurdles to overcome in that aspect of the negotiations.

    There are also some issues, as I indicated to colleagues this afternoon, where we shall require solutions to very serious problems. We reached an agreement to Maastricht some years ago which means that British companies are not saddled with job-destroying burdens. I shall expect our partners to stick to the letter, and to the spirit, of that agreement. And if the European Court decides against us in the Working Time Directive, I shall require treaty amendment to return the situation to what it was at the end of the Maastricht negotiation.

    I made clear to our partners this afternoon that it is also necessary to resolve the very serious question of quota hopping. National fishing quotas are meant to benefit not just the fishermen who catches the particular catch, but the fishing communities of each member state. If the present treaties don’t allow us to correct the abuses that presently exist under the Common Fisheries Policy, then the treaties must be changed, and that is another subject for discussion in the weeks and months that lie ahead.

    In many of these areas I expect there will be quite a lot of tough negotiation. On some of the issues we will find allies; on others, perhaps at the outset at least, we may be alone. But I shan’t hesitate to say no to the ideas that I believe are wrong for Europe as a whole or wrong for the interests of the United Kingdom.

    I want to add another point if I may. There are more important matters at stake for the European Union than treaty changes. I prefer creating jobs than writing an employment chapter into the treaty that would not create jobs. I prefer real defence to defence on paper. I prefer practical cooperation on drugs and crime, not a theoretical arguments about Community competence. I know Community competence is a very fascinating subject for the cognoscenti, but competitiveness is a much better one for those people who don’t have jobs and would like to have jobs.

    When we had finished the discussions, and they were very much preliminary discussions, on the Intergovernmental Conference, we spent time, both over lunch and later in the afternoon, on the Middle East peace process and the Foreign Ministers spent some discussing that as well. The important issue essentially is that we continue to offer support to the Middle East peace process, vital we encourage people to negotiate, vital we ensure that nothing we can say can be seen as boxing people in corners and making it more difficult for them to try and reach an agreement with one another.

    I also took the opportunity of being here to have a brief discussion with John Bruton about the Northern Ireland peace process. We reviewed the position that we have currently reached in the Belfast talks. Both of us believe that progress is not remotely as rapid as we would have liked and we would like all parties to redouble their efforts in the talks. We clearly need to discuss the question of decommissioning further. We are certain that progress in the decommissioning talks should be made on the basis of Senator Mitchell’s report. We are agreed about that. We will of course keep in very close contact. Today wasn’t the day for making decisions, it was just an occasion to review the present state of play in those negotiations.

    So those are the matters we have touched upon today and the Foreign Secretary and I will happily answer any further questions you may have about any of those matters.

    QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

    QUESTION (Hugh Pym, ITN):

    Prime Minister, did you register your disapproval of Dr Hansch’s remarks in his speech in Cork, and remarks after that that he made in a debate last night?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes I did. Yes I did. I told him his remarks were offensive, and I think he knows that. I suggested in particular that it was apparent some members of the European Parliament, senior members, senior representatives of the European Parliament, clearly did not understand what British policy was. He took the point very clearly that I was talking about him and not other people. I think the points I made to him had some impact.

    QUESTION:

    Are there specific areas that you would like the Irish Presidency to deal with in the coming months that have not been addressed to date?

    FOREIGN SECRETARY:

    I think it has been rather a good Presidency. Having the Presidency of the European Union is not the most attractive job in the world, it is trying to reconcile 15 different competing interests across a whole range of subjects. I think they have done rather well. They assembled an agenda for today. I think there were mixed feelings about whether there was any practical purpose in having today, but the Irish had no choice but to proceed today.

    That was a decision that was taken some time ago, and they have done so. They are working extremely hard to produce a draft treaty, albeit with alternatives for December, and that is a pretty massive job and I think they are doing it pretty well. So I have no criticism at all to make of the Irish Presidency. I think they are doing well and I am sure they will continue to do well.

    QUESTION (Hosni Imam, Kuwait News Agency, London):

    I wonder if you could put some gloss on the decisions you have taken on the Middle East, particularly about sending an envoy to the region?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    This was discussed both amongst Foreign Ministers and amongst Heads of Government. If I could make a general point about that first. Progress in the Middle East talks will be made between President Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu, or it won’t be made. Let us not believe that the European Union, or indeed anybody else, is going to determine that progress. What will happen is that Dick Spring, representing the European Union Foreign Ministers, will be going, probably on Monday I think and will meet Mr Netanyahu and also meet Mr Arafat to express the European Union’s concerns, and of course to offer any assistance that we can perhaps provide. But essentially we can do a little more than continue to assist in material matters, as we do very much with the Palestinian authority, quite a lot of cash from countries within the European Union and the European Union collectively, and quite a lot of important relationships with Israel through the Cooperation Agreement. So I think we are in a position to apply some pressure, but we ought not to let anyone misunderstand how much we can do. We can apply pressure but it is the Israelis and it is the Palestinians that will determine whether progress is going to be made or not. The Foreign Secretary may want to add something about his talks?

    FOREIGN SECRETARY:

    No, I have nothing to add to that, Prime Minister.

    QUESTION.

    [Inaudible].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    He is going on holiday.

    FOREIGN SECRETARY:

    That is Dick Spring. Dick Spring will be going on behalf of the European Union.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    And he is probably going on Monday, as I said.

    QUESTION (Polish News Agency):

    Both Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac said that enlargement to Eastern Europe would happen by the year 2000. Would you consider this date unrealistic and in what context was enlargement discussed during today’s talks?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    On the first point, you will recall it was the United Kingdom and Germany who were the foremost advocates of enlargement to the East. I passionately believe that the most important thing that the European Union ought to be doing at the moment is not institutional change, which often takes so much time, but enlargement to the East. We have an historic opportunity in this generation of politicians to extend the European Union to the East, which I think has great security advantages and will have great advantages in removing the economic Iron Curtain that has also been set right across the middle of Europe. So I am very much in favour of that and we were one of the great advocates of Poland and the other Central and Eastern European countries coming in, and we still are. I would add we are also more enthusiastic to open European trade borders to the Central and East European nations than most of our colleagues as well.

    Can it be done by the year 2000? If it can, no-one would be more pleased than us. It is an ambitious target but it is not a target that would be delayed as a result of any policy inhibition on the part of the British government, we would welcome it.

    As to the context of enlargement, enlargement is going to involve institutional change and it was in that context predominantly that it was discussed.

    QUESTION (RTE News):

    On Anglo-Irish matters, you had a brief discussion with the Taoiseach, but in essence the peace process in Northern Ireland is dead in the water. For three and a half months nothing has been achieved at the Stormont buildings, how are you going to put new life back into the process between you?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t agree with your assessment, with respect. I am something of a veteran over the past four years of being told that the peace process is dead. I have been told that on many occasions. But I don’t believe it. The peace process does often take two steps forward and one step back. If often gets into a phase where suddenly everyone is very optimistic because quite a lot suddenly seems to be being achieved and then suddenly it grinds to a halt while each of the respective negotiators goes back to their grass roots, assembles views, assembles feelings, and decides how they can move forward. We have been in a frustrating stop period for some time, it has got bogged down, I think that is absolutely true. But I don’t think, because it has been bogged down for a period, that one should assume that it is dead.

    And the reason I don’t believe you should assume that is not because there are not difficulties about, self-evidently there are, it would be foolish to deny that there were not difficulties. But the overwhelming wish, the overwhelming will, of the people in Northern Ireland, is to push the politicians further into making an agreement. And I think that is very important.

    The process was dealt a very savage blow indeed when the IRA returned to violence, there can be no conceivable doubt about that, not just because they had returned to violence, but because it fractured any embryonic belief that existed amongst any Unionists that they ever were serious about giving up on violence. So we must judge them on their actions. I hope we are going to get another ceasefire. There is no sign of it. We occasionally get talk of it from Sinn Fein/IRA circles, but that is all thus far it has turned out to be.

    But the peace process itself will continue and there will be set-backs. I have no doubt on future occasions people will say to me this is dead.

    But for so long as I can push it forward I will continue to try and do so and I believe that would be John Bruton’s view as well.

    QUESTION (Spanish News Agency:)

    When you say that you are not happy with the quota fishing system, because it does not benefit the community, do you mean that it is necessary to change the treaty, do you mean that it is necessary to change the distribution within the treaty, do you mean that it is necessary to change the distribution with the quota, or you are completely against the system of quotas?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We discussed quotas in a different context at one stage in terms of asylum, so I wasn’t quite sure which element you were talking about. As far as quota hopping is concerned, the principal problem is this. When the Common Fisheries Policy was first determined, there were quotas determined for each national country. And the expectation was that the fish would be caught by the national fishermen, and then docked in the national ports, and create the growing employment for the fishing communities that results from the fish going back to its own domestic port. What has happened subsequently, with quota-hopping, is that national quotas have been purchased by another nation and that has had a very severe impact upon the fishing industry ashore, and upon fishing communities. And what I have said to my colleagues is that that was not what we intended when we agreed the Common Fisheries Policy and it has very severe effects on particular parts of Europe, and particularly particular parts of the United Kingdom, and it is no longer tolerable for the system to continue as it is.

    So we have tabled a Protocol to change the circumstances on quota-hopping and we will be looking at that, and other issues, to see what can be done to ensure that the original intention of the treaty becomes the current operation of the treaty.

    QUESTION (Tom Burrows, Market News):

    Although it was not on the official agenda, was in any shape or form EMU discussed; and secondly, was the EU’s trading relations with other blocs discussed, for example in the context of the work the Foreign Secretary has been doing on improving trade relations with [indistinct] and North America?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No. On the second point, no, trading blocs were not discussed on this occasion. They are very important, but they just weren’t on the agenda today. As far as EMU was concerned, it wasn’t discussed. If I might say, it was mentioned but not discussed. People made passing references to it, I made passing references to it, but it wasn’t a subject of discussion. I hope that is not thought to be an odd difference to draw, but that is actually what happened, some people said we must go ahead with it; other people pointed out the timetable was at risk; other people said there are difficulties that haven’t yet been confronted. But that was all that was said, not discussed.

    QUESTION (John Palmer, Guardian):

    In common with a limited number of other senior Privy Councillors, you have received a letter from the Editor of the Guardian containing prima facie evidence alleging a government cover-up in reaction to the recent corruption scandals which are being investigated. What is your reaction to the evidence that you have been presented with and can you give a clear and unqualified assurance that no member of the government has been involved in any such cover-up or has in any sense misled the House of Commons?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    For some time the Guardian and other people have been running the most extraordinarily suggestive stories. Let me say to you absolutely clear that I am determined that the House of Commons investigates properly and fully the allegations that have been made. I might perhaps remind you that, against the opposition of many people, I was the person who set up the Nolan Committee. Many people didn’t like that, but I was determined that Parliament should be clean and above suspicion and I established the Nolan Committee. Sir Gordon Downey sprang out of the Nolan Report. I asked Sir Gordon Downey, I was not asked by Sir Gordon Downey, I said to Sir Gordon Downey that he might have all the documentation that he requires to carry out the inquiry that he needs to carry out.

    And I went further. I said he can also see all the documentation that was provided for the court case that did not take place, so that he – Sir Gordon – can satisfy himself he has every document that he needs to carry out his investigation. When he has investigated, he will report to the appropriate Commons Committee on members’ interests. I have no doubt they will follow their previous practice of publishing his report, and that is what I would expect them to do. What I am not going to do is to respond to a whole series of individual allegations, upon which a particular spin may be put, until this investigation is completed.

    I have made sure that the investigation has full cooperation, I am sure the investigation will be comprehensive, I have no doubt it will be properly considered by the appropriate House of Commons committee and I have no doubt the report, at their instigation, will then be published. And I would think that people, since they have such a comprehensive report, might wait for that report before they make comments or publish articles that may mislead and encourage other people to misunderstand.

  • Mr Major’s Briefing in London – 25 September 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s on the record briefing, held in London on 25th September 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t want to make a long introductory series of remarks. Just very briefly, there are just 2 or 3 things that seem to me to be quite important at the moment. Very important that the peace process continues. I remain as committed to it as I was in the past. Underneath the surface oratory quite a lot is happening, a lot still has yet to happen, and it is very important that it does. We will continue to give it all the support we can. I will no doubt enlarge on that in any questions, if you wish me to. Not a helpful occurrence, the huge potential explosion that didn’t take place. We have been in no doubt for some time that the IRA were planning future atrocities. This would have been a very big one, it didn’t take place, I think we can all be thankful for that. Thirdly, the European Summit approaches with the Irish Presidency, clearly a lot of very important European issues about, not just the preparation for the Inter-governmental Conference, though that certainly is important, also the continuing work that is proceeding towards the possibility of monetary union at a later stage, and also of course a range of other problems – working time directive, beef, fishing and a whole series of other things.

    If I may say so, the Presidency of the European Union is always a mixed blessing for the country that has the privilege to hold it. I daresay that John Bruton and his colleagues are discovering that, just as all his predecessors have in the past. It is a tough old job being President of the European Union for 6 months, and everyone takes it up with huge enthusiasm and in my experience usually lays it down with equally huge enthusiasm 6 months later. So I look forward to seeing my European colleagues in Dublin twice – once on 5 October for an informal meeting I believe, though the agenda is not yet finally determined, as I understand it; and then for the normal 6 monthly meeting at the end of the year.

    QUESTION (Sunday Tribune):

    Prime Minister, there was that incident in London that you said was not very helpful, has it been clarified yet as to whether the person who was shot dead was armed?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think it will be a matter for the Coroner. The Police undertook the action, the incident occurred, I don’t know what happened. The Coroner will examine that and there will be a subsequent investigation but I don’t know the details of it yet. I don’t know all the details of the police investigation yet, no doubt that will come out subsequently.

    QUESTION:

    [Indistinct] so many explosives and arms [indistinct].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Some things self-evidently are revealed. It self-evidently reveals the fact that the IRA were perfectly prepared to continue violence on the mainland, and not only continue violence on the mainland but continue violence on a very large scale indeed – 8 to 10 tons of explosives. That dwarfs anything we have seen before. This was clearly, whatever it was going to be, one or more for all we know, one or more very large incidents. Having said that, it is difficult to know what the psychology of the IRA is. I suspect there are divisions of opinion, quite sharp divisions of opinion, within the IRA as to the right way to proceed. There will be those, I am sure, who are arguing that if you commit another outrage it will force the British Government into concessions. That has been a standard piece of Republican – I mean Republican in the sense of IRA Republican – thinking for a very long time. It is a fundamental misunderstanding of the way any British Government, not just this one, would respond, but it is the way they think. And so very possibly they were thinking that it would put pressure on us. It would have done immense damage to the peace process if that had occurred, and would have destroyed any shred of credibility that remained amongst the leadership of Sinn Fein. I am very disappointed that Sinn Fein have not unequivocally denounced what happened, I think it would have been extremely helpful if they had.

    At some stage Sinn Fein are going to have to make it clear precisely what their position is: either they are the political wing of the IRA, in which case there is no real role for them as people who will sanction violence; or they have got to denounce the IRA and say we are a democratic political party, in which case they are welcome at the negotiating table to argue their views with the DUP, the SDLP, the Ulster Unionists and the others. I hope they will prove to be a political party. I have to say, they haven’t proved it yet. And a failure to denounce what undoubtedly would have been an atrocity, leading to mass murder, in unequivocal terms is pretty disappointed to put it mildly.

    QUESTION (Daily Correspondent, Dublin):

    As a supplementary to what you said about atrocities not influencing the British Government, the public perception throughout Ireland is that the Canary Wharf bombing did in fact influence you into taking action, action that people felt had been very slow in coming before that?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That may be the perception, because that is the way people choose to think and act. I can tell you, sitting here, the only thing atrocities do as far as I am concerned is make me dig my heels in more against the people who commit the atrocities. It is a fundamental misunderstanding of the British character, and I think the Northern Irish character, I don’t mean it isn’t the case for the southern Irish character, I don’t know that quite so well, but the Northern Irish character to believe that we would actually respond in that fashion. I know it is something that the IRA believe, that is self-evident to anyone who has made even a cursory study of them, but it is just flatly wrong. Canary Wharf did not influence the government’s decisions at all. Those sort of atrocities often, if they have any influence at all, have a malign influence in holding back moves that might otherwise have been taken towards rapprochement and proper dialogue. That is the only impact it has and it is a wholly negative impact. It would not have a positive impact of encouraging the British government into constructive dialogue, quite the reverse.

    QUESTION:

    There is another perception which is that for 17 months up to the Canary Wharf bombing the British Government perhaps acted too slowly in response to the initial ceasefire. How do you respond to that now, looking back, and possibly looking forward?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I will tell you exactly how I respond to it. I genuinely say to you it is a wrong perception. It has always seemed apparent to me that if you were going to have these negotiations continue, they cannot continue down a track in which one side seems to be winning every element of the argument and the other side seems to be losing. And there was a straight-forward and blunt disagreement between two effective sides of the negotiating table, one side saying we will only decommission at the end of the talks, and the other side saying we will only begin the talks if you decommission before the talks begin. Aft immense amount of work went into trying to find a way through that. It was apparent at the beginning that at the end of a long amount of discussion it was very likely that the way through would have to be decommissioning in parallel with talks. The Mitchell Commission was established, an independent look was taken, and they indeed ratified what I expected would be the case when they looked at it, and that is the only way it is going to come forward. But what caused the delay was the fact that if one had proceeded without having that particular element of the argument in play, the talks would have got nowhere because we would have called the talks and one side or the other would not have been prepared to talk because there would have been conditions laid on the table that the other side simply could not meet. And that is the fundamental reality that we had to face during that long period.

    QUESTION:

    But was that pragmatic?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It is pragmatic, I am a pragmatist on some issues. I am a pragmatist about finding a way that will end the murder and mayhem that we have seen in Northern Ireland. It is important to me that people realise that this is an issue that has been, and is, and will remain for as long as I sit in Downing Street, a matter at the top of the British government’s agenda.

    I don’t think what happens in Northern Ireland is tolerable. If it had been happening in Surrey or Sussex I wouldn’t have tolerated it, couldn’t have tolerated it, why should I tolerate it in Northern Ireland, I can’t. That is why I will pursue these talks. But the belief that you can do it, and reach a peace and a settlement that will last to provide both peace and peace of mind in Northern Ireland, without actually getting a negotiated settlement is folly. So you have got to create the conditions for a negotiation and that is very painful and difficult when you have competing views asking for pre-conditions that the other side can’t meet, and it is a lengthy business that takes a lot of time. I said at the beginning that it would often be 2 steps forward and 1 back, 2 forward and 1 back, and so it has proved. The important point is that we keep taking the steps forward.

    QUESTION:

    You mentioned that had the bomb gone off it would have caused immense damage to the peace process. How do you respond to the view that is being expressed, not just by the media but by politicians as well, that if it is discovered that the alleged IRA volunteer was unarmed, that that will do damage to the process?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am not going to comment on something I know nothing about at this stage, and I think it would be extremely unwise of me to do so. Let us wait and see what happened, and why it happened, and then we can make a proper judgment of it. What we do know is that there was a huge amount of explosives which presumably wasn’t there for any purpose other than to be used. We do know that. Beyond that the information is not yet clear and our system of law requires that there is a Coroner’s Inquiry and a proper investigation. When we have had the inquiry and the investigation, then would be the time for the government to respond, not in advance of the inquiry and the information. So I fear there is nothing I am going to say about that until I have the information, but at the moment I don’t have that.

    QUESTION:

    What is your personal assessment of Gerry Adams?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I find it difficult to make a judgment of Gerry Adams. He talks of his wish for peace and yet he doesn’t denounce atrocities that operate against peace. He has indicated on a number of occasions that he is moving in a particular direction, he hasn’t done so. What I don’t know is whether he is a man who wants to move in that direction but is constrained by his membership, or whether he is deliberately seeking a public relations posture that does not reflect his real views. It is difficult to know precisely.

    What I can say is that I do think that he could be a good deal more forward and constructive in trying to carry the peace process forward and I hope he will be so. But I don’t think my personal view of Gerry Adams is – well I won’t continue with that sentence, I will leave it there.

    QUESTION:

    What does this mean, I am quoting from Sir Patrick Mayhew’s speech today, in which he says that the restoration of the ceasefire, [indistinct] to the Mitchell principles, and then it says and entrusting to the issue of decommissioning. What does that mean, to the issue of decommissioning?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It means exactly what it says, that there has got to be constructive discussion about how one actually decommissions the weapons. What we have not said, not because it wouldn’t be desirable but because it wouldn’t be deliverable, is that the weapons should be entirely decommissioned before Sinn Fein enter the discussions, the talks. What we have said is that during the currency of the talks there has got to be progressive decommissioning in order to build confidence on both sides. And don’t think, unless we have a parallel track like that operating, that we will get to the end of the talks.

    And what has been the missing ingredient for so long in this whole sorry affair is any element of trust between the representatives of the various communities. Progress in the talks, and decommissioning, would add an element of trust and confidence that this could be carried through to a conclusion that we haven’t previously seen. And I hope that is the direction that we can go in. If we don’t move in that direction then I think the prospects for the talks are grim.

    QUESTION:

    Something you said earlier echoes something that the Secretary of State said this morning, and that is that progress is being made even if it is not being seen. Not only is it not the public perception that progress is not being made, many of the politicians taking part in the talks, and particularly Seamus Mallon has said that in fact the Unionists are stalling and holding them up. Can you give us any indication which shows that progress is being made and indeed would explain the Taoiseach’s optimism about what is happening at the moment, because it is certainly not apparent to anyone else?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    If one wanted an analogy for the talks I suppose you could think of a duck on the water, not a lot seems to be happening on the surface but the animal is paddling like hell beneath it. And there is a certain amount of that going on.

    There is more contact between the two sides in private, between the Unionists and the Nationalists in private; there is a much greater understanding between the two sides; I think there is a greater appreciation of what I called a moment ago the parallel process of decommissioning. All of those are happening under the surface. One of the things that bedevils it of course is that often public statements are made in order to bolster a particular position and as part of the negotiating process, which give the impression that no progress is being made at all. And progress is being made, not as fast as I would wish, but I think progress is being made.

    QUESTION:

    In what areas, other than perhaps the breakdown and the animosity that was there previously between the SDLP and the Unionists, in what areas is there further progress because the one particular issue that we thought we would see reaffirmed by September, September was the date, was the whole question of a format for decommissioning. We know that people are meeting each other certainly, and we know that people are making statements in public, but we have had no evidence to support the claim that these are purely public statements and that progress is being made. So what evidence is there?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think you will have to wait. I am not going to outline the information that has come to me of what has emerged from some of these private contacts, I don’t think it would be productive to the peace process to do so. I can only say to you that I think the atmosphere has improved quite significantly over the last few weeks, I am not saying to you that all is roses, self-evidently not, you know that and I. know that and everybody involved with it knows that. But the atmosphere has noticeably improved and many of the hurdles that people wondered whether we would get over just a few months ago have been got over. Would we actually get up to the elections? Would people take part? Would the forum be established? Would anyone turn up? Would anybody sign up to the Mitchell principles? All those things, one by one, all of them have had their little dramas of one sort or another – well not little, in many cases quite big dramas – all of them have had their dramas but one by one we have overcome those points. And you could actually go back over much of the last 5 years and see the same thing. The frustration one has is really two-fold: firstly that it is taking so long; and secondly that from time to time there is a set-back. Both of those I share the frustration very personally that all of you must share reporting it, but that the progress has been made is undeniable and I think it is still happening and I think it has a good deal further to go.

    QUESTION:

    Do you think that John Cree contributed to the distrust that has been established between the two communities and that that had any impact on the progress of the peace talks?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    There is no doubt that there was a great deal of fuss after John Cree, absolutely no doubt. There was a great deal of fuss on both sides of the sectarian divide after John Cree, it would be absurd not to say that that wasn’t the case, it was, and there was plenty of blame to spread around in every direction. The point is the atmosphere has lightened a good deal since then, I said there would be occasional set-backs, that was a set-back, don’t expect me to say it wasn’t, it was.

    QUESTION (Irish Times):

    One of the perceptions in Ireland is that Mr Bruton is doing more to lean on Nationalists, Republicans, than you are doing in leaning on the Unionists, and in fact the idea that the Unionists are holding things up, are not being persuaded is quite widely spread. There is also a feeling that they can be persuaded, they can be pushed?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think it is a false perception. I don’t doubt that John Bruton is encouraging people to move. I have regular discussions with John and I know how strongly he feels about this issue, he knows how strongly I feel about it. Anybody who seriously thinks haven’t used all the influence I have to encourage people to move forward into this process, hasn’t examined what has happened in this process over the last few years. So people may have that perception. But I suppose there are many things you learn sitting in this particular chair and one of them is that there is often quite a gap between perception and reality.

    QUESTION:

    The Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein maintain, at least in public, that if they were sure of the how and the when of decommissioning then it might be possible to have a ceasefire and Sinn Fein go into talks, because Sinn Fein’s fear is that they will be sucked into talks and get nothing.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    But that is the reason for the progressive decommissioning. I think that argument, I mean I wouldn’t agree with that argument because I think there is absolutely no justification for violence to pursue a political argument at all. Let me just say that at the outset. But given that that is my position, and I think the position of most people, what people are saying to Sinn Fein and the IRA is let us have progressive decommissioning, decommission something, see how the talks proceed, as the talks proceed decommission a bit more. If you are really trying to press your political points, remove the impediments to other people who are saying we are not going to negotiate everything, and then at the last minute have Sinn Fein walk away from the table threatening to return to violence because they didn’t get the last element of the deal that they wanted. There are going to be compromises in this deal, if this is going to come to a conclusion there are going to have to be compromises, don’t imagine otherwise. No one side is going to get everything they want.

    So what is the logical argument against a progressive decommissioning in line with progressive movement in the political process? I am not asking, and never have asked, the IRA to put themselves in a position where they have to come and throw down their weapons in front of the British government. I don’t mind how they are decommissioned, I don’t mind what international body actually oversees the decommissioning, I don’t mind about that. I just want them taken out of use.

    QUESTION:

    [Indistinct] in the north of Ireland to the extent that the RUC was forced to back down in the face of the threat of violence at Drumcree, and he said on a number of occasions that it was not possible for the police to hold the line and that that situation might prevail again. That seems to be a very serious admission that the British Government has lost control in the north?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well we patently haven’t lost control in the north. We have got 17,000 troops there, we have had them there for years, we have got a very large RUC presence, there were a particular set of circumstances on a particular incident. No-one should think one hasn’t learned from that incident. To draw a general conclusion about law and order from a particular incident and a particular series of decisions taken by the Chief Constable I think would be to read too much into that particular incident. So I wouldn’t accept the conclusion you draw from it.

    QUESTION:

    The Secretary of State made that conclusion.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I haven’t seen what the Secretary of State said and I don’t draw the conclusion in its generality in the way that you present it to me.

    QUESTION:

    When the Taoiseach went to Washington recently, I am sure you will have seen that there was a story generated as a result of that that he appeared to be optimistic about the chance of a new ceasefire and there was some clarification sought [indistinct] the true import of what he said. But in the Republic I sense there is a feeling that the Taoiseach has been drumming up a sense of optimism, that a deal is inevitable, and we are trying to get the sense of whether this optimism is founded on a good basis. Can you send us away with some feeling of where the progress really is occurring?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    The answer is I won’t. I am sorry but it is the outcome I want, not the publicity. Forgive me, I suppose that is a dreadful thing to say to you, but it is the outcome I want, not the publicity,

    QUESTION (Sunday Tribune):

    I listened to you very eloquently last year of your passion for peace in Northern Ireland, as you are today. What went wrong in the last year and how do you re-mend it to get Sinn Fein/IRA to the talks, at the same time undoing the damage of Drumcree and the sectarian [indistinct] that exists in Northern Ireland?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Quite a lot has gone right as well as gone wrong. I won’t reiterate the points about the elections and the forum, and the Mitchell Principles and the fact that the parties are now actually sitting down talking together in a way that we haven’t seen in the past. All that is right. What has not gone right is the fact that violence has returned – that was a unilateral decision by the IRA – and Drumcree was an incident which caused difficulties, we have dealt with that and that we can’t get Sinn Fein back into a position in advance of the ceasefire where they could credibly join the talks.

    They couldn’t credibly join the talks, even if .I were inclined to invite them – which I wouldn’t be – because nobody else would remain at the talks to talk to them. So the question in many ways ought more accurately to be directed to the IRA. I don’t know what caused them to decide that they would return to violence. I can make judgments as to what it is – I am not going to, before you ask me to – and I think those judgments might be right, but I don’t know. I hope that as it becomes increasingly evident that progress is going to be made, and that we are not going to back away from this peace process and neither are the Irish Government, whether Sinn Fein are there or not, that it will become increasingly apparent to Sinn Fein that they are going to have to be there. And if they are going to have to be there, there is going to have to be a ceasefire and it is going to have to be credible, and there is going to have to be progressive decommissioning in line with political progress. What I am not prepared to do is to see these talks grind into the sand and stop because of the way the IRA have behaved. I am not prepared to do that, I will do everything I can to avoid that happening, and I hope that we will see a ceasefire in due course and that they will return. But I can’t determine that myself.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No I don’t, if you mean of a particular issue?

    QUESTION:

    Yes.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No I don’t, no. I don’t do that.

    QUESTION:

    If you enjoyed a stronger majority in the House of Commons, do you think you might have been able to move faster?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No, I think that is a false assessment because I have had a lot of cross-party support in the House of Commons. The majority in the House of Commons for the posture the government has taken is absolutely overwhelming. On any free vote in the House of Commons I would have a massive majority for this policy in the House of Commons. So the argument that the policy is held back by the size of the government’s majority does not stand up to any logical examination at all.

    QUESTION:

    What about the increasing evidence that the Republican movement, both Sinn Fein and the IRA, are going to sit it out and they are going to wait for a Labour government in Britain and a Fianne Foyle government in Dublin. Does that cause you concern?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    They are going to have a jolly long wait.

    QUESTION:

    But it is something obviously you are aware of?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am aware that that might be their view. I think they are in for an extremely unpleasant shock, I can live with the shock they are going to be receiving, but I think they are in for an extremely unpleasant shock if they actually take that view.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    My word, you are sharp.

    QUESTION:

    The implication of it is that they are not going to do business, that they are going to hold back and that they are going to continually attack the British Government and try to force a coalition in the south against the British Government as well.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    If that is the strategy that they choose to pursue, why were they floating the prospect a few weeks ago that they were going to declare a ceasefire? If that is the strategy, how are they going to deal with the fact that there is going to be progress made in the talks without them being there? There is going to be progress made in the talks without them being there. If they want to sit it out they will miss the progress, they will have no voice at that table for those talks and those talks are going to continue. I am determined on that and so is John Bruton. So if that is their strategy it is an extremely misguided one.

    QUESTION:

    On progressive decommissioning the [inaudible] argument is very valid. Can there be an agreement in the multi-party talks that all the parties already in the multi-party talks will accept progressive decommissioning?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It depends what you mean by all the parties.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well you had better ask that question of David Trimble and not me. I am looking for an agreement that will enable us to have parallel decommissioning and political progress.

    QUESTION:

    At what stage would the first [inaudible] have to be decommissioned?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That would be one of the matters that the decommissioning sub-committee would examine. It is not something that I would prescribe myself, I would be perfectly prepared to prescribe it myself but it wouldn’t be the best way of getting an agreement, it would have to be an agreement in the discussions between the participating parties in the Mitchell sub-committee, it would have to be done that way.

    QUESTION (Sunday Independent):

    In the event of a sustained impasse developing in the all-party talks, what alternative is there open to the government? Would it, for example, have a bilateral agreement with the Irish government and then attempt to impose that over the heads of the parties?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    If I wanted to bring the talks to a juddering halt, I would suggest what I would do in the event of that actually happening. I don’t think it would be helpful for me to speculate at all on what I would do. I expect the talks to continue, and I believe the talks will continue and I wish the talks to continue and I am not going to speculate.

    QUESTION:

    Does that mean that the British government has a fall-back position?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Whether we have a fall-back position or not, I am not going to speculate about it.

    QUESTION:

    Tomorrow morning Gerry Adams will be in the House of Commons. Does this infuriate you, what are your feelings on [indistinct].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am happy to offer cross-party support to Mr Blair in his problem.

    QUESTION:

    Is he offering you cross-party support in your problem?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    He has offered me cross-party support on Ireland.

    QUESTION:

    But on Europe?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    But he has got the same problems that I have.

    QUESTION:

    But yours are particularly acute.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Only because your colleagues in the press tend to concentrate more on ours. He has got more real anti-Europeans and Euro-sceptics in the Labour Party than there is in the Conservative Party. Do not be deceived about that. The day Mr Skinner, Mr Benn, Mr Shore and 50 others I could easily mention become anything other than solidly opposed to any aspect of the European venture will be a very remarkable day indeed. They are keeping very quiet for the time being.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible] and maybe history will tell us, that by meeting Gerry Adams in the House of Commons you might actually achieve the securing of the peace talks once again. Have you thought that you might be able to help by having such a meeting, would it not be an issue?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t think that it would help at this moment to have such a meeting.

    QUESTION:

    Why?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t think it would help to have such a meeting at this moment. Gerry Adams has just utterly declined to condemn the prospect of 10 tons of explosives, in the middle of London or wherever it may be; he utterly failed to condemn the murder of those little boys at Warrington; he utterly failed to condemn Canary Wharf. Upon what basis would a British Prime Minister meet him when that is his position?

    QUESTION:

    Because you might move the situation forward and achieve a ceasefire as a result of a gesture like that, it is just a suggestion?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes, I understand you are putting it to me as a suggestion but I don’t think it is a suggestion that is credible at the moment.

    QUESTION:

    There is very little evidence that the Unionist parties have any interest in these talks, with or without Sinn Fein, and there is certainly no evidence to suggest that they will sit down with Sinn Fein, even in the context of a ceasefire. How do you bring all-party talks about?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    With great respect, you say there is little evidence that they will actually do it.

    QUESTION:

    Because they feel that they don’t have to.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t think that is right and I will try and answer your question I think in two complementary ways. Firstly, the comment that you just made that they don’t have an interest in proceeding and so forth, that is exactly the view that many people have taken right the way through the last few years, that they would never accept the Downing Street Declaration, they would never accept the framework plan, that they would never accept a whole range of other things. Gradually they and the Nationalist parties have accepted those things. I understand the frustration, and at any one time can find 10,000 reasons why there won’t be progress. But slowly, often I concede at a snail’s pace, progress is continually being made, each hurdle gradually has been overcome.

    The other point that I personally make, you may have heard me say it before but I passionately believe it to be true, that whatever the view may be of the political parties at any one stage, the view of the everyday citizen in Northern Ireland is that they want progress. For the first time in the lifetime of nearly half the people in Northern Ireland, they had an 18 month period in which they had the same sort of peaceful existence that people could expect in London or in Dublin. And they liked that. When one is out on the streets meeting with them and talking with them, the tangible feeling from them, from the churches, from the community leaders that they wish to see that return is real. Now the political parties have to be in negotiating posture. But don’t think as individuals that in the case of the politicians that they too don’t want the return of that. I have seen some of them, both sides, I am not making a Unionist point or a Nationalist point, I have seen some of those MPs, whether in the Ulster Unionist Party or any of the other political parties, the SDLP, the DUP, I have seen those MPs after there has been some atrocity in their constituency. So of course they have negotiating positions, but the feeling amongst their supporters, whichever party they represent, that they want and they believe the politicians should find a way through this problem is tangible.

    Now what we have to do is to stop the thing that has bedevilled Northern Ireland so frequently over recent years where you have something that becomes a part of the mythology and hauls progress back just when you think you are moving forward. That happens from time to time but we are going to have to try and ride over that. The greatest hope for peace in Northern Ireland is retaining the determination amongst ordinary people, everyday people, that they have a right to that peace in their part of the island of Ireland. I believe that very strongly. Every time I go there I believe that, whether they are people who are supportive of what r am doing or oppose what I am doing. I think the politicians are not immune from that and they cannot be immune from that.

    QUESTION:

    The worrying thing is that of course there is a desire for peace, but we have never seen the dearth of sectarianism that we now see across Northern Ireland, and indeed across the [indistinct] and this is the result that it would seem from the post-Drumcree split where the Province was paralysed, where towns and villages were surrounded and barricaded and where force seemed to triumph. So the politicians really would need to break out of that sectarianism and show leadership, but there is very little leadership being shown. Certainly perhaps on the Nationalist side we have people like John Hume and Seamus Mallon, but on the Unionist side [indistinct].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Out of disaster can come triumph. I think the sheer concern that you illustrate, which I know existed in Northern Ireland after Drumcree, the sheer concern and in some cases fear as to what might happen that actually came out of that, I think shook everybody, including the politicians. I believe that does change minds. Who would wish in any way to be in the position where it was said they had contributed to that problem again? Who in public life in Northern Ireland would wish to find themselves in that position? It is not so easy to strike attitudes on the back of that. So I don’t think Drumcree was a plus, but I think out of Drumcree you can see the possibility of changed attitudes and I think we will see a possibility of changed attitudes, and I am not as pessimistic as some of the comments around this table lead me to believe that you are, not at all.

    QUESTION:

    [Indistinct] which is the religious thing [Indistinct] do you understand that, because that is your core problem? [Indistinct] and the churchmen have [Indistinct].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    My experience of the churchmen, overwhelmingly, whether it is on the Protestant side or on the Catholic side, is that they have been very supportive. I have met the senior churchmen regularly here and they have been unfailingly supportive. They haven’t always agreed with every aspect of government policy, I am not trying to suggest that to you, but their desire to see this process move forward, on no occasion have they denied their support when I particularly needed it to move the process forward. And I think some of the things they have said, on both sides, have been very brave. I don’t agree with everything they have said and I wouldn’t pretend to you that I did, but some of it I think has been very brave.

    QUESTION:

    Ted Heath, in his proposal through the power-sharing executive [Indistinct] education because of the failure of [Indistinct] they don’t get to the core. What are your proposals for an integrated education in Northern Ireland? It is things like that that get back to the basics.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Let me take that point directly. One of the things that Northern Ireland has lacked over the past 25 years or so is politicians in Northern Ireland who had to take decisions rather than to advance views. That is profoundly worrying. Politicians ought to take decisions and then answer for their decisions. I want to get back to a situation in Northern Ireland where politicians actually take decisions on local matters and have to answer to people for the decisions they take, rather than simply represent their electors with the views that they and their electors have had. When you are faced with the reality of taking decisions, it is a different proposition from when you are simply advancing a view. And that is the direction in which I am moving and the direction in which I wish to move. Once they are taking decisions the ball-game begins to change. And there is a lot of talent in Northern Ireland. It is a tragedy in Northern Ireland that for 25 years you have not had politicians with any real decision-making to take.

    QUESTION:

    I am happy about what you are saying. I remember being present at the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin when Protestant churchmen came down, and I think it was Dr Mahaffey who said, he was being asked to discuss the problem of leadership, and he said you can’t lead from a mile down the road. And that struck me, I thought it was a worrying kind of observation. Would you make any comment on that?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It is a slightly ambiguous observation. Can you tell me who said it?

    QUESTION:

    Dr Mahaffey, the Bishop of Derry.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    For a Bishop he would make a superb politician because there is a degree of studied ambiguity in that which I very much admire.

    QUESTION:

    Can I ask you for clarification of one point, because it is ambiguous and it is open to several interpretations, and that is your comment that you want to see politicians in Northern Ireland getting back to making decisions. You know there is a great fear on the part of a number of Nationalists of a return to a Stormont-type situation and you know there is a desire on the part of some Unionist politicians for a return. So what exactly do you mean?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes I know exactly what you are worrying about, am I talking about a wholly internal settlement? No, I am not talking about a wholly internal settlement. I am talking about the fact that as part of the three-stranded process, as part of the discussions between the parties, we have got to get ourselves into a situation where there is a genuine capacity for decisions that in the rest of the United Kingdom are actually taken directly by local politicians actually being taken in Northern Ireland as well. I am glad you raised that question so that there was no misunderstanding about it. It is a lack of accountability when so much of the decision-making process which normally ought to be in local hands is not in local hands. I would like to put it back in local hands, I think it is a very healthy thing to do. But it isn’t an easy thing to do and it has to be done by agreement, but it is one of the things that I think we need to stretch to. If we are going to get this thing really working properly it is going to be platform by platform, step by step, you are going to have to build it up. I think that is one of the building blocks.

    QUESTION:

    What contribution do you think the framework document can make in that respect, and the [Indistinct] document that actually talks about building political structures locally as well as cross-border institutions and executive powers?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    The framework document is not a blueprint. The blueprint, if indeed there is to be one, will come out of the talks and then it will be agreed between the political parties. What we were effectively asked to do was to provide a cock-shy as it were, a framework that we thought, that we the government thought, would be acceptable to people. But neither of the governments are saying this is an absolute blueprint from which no-one can deviate, these are things that they will have to discuss themselves.

    QUESTION:

    The Irish Government is saying that it should form a very important building block.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It is self-evidently a very important building block.

    QUESTION:

    You accept that?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Of course it is an important building block, that is why we developed the frameworks. An important building block, yes; written in letters of fire and immutable, no. It has to be discussed and agreed, it is a basis for the discussion and agreement that is to follow. But what we wish to see is to make sure that that discussion and agreement takes place. We have set out in the frameworks the areas that we think need discussing. But if it was immutable there would be no point in going into the talks process. We have to go into the talks process so that we can find out the degree of support, or opposition, or areas where mild changes may be needed amongst the various political parties in Northern Ireland. And then after that of course, when a final agreement has been reached, it will need to be put to all the people of Northern Ireland as an outcome in a referendum.

    QUESTION:

    Can you envisage the outline of a settlement, as Dick Spring has suggested he thought was possible over the last few days, an idea yourself of how this could be resolved and over what timescale?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Timescale depends on goodwill. It is very difficult to pick timescale. With serious and mature discussion and a willingness to pragmatically compromise and decommissioning proceeding in parallel, I think quite rapid progress could be made. Without any of those ingredients progress is going to be very slow. So I think that is the difficulty when people occasionally say to us well why don’t you set a constraining time limit to the talks? What would happen is that anybody who wished the talks to fail would simply fail to reach agreement within the time frame and that it would all fall to pieces. So although it sounds as though it would put impetus into the talks, I think it would ensure the talks ground to a halt. If you mean can I see a way in which you could have an outcome, personally yes I do see a way in which there could be an outcome. But it isn’t what I think at the end of the day is going to be the only determining factor. The principal determining factor will be what can be agreed between the political parties and either for John Bruton, or Dick Spring, or I to say we think this is the right way forward might not necessarily – I say this with some humility – be the best way to ensure that you got that agreement.

    QUESTION:

    Do you think that you will call your general election before John Bruton calls his?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think that depends on when John Bruton calls his.

    QUESTION:

    [Indistinct] November, but May/June might be more realistic?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    This year or next year? Well I am in no hurry for my general election. Our economy is now outstripping the rest of Europe quite comfortably and the economic statistics are rolling out extremely well. We have now got inflation at levels we haven’t seen it for a very long time; we have got mortgage rates and interest rates lower than we have had for a very long time indeed; we have got growth accelerating, exports accelerating and we are probably the most competitive nation at the moment in Western Europe. And there is no doubt that that trend looks pretty well established. So I am in no hurry. I am happy to let the trend roll on for a while.

    QUESTION:

    When will you decide on EMU?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We don’t know the facts to decide on it yet. Let us assume you were a farmer, well you might be for all I know. A farmer asked me the other day: How will EMU affect me? And I said to the farmer: Well I can’t tell you the answer to that question. He said how will it affect me if we – by that he meant the UK – are in EMU? I said: I can’t tell you that yet. How will it affect us if you are not in EMU? I said: I can’t tell you that yet, I don’t know what the circumstances of it are. Will it affect us? Yes, I said to him, it will affect you whether we are in it or whether we are out of it.

    And that is really the substantive point. If it is going to affect my country whether we are in it or whether we are not in it, how could I explain to the farmer, or the businessman, or the man in the city, or the man or woman in the street, that I had decided to rule myself out of those negotiations when the outcome of those negotiations would affect them? What would I have said to my farmer who asked me whether it would affect him, and I said Yes, when he then said to me: Then why are you, the British Prime Minister, not in there negotiating in my interests?

    What is the answer to that question? There is no answer to that question. And the decision that will be taken on Economic and Monetary Union for Europe as a whole, I am not just talking of the UK, will be the biggest economic decision Europe has taken. It needs to be right, it needs to be considered. You have to consider what it means for the smaller countries of Europe as well as the big countries of Europe. You have to consider what it means for the countries who don’t go into a single currency as well as those who do go into a single currency.

    If people are Statesmen, they would have to consider what it means for the countries who are coming into the European Union as well as those who are in it. The biggest single issue I think that the European Union has to face is how to absorb into the European Union those former Iron Curtain countries in central Europe who look to the West for freedom, an open market and a quality of life that we enjoy in the West. That is an opportunity for this generation of politicians that no generation of politicians has ever had before – the opportunity to create an economic market that would prevent the sort of wars that have twice started in Europe in this century and that in the last few years we have seen in Yugoslavia. l think that is a bigger prize than institutional change within the existing members of the European Union. And I think to concentrate on the institutional change, without looking at that wider picture that may ensure that our children and our grandchildren never face the sort of difficulties that our fathers and our grandfathers faced, is not Statesmanship but folly. And that is why I think we have to look at that as the first issue.