Tag: Maastricht

  • Sir John Major’s Interview on BBC’s Newsnight – 1 May 2026

    The interview with Sir John Major broadcast by BBC Newsnight on 1 May 2026.



    Matt Chorley: Sir John Major was born on 29 March 1943 to Gwen, a librarian and part-time dance teacher, and Tom Major-Ball, a former trapeze artist and music hall performer who later ran a successful garden ornaments business. Young John underperformed at school in Brixton, leaving with just three O-Levels. But a chance meeting with his local MP led him into politics. He became a Conservative MP in Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 landslide victory, then rose through the ranks pretty quickly to become first Foreign Secretary and then Chancellor. Within 15 months of taking his first great office of state, he reached the greatest, replacing Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990 at the age of 47. He went on to win the 1992 election with the most votes ever recorded for a British political party before losing to Tony Blair’s New Labour landslide in 1997.

    I’m delighted Sir John joins me now. It’s great to see you. Thank you. Can you take us back to that church fete, the turning point, it seems, the moment where you discovered politics?

    Sir John Major: Well, I discovered it before that. I read a lot of history and politics always fascinated me. I remember the church fete very well. The vicar was a delightful man. So was his daughter. We were friends. I was at the church fete and the local Labour Member of Parliament, Colonel Lipton, Marcus Lipton, who had been there since 1945, attended every church fete in the constituency. I don’t think church fetes were legitimate unless Marcus was there.

    He talked to me and we talked about politics. He must have realised that I naturally moved to the right of centre rather than the left of centre. But he saw I was interested and he kindly offered me some seats in the gallery in order to watch Parliament in session. I did that and I saw a small part of a very boring part of the year really, but not for me. I was thrilled. It was the debate on the Budget in the mid-1950s and I saw on the benches Iain Macleod, Harold Macmillan was there, Rab Butler was there for a brief time. When I walked into that building, it reached out and grabbed me. When I left, I thought, this is where I wish to be, and my mind never moved away from that.

    Matt Chorley: It didn’t focus you on your schoolwork, though. You clearly didn’t think, “I need to knuckle down if I want to get into the House of Commons.” In fact, I was looking, you didn’t do all that well at school. You were one of only eight Prime Ministers ever not to go to university, a grammar school boy, not privately educated. Do you think that now we’d call that a great backstory, but did you feel like that held you back in your pursuit of getting into politics?

    Sir John Major: Of course it did. Absolutely. And it was very stupid. The background to that is not straightforward. My father was 65 when I was born. When I was 10 or 11 and went to Rutlish, having passed the 11-plus, he was very sick and also nearly blind with cataracts. He had lost all our money. We didn’t have much, but what we had he had lost in a business venture. So we moved from a bungalow in Worcester Park to two rooms, four storeys up, in an old Victorian house in Brixton. That is where we lived.

    Matt Chorley: Is it still there?

    Sir John Major: It is. It’s still there. It’s hardly changed. We lived in just the two rooms. There was nowhere there to study. They insisted that I stayed at Rutlish, which was at Wimbledon, so I had to travel back and forth from Brixton to Wimbledon every day. I was pretty rebellious at school. I didn’t like it. I wasn’t comfortable there. I felt alienated by life. It was extremely stupid. So I just didn’t work, except at the things that interested me, which were mainly history and English. The result of that was a lamentable record at school and the need to get up at 05.00 each morning after I left school aged 16, studying, taking more O levels and a banking degree and other matters.

    Matt Chorley: These days, the House of Commons is very different to the House of Commons that you entered. Fewer trade unionists in the Labour Party, fewer business people in the Conservative Party and so on. A lot has changed. Do you think that has changed for the better?

    Sir John Major: No, I don’t. I certainly don’t. If you take both parties, if you look at the Labour Party, and I have no animosity against the Labour Party. I grew up in a Labour area. I didn’t agree with their policies, but I saw decent men trying to do a decent job on Lambeth Council.

    I looked at the Labour Party when I got into the House of Commons and there were lots of ordinary, everyday people, people without money, without privilege, working-class people who really knew their constituents. They may not have got degrees in English, but my goodness, they knew how their constituents lived. They cared about that and they represented that in the House of Commons. That doesn’t happen in the Labour Party now. They are much younger, much better educated and, in my judgement, much less close to their constituents than their predecessors were.

    You can see it on the Conservative side. Where are the businessmen? Where are the soldiers? Where are the people who would have been a staple part of the party in the 1950s, 60s and 70s? They are very sparse now on the Conservative benches. There has been a change in nature and I think that is partly because of the way in which politics is disregarded by so many people these days. Many of the people who would be a very happy addition to Parliament simply will not contemplate going into politics. I hear that theme again and again and again. There are many reasons for it, which we both know and I think the whole world knows, but it is a loss to Parliament in my view.

    Matt Chorley: Would the John Major of when you first went into politics, from your background and experience, consider going into politics now?

    Sir John Major: I couldn’t not do so. I am out of politics now and I had no regrets about leaving politics when I was in my early 50s. No regrets whatsoever. But there are moments when I see things happening and I wish I was still there, because I would have a voice to point out things that I had seen being done before and I know they went wrong. Experience and a long memory, an historic memory, in Parliament is very useful. It can stop many mistakes being made. So there are moments when I wish I was back in politics, but they are fleeting moments and they are entirely overridden by the fact I couldn’t take the divorce if I were still in politics.

    Matt Chorley: Norma would have something to say?

    Sir John Major: Norma would have something to say. And so would my children.

    Matt Chorley: Let’s talk about this. You become an MP and most people, when they become an MP, even if they only say it to themselves at night, probably privately harbour the idea that one day they might be called upon to become Prime Minister. But it happens to you in 1990. The Conservatives had been trailing in the polls for months. Geoffrey Howe’s devastating speech to Margaret Thatcher leads to Michael Heseltine’s challenge. You, though, Sir John, miss much of the drama because for some time you had been nursing a painful wisdom tooth and you were under the dentist’s anaesthetic while everyone else was plotting. Yet you wake up, you are coming round from the anaesthetic and the conversation almost immediately turns, with Norma and your daughter Elizabeth, to the prospect of you possibly throwing your hat in the ring. Was it the drugs?

    Sir John Major: Well, you may say so. Others may have wished so. No, it wasn’t. The tooth has become a subject of myth over many years, with people saying he didn’t have a tooth problem at all, he was just getting out of the way and plotting, which is entirely absurd. If anyone would care to go to the hospital in Essex, I had the wisdom tooth out under full anaesthetic. It was an abscess under a wisdom tooth that I had been nursing for a couple of months. I had a hospital appointment. I wasn’t going to cancel it. I had suffered from that enough. I didn’t anticipate, frankly, the degree of drama with Michael’s challenge to Margaret.

    But when Margaret decided she wasn’t going to stand, I was approached by a lot of people to see whether I would stand. I hadn’t been contemplating it. I can honestly say that. My daughter was coming up to A levels, my son to O levels. I had just got the job I really wanted in politics, which was Chancellor. I can honestly say, hand on heart, that I was not contemplating being Prime Minister.

    But I was approached by a number of people. I then learned that some people had been canvassing on my behalf. I said to my parliamentary private secretary, “Look, I don’t know how many votes. I don’t want to humiliate myself by getting a few votes.” He was a very good listener, one of those rare politicians who listens rather than talks, and he said, “Well, I think I can guarantee you 150 votes if you stand. Dare you say no to that?” I couldn’t really.

    I remembered the old Iain Macleod maxim. It was Macleod as much as any individual politician who took me into politics. He was a magnificent orator, not just in how he spoke but what he said. He once said, “If the ball comes out of the ruck, you grab it. It may never come out again.” That was pretty much how I felt. I was confident that I wasn’t going to be humiliated, so I decided I would stand.

    Matt Chorley: You write in your memoirs that for large parts of that period, actually right up until almost the moment you won, you were stuffed with painkillers. It was an extraordinary moment, with you dealing with this pain in your mouth while each day getting closer to becoming Prime Minister.

    Sir John Major: Yes. The campaign only lasted a week and it was the best-natured campaign I think I have seen in all my years in politics, between Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd and myself. We all knew one another extremely well. I was particularly close to Douglas Hurd. I didn’t know Michael quite so well. It only lasted a week.

    As the campaign began, the painkillers were winning over the pain quite comfortably, so we sailed through the week’s campaigning. It wasn’t a difficult week of campaigning because we weren’t in the business of slagging off one another. We had worked together in the past, we would work together in the future. Whatever had happened, the three of us would have been together in the Cabinet. So it was a very good-natured campaign and it went quickly.

    Matt Chorley: Michael Heseltine has, of course, concluded that he who wields the knife doesn’t wear the crown. If you are the person who leaps first, you end up not getting the top job. Do you think he is right about that? Are there lessons for today?

    Sir John Major: I’m not entirely sure about that. Lloyd George might argue to the contrary, and so might others. I think it can be a disadvantage. It depends on the nature of the relationship between the departing Prime Minister and the wielder of the knife.

    Matt Chorley: Tell me about that moment when you become Prime Minister. You go to the Palace. You had obviously been into Number 10 before, but it is very different going as a minister than it is as Prime Minister. What is going through your mind during the drive?

    Sir John Major: Several things really. Firstly, I wondered how this ceremony goes. Does kissing hands mean literally? It doesn’t. It means figuratively. What exactly are we going to talk about? So I was thinking about the Queen and how that would work out.

    A different compartment of my mind was thinking about what I was going to say when I got back to the doorstep. That was certainly occupying my mind. Two other things were occupying my mind. A new Prime Minister within two years of an election: we were going to have to have some Cabinet changes, and that was going to be awkward. I had only been in a Cabinet for three years. I was younger than most of the Cabinet. I had been there less time than most of the Cabinet. I was going to have to say to very senior people who had been there much longer than me that it was time to go and to bring some new blood into the Cabinet. Nobody likes destroying someone’s career. Only sadists like that.

    Beyond that, I was very conscious of the problems we faced. You touched on some of them. The party was deeply split on the European Union, deeply. I felt as though I was standing on either side of a widening chasm. The poll tax was still around and had to be destroyed. Michael Heseltine had to come back into the Cabinet. Those last two points were bound inevitably to upset Margaret Thatcher: her poll tax, I was going to have to abolish it; and her assassin, as she saw Michael, was going to have to come into the Cabinet. So one could see immediately that there were going to be problems that lay ahead. It was only a short ride from Downing Street to Buckingham Palace, but I remember very plainly, almost as though different components of the mind were thinking of these things.

    Matt Chorley: It is often said that being Prime Minister is a lonely job because so few people have been there and done it. When you were there, still alive were former Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher, Jim Callaghan, Harold Wilson, Ted Heath and Alec Douglas-Home. Were you able to reach out? Clearly the relationship with Margaret was difficult because of the circumstances of you becoming Prime Minister. Is there a gang of former Prime Ministers who all talk to each other?

    Sir John Major: I had no difficulty with the other Prime Ministers at all. The one who from time to time was most helpful was Jim Callaghan, who had a similar background to me and understood the difficulties. He understood the restraints in 1990s society, and from time to time he was very helpful. Harold Wilson by then was clearly ill, and when I talked to him we met in the corridors and discussed Huddersfield Town Football Club, of which Harold was a tremendous supporter.

    So I had no difficulties there. When I met Margaret, there was never any difficulty. The first time I met her was at a by-election in 1978 in Berwick and East Lothian, which we lost. I was very impressed, because it was thought we were going to win the by-election. She had been there for a morning and came in and talked to me just after lunch, and she knew we were going to lose it. Her sensitive political antennae had grasped the fact that it wasn’t right, and I was hugely impressed by that.

    I had a very good relationship with her. We had a furious fight when I was a young whip. We disagreed severely about something and everyone thought my career was over. The next day she came and sat next to me on the bench and said, “Well, we’d better regroup and discuss these matters again.” Three weeks later she gave me a job in government. I remember her saying to me when she gave it to me, “It’s the job I started with. If you learn about social security, you’ll be better equipped than most of the parliamentary party for the future.”

    Matt Chorley: You mentioned that when you became Prime Minister, you knew there was a general election certainly within two years. In that election in 1992, there was an expectation that Labour were going to win it under Neil Kinnock.

    Sir John Major: More than an expectation. It was almost written into the stars.

    Matt Chorley: What was it for you? There has been endless discussion: was it the Sheffield rally, was it the soapbox? What was it for you?

    Sir John Major: I never quite agreed with the way the opinion polls were going all the way through the campaign. It may simply have been my naivety, but everywhere I went I got a very large and warm welcome. Everywhere. There was no hostility. I was surprised about that. We had been in power for 11 years and people were plainly tired of the problems over the poll tax and Europe, and yet there was an immensely warm reception everywhere I went.

    So I had this blind faith that, having come from where I did to where I was, it wasn’t going to end that quickly. I thought throughout the campaign that we would win. We had a very large lead in votes, you may recall. It was only a slender lead of 21 in seats, but we had a seven per cent lead in votes. We should have had a majority of 70 or so if the votes had been distributed, but of course they weren’t.

    Matt Chorley: The record for any party in a general election still stands. Given the way our politics is going, with more and more parties, do you think that record will ever be broken?

    Sir John Major: Ever is a long time. But I don’t think it is going to be broken in the near future, because there is going to be a greater dispersal of votes, which raises a whole series of other questions.

    Matt Chorley: Soon after that 1992 election you discussed with Chris Patten the idea that you had stretched the elastic and defied expectations. You then spend the next five years assuming that you wouldn’t win in 1997. I wondered whether it would be better for governments if they behaved like they weren’t going to win and did what they thought was right by the country, rather than chasing percentage points in the polls.

    Sir John Major: There was a bit of that. It sounds rather gallant to say you proceed entirely on that basis. Of course we wanted to win the election. But we managed to find a way of losing it quite comprehensively, and we had a lot of assistance from my colleagues in doing so.

    For Europe, there was a changing of the guard in 1992. The elderly members who had been in the war or soon after and in the services were very pro-European in the Conservative Party because they never wanted to see a European war again. A lot of them retired in 1992 and were replaced by much younger and more recently baked Conservatives who had a much more Eurosceptic view. So the huge majority for Europe in the Conservative Party that existed in 1991 had gone in 1992. We faced a completely different parliamentary party. Although we had a majority of 21 nominally, on European matters we barely had a majority at all. Very soon, with by-elections, that bare majority was whittled away.

    Matt Chorley: Was it then, in 1992, that the seeds of Brexit were sown in that generational shift in the Conservative Party?

    Sir John Major: They were there before. Going right back to Enoch Powell and others, there were people who were, let me say, unenthusiastic, which would be a kind way of putting it, about Europe. But it was in the 1990s that the numbers began to grow. They began to grow because of opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, and that was very odd. You may say, why is it odd? Because the Maastricht Treaty did all sorts of extraordinary things, but every one of those things was actually preordained in the 1986 Single European Act. We had signed up to a whole range of things that were in the Maastricht Treaty, and the very people who had signed up to that treaty now opposed it, and opposed it violently. The new members followed them, and they became more and more of a thorn in the side.

    Matt Chorley: In 1993, you were caught on camera calling some of your Eurosceptic Cabinet ministers “bastards”. Do you have any regrets about that?

    Sir John Major: I remember that very well. It was a BBC feed that was left on when I was speaking privately to a single person, and the feed crept under the door and they chose to use it. Of course I shouldn’t have said that. My only excuse is that it was true.

    Matt Chorley: As the pressure built over time and you faced more criticism, in 1995 you pushed what many thought was the nuclear button and challenged your opponents to put up or shut up. One of our listeners, Mike, got in touch and said, “My question to John Major would be: what would you do if you were in Keir Starmer’s shoes, assuming local elections are bad as well? Would you advise doing what you did, put up or shut up, or is this a case of different party, different circumstances, different times?”

    Sir John Major: I think the circumstances are very different and the times are very different. Enough has been said by enough people about that particular issue. I don’t really wish to add to it.

    Matt Chorley: Did you think you would win when you did that back in the 1990s?

    Sir John Major: I wasn’t sure. I was prepared for the fact that I might have to resign. I didn’t think I was going to be defeated in the ballot, but I had put in a sealed envelope the number of votes I had to have in order, in my mind, to credibly stay. We exceeded that number by three votes. So it was very close. Four votes less and I would have resigned.

    Matt Chorley: When you weren’t dealing with your own MPs, you were dealing with Tony Blair in the latter stages across the despatch box. Prime Minister’s Questions is the part of politics that most people see on the news, and he was pretty remorseless to you during PMQs. “I lead my party. He follows his.” Calling it “weak, weak, weak”. Did any part of you enjoy Prime Minister’s Questions?

    Sir John Major: It was a very good line. I don’t know who wrote it for Tony, but it was extremely good. If I were in his position, I might have done exactly the same thing, because I was in a position where, whatever I did, half the party would disagree with it. I was trying to bring the party together. My fear from the moment I became Prime Minister was that the European issue could break the Conservative Party apart, as free trade had done in the past. That was very inhibiting as to what you could do, and it provided Tony with that opening.

    Matt Chorley: You also faced a lot of hostility from the media during that period.

    Sir John Major: Surely not.

    Matt Chorley: It is said, and I have interviewed people who worked with you at the time, that there was a feeling among some that you focused too much on the media, that you read the papers too closely. With the benefit of hindsight, do you think they were right?

    Sir John Major: Possibly. But it’s difficult to know what you’re facing unless you hear about it and read about it. It is very easy to say. I seem to recall it was Franklin Roosevelt who read 18 newspapers a day, something of that sort. Yes, I suppose you could say I wasted too much time reading things that were unnecessary, but you needed to be prepared. If you are suddenly asked a question and you don’t know why the question has come, you could be in a very difficult situation.

    Senior politicians face that today with social media. They may be going around the country, they’ll be stopped, they’ll be asked a question about an event that has happened on the other side of the world, and they don’t know of the event. Sometimes they are foolish enough to commit themselves and get themselves into a great deal of difficulty.

    Matt Chorley: I was thinking about the way that everything has sped up, rolling news and then social media. Thinking of a drama like Black Wednesday, do you think you could have survived Black Wednesday in a world of social media, with the sort of frenzy that people whip themselves up into?

    Sir John Major: It could hardly have been worse if social media had been there. There is a great deal behind that. Many of the myths in it still survive, but it was extremely difficult. It lingered a long time and it marked us.

    There were two things about Black Wednesday really. Firstly, when we were forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism after a market turmoil that began in northern Europe, not with us, and injudicious remarks by the governor of the Bundesbank led them to concentrate on sterling, which was very unhelpful indeed.

    When we were forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, I was already in discussion with the policy unit about how we could leave it, because its purpose had been to bring down inflation, and it had done that. Many people hated the ERM because they thought it was a stepping stone to the euro and that we were going to join the single currency. That was never going to happen while I was there. I wasn’t going to join the single currency. We weren’t ready for it. Parliament wouldn’t have accepted it and I didn’t like it anyway.

    We went into the Exchange Rate Mechanism because we had failed to get inflation down with every other policy. We and our predecessors, in Margaret’s time, in Ted’s time, in Jim Callaghan’s time, in Harold Wilson’s time, had seen inflation come back again and again and destroy parties. I was determined that we would stick with the ERM until we had beaten inflation. And we did. We enjoyed the benefit of that right up to about 2010. So the incoming Labour government inherited a low-inflationary position and a very good economy in 1997.

    But because we had fallen out of the ERM, that masked the changes in the economy and the changes in interest rates. We got none of the credit a government would normally have got for that simply because we were thought to have been incompetent because we were forced out of the ERM.

    Matt Chorley: So it was a political impact rather than an economic catastrophe?

    Sir John Major: It was a political catastrophe, but it wasn’t an economic catastrophe. The economy could then sustain leaving the ERM. The difficulty was how to get out without the markets thinking you were weakening the anti-inflationary policy. That was the difficulty that we didn’t solve. So when we were thrown out, it was catastrophic politically, but it had done its job.

    I felt so strongly about inflation, and I will put it in this personal way because it is how I felt. When we were living in those two rooms, there was barely a week when the money did not run out before the week. I saw my mother go downstairs and borrow money to see us through the week, then desperately try and find some way to pay it back, then repeat the exercise week after week after week. I knew what that was like, and I knew that was what inflation did not just to my family but to families all over the country. I hated inflation with a passion, and I would rather have been forced out of government and out of politics than have given up on the anti-inflationary programme. That was the ERM.

    The other point I would make about it is that with all my critics, I remember even the Daily Telegraph had banner headlines saying “At last we’re going to have some economic discipline” on the day I went in. It is amazing how successes have many fathers and failures are orphans.

    Matt Chorley: Can I ask you about Spitting Image? Did you watch Spitting Image? We had various questions sent in from people asking about you being portrayed as the grey man of politics, despite having the background you came from, winning a general election and beating older politicians.

    Sir John Major: Politics is a rough old trade. That was originally a joke across the tea room by a friend of mine when my hair started to go grey when I was about 48. That is where it came from. It was a very useful way to portray something quite different and it was used mercilessly, because politics is sometimes a rather fierce trade. But you know that when you go into it. There’s no point crying over it.

    Matt Chorley: Did you watch it at the time?

    Sir John Major: I stopped watching it when I saw the portrayals of Norman Tebbit and Margaret Thatcher, which I thought were downright crude. So I did watch it occasionally, but when I began to feature in it in an indelicate way, I thought the same people who told me I ought not to read the newspapers now said, “Why didn’t you watch Spitting Image?”

    Matt Chorley: Do you watch any political TV shows? The Thick of It, Yes Minister, or was it all a bit too much like work?

    Sir John Major: The only one I watched was Yes Minister, which I thought was pure genius. It got so close to a parody of reality. I didn’t think The Thick of It quite achieved that. I didn’t watch that very much.

    Matt Chorley: Can I ask you about the job of being Prime Minister and how you approached it? Since you were there, we have had seven or eight Prime Ministers. Is it getting harder?

    Sir John Major: In some ways, yes. It is certainly getting harder because of the external pressure of social media. That is undoubtedly getting harder. On the other hand, newspapers matter less than they did politically. They are not as powerful as they were in the 70s, 80s and 90s.

    The problems are wider today, and there seems to be a shorter time frame in which people feel they can deal with problems and push them aside. Most of the big problems we have in this country at the moment are long-term problems. How are we going to cope with an ever-increasing number of elderly people who will live longer and need more medicine and more expensive medicine? How are we going to prepare for that? How are we going to prepare for people having their own pensions when the Government keeps producing measures that will reduce the private pensions that people actually earn and save for in their own lifetime? They are forcing more people into state assistance when they retire by the policies they are following now. That is not only wrong, it is plain stupid.

    Then there are other things like climate change. Some people deny climate change. I don’t know what planet they are living on. When they say, “I don’t believe in climate change”, it’s a cop-out. It means they needn’t put the money towards the policy and they can spend it on something else that is more politically popular. But I only have to look at my own garden. The daffodils come up six weeks earlier. The climate is different. The ice caps are not in my garden, by the way, but the ice caps are melting and changing the positions inside the oceans. There are more hurricanes. There are much more extreme weather events. The climate is changing.

    Those people who say, “Let’s push it back a bit. Let’s not do anything. Let’s do it a little more slowly so we can spend a little money on something else” are saying to my children, your children and their grandchildren, “Tough luck, chaps. We’re not only leaving you a difficult economy with too many old people that you can’t afford to care for. We’re going to leave you with climate change that we should have put right for you and didn’t.”

    The first role of any government, in my view, is to leave something better for the next generation than your generation inherited. This is not done now. The youngsters of today are inheriting a more difficult world and a less favourable world than my generation, and their successors may be in exactly the same position unless we now begin to take seriously those very long-term problems.

    I’m sorry that’s a long, tedious answer, but I feel very strongly that it demeans politics. You are not there as a politician as if it is a game show. You are not there just to provide fodder for the media and project your own career. You are there to deal with problems that ordinary people elect you to deal with. We are a representative democracy. We send representatives to Parliament to make sure our lives are better. If you ignore and deny those issues, our lives will not get better and those Parliaments will have failed.

    Matt Chorley: Some of those issues you are talking about, changes to pensions and so on, are unfolding under the Labour Government. But some of the things, climate change and net zero, those are ideas which are taking hold in the Conservative Party as well.

    Sir John Major: I am not making a point against any one government. It has been going on for quite a long time. Let me put it to you in this one question. You know politics better than most people, I would guess. When did you last hear a senior politician deliver a detailed lecture about the problems we face and what we must do to make those problems better over the next 30 years? Can you remember such a speech?

    Matt Chorley: Not off the top of my head.

    Sir John Major: No, neither can I. Don’t you think the people out there would actually like to hear someone standing up and saying: “We’ve got these things wrong. We’ve really screwed up. We’ve really got to take this particular policy more seriously. We cannot cope with population growth and the growth in the length of years people live, and the more expensive medical treatments. We cannot cope with it unless we begin to take action on those things. At this moment, we cannot delay on that.”

    Matt Chorley: So what is the problem? Is it the quality of the politicians? Is it the quality of MPs in Parliament who get restless too quickly? Is it partly our fault, the electorate’s fault, that we are impatient and we want quick and easy answers to big complicated problems?

    Sir John Major: I’m afraid we do. That is because nobody is telling us we can’t have that. Instead of saying, “These are the difficulties we’ve got to face and you can’t have that,” nobody is doing that. Too many people listen to focus groups and parody the focus groups in their policies, which naturally means more expenditure, and that inevitably, in the short term or the longer term, means either more debt or higher taxes. Governments have lost the capacity, it seems, to say no. Part of the job of politics is to say no.

    Matt Chorley: I suppose the counterargument is that if you say no, you lose elections and you are not in a position of power any more.

    Sir John Major: I’m not entirely sure that is the case. I would guess there are millions of people out there who would be only too pleased to hear a politician stand up and set out absolutely clearly, honestly and unmistakably the depth of the problems we face and the sort of measures we are going to have to take in order to protect ourselves.

    They say, “You can’t do that. You’ll lose votes.” Really? When you are setting out a policy that will ease the lives of their children and grandchildren? Are we so self-centred that we can’t take in that message? I don’t believe it.

    Matt Chorley: I wonder, we have touched a bit on social media, but the role of social media in changing the way people consume the news, instead of watching the six o’clock news or reading a newspaper which might have a broad range of issues and voices. If you are just watching people you agree with, that reinforces the idea that this person has all the answers.

    Sir John Major: Yes. I’m afraid there has been a lot of that over a long time, where people mix with other people who have the same views and read newspapers that echo their views, or indeed shape their views. This is happening in a much bigger way in America, I may say, but it is certainly happening here as well. It is very dangerous. You can’t debate and change the world unless you meet the people with whom you disagree and try to persuade them. If, instead of that, you avoid the people you disagree with and form your own clique with your own views, then nothing is going to change in terms of really addressing the problems that lie before us.

    Matt Chorley: You have talked in the past about believing in a rough and ready decency. Do you think we see enough of that in our politics today?

    Sir John Major: Sometimes you do.

    Matt Chorley: Is it more rough than it is decent?

    Sir John Major: There are a lot of very decent people in politics. I don’t know the present Parliament as well as earlier Parliaments. I’m not a member of the present Parliament, but I know a number of MPs from the Conservative Party and Labour Party, not so much the Liberal Democrats these days. There are lots of them who have very decent instincts. The curious thing is that many of their instincts as to what they would like to achieve are the same. What they differ about is how to achieve it.

    The economy is a practical example. The Conservative Party would say we have to deal with it with much more free enterprise and much less regulation. Many people in the Labour Party would also want a much better economy but would go a completely different way: more state direction. Everyone can have their own view on that. But the interesting thing is that the objectives are the same.

    The very nature of the House of Commons, with His Majesty’s Opposition being two sword lengths apart from His Majesty’s Government, actually promotes the idea that the opposition must oppose everything. I’m not sure that I agree with that. I think the opposition has a duty to point out shortcomings. But when the objectives are the same, I think it would be better if people acknowledged similar objectives and began more practically to suggest mutual ways of meeting those objectives.

    The classic example I would give you is that I do not think we will get a proper concordat on health, probably the single most important issue to many people, until the main parties agree the broad parameters of it, and that includes funding. I think that is something they ought to be looking at. We can’t have one party coming into government, setting out a series of policies, making changes, and the other party denying them, then, because they have denounced them, coming in and feeling they have to change them. That is poor politics.

    Matt Chorley: And yet, when we look at how politics has unfolded over the last few years, promises do not get very long, whether it is their own MPs or the media.

    Sir John Major: Maybe these long-term problems would. In any event, the fate of individual politicians doesn’t really matter as much as the development of the right policy. It isn’t a good idea to keep changing Prime Ministers. I think there is also a limit. If I give you a term of years, it will undoubtedly cause trouble, but I think it is an idea to have a limited number of years. The Americans have two terms of a president and then stop.

    Matt Chorley: We can’t get to two years at the moment before speculation.

    Sir John Major: I know, but this is a phase we are going through. It is partly a function of the many, many difficulties that we face at the moment.

    Matt Chorley: Is the frustration that people don’t believe those problems show signs of being solved?

    Sir John Major: The best aphrodisiac in politics is hope. If people can see a change, there is a change in atmosphere. It doesn’t even have to be politics. If we win the Ashes or the World Cup, there is a total change in atmosphere in the country. If you see interest rates going down rather than up, there is a total change in people’s capacity to invest and their belief in what is going to happen in the future. The moment the economy turns, politics will turn too.

    Matt Chorley: It sounds as if, if Keir picked up the phone to you, I don’t know if he ever does, your advice would be the old Churchillian phrase, “Keep buggering on.”

    Sir John Major: I’m not going to offer advice. I have been in politics a long time and I have made many mistakes. One mistake I’m not going to make is advising a Labour Prime Minister in public. And no, I have not been asked to advise a Labour Prime Minister in private either.

    Matt Chorley: You talked about Her Majesty’s Opposition. Obviously now it is His Majesty’s Opposition. When you were there it was the Queen. Tell me about the weekly audience. I have heard other Prime Ministers talk about how it is the one meeting you go into where the other person doesn’t want your job. How important was it for you, having that regular audience?

    Sir John Major: It was very important. I don’t mean for me. I think the Prime Minister meeting the monarch weekly is very important for the monarch too. I have no intention of telling you the sort of things we discussed. I will tell you it wasn’t all politics by any means. The only others present at those meetings ever were the corgis. If someone had bugged the corgis, it would have been quite a revelation.

    Matt Chorley: Are you a fan of dogs?

    Sir John Major: Oh yes.

    Matt Chorley: You got on with the corgis?

    Sir John Major: Yes, the corgis were fine. We even have an office therapy dog.

    Matt Chorley:  Do you?

    Sir John Major: No, it’s not my dog. It’s my chief of staff’s dog.

    Matt Chorley: Oh, great. What sort of dog is it?

    Sir John Major: I’m not going to go into the dog. I don’t want the dog to become famous.

    Matt Chorley: When you were Prime Minister, it was quite a turbulent time for the royals. We have since had Cabinet papers released from when the Queen went through her annus horribilis. Did you feel that the royals were really under pressure at that moment? And did you feel that you helped turn things around?

    Sir John Major: I have no intention of commenting on that, except to say I did share an annus horribilis with the Queen at the same time, so we had plenty to talk about.

    Matt Chorley: You talked about how you had a small majority after 1992 and obviously that made your life hard. Is there a sweet spot for the size of a majority? Is there a point where having a massive majority is also a problem?

    Sir John Major: Something between 40 and 50 is the sweet spot. One of the problems the Labour Party has at the moment is that they have such a big majority. A large number of people know in their hearts that they are a one-term Member of Parliament for that particular constituency. Unless they defy political gravity, they will lose at the next election. That will encourage many of them not to take difficult decisions, but to cry out against difficult decisions so they can be seen to be defending their constituents against something that may be necessary but is unpopular. That makes any government’s job much harder.

    Matt Chorley: I just want to end on a couple of reflections. Any regrets? Your biggest regret from your time as Prime Minister?

    Sir John Major: Have you an hour or two? There were lots. I won’t say it is the biggest, but a big regret I have is that when I negotiated the Maastricht Treaty, it was hugely well received in Parliament. We didn’t put the Bill for the Maastricht Treaty through Parliament before the 1992 election because it had such support. There were five or six hundred Members of Parliament voting for it. We didn’t put it through. We put through other measures that were more immediately relevant, and so we left the Maastricht Treaty until after the 1992 election.

    As I explained earlier, after the 1992 election, the complexion of the Tory Party had changed remarkably. Without that, we would not have had all the troubles we had with the Maastricht Treaty, which had a great deal to do with the eternal damnation of the Conservative Government at the time. So that is a regret. I could have got it through.

    Matt Chorley: And that might have changed what followed afterwards.

    Sir John Major: Yes. There wouldn’t have been a Bill that they could spend a whole year attacking.

    Matt Chorley: On the positive side, George, who is a listener, got in touch and said, “Does Sir John feel he did not get enough credit for the National Lottery, lottery-funded elite sports and Team GB’s success at the Olympics? Please thank him from me.”

    Sir John Major: I’m very pleased it has done so well. I’ll tell you how I came about doing it. I was Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 1987 to 1989, and the Chief Secretary negotiated public expenditure with every individual minister. So he had, although he was a junior member of the Cabinet, more power than most members because he could redirect money.

    I noticed in doing that that the things the public most cared about, sport and the arts, got petty cash from the Government. I could never see a circumstance in which you could take money away from health or education or defence or social security in order to enhance leisure. Governments have never been big on leisure, if you go back as far in history as you like. So I was looking for some external way of funding something that the public really loved, sport and the arts. The answer was the lottery.

    Since then, I don’t know if you know how much it has given apart from prizes. How much do you think it has delivered to the public in good causes?

    Matt Chorley: In good causes? It must be billions.

    Sir John Major: Have a rough guess.

    Matt Chorley: Three billion?

    Sir John Major: £50 billion. And that was 18 months ago, so it will be £51 billion, rising to £52 billion now. You can go to almost every village in the country and you’ll find something badged with National Lottery money. If you see that badge, you think, “I did that.” Well, it wasn’t only me. Lots of other people were there. One takes personal blame and one takes personal credit, but neither of those things is fully justified. You shouldn’t entirely get the blame or entirely receive the credit. But I am very pleased it went well.

    Matt Chorley: A final thought, then, going back to where we began. The young 13-year-old John not working that hard at school, difficulty at home, parents distracted by trying to make ends meet. If that young John now were to come across our conversation and had an interest in politics, what would you say to him?

    Sir John Major: I would say to young people, we need you in politics. If all the talent in this country concentrates on “How can I earn more money?” and “How can I avoid public service like the plague because I don’t like the idea of it?”, then we are in deep doo-dah.

    We do need people to go into politics and we need our best people to go into politics. That may mean some changes in the way in which Parliament works. It will certainly require a change in attitude where public service, whether it is elected public service in the House of Commons, appointed public service in the Civil Service or any of the government bodies, particularly local government, is attractive. We need that sort of career to be attractive and to be socially attractive as well as financially attractive. I am not suggesting one is more important than the other. We need both. When you have respect for those, I think we will be getting back into a much more healthy position. It is very silly to argue and denigrate public service. People simply shouldn’t do it.

    Sir John Major, it has been fascinating to talk to you. Thank you for your time.

    Sir John Major: My pleasure. Thank you.

  • Mr Major’s Press Conference in Maastricht – 11 December 1991

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s press conference in Maastricht on Wednesday 11th December 1991.


    PRIME MINISTER:

    Thanks to all of you for staying so late for this press conference. We have had two and a half days of intense, detailed and occasionally tough negotiation. I am very happy with the outcome, I think it is a success both for Britain and for the whole of the Community.

    What we have agreed in the last couple of days is a treaty on European Union covering economic and monetary union and also political union. It marks a very significant step forward for Community cooperation, it settles the argument as to whether we should deepen or widen the Community, because we will now, as we have advocated for some time, do both of those things.

    Let me turn firstly to economic and monetary union. Our main objective in the economic and monetary union treaty was to secure a legally water-tight provision so that the United Kingdom can decide whether it wants to join a single currency or not and if it does, when it should join a single currency. We have achieved that in a legally binding protocol which forms an integral part of the treaty. We have secured also strict convergence conditions before any of the Community countries can move to Stage 3. We have retained absolute control over monetary policy in Stage 2 and of course whether we move to Stage 3 at all will require a separate decision by the British government and Parliament. Those were precisely the objectives we came here to achieve in this treaty.

    The text on political union preserves the separate pillared treaty structure which we have long argued for on defence, on foreign policy and on interior and justice cooperation. What that means is no Community competence in those areas and no jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice. That was a vital requirement for the United Kingdom and we have achieved it in full.

    For foreign policy we have preserved unanimity in decision-making, that also was vital for us. If there are to be any implementing decisions capable of majority voting then those decisions themselves will be first identified by unanimity, again an absolute requirement when we came here.

    On defence, the outcome is good for the Alliance and it is good for us. We have agreed that any new arrangements must be compatible with NATO, that defence issues should be dealt with by the Western European Union and not the Community and that the Western European Union will not be subordinated to the Union. A common defence policy will be a matter for the long term.

    We have also agreed a separate Western European Union declaration annex to the treaty which further reaffirms the independent status and decision making of the Western European Union, confirms that any new arrangements will be compatible with NATO and that the Western European Union will act in conformity with the Alliance. This is absolutely the outcome that we required.

    There has been a lot of concern, and not I think just in the United Kingdom, at creeping competence in the Community, the Commission using whatever articles are available to create an unjustified legal base for Community action. That has been particularly true and has caused us especial concern in the social area.

    Let me say, without equivocation, that we accept that there is a social dimension to the Community. Eighteen out of the 32 measures in the social action programme have been adopted, all of them, all of them, have been implemented by the United Kingdom. What we could not accept was further extensions of Community competence, not to deal with health and safety, but to do with employer, employee relations.

    I said before I came that I could not accept a text that would allow the Community to adopt measures that would drive a coach and horses through the trade union reforms we have won over the last decade which have, just to give you an illustration of their effectiveness, reduced the days lost through strikes from 29 million in 1979 to less than 2 million last year. As you will know, the social chapter has been dropped entirely.

    In the social area the treaty text is completely unchanged from the existing Treaty of Rome, there are no extensions of Community competence, no additional provisions for majority voting, there is no new treaty text on social issues. The other eleven member states, who have different backgrounds and different traditions in this area, will make their own separate arrangements for extra measures which will affect only their countries and for which they only will pay.

    One of the features of the negotiations has been the recognition that the Community should not just step in because it feels like it but only when there is a good reason for the Community to do so. And this is reflected in the treaty text, proposed by Britain and Germany, which implements the principle of subsidiarity, the principle in essence that the Community should only take action if and insofar as its objectives cannot be better achieved at national level. That was important to us and it has been agreed and sanctified in the treaty.

    We have reduced unanimity for major areas of Community spending and in particular research and development. Now that is an important gain. At the same time we have strengthened the Community so as to help our citizens. We have improved the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the Community.

    We have given the European Parliament a new power to investigate maladministration. We have created a European Community ombudsman. We have given European citizens a right to petition the European Parliament. All of those that I have just listed were British initiatives that are now in the treaty.

    We have taken measures to improve the implementation of Community measures, on which Britain’s record on implementation is one of the best. And in particular, the European Court of Justice in future will be able to impose fines on those governments which fail to carry out their legal obligations.

    I referred a few moments ago to deepening as well as widening. In its conclusions the Community, at our suggestion, has agreed that new membership negotiations can begin in 1992. The Commission will undertake a study of enlargement and will report back to the European Council in Lisbon next June. Enlargement will then be something for Britain to carry forward during our Presidency in the second half of next year. We look forward to doing that.

    The greatest challenge to the Community is not our internal development but how the Community as a whole matches up to the dramatic events taking place all around us, particularly to the East of Europe.

    We have agreed a number of statements on foreign policy issues as well. Let me draw your attention just to two of them. The first on the Soviet Union is designed to encourage peaceful and democratic development in the Soviet Union, it calls on the republics to respect the rights of minorities, to put into effect international agreements on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, to control and secure their nuclear weapons and to honour their obligations in respect of the Soviet Union’s external debt.

    As many of you may know, I discussed developments in the Soviet Union with President Mitterrand and we have kept in close touch with the Americans over the last two days.

    The Political Directors of Britain, France and the United States will be meeting later this week and I hope the Foreign Ministers of the three countries will meet to discuss these developments, I hope, next week.

    The European Council has endorsed the demands which we, France and the United States have made to the Libyan government requiring them to abandon their support of terrorism and hand over the perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing.

    So those are some of the things that have happened over the last couple of days. Tonight’s agreement of course was not just achieve in two days, it reflects a great deal of work over many months. It reflects enormous credit on Ruud Lubbers and the Dutch Presidency who have been unfailingly courteous and helpful throughout the lead-up to the negotiations and during the negotiations.

    And tough though the negotiations have sometimes been, there has been a genuine spirit of give and take amongst the Member States, I believe that the agreement that we have agreed this evening fully reflects Britain’s interests on economic and monetary union, foreign policy, defence and the future development of the Community. I shall have no hesitation in recommending it to Parliament and to the British people.

    And finally, I told you when I came here that the term federal vocation would have gone by Tuesday night – it has.

     

    QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

    QUESTION (John Sergeant):

    Could you confirm that the eleven countries who have agreed the protocol on the social chapter will not be able to act within the structures of the European Community and that any policies they agree together will not become part of Community law?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That is correct. They will be able to use the Commission, they will be able to do that, it will be specially funded, it will be separately funded and it will not become Community law as far as the United Kingdom is concerned.

    QUESTION (Keith Rockwell, Journal of Commerce):

    You mentioned that you thought that the social aspects of this treaty would result in damage to the competitiveness of Europe, I wonder if you think that the outcome of this treaty or this opting out or however we are going to phrase it here, may give Britain a let up on its competitors in terms of foreign investment and trade in the future?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It certainly will do us no harm. One of the prominent European figures indicated some time ago that a country that did not have these obligations would act as a magnet to investment. I do not know whether that is true or not. I can certainly say that in the United Kingdom in recent years we have had the fastest job growth since the war, 75 percent increase in the number of self-employed since 1979, 33 percent rise in the number of registered businesses.

    These were developments over the last decade that I was simply not prepared to put at risk and I believe that the provisions that were there in the social chapter, for reasons that I spelt out to our Community partners, would have damaged that competitiveness and would have damaged that job creation. And it was for that reason, not only anti-communautaire spirit, that I decided that those were provisions that it was not in Britain’s interests to sign up to. We have certainly retained our competitiveness, I look forward to welcoming a great deal more of inward investment and to sustaining our competitiveness in the short and medium term.

    QUESTION (John Palmer, Guardian):

    As you have told us, this European Summit has embarked upon an accelerated timetable in many ways for full European Union, Britain reserves the right to remain outside. Eleven countries, we have heard tonight, have announced their intention, using the European Commission and the European Parliament and with the British Ministers abstaining in the Council of Ministers, to press ahead with social legislation. Is it the position that we have now got a two-speed Europe and you have put Britain embedded down in the slow lane?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Absolutely not. Let me take the first point which I assume was aimed at economic and monetary union. You said that we have reserved the right not to go in, but that is only half the story, John, we have also reserved the right to go in if we think it is right of the British economy at that stage, it is not a one-way option. Everybody else seems to have decided now, irrespective of the circumstances at a later stage, irrespective of their own economic development and what the world looks like, that they wish to commit themselves to that providing the convergence conditions are met.

    We have a two-way option. If we think it is right, we can go in. If we think it is wrong, we can stay out. So we have surrendered nothing and we have lost nothing, the option is there for us to go in or not to go in as we choose.

    Upon the second point about the social charter. The social charter is of course a misnomer because it really relates essentially to employment matters and what is important is that you actually look at what is proposed in that social charter and see what it actually means and the extent to which it would effect, badly in my judgment, upon British practices and British competitiveness.

    Some people say: “But the social charter, it must be good for British workers.” I can only say to you, John, that costing British workers jobs is not good for British workers and that is why we decided not to go in it.

    QUESTION:

    If I could look at the issue of foreign policy, what is the current British stance on asylum seekers and refugee seekers that are going to potentially be coming in from Eastern Europe given the current instability in the Ukraine and Belorussia and Russia as well? What is your stance and how is Britain prepared to deal with the potential influx of asylum seekers and refugees?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    This has been discussed over recent weeks, not just of course in the discussions over the last couple of days, but has also been discussed more extensively amongst the Foreign Ministers. Now by good fortune I have the Foreign Secretary with me, so he will respond to you.

    FOREIGN SECRETARY:

    You will see the declaration that was put out today about the Soviet Union, that gives the general background as to how we analyse the position there. But as regards the asylum seekers and refugees, of course there is a problem right across Europe and I think we are all agreed that we hold strictly to the UN definition of a refugee, asylum-seeker, as someone who has a well founded fear of individual persecution. Those people we accept, all the countries of Europe accept, as is our duty under international law. But what we do not accept of course is the right of people to come to Europe, whether it is Britain or Germany or wherever, simply in order to better their economic position and we have legislation going through the British Parliament at the present time to deal with that.

    So one of the things that has been agreed here at Maastricht is that the countries of Europe should work together more intensely on this and similar problems, not under the jurisdiction of the Community, not with the competence of the Community, but between governments. And that work I think is going to be increasingly important as the months pass.

    QUESTION (Andrew Marr, Economist):

    Mr Major, you have said that there has been a lot of give and take in these negotiations and you very helpfully listed for us all those areas where you have taken. Could you list for us now those areas where you have given?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am sure lots of other people will do that for you, Andrew. But let me set out some of them. There are some areas of increased competence, a good deal of it by decisions by unanimity rather than qualified majority vote and there has been an extension of a negative assent procedure.

    We have also given in terms of what is in the treaty. Many of those individual matters that give greater powers to the European Parliament, and I listed them earlier in my opening remarks, were in fact British initiatives. I think what we have also done in some areas is to ensure that decisions are taken which are good for the Community, not just for the United Kingdom but for the Community as a whole. So I think we have given a great deal to these treaties and I believe dispassionate observers would acknowledge that,

    QUESTION (Robin Oakley, The Times):

    There have been indications that some national parliaments might not ratify the deal reached tonight if it is not agreed by the European Parliament and also there is some expectation that the European Parliament might not like the deal. If it is not ratified by various national parliaments and your 11 partners come hack to you and say they need a new deal, a new arrangement on the social chapter, would you be willing to start talking about it again?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I honestly do not think that problem will arise. The European Parliament will accept this deal, I have no doubt about it. I dare say in some areas the European Parliament would have liked the deal to have gone further, that is undoubtedly the case. There is no-one, no national government that sat round that table that got everything it wanted, all of them have conceded something, all of them will have some things in the treaty that they would have preferred not to have had. They have made the decision as national governments to endorse the treaty, the European Parliament finds itself in the same place, it has got a great deal that it will like, it has not got some things that it wanted, but do not myself believe that it will fail to ratify the treaty.

    QUESTION (David Marsh, FT):

    Two questions about monetary union. What is the likelihood that a sufficiently large number of countries will actually reach the very tough convergence criteria to make monetary union a meaningful possibility either in 1996 or in 1999? And at what stage will you be moving to make the Bank of England independent to at least prepare yourself for the possibility of Britain opting in?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    On the first point, it is very speculative as to when people will actually achieve that state of convergence. The convergence conditions that people have to meet are quite tough and yet it is absolutely essential that those convergence conditions are there, otherwise there would be an economic catastrophe for Europe. I cannot make a judgment as to how rapidly those countries will get to convergence, it is certainly possible that they will not have achieved it by 1996/97, which is why the French for example, who are very enthusiastic about it, have produced the proposition of looking at it again two years later. Whether a sufficient number, a critical mass, will have reached it then is still a moot point. So that is speculative and I cannot make a judgment about that.

    On your second point, the Bank of England would become independent if we went into Stage 3 and when we went into Stage 3,

    QUESTION (Radio CB international):

    How can it be that in this year there is carrying on a bloody civil war in Europe, people are being killed, Dubrovnik which happens to be a favourite town of mine is being destroyed, and there sit the twelve Heads of government of the European Community and nothing is being done and can anything be done and what can be done to stop it after the 83rd ceasefire?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I do not think anyone has done more than the Foreign Secretary and his counterparts in Europe to try and bring it to an end. If the combatants in Yugoslavia continue fighting it is not necessarily possible for other people to stop them. But there is a wider answer to your question. Thirty years ago people might well have said: “How can you stop the Western European nations fighting against one another?” Today, such a question in Western Europe would be ludicrous, the integration and the inter-relationship between the European Community has effectively stopped conflict in Western Europe for good. One of the reasons that the decisions on enlargement are so important is that perhaps not in my political lifetime but beyond that, we can look forward to a Community that stretches right the way across the whole of Europe and that will prevent the prospects of conflict right the way across the whole of Europe. We have started a trail today that might provide the only comprehensive answer to your question in due course.

    QUESTION:

    Are you an optimist for the Balkans?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It is not for me to declare whether I am an optimist or a pessimist.

  • Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the 1991 European Council Meeting at Maastricht – 11 December 1991

    Below is Mr Major’s statement made in the House of Commons on 11th December 1991 on the European Council held at Maastricht.


    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the European Council in Maastricht which I attended with my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

    The European Council has reached agreement on a treaty on European union. The relevant texts have been deposited along with the presidency conclusions. The House will be invited to debate the outcome next week.

    Let me set out the main provisions of the agreements we reached. The treaty covers economic and monetary union and political union. It follows the structure for which the United Kingdom has consistently argued.

    The treaty creates a new legal framework for co-operation between member states in foreign and security policy and in the fight against international crime. That co-operation will take place on an intergovernmental basis outside the treaty of Rome. That means that the Commission will not have the sole right of initiative and the European Court will have no jurisdiction.

    On defence, we have agreed a framework for co-operation in which the primacy of the Atlantic alliance has been confirmed and the role of the Western European Union has been enhanced.

    As the House knows, there was strong pressure over many months for all aspects of co-operation to come within European Community competence. That was not acceptable to this country. Instead, an alternative route to European co-operation has been opened up. I believe that this will be seen as an increasingly significant development as the Community opens its doors to new members, and more flexible structures are required.

    I turn now to the main features of the text. The treaty provides for the possibility that member states will wish to adopt a single currency later this decade, but they can do so only if they meet strict convergence conditions–conditions for which the British Government have pressed from the outset. These cover inflation, budget deficits, exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates.

    A single currency may come into being in 1997, but only if a minimum of seven countries meet the convergence conditions, and eight of the Twelve vote in favour. The treaty lays down that a single currency will come into being by 1999, but only if those convergence conditions are met and only for those countries which meet them. It is therefore highly uncertain when such a currency will be created and which countries it will cover.

    In the House on 20 November, I said that there must be a provision giving the United Kingdom the right to decide for ourselves whether or not to move to stage 3. That requirement has been secured. It is set out in a legally binding protocol which forms an integral part of the treaty. The protocol was drafted by the United Kingdom and fully protects the position of this House. The effect of the protocol is as follows. We have exactly the same option to join a single currency at the same time as other member states if we wish. We shall be involved in all the decisions. But, unlike other Governments, we have not bound ourselves to join regardless of whether it makes economic or political sense.

    The treaty text on political union provides for enhanced intergovernmental co-operation on foreign and security policy, on defence policy and in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and other crimes.

    International crime knows no frontiers. Terrorists and other criminals must not be allowed to escape justice or to retire abroad with the proceeds of their crime. This text gives us a new basis for co-operation with our partners in bringing these criminals to justice.

    The text provides for joint action in foreign policy, building on what was already agreed in the Single European Act. But, as I told the House on 20 November, if Britain needs to act on its own, it must be free to do so. The treaty meets that requirement. Joint action can take place only if we agree. Where there is no joint action, each member state is entirely free to act on its own. If, after joint action has been agreed, a member state needs to take its own measures to meet changed circumstances, it may do so.

    There was pressure from other member states to take foreign policy decisions by majority voting. I was not prepared to agree that Britain could be outvoted on any substantive issue of foreign policy. Some of our partners also sought to draw a distinction between decisions of principle, where unanimity would apply, and implementing decisions which could be subject to majority voting. No one was able to explain how that distinction would work. I told the European Council that, if such occasions did arise, we should consider the case for majority voting on its merits. The treaty reflects our view. It provides that the Council may, but only by unanimity, designate certain decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting. But we cannot be forced to subject our foreign policy to the will of other member states. We have, in fact, preserved unanimity for all decisions where we decide that we need it.

    We are agreed that Europe must do more for its own defence. We should build up the Western European Union as the defence pillar of the European union, but the treaty embodies the view set out in the Anglo-Italian proposal two months ago, and endorsed at last month’s summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation that whatever we do at European level must be compatible with NATO. The WEU must in no way be subordinate to the European Council. It is not. We have avoided the danger of setting up defence structures which would compete with NATO. We have created a framework in which Europe can develop its defence role in a way which complements the American presence in Europe and does not put it at risk.

    In these negotiations, we put forward a series of proposals designed to be of direct benefit to the European citizen. All of them were accepted. The Community has agreed to increase the accountability of European Community institutions; to strengthen the European Parliament’s financial control over the Commission; to allow the European Parliament to investigate maladministration and to appoint a Community ombudsman accessible to all Community citizens; to build up the role of the Court of Auditors, which becomes an institution of the Community; and to ensure compliance with Community obligations by giving the European Court of Justice power to impose fines on Governments who sign directives but subsequently do not implement them.

    We wanted–and secured–a sensible enhancement of the role of the European Parliament. We did not accept the proposal made by other member states for a power of co-decision between the Parliament and the Council. As I told the House on 20 November, the Council of Ministers must be the body that ultimately determines the Community’s laws and policies.

    I also said then that we were prepared to consider some blocking power for the European Parliament. That has now been agreed. The treaty sets up, in a limited number of areas, a conciliation procedure where there is disagreement between the Council and Parliament. In the last analysis, the Parliament would be able to block a decision in those areas, but only if an absolute majority of its members turned out to vote the proposal down.

    The House has been rightly concerned at the creeping extension of Community competence over the last few years. The Commission has often brought forward proposals using a dubious legal base, and the Council has found it difficult to halt that practice in the European Court. We have taken significant steps to deal with that problem. First, the structure of the treaty puts the issues of foreign and security policy, interior and justice matters and defence policy beyond the reach of the Commission and the European Court. Secondly, the treaty itself embodies the vital principle of “subsidiarity”, making it clear that the Community should only be involved in decisions which cannot more effectively be taken at national level. Thirdly, in some areas–notably health protection, educational exchanges, vocational training and culture–we have defined Community competence clearly for the first time. Fourthly, there will be no extension of Community competence in employer-employee relations–the so-called social area. We have a high standard of social protection in this country. Our national health service, free at the point of use, is the envy of many in Europe, but we recognise the Community’s social dimension. Also–unlike some of our European partners–we have implemented that dimension too ; 19 out of the 33 measures in the social action programme have been agreed. But there is no reason for the Community to get involved in employment legislation, which must be for each country to decide for itself.
    Over the past 12 years, we have transformed labour relations. In 1979, 29 million working days were lost in strikes. Last year the figure was less than 2 million. I was not prepared to see that record put in jeopardy. Nor was I prepared to risk Britain’s competitive position as the European magnet for inward investment. I was not prepared to put British jobs on the line. [Interruption.]

    Mr. Speaker : Order. A great many people outside the House are interested in what the Prime Minister has to say.

    The Prime Minister : Many of our partners have a wholly different tradition of employment practice which is reflected in the separate arrangements which they have agreed, which will affect only their countries and for which only they will pay. But even among these member states there are many who fear the effect of Community measures on their jobs and their ability to compete. Our arguments are based not only on our national interest but on the risks we perceive to the competitive position of the Community as a whole. This week’s events in the Soviet Union were a salutary reminder that reform in the Community is not an end in itself. The Community’s primary task must be to extend its own advantages of democracy, stability and prosperity to eastern Europe. At British initiative, we committed ourselves at Maastricht to the further enlargement of the Community, starting with the EFTA countries. When they and, in due course, the new democracies of eastern Europe are ready to join the Community, we shall be ready to welcome them. With this in mind, the Commission will report on enlargement to next June’s European Council in Lisbon. Thereafter, it will be for the British presidency to carry that work forward. I look forward to doing so.

    We agreed a number of statements on foreign policy issues. I will single out two of them. On the Soviet Union, the European Council calls on the republics to respect the rights of minorities, to implement international agreements on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, to control and secure their nuclear weapons, and to honour their obligations in respect of the Soviet Union’s external debt.

    The European Council has endorsed the demands which we, France and the United States have made to the Libyan Government requiring them to abandon their support of terrorism and to hand over the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing.

    The founders of the Community knew that they could not create a viable organisation if they established goals that could never be achieved. In talking about European union, we are talking about concepts that have to be cast in the reality of national legislation and everyday life.

    The Single European Act started as a grandiose design and ended up as a workmanlike blueprint for a free market. Those treaties have followed the same course.

    Our role has been to put forward practical suggestions–and sometimes to rein in the larger ambitions of our partners. Where we believed their ideas would not work, we have put forward our own alternatives.

    Those can be found throughout this treaty. As with all international negotiations, there has been give and take between all 12 member states. But the process was one in which Britain has played a leading role, and the result is one in which we can clearly see the imprint of our views.
    This is a treaty which safeguards and advances our national interests. It advances the interests of Europe as a whole. It opens up new ways of co-operating in Europe. It clarifies and contains the powers of the Commission. It will allow the Community to develop in depth. It reaches out to other Europeans–the new democracies who want to share the benefits we already enjoy. It is a good agreement for Europe, and a good agreement for the United Kingdom. I commend it to the House.

  • Mr Major’s Joint Press Conference with President Mitterrand – 24 June 1991

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s joint press conference with President Mitterrand, held in Dunkirk on Monday 24th June 1991.


    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    Ladies and Gentlemen. We are very happy to welcome Mr Major and several of his Ministers today here in Dunkirk, it is in the framework of the regular talks that we have between our two countries. Mr Major and myself have had a conversation and then Edith Cresson, the French Prime Minister, joined us and at the same time the Ministers had started meeting in the middle of the morning in order to work out the conclusions which they then put to us later.

    The talks revolved around Europe of course, the preparation for the Luxembourg European Summit which as you know will be beginning next Friday. There were a certain number of agreements, we are understood for example on the need to terminate the intergovernmental conference by the end of 1991 at Maastricht in the Netherlands, but considering that the Luxembourg text on political union I should say as the basis of our work. We also talked about defence and the structure of the future treaty on economic and monetary union with the transition from one stage to another.

    There were other questions which we also talked about, in particular the WEU, GATT and the Schengen agreements. And then moving further away from Europe we discussed several international matters, still in connection with WEU, the preparation of the forthcoming meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers on 27 June and then for Iraq we noted considerable convergence of views on the vigilance that had to be deployed in northern Iraq, in Kurdistan, so as not to have the past beginning again, guarantees have to be given to the Kurdish populations. On the one hand the [indistinct] if necessary the means for such vigilance to be set up. There are certain questions which have been put to the Iraqi government and replies to those questions will to a large extent determine the steps that have to be taken. We also talked about the Atlantic Alliance and the preparation of the forthcoming Summit on 15 July and bilateral cooperation in defence matters.

    But I will leave it to Mr Major to pursue this presentation and I would like to say to him once again that for we the French it is always fairly pleasant and certainly extremely useful to be able to take into greater depth our conversations because our two countries to such an enormous degree are associates in the broader areas of political affairs for Europe and for international affairs generally. So I wish to thank you, Prime Minister.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Mr President, thank you very much indeed and thank you for those opening remarks.

    President Mitterrand has set out in the last few moments the breadth of our discussions this morning and I have very little really to add to that. It has been a very useful and I think a very timely meeting with the European Council immediately ahead of us, the World Economic Summit in July and with our joint intention to reach agreement on the two inter-governmental conferences by Maastricht at the end of this year.

    So I am most grateful today both to President Mitterrand and to the Mayor of Dunkirk, Minister of State Delobar [phon] for their hospitality and for the warmth of their welcome here today. This is of course a town with very historic connections for both of us. It was also a very pleasant opportunity this morning to meet for the first time Madame Cresson. the new French Prime Minister, I very much enjoyed that and I know my colleagues have had very useful discussions with their opposite numbers over the last few hours.

    The relationship that the United Kingdom has with France is very important to us, it is one of constant meetings, constant exchanges, it is a fluid, long-standing and vitally important relationship both within the European Community, within NATO and bilaterally, it is one we treasure very much indeed. And although this is the first formal Summit for a year, the President and I have met on a number of occasions over the last 6 months and there is frequent contact and frequent meetings between Number 10 and the Elysee, I know that will continue and I welcome that very much indeed.

    It is vital I believe to both our countries to reach agreement on European defence. We need to reconcile the desire to spell out long term concepts and concerns with the need to be certain what they mean in practice in the near term and we have instructed our officials to work on this problem with the intention of taking an agreed position at the Council at Maastricht.

    On Friday and Saturday of this week we should in Luxembourg take stock and give guidance for the future work of the two vitally important inter-governmental conferences. Very considerable progress has been made under the Luxembourg Presidency and I am very happy to congratulate them on the work that they have done. The President and I have agreed this morning that we can build on that progress to reach decisions at the European Council at Maastricht in December. What we cannot do at Luxembourg this week is to take partial decisions half-way through a negotiation on subjects which can only be judged as a whole at the end of the negotiating process.

    We touched on a wide range of matters in our discussions. On economic and monetary union, for example, it was agreed that strengthening the Ecu was a very important part of Stage 2 and that monetary policy should remain in national hands during that period. There are many matters still to be discussed both at the European Council and in ECOFIN before we are able to finalise decisions on economic and monetary union towards the end of this year.

    We discussed also a number of the important matters that are dealt with in the political union treaty and found there were areas of clear agreement and other areas where there was still more work to be done. But I hope and believe again that it will be possible [indistinct].

    We touched very briefly on the prospect of welcoming President Gorbachev to London next month at the end of the Economic Summit, I think that will be a useful meeting, I believe it will be an opportunity to hear from President Gorbachev of his commitment to democratic institutions in the Soviet Union and for the development of a genuine market economy. Those are discussions both the President and I look forward to.

    And finally on bilateral issues we are intensifying our discussions on possible areas of cooperation in the defence field. Britain and France played a very notable part in the liberation of Kuwait and in the establishment of safe havens in Iraq. We believe that there is room to enhance that cooperation as we develop a stronger European defence identity.

    So in summary we have had some very worthwhile and very wide ranging discussions over the last few hours, I have found them most useful and I look forward to continuing those contacts in the future.

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    Thank you very much, Prime Minister. I could add to what you have said, the intensity of our relationship will be given additional confirmation fairly soon because we will be meeting on 29 July in Calais to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the treaty signed at the time on the Channel Tunnel.

    QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

    [NB: Microphone difficulties made audibility difficult]

    QUESTION:

    Mr President, would we be talking more about a common currency or a single currency?

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    [Indistinct] that is of course the whole question of substance, as you know, single currency/common currency. What was said among ourselves is that the process that has started, and we agreed on the timetable for the three stages, the point is that this programme should make it possible for us to go towards a single currency with it being understood that for France this is a [indistinct] and to negotiate with our partners for the setting up of a single currency; whereas for the UK it could be a consequence if everything that will happen before that time, before the date chosen by the Community has in fact developed to lead harmoniously to the possibility of having a single currency. In other words, the theoretical and a priori view points are different, the method that would make it possible for a rapprochement to take place and really Mr Major quite recently has taken certain initiatives on the hard-Ecu which after all had made it possible for the situation to get unblocked. But I think it would probably be better for the Prime Minister to say himself what his position is on this.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Thank you very much. You do touch on the very heart of the problems that remain to be decided and there is a great deal to be concluded before we can reach proper decisions about this. One of the matters of course that is of most importance is a proper assessment of what the economic results of proceeding either via a common currency or via a prescriptive approach to a single currency might be. Such a detailed economic analysis has not yet been concluded and one does not quite know what the outcome of that would be. But I have expressed my concern in the past about a prescriptive move forward suddenly to a single currency without the right degree of preparation and the right degree of economic convergence. And the United Kingdom would find it very difficult to agree to the objective until it actually knew what the effect of the objective would be and we cannot of course know what the effect of the objective will be until we see to what extent and in what fashion and at what pace the economies do converge. And that is one of the matters that must remain under discussion between now and the remainder of the year.

    The proposal that the United Kingdom put forward when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer was a proposal to create a parallel or common currency in the term that you used but would enable countries to utilise that common currency whilst withdrawing their own domestic currency at the same time to ensure there was no growth in money supply and hence increased inflationary prospects in Europe. That is a matter we shall still want to discuss with our colleagues. If the hard-Ecu proposal were successful, if countries wanted it, if companies wanted it, if individuals wanted it, then it is self-evident that that would develop into a single currency and it was with that proposition and with that understanding that we actually launched this proposal in the summer of last year. So these are .matters under discussion and the prospect is that we will discuss these and the economic effect of those routes in the period between now and December.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible].

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    The question, which you may or may not have heard, was should the word “federal” go, be removed from the Treaty, but that problem has not really been settled. Some people would like to move towards a federal structure, others no and the discussion is an open one so one cannot prejudge that particular question.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible but question repeated by interpreter]

    The question is whether the French would be prepared to support the British in Luxembourg and try to defer or evacuate that problem of a federal goal.

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    The French are in favour of an orientation of that kind if you like but we had not planned to spend the little time at our disposal to try and persuade our British friends to share our views on that. We may perhaps try in Luxembourg or during the course of the year – that will be for later.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Our views on the word “federal” have been clear for some time. There are some differing views within the European Community as to what the word “federal” actually means. It certainly means different things to different nations in the European Community and that does give rise to a considerable amount of confusion but as expressed and understood in the United Kingdom of “federal” being a centralisation, it is not an attractive proposition to the United Kingdom and the formulation we prefer is the formulation of course that appeared in the original Treaty of Rome of ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. That is a prospect that operates bilaterally and operates also through the Community that is a more acceptable premise but the idea of federal union is not an attractive concept for the United Kingdom and we have made that clear repeatedly.

    QUESTION:

    While accepting that the word “federal” can mean different things in different countries, why has it become such a sticking point for the United Kingdom?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    There must, at the conclusion of these Inter-Governmental Conferences, in the Treaty be no doubt about the destinations to which we are heading in that regard so if there is doubt about what “federal union” may mean and it may be interpreted as leading to a great level of centralisation beyond that that we would find tolerable in the United Kingdom or that I believe many of our partners would find tolerable in the Community, then we ought not to leave such a phrase so capable of misinterpretation in the Treaties.

    At this stage, we have a draft Treaty in front of us, the details of that have not yet been discussed. There will be many changes, I have no doubt, of all sorts in the Treaty texts that are before us in Luxembourg and some of those changes may be flagged up in discussions at Luxembourg this week-end, others will not, but I think the time to be concerned about the detail of what is in the Treaty is as we come close to Maastricht and of course, at Maastricht and at the conclusion of it.

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    The discussion has only just started; one cannot consider it is closed. The two IGCs have fixed the end of 1991 in order to conclude and we have not got there yet so we cannot prejudge the decision that will be taken.

    QUESTION:

    Do you think, Mr. President, that the discussion of the long-term goals of Europe is a purely British discussion? Do you think that on the French side the French have really accepted the idea of a European federation and that, in a way, we should talk about this?

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    No, I confirm what has already been said: the debate has not yet taken place; it just has not started yet so we cannot say what the outcome will be.

    In France, I myself mentioned that as a hypothesis, a possibility, but it is only one hypothesis.

    QUESTION:

    Prime Minister, do you now have French and German support at the Summit for a Monetary Union Treaty which, if necessary, allows Britain to opt-in at a time of its choosing?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    These are discussions that we are going to have in ECOFIN and at the European Council over the months ahead. We have discussed many of the details, many of the practical aspects of what needs to be discussed but until we have reached the conclusion of those discussions, we cannot determine what the outcome will be so it is not a question of making agreements and deals way in advance.

    We have set out the reservations which we have; we have discussed the details and the way ahead with our partners in France and in Germany and indeed in a number of the other European countries and we will advance those discussions over the months ahead.

    I think we have made the position as clear as we possibly can about the reservations that we have. I have, for example, made it clear on a number of occasions that progress towards economic and monetary union, which was mentioned originally in the Treaty of Rome and also in the Single European Act, is not just a question of dates though I understand the desire to set dates as a time-table but it is also utterly dependent upon the key questions of economic convergence which in the view of the British are more important than simply the dates; that one needs to see whether the economic situation makes it a justifiable proposition to contemplate moving from a dozen currencies in Europe to one.

    Those are all details and technical matters many of which are only in their infancy in terms of discussion, so it is impossible yet to reach final conclusions as to what the outcome will be.

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    We have come back several times to this kind of discussion and after all, it is very pleasant for me to see several members of the press who seem to be in a great hurry for the whole thing to be done with and in a way they sort of share my own feelings on this but certain deadlines have been fixed, certain times, a time-table has been fixed, a time-table which takes us in fact several years ahead. These are things that are very important, serious matters and difficult matters to be given time since they in fact will affect the future of the twelve countries of the Community and perhaps others too so it is something that has to be carefully thought out.

    Our positions on the French side are well known. We tend to want more, if you like, than the common structure that is under discussion and the discussion should be over its first period before the end of 1991. We ourselves have our preferences obviously and our preferences would be for a stronger structure of the federal type for example but it would be very premature to put that point of the problem to partners who have not even finished talking about Political Union and Economic Monetary Union, so I think there is a time for all things.

    QUESTION:

    My question is nothing to do with the Franco-British discussion. A Moroccan Member of the Opposition has just been expelled from France. Is that a question of “reasons of state” so to speak or are there genuine reasons which explain and justify the fact that Mr. Duni [phon] has been expelled from France? Why was this done?

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    Mr. Duri for many years enjoyed the status from 1974 of a political refugee and this was under my predecessor – seven years under my predecessor, more than 10 years under me – but as long as he was content with respecting the obligations of a political refugee because there are certain obligations on both sides – it is a contract, if you like, a contract between the country of asylum and the refugee – and the political refugee has to show certain constraints and that is what happens.

    In France, there are political refugees of all nationalities. My definition of a political refugee is someone who is rejected by the government of his country and who rejects such government and so obviously is a spokesman of a certain vigorous form of action against the political system of his own country.

    But France, acting as host as it were, cannot accept to move into serious difficulties with each of the countries from which we have political refugees so there are certain duties concerning constraint shown by a political refugee and this is a legal obligation; this is mandatory for any political refugee asking for right of asylum in France.

    This kind of problem arises very often and I repeat that it is rather understandable surely. A political refugee is usually someone who wishes to pursue in a different form the [indistinct] that he is engaged in but France also has her own obligations.

    So for 17 years there was no real problem except that for several months now – and also this is nothing to do incidentally with the hypothesis that some people have thought up about the recent incidents – but for several months Mr. Duni had been warned that on several occasions and in several areas he was in fact violating the rules and his obligations. This does happen periodically but not very often in France because one is fairly indulgent but the time did come where he had gone beyond the limits and there were too many violations of all kinds and therefore it was decided to expel him.

    What do you want me to add to that? For the rest, under our French law, freedoms etc. are fully respected. One can express oneself in France, any French citizen who says something in writing or in speech and is subjected to no censorship as you know well, particularly with regard to Morocco because that is the country we are talking about. A foreigner can publish what he wants to publish but one cannot accept the repeated violations – I would almost say continuous violations – of the rules governing political refugees because after all, diplomatic relations between France and the countries concerned depend on all this.

    From time to time I have problems of this kind with a certain number of countries with whom we have diplomatic relations, very often good relations or perhaps not all that good, but the law is the same in all cases and one has to abide by the law.

    QUESTION:

    Can we take it, then, from what the President and the Prime Minister are saying, that the conference in Luxembourg will merely be a stocktaking exercise; that Britain need not expect to be bounced or ambushed in any way on major decisions at that conference?

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    Great Britain never allows herself to be bounced as you indicate and certainly no other country of the Community would try to do that. No! One tries to convince Great Britain of the validity of certain options but that is quite different and there have been in the past particularly fairly lively discussions but we have always managed to move forward; Europe has always moved forward so I am very confident in the outcome following discussions that it will be perfectly well understood that the Inter-Governmental Conferences are to be terminated in 1991 and therefore this will take place at Maastricht in the Netherlands.

    The first European Council in each year – and of course there is a change as you know every six months – makes it possible to take stock of the situation and see where we are, sort out the problems of the day and that is what will take place in Luxembourg, especially as the Luxembourg Government has prepared a document which is a very well-drafted document and which will contribute to shedding light on the whole range of our discussions.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am sure there are going to be issues of substance discussed at Luxembourg – I don’t have any doubt about that. There are a great many things that will need to be discussed on the basis of the Luxembourg draft and then we will have to determine where there are broad areas of agreement and where there are not and I think it will highlight the direction in which the discussions must go for the remaining six months of the year. But we are only half-way into these discussions; there is a long way to go yet and a long way before we can reach final conclusions.

    One of the points of general agreement amongst, I think, all the Community nations is that there is a great deal of inter-relationship between the conclusions both of the Economic and Monetary Union Conference and the Political Union Conference and of the subjects that need to be decided within both of those treaties, so although some areas will throw up points of agreement and points of disagreement, for practical reasons it will be towards the end of the year before final conclusions can be reached when the two packages are seen as a whole.

    QUESTION:

    I would like to ask President Mitterrand and the Prime Minister, following their discussions, how they both see the future relationship of NATO, Western European Union and the European Community developing and how soon each now expects to see a common defence policy?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We have a great deal to discuss about the development of defence. The defence of Europe has been based on NATO for a long period of time and both France and the United Kingdom are both members of NATO and very important members of NATO.

    The development of defence policy in the future has got to examine separate premises: the development and sustenance of NATO and also the fact that within that, it is both desirable and I think inevitable that Europe itself should make a larger contribution to the communal defence of its own territories.

    Those, I think, are points of total agreement and what we have to discuss in the discussions about NATO, about Western European Union and about the Community’s aspirations towards common defence is the best mechanism for taking this debate forward but it is an important debate and one we will have to take step by step.

    PRESIDENT MITTERRAND:

    The debate on common defence is not a debate between France and Great Britain but between France and those who, in the framework of the integrated NATO command, decided to take a certain number of initiatives quite recently, initiatives in which France intends to participate, so there is no specific point really between the UK and France on this; it is a more general debate within NATO at the political level and not in the military framework because France is not present in that military framework.

    But alongside this there is a debate also on the future of the WEU; in other words, we are looking for a sort of embryo for European security and the British and the French are on the same side and engaged in usually constructive discussions and it is really the link between these two manners of approaching security which is at present in question but I repeat this is not specifically a Franco-British negotiation.