The Rt. Hon. Sir John Major KG CH

Tag: Northern Ireland Peace Process

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Henry Grattan Lecture – 25 May 2023

    Sir John Major’s speech made at the Henry Grattan Lecture held at the Irish Embassy on 24 May 2023.

    It’s a great privilege to be here, and to have been invited to deliver this Lecture.

    I first became aware of Henry Grattan in the early 1990s when I was reading myself into the history of Ireland ‒ and particularly her relationship with England.

    For me, this was essential, to better understand the generations of hurt and grievance that lay in history as a backcloth to the violence of The Troubles.

    I soon learned that many of the heroes of Irish history earned their fame fighting for Irish interests ‒ most often in rebellion against the British.

    Rebellions were repetitive over hundreds of years.  The causes of them were bitter and the aftermath long-lasting.  

    History built scars into the relationship between England and Ireland ‒ and between Protestant and Catholic ‒ that were not easy to eliminate.

    Henry Grattan enters into this epic story in the late 18th Century.  

    Under the Declaratory Act of 1719, legislative independence for the Irish Parliament needed the assent of the British Parliament ‒ which was not given.  

    Grattan’s great contribution was ‒ against all expectations ‒ to obtain the repeal of this prohibition.

    One of the eternal truths of politics is that it can be contradictory, complex and confusing:  the simplicities of what we now call “Populism” betrays reality – as well as the nature of human behaviour.

    Grattan was not a man of detail, but he was a formidable orator:  a gift – in my experience – that is innately Irish.  And Grattan used this gift not to threaten, but to persuade, with a subtlety that was hard to deny.

    Grattan argued for Ireland to receive similar concessions to those granted to American colonists after the War of Independence.  As he put it:  

    “Can England cede with dignity?  I suspect she can;  for if she has consented to repeal all the laws respecting America, among which the Declaratory Act is one, she can with majesty repeal the Declaratory Act against Ireland.”

    Tellingly, he went on in a way that was both cunning and wise:

    “Ireland has declared her resolution to stand and fall with the British nation, and has stated her own rights by appealing not to your fears but your magnanimity.”

    It was an approach themed to appeal, and was accepted by Lord Rockingham during his brief second Administration.  

    It was that very approach:  of insight, of political genius, which earned Grattan a place in history.

    Most particularly, for the purposes of this evening, it illustrates a method of reaching across a deep divide, to obtain an outcome few believed possible.

    * * * * *

    I have been asked to speak about the history, legacy and future of Northern Ireland.  

    However, since – at least in part – that will depend on the future policy of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, I will stray a little beyond those narrow confines.

    Let me turn first to my own experience of the Peace Process.  The Good Friday Agreement is now in being, but the full dividends of peace are still a work in progress.  

    Legislation can change the law, but it takes time to build trust and heal emotions.

    I won’t reiterate all the twists and turns of the Joint Declaration (1993) and the Framework Agreement (1995) ‒ I have done that before.  

    This evening I will try to open my mind, and set out how events seemed – from my own perspective – as they unfolded.

    The “Troubles” began ‒ or, more accurately, were reignited ‒ in the late 1960s. On the day I became Prime Minister, they had plagued life in Northern Ireland for over twenty years.  

    Palliatives had been tried ‒ and were still being tried ‒ but none had worked.  The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 had imploded.  

    Several things seemed obvious to me.  No-one was going to “win” this conflict.  

    The British Government would neither give in to force, nor change the status of Northern Ireland – except at the express wish of the people of Northern Ireland.

    The IRA would not ‒ and, probably, could not ‒ give up their struggle for a united Ireland.  

    Nor, having embarked upon an armed struggle, was it easy for them to revert to a purely political struggle ‒ a Grattan struggle, if you wish – using blandishments and logic in place of guns and bombs.  

    Indeed, the IRA could not do this for as long as they were outside the political mainstream.

    I believed that, if violence was to be brought to an end, it would only be done by agreement – and any such agreement would have to embrace the wholly different ambitions of the Unionist and Nationalist communities.

    On a more hopeful note there were allies who could help secure agreement ‒ notably the churches, a wide swathe of public opinion, and brave individuals who had been arguing for peace over many years.

    For me, an essential prerequisite seemed to be a close partnership between Westminster and Dublin, and this fell easily into place.

    Charlie Haughey was Taoiseach in 1990, and he readily agreed to regular meetings between Taoiseach and Prime Minister to cover all Anglo-Irish issues.  

    I was then fortunate to have successive partnerships with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton.  Their ambitions for an end to violence mirrored mine.  

    Moreover, our joint membership of the European Union was an easy opportunity for wholly informal and private discussions.

    And there were other options in play.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke had opened an intelligence channel to carry messages to and from the IRA.  

    There was also the Hume-Adams dialogue that – although anathema to the Unionists – was an important part of the solution.  

    Hume-Adams revealed the nationalist appetite for peace.  It was their talks that first proposed a Joint Anglo-Irish Declaration as a route to peace.  And, if often unintentionally, it revealed IRA thinking.

    On the downside, Unionist hostility to the talks meant that proposals with a Hume-Adams label were treated with the utmost suspicion, and rejected by them almost without consideration.

    The whole route to peace resembled a jigsaw with missing pieces.  

    One further impediment was that all the principal actors had supporters to placate ‒ many of whom were instinctively suspicious of any move towards consensus.  Their fear was betrayal.

    The British Parliament had strong Unionist supporters in ‒ and beyond ‒ the Cabinet who feared that entering into a Peace Process was bound to end badly.  

    The Irish Government had the IRA watching them like hawks.  

    The IRA leadership had to convince their own “volunteers” they weren’t weakening or being tricked – either by one or both of the two Governments.  

    The Unionist Parties had suspicious minds within their Party ranks, and among their membership.

    All of this meant that everyone was having to watch their backs ‒ and convince their supporters of the actions they took.  This inevitably slowed progress – as mistrust always will.  

    Nonetheless, progress was made.

    The Joint Declaration, in December 1993, was a set of agreed principles.  The first, tentative, step towards peace.  

    But, 70 years after partition – and a quarter of a century of bombs, guns, punishment beatings and violence – it was an agreement that both the UK and Ireland could welcome.

    In a thousand years of history, such moments of unity were rare and left me confident that ‒ in due time ‒ an agreement could be fashioned that would last.  

    That said, I was less confident that it would be completed during my time in Government ‒ and so it was to prove.

    The Joint Declaration set out some essential building blocks to the Good Friday Agreement.

    The Unionists were reassured that a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    The Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    And – crucially – paramilitaries were offered a route into the political mainstream.  

    Everyone was given a persuasive case to put to dissenters among their supporters.

    As they did so, work was well underway on what a final settlement might look like.  The Joint Framework Documents ‒ in which John Bruton had a huge input ‒ were in three parts.

    Strand One set out a possible structure for internal Government in Northern Ireland which was of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast.  It proposed a new elected Executive and Assembly.

    Strand Two was concerned with relations between Belfast and Dublin, and foreshadowed cross border bodies.  

    Strand Three was concerned with relations between the UK and the Republic.  

    All three Strands were seen as a single entity – with nothing agreed until everything was agreed.  

    Without that caveat, we might not have been able to move forward.

    John Bruton and I put these proposals out for public consultation:  they did not have an easy birth.  

    During the negotiation ‒ which had been extremely hard pounding for Officials and politicians alike ‒ there had been leaks, both accurate and inaccurate, protests, near rebellions in the House of Commons, and sharp concern in Ireland.

    Unionists – as a matter of course – were suspicious, and uncertain what these constitutional proposals might imply:  was this a short cut to a united Ireland?

    Republican Bishops were unhappy.  

    Presbyterians were critical of proposals that were “too green” for their taste but, as the proposals settled and were studied, many of these fears fell away.  

    A document produced by Paddy Mayhew ‒ a true hero of the Process – together with innumerable meetings to re-assure worried groups, finally produced broad agreement.

    It seemed for a while that the “Frameworks” might fail but, in the end, they did not and – re-assembled – were to become a key part of the Good Friday Agreement.

    Ironically, this year of high concern – and many angry words ‒ was also the first year in a quarter of a century in which there were no terrorists killings.  Violence, yes.  But killings, no.  

    Painstakingly, progress was being made – step by step.  

    And we finally began to see a realistic hope for a better future.

    At this point I should make something clear.  The progress made was not simply due to the work of two governments and a handful of politicians.  

    The Peace Process profited from the spirit of a nation tired of old ills, who demanded something better.  

    It was the construct of many hands.  Talented and dedicated Officials in London, Dublin and Belfast ‒ too many to mention by name – each made an enormous and selfless contribution.

    Church Leaders carried reassurances to worried groups.  The public support for peace was overwhelming and constant:  in this, the Peace Women of Northern Ireland are one especial memory for me.

    Individual politicians on both the Nationalist and Unionist sides made significant contributions:  John Hume throughout the Process and, whilst he was Leader of the Ulster Unionists, Jim Molyneaux, too.  

    Jim’s successor, David Trimble ‒ once a leading opponent – became a courageous advocate.  

    All of these ‒ and so many more ‒ had a role to play.

    There is one key contributor I have not yet mentioned ‒ the leadership of the IRA.  

    Their years of violence had only hardened the heart of successive Westminster governments ‒ it was folly for the IRA to believe they could bomb their way to a settlement.

    When I first learned of the Hume-Adams talks I began to think that the Provisionals had realised that mis-judgement, and did not wish to condemn yet another generation to living through mayhem.

    But, whether I was right or wrong about the IRA’s motive, they did seem to be looking for a political settlement and – if that was indeed so – it was a difficult step for their leadership to take.  

    Many in their ranks would not have approved.

    That was, I began to believe, why – even as the Peace Process moved forward – the IRA returned to repeated violence.  It was to persuade their volunteers that they were not weakening in their armed resolve.  

    As the atrocities mounted ‒ Warrington, Shankill, Greysteel, Canary Wharf ‒ it was often uncomfortable to retain support for the Peace Process – both on a political and personal level.  

    But one reality sustained it:  if it failed, yet more people would be killed or maimed.

    It soon became apparent that ancient enmity – not least the hunger strikes – made it unlikely the IRA would conclude the peace with a Conservative Government.

    But we were lucky.  From the moment in the early 1990s when I first briefed John Smith of my hopes, the Labour Party was wholly supportive.  

    First under John, then ‒ in an interregnum ‒ under Margaret Beckett, before Tony Blair became Leader.  

    This was also true of the Liberal-Democrats.  

    The opposition – within Government and Parliament – came from impassioned supporters of the Union, who feared it would be sacrificed to gain an agreement.

    After Labour’s election victory in 1997, Tony Blair, and his team carried the Peace Process forward at speed, and with great success.  

    There were delicate issues to resolve:  the decommissioning of weapons and the treatment of IRA prisoners being foremost among them.  

    But they handled them all with skill and tenacity, and the Good Friday Agreement was a triumph.

    Twenty five years on, life in Northern Ireland is immeasurably better.  

    No longer is death and destruction a regular feature of the news.  

    Relations between North and South has been transformed ‒ although more can and, I hope, will be done.  

    Britain and Ireland are each other’s closest neighbours.  Over the centuries, where there should have been harmony, there has been antagonism.  

    Now, that is changing.  

    Apart from the turmoil of the Brexit years, when relations were disturbed, London and Dublin have become closer, perhaps, than at any time in our long joint history.  

    I hope we have the good judgement to build on that.

    At some time, the British and Irish Governments may wish to review the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and, perhaps, make some tweaks ‒ but not, I think, very many:  the Act has stood up well over a long infancy.  

    But it might be prudent to amend the legislation to protect the Executive and Assembly from being collapsed if one Party fails to take up its responsibilities.

    If the Leaders of the two main Parties do not accept their Ministerial role, the Executive cannot be formed, and the elected Assembly cannot meet.

    Northern Ireland cannot then be governed by its elected Government, and democracy falls away.

    This interregnum is harmful to Northern Ireland, and needs to come to an end.

    Other amendments may be needed to ensure the cross-border bodies act as originally intended, or to take account of the rising third party vote.

    In our world of autocrats, of divisions, of hardships, of many man-made evils, Ireland has fashioned a peace to last.

    To maintain that peace, there should be no tolerance of old grudges being used as a crutch for new bigotry.  There is no place for them if we are to build the future for which we all wish.  

    We need to focus ‒ not on the Ireland that was ‒ or even the Ireland that is ‒ but on the Ireland that can be.

    Northern Ireland, has changed for the better ‒ and, I hope, for good.

    Time is healing.  The killing has stopped.  The old feuds and hatreds are easing – even though in some minds, they might linger on.

    In the decade after the Good Friday Agreement, the potential for growth was proven – until the financial crisis, Covid and the war in Ukraine erected new barriers to prosperity.

    But – if Northern Ireland can continue to lay aside its quarrelsome past ‒ there is no reason why prosperity should not return … and soar.  

    Belfast is ranked only behind London as a UK Tech City, and has a growing reputation for green energy projects.

    There is a successful services sector to build on, and growth opportunities in cyber, Artificial Intelligence, life and health sciences, and the creative industries.

    All of this can thrive alongside traditional skills in aerospace, engineering, defence and manufacturing.

    As old grievances and lack of trust are put aside, the scope is there to capture and embrace prosperity.  

    If the will is there, the results will follow.

    The Republic is also perhaps, better placed than at any time in her history.  She is a respected country, firmly settled within the European Union.

    She has a reputation as a peacemaker that carries far and wide.  She is a close friend ‒ even protégé ‒ of the United States and, after much turmoil, has an increasingly close relationship with the United Kingdom.  

    Within the international community, she inspires friendship and co-operation.  She offends no-one and is welcomed by almost everyone.  

    Of course there are problems – most obviously in housing – but her economy is healthy.  So are her finances.  And her taxes are buoyant.

    It is an enviable position.

    For me, it will be of eternal regret that I was unable to bring the Peace Process to a conclusion.  BUT – and it is a BIG but – it is far more important that the lives of the people of Ireland – North and South – have been transformed over the past 30 years.  

    Throughout her long history, Ireland’s children emigrated to build a better life for themselves.  

    Looking into the future, they may still choose to do that – but, I believe – will no longer need to do so.  

    A better life – for Ireland North and South – is there to be found.

    And nothing could possibly bring me – or, I suspect, the shadow of Henry Grattan – greater or more eternal happiness than that.

  • Sir John Major’s Comments at the 30th Anniversary of Warrington Bombing – 20 March 2023

    The comments made by Sir John Major at the 30th anniversary memorial service held in Warrington on 20 March 2023.

    I feel honoured to be with you in Warrington this morning:  commemorating that dark and desperate day exactly 30 years ago …. almost to the minute.  

    It was a day which affected so many – but none more so than the families and friends of Tim Parry and Johnathan Ball.  

    I have never forgotten the moment I received the call from No10.  I was in my garden in Huntingdon that weekend:  a sunny, early Spring day, when children were in shopping centres up and down the country buying cards and flowers for Mothering Sunday.  

    When Tim and Johnathan’s mothers waved their sons off on the morning of 20 March, 1993, they couldn’t possibly have known that what they were seeing was the last wave they would receive in return.  

    What they suffered is beyond the nightmare of any parent.  

    The two bombs here in Warrington brought me the closest I ever came to giving up on the Peace Process.  

    I felt that if the IRA could continue to plant random bombs, in random towns, randomly killing children and other innocent men and women, whilst we were trying to find a way through to peace, there really was no hope.  

    But I couldn’t give up.  I feared that – if we did – there would be even more bombs, even more children, and even more grieving families.

    And there is always hope.  As time has proved.  

    But there is more.

    There is also healing, forgiveness, and turning something so unimaginably painful into something so enduringly positive.

    As Colin and Wendy Parry did at the Peace Centre here in Warrington.  

    Established in memory of Tim and Johnathan, they created a meeting place and education centre, bringing together people from different religions to gain a better understanding of each other’s beliefs and cultures.  

    Many friendships – from historically opposing factions – have been forged and kept.  

    And hope got a helping hand.  

    The Peace Centre has also provided support and professional counselling to all victims of terrorism here in the UK – most recently to the families affected by the Manchester Arena bombing.  

    Since 1993, Colin and Wendy have devoted themselves to this cause.  Selfless and tireless in their determination to honour Tim’s memory, by helping others who have fallen victim to the same senseless violence that ended their own son’s life in this very place – 30 years ago today.  

    I cannot think of a greater legacy any parent could gift their child.

    Shortly, we will be hearing memories of Tim and Johnathan, from those who knew them best.  Tim’s nephew, Arthur, will read a poem. And the choir from Tim’s former school will sing one last song:  “Something Inside so Strong”.  

    I would like to end by touching on one particular line from that:  “My light will shine so brightly it will blind you – because there’s something inside so strong”.  

    Let us think about that for a moment.  

    There is a light too bright to be extinguished.  

    And that is hope.

    Let us hope that light will shine down on us all.  

    May it provide:

    • the strength we need to sustain us in times of trauma and grief;  
    • the forgiveness we must find within ourselves to heal;  
    • the tolerance to understand views that are different from our own;  
    • and the resolve to explore every conceivable  avenue – to turn what might seem the impossible, into the possible.

    It can be done.  It has been done.  It will be done again.

    With hope – there is always a way …..

    And, with that in-extinguishable beacon lighting our path, peace and reconciliation can and will be found.  

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons – 7 February 2023

    The opening statement made by Sir John Major to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 7 February 2023.

    OPENING STATEMENT

    I think it might be helpful if I spend a few minutes introducing the subject. I will do so only sketchily, and fill in more detail in answer to your questions.

    By the early ‘90s, life in Northern Ireland had not been free of terror for 25 years and – to me – violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    I spent a long time reading myself into the problem and its history. I did so to better understand the fears and ambitions of the opposing factions.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was open to politicians of mainstream Parties, as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    As to background, relations between London and Dublin were only spasmodic. Unionist and Nationalist opinion was far apart.

    Bombing, killings, paramilitary beatings, the murder of soldiers by Provisionals, were a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland – as was violent retaliation by Loyalist paramilitaries.

    Even when the Peace Process gained traction there were innumerable setbacks and perpetual suspicion. Distrust was rife. The political parties would talk to the UK Government, but not to one another.

    Throughout the Process violence re-occurred, as the IRA were determined to show their volunteers they were not weakening, even as progress was made.

    The Process was often slowed by Unionist suspicion of the process inflamed by partial “leaks” and unreal “fears”. John Bruton’s Government faced similar problems with Provisional opinion.

    All this was a perpetual frustration.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and also made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so.

    In early 1993, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    We asked ourselves, was this genuine or a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    – we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    – with no pre-determined outcome; and emphasised that

    – the result could be a united Ireland, but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the Peace Process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side. I was aware that the IRA Leaders had backbenchers more lethal than mine.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated, by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin, and asked when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    In reply we stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994.

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    We looked at text after text: from Hume-Adams; from Albert Reynolds ‒ but by October 1993 progress was stuck. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Greysteel moved us forward.

    We developed a text with Dublin ‒ and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and their “leaks”.

    We then made progress on the Draft. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition, and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. These were essential preliminaries to the Good Friday Agreement.

    In August 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an Investment Conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement, and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    At first the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents but, reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    After February 1995, action focused on decommissioning weapons. A “Working Group” had been set up in October 1994. (Chilcot and Dalton).

    It was a tortuous process of one step forward ‒ and then stalemate.

    I will spare you the litany of proposals, rejections, quarrels, grandstanding ‒ as the Provisionals refused to budge.

    John Bruton and I proposed an International Commission with Senator George Mitchell as its Chairman. The Provisionals tried to block it. Rows were sufficiently serious to cause an Anglo-Irish Summit to be postponed due to threats of violence.

    Paddy Mayhew had been developing a “twin-track” initiative of decommissioning and political progress. It was rejected. We re-drafted it as a “Building Blocks” Paper.

    In November, John Bruton and I agreed the “twin-track” initiative, and to establish the decommissioning body.

    President Clinton arrived in London and I briefed him. He was shocked that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists, 75. In London, Belfast and Dublin, he rammed home the peace message. This was timely and immensely helpful.

    By early 1996, it became clear the Provisionals were waiting for a General Election, with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The IRA exploded bombs in Canary Wharf killing two people and injuring over 100. Naturally, they blamed the British Government.

    Despite this setback, the UK and Irish governments agreed Rules for All-Party Talks and confirmed these could begin in June, with elections to the negotiating body in May.

    The elections took place – heralded by the IRA exploding a massive bomb in Manchester days after All-Party Talks began.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. I was confident Tony Blair and Labour would carry it forward.

    Labour did not bear the scars of 18 years of dispute with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, and the preparatory work on decommissioning weapons.

    To their great credit ‒ they did.

  • Sir John Major’s Witness Statement and Answers to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    The witness statement and answers given by Sir John Major to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on 26 January 2023.

    Text of session (in .pdf format)

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    Sir John Major’s opening statement to the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement of the Irish Parliament on 26 January 2023.

    It is a great pleasure to meet with you today, and I’m only sorry I can’t be with you in person.

    You were kind enough to invite me to make an opening statement.

    As I made clear before I accepted your invitation, I was only involved in the work that led up to the GFA. The negotiation of it was undertaken after I left Government. It is for others to respond to that.

    When I became Prime Minister in November 1990 I had no background in Northern Ireland issues and so, perhaps, the first question is ‒ why did I become so concerned about “The Troubles”?

    The answer is simple. Life in Northern Ireland over the previous 25 years had never been free of terror and, to me, violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    For that reason, between 1990/97 I visited Northern Ireland more often than anywhere else – at home or overseas.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and by November of that year he had made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    I spent a long time reading myself in to the problem and its history. I did so to get into the minds of the opposing factions so that I might better understand their fears and ambitions. It was clear the hopes of Unionists and Nationalists were far apart.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was always open to politicians of all Parties as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so. I will come to that later.

    In February 1992, Albert Reynolds became Taoiseach and, within a fortnight, we had a private supper at Downing Street. We discovered an empathy, and a shared ambition to end violence in Northern Ireland.

    Despite disagreements, rows, and frustrations, our friendship held until the day Albert died. His role in advancing peace should never be underestimated. He was a remarkable man who became a friend to cherish.

    Sometimes we disagreed. Many disagreements were trivial: others more substantial. Albert would have liked me to become a persuader for unification but that I could not ‒ and would not ‒ do. If I had done so, it would have broken the peace process – because the Unionist community would have never co-operated.

    It was clear that unification ‒ if it were ever to come about ‒ would have to be with the open consent of the Unionist community. Any attempt at duress would have failed and led to renewed violence. That was ‒ and remains ‒ true.

    At that time, the three stranded talks were often stalled because the political Parties would talk only to the UK Government and not to each other. Unionists were suspicious of the Hume-Adams talks in which there was no Unionist voice.

    In late 1992, Paddy Mayhew [new S/S NI] promised a “fair deal” to all who abandoned terrorism.

    Soon afterwards, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    It went on ‒ to point up a real problem for the Provisionals:

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    This fear helps explain why bombings went on even as the process advanced.

    The message ended:

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    But ‒ was the message genuine? I was assured that it came from Martin McGuinness (although he always denied it).

    Or was it a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We could lose our jobs ‒ or lose the Peace Process.

    Paddy and I consulted colleagues, and decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    with no pre-determined outcome and emphasised;

    the result could be a united Ireland but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the peace process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in the centre of Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side.

    So we continued with talks.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin: when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    This message set no conditions for such talks.

    I convened a meeting with senior colleagues, and we agreed to spell out in detail what we needed for talks, and what the IRA had to do.

    This we did on 5 November 1993. We stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994. This was the last message to go via the private route.

    * * *

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    Dublin had been discussing it with Adams in 1991: Charles Haughey had suggested it to me even earlier.

    In February 1992, John Hume offered a text ‒ presumably from Sinn Fein.

    Albert Reynolds knew the February text was unacceptable but could not shift the Provisionals. He presented it to us ‒ and we rejected it. In June, Irish officials offered a different text. The idea was sound but, in truth, both texts were dead in the water.

    Also, in June 1993, I met Albert Reynolds and Dick Spring. We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    I met Albert in Brussels by which time it was clear the Hume-Adams process would never be acceptable to Unionists. If any Declaration were to be widely accepted it would have to be negotiated by London and Dublin, and accepted by the British and Irish Parliaments.

    In October 1993, progress was stuck, and I reiterated publicly that if the IRA ended violence Sinn Fein could enter politics as a Democratic Party. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Graysteel moved us forward.

    We developed our own text ‒ with helpful advice from James Molyneaux and the Church of Ireland. Albert Reynolds initially rejected our text, but then suggested amendments – and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and Irish “leaks”.

    But we then turned to the Draft and made progress. Failure would have been disastrous but slowly and surely, we worked towards an agreement. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text by telephone.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done. So was Albert. A mini Rubicon had been crossed.

    The text was convoluted but served its purpose. It promised a fair outcome.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. This was all an essential preliminary to the Good Friday Agreement.

    On 31 August 1994, a ceasefire was announced by the IRA. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To accompany the ceasefire, IRA supporters came onto the streets to declare a triumph, which carried the flavour of a victory for them (which it wasn’t) and this destabilised the ever-fearful-of-being-betrayed Unionists.

    It was a smart, if cynical move by the IRA to cover the backs of their leaders. The outcome was welcome, but there was still no commitment to permanence or ‒ as events were to prove ‒ to disarmament. Nor did “punishment beatings” end.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    Our intention was to encourage the Provisionals into the political process.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an investment conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    They were suspicious of an IRA leadership apparently committed to peace while, at the same time, recruiting new volunteers.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    During 1994, Albert and I – together with Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring – had worked on the documents. It was hard pounding.

    Progress was on a knife’s edge.

    At this pivotal moment, what Paddy Mayhew called “black work at the crossroads” nearly derailed the whole Process.

    The London “Times” was leaked an extract from the text of the Framework Document, and wrote an incorrect report of it ‒ with the assertion that it “brought the prospect of a united Ireland closer than at any time since Partition in 1920”.

    We told them categorically their story was wrong – but they printed it anyway.

    At that moment, nothing could have been more damaging to the Peace Process.

    I called a midnight meeting of Parliamentary colleagues to brief them, in order to avoid outright rebellion in Parliament. It was a close run thing, but they accepted our word, not least because Robert Cranborne (now Lord Salisbury) – as an undoubted Unionist – supported us.

    After this we pressed ahead ‒ meeting Unionists to allay their fears.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast ‒ and put the proposals out for public consultation. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    The Unionists were hostile, the Republican Bishops complained, the Presbyterians said the documents were “too green” but ‒ as the proposals were examined more closely – vocal criticisms fell away.

    But the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents as a basis for progress.

    So, Paddy Mayhew produced an “Issues” Paper. Shorn of constitution prose, it helped ease the fears of a majority of critics.

    It seemed ‒ for a time ‒ the “Frameworks” might fail: there were no “inclusive” talks, nor renewed constitutional negotiations. But they did not.

    Reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    The problem of guns and explosives remained, which the British and Irish Governments agreed had to be addressed.

    The Provisionals sought entry to the negotiations – but stone-walled over weapons ‒ claiming (falsely) that decommissioning was a new issue.

    That was demonstrably untrue but, from their perspective, surrendering weapons ‒ especially to the British Government ‒ looked like a defeat.

    Gerry Adams said in terms: “we must take the gun out of Irish politics” with which I wholly agreed. But he then argued this included the army and the police ‒ who did not bomb, murder or knee-cap.

    During this convoluted discussion some progress was made – but then undermined.

    In October, 1994, we had set up a “Working Group” headed by Sir John Chilcot [PUS NIO) and Tim Dalton [PUS at Ireland’s DOJ].

    Its Report, in February 1995, suggested decommissioning should begin with “a worthwhile quantity of arms”, with parallel progress in relaxing security measures and release of prisoners.

    On 3 November, to further encourage progress, Michael Ancram met Martin McGuinness. A meeting between Paddy Mayhew and McGuinness followed. No movement on decommissioning resulted.

    In June 1995, John Bruton and I met at an EU Summit (in Cannes) and agreed to build on the idea of an International Commission (first suggested by Ken Maginnis, UUP).

    As Chilcot and Dalton worked up the idea, the US Ambassador to the UK, Admiral William Crowe, met Adams to protest at their refusal to move on decommissioning.

    I agreed more private Ministerial meetings with Sinn Fein ‒ which drew predictable opposition in and beyond the British Parliament. Critics were wary that Sinn Fein was allied to an armed militia.

    Patrick Mayhew was developing a “twin-track” initiative based on parallel progress on decommissioning and political progress.

    As the first anniversary of the ceasefire approached, on 31 August 1995 threats of a breakdown led to requests for concessions ‒ in essence for not returning to killing people.

    On 1 September 1995, the two governments reached agreement on a Summit to be held five days later to launch the proposed Decommissioning Body.

    The Provisionals did all they could to block it. The Irish Government was threatened with a return to violence ‒ and “bodies in the streets”.

    John Hume supported opposition to the “twin-track” agreement.

    John Bruton tried to hold the line but it became clear that postponement was a more prudent course.

    The Americans tried to revive the initiative in mid-September but were rebuffed by Gerry Adams.

    At a meeting of EU leaders in Majorca, John Bruton was resolute that he still wished to revive the twin-track proposals and ‒ days later ‒ both David Trimble and Ian Paisley proposed an elected Assembly where all Parties could meet.

    November brought setbacks. Unhelpful leaks from America suggested they wished to “knock heads together”. US proposals were rejected by the Provisionals.

    John Hume and Martin McGuinness suggested ideas that would undermine the International Commission, and set ultimata for All-Party Talks that ‒ as John Bruton commented – “had no hope of running”.

    To regain momentum, the Northern Ireland Office re-packaged the “twin-track” proposals into a “Building Blocks” Paper. Tortuous negotiations followed. Sinn Fein accused the British Government of insisting on surrender. To refute this we published the “Paper” in full.

    On 28 November 1995, John Bruton and I met at Downing Street and agreed both the twin-track initiative and to establish an international body to assess decommissioning.

    We announced a three-man International Body with Senator George Mitchell as its Head [General John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri], and asked them to report by mid-January 1996.

    I doubt if George or his colleagues realised how long they would be involved.

    President Clinton arrived in London the following day. He was shocked when I showed him evidence that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 so-called “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists 75.

    In speeches in Britain, and the North and South of Ireland, Bill Clinton rammed home the peace message, condemned “punishment beatings”, and attacked terror. It was a stellar performance.

    The IRA responded a week later saying there was “no question of meeting the demand for a surrender of IRA weapons”.

    But public opinion was moving against violence. Before Christmas 1995, I made my thirteenth visit to N. Ireland and was greeted (with John Bruton) in the South with tremendous public support for what we were doing.

    In 1996, the Provisionals dug in. They were waiting for a UK General Election with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The Mitchell Report (in January 1996) noted “nearly universal support… for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.”

    Mitchell noted: “The IRA will not decommission arms prior to All-Party negotiations. He added: “An elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.”.

    But the dilemma remained ‒ of how to bring all the parties together.

    “The IRA and other paramilitaries would not get rid of their weapons” and until they did “the Unionists would not enter talks”. It looked like stalemate.

    An elective body to bring all parties together seemed the only way forward but it attracted impassioned opposition from John Hume, who accused the Government of “trying to buy votes to keep themselves in power”.

    This was an unfair attack, uncharacteristic – and untrue.

    Matters worsened in February 1996, when the IRA ended their ceasefire by exploding a bomb at Canary Wharf killing 2 people and injuring over a 100. As a matter of course, they blamed the British Government.

    The Canary Wharf bomb broke the peace and lost support for the Provisionals in Ireland and America. It brought London and Dublin even closer together.

    On 28 February 1996, the UK and Irish Governments agreed Ground Rules for All-Party Talks, and confirmed they could begin on 10 June. Elections to the negotiating body would be in May.

    The elections took place (with Sinn Fein) but, a month later, the IRA exploded a massive bomb in Manchester, only days after the opening of the All-Party Talks under Senator Mitchell’s chairmanship.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. Tony Blair and Labour had been supportive throughout the Process, and I was confident they would carry it forward.

    They did not carry the scars of 18 years of dispute in Government with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, the united international support for the Peace Process, and the work of George Mitchell and his Committee.

    It is greatly to Tony Blair’s credit that they did.

    But, if I may, I would add one final point.

    The Peace Process did not progress simply because of the politicians and their officials. The Northern Ireland community, the Churches, individual clerics, groups such as the Peace Women – and so many others – all played an important part.

    I hope that no one person, no group, no political party – and no ideology – will now risk imperilling the peace so carefully constructed by so many, for so long.

  • Sir John Major’s Statement on the Death of Pat Hume – 3 September 2021

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 3 September 2021 following the passing of Pat Hume.

    Pat Hume was a huge support to John throughout his political career and, most especially, his remarkable efforts in helping to secure peace in Northern Ireland.

    All my thoughts and warmest wishes go out to the Hume family during this time of such sadness.

    3 September 2021

  • Joint Statement with Tony Blair on UK Withdrawal Treaty Breach – 12 September 2020

    The joint statement issued by Sir John Major and Tony Blair on 12 September 2020 and published in the Sunday Times on 13 September 2020.

    Last October, Britain concluded an international Treaty with the European Union for the terms of Britain’s exit from the EU. This subsequently passed into British Law. It contained a specific agreement for resolution of the terms of trade for Northern Ireland.

    It was described by the Government as a “negotiating triumph” which would lead to an “oven ready” trade deal between the UK and Europe.

    It was, of course, no such thing. Even so, a General Election – with this agreement very much centre stage – was fought and won by the Conservative Party.

    Last week, with the promise of a comprehensive trade deal with the EU long gone, and the Brexit negotiations in disarray, the Government published a Bill which it openly admits is a violation of that Treaty. This Bill contravenes the Treaty the UK ratified, and overrides the law that Parliament passed on the basis that the agreement over Northern Ireland – as reached by the Prime Minister himself – did, in any event, contain “unforeseen” ambiguities.

    We have become so inured to the unending Brexit saga of misinformation and misdirection that the hollow claims, empty promises and emptier threats have lost their power to shock.

    But what is being proposed now is shocking. How can it be compatible with the Codes of Conduct which bind Ministers, Law Officers and Civil Servants to deliberately break Treaty obligations? As we negotiate new trade Treaties, how do we salvage credibility as “Global Britain” if we so blatantly disregard our commitments the moment we sign them?

    Yet the Government seeks to do so by the extraordinary pretence that breaking international law is necessary to “save the Good Friday Agreement”, which has given us peace in Northern Ireland for over two decades, and utterly changed the relationship between the UK and its nearest neighbour, the Republic of Ireland.

    We disagree. The Government’s action does not protect the Good Friday Agreement, it imperils it.

    When the two of us travelled together to Northern Ireland during the 2016 referendum campaign, we warned that the open border between the North and South of Ireland – such a vital element of the Peace Process and the Good Friday Agreement – was inconsistent with the UK leaving the European Single Market. We warned that we would be faced with a choice of either abandoning that open border, or keeping Northern Ireland at least inside the Single Market. We warned that, if Britain left the Single Market and Northern Ireland stayed, a degree of separation would be created between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.

    At the time we were excoriated as out of touch and out of time “has beens” who didn’t understand the complexities of the Irish problem. We – and the British and Irish people – were assured it would be easy to negotiate a way around all this.

    Four years on – after Theresa May ended up accepting, as a “back-stop”, that Northern Ireland should stay closely tied into the rules of the Single Market and the whole of the UK in the Customs Union – Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary on the basis that her agreement was a “betrayal”. He subsequently succeeded Mrs May as Prime Minister, and promptly replaced the “back-stop” with a “front-stop” that keeps Northern Ireland tied to EU single market rules, which was exactly where we were always going to be.

    When the Government renegotiated the Withdrawal Treaty, and urged MPs to pass it into domestic law, it did so in full knowledge of the consequences of doing so. These were that Northern Ireland would have to comply with some EU rules to keep the border open, including those on state aid, and that, as a result, new barriers to trade would arise between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.

    That was the unavoidable price of Britain leaving the single market and customs union, while wishing to avoid the imposition of a new hard border on the island of Ireland.

    To claim now that the Government has only just discovered this consequence is a nonsense, for it was the Prime Minister himself who negotiated it.

    The overt repudiation of the Treaty – by seeking to unilaterally override the provisions agreeing to the application of certain EU rules to Northern Ireland strikes at the very heart of the Withdrawal Agreement.

    It puts the Good Friday Agreement at risk, because it negates the predictability, political stability and legal clarity which is integral to the delicate balance between the North and South of Ireland that is at the core of the Peace Process.

    If the Government has concerns about specific parts of the Withdrawal Treaty, there are ready mechanisms within it to resolve them amicably, in the first instance by negotiation between the UK and the EU and, if that fails, through independent arbitration.

    It has chosen to ignore these options. Instead, it has thrown the Withdrawal Treaty into uncertainty and given the EU genuine reason to question whether Britain can be relied upon in any future agreements they make for trade with the EU.

    This has wide-ranging ramifications. It will not only make negotiation with the EU more difficult, but also any trade negotiations with other nations – including the United States. Once trust is undermined, distrust becomes prevalent.

    If Parliament passes this Bill, the UK is bound to end up before the ECJ which, under the Northern Ireland protocol, retains jurisdiction over EU rules. What if the UK loses? Do we defy the ruling? What price our international word then? Has any of this been thought through?

    It is unlikely that the EU will respond in a way that prejudices the Good Friday Agreement, but it may well retaliate in areas of enormous significance to the UK, such as limiting the access of UK financial services firms to the Single Market.

    We both opposed Brexit. We both accept it is now happening. But this way of negotiating, with reason cast aside in pursuit of ideology, and cavalier bombast posing as serious diplomacy, is irresponsible, wrong in principle and dangerous in practice.

    It raises questions that go far beyond the impact on Ireland, the Peace Process, and negotiations for a trade deal – crucial though they are. It questions the very integrity of our nation.

    If the Government succeeds in its plans, what constitutional audacity will be beyond them? If Parliament deliberately passes legislation known to undermine international law, what will that do to the reputation of Parliament and our country?

    For a country which has for hundreds of years furthered the cause of law around the world, respecting treaty obligations is just as important as domestic law. The constitutional principle of the Rule of Law requires us to treat such obligations in international law in the same way as in national law. Sophistry cannot justify this behaviour, nor can sly interpretation of one particular clause over another.

    This Government has already played fast and loose with Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. It had its knuckles rapped last year by the Supreme Court, but this did not deter them.

    As the world looks on aghast at the UK – whose word was once accepted as inviolable, this Government’s action is shaming itself and embarrassing our nation.

    This latest ruse has spectacularly misfired, and must stop now – before any further damage is done. And, if the Government itself will not respect the Rule of Law, then the High Court of Parliament should compel it to do so.

    The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH

    The Rt Hon Tony Blair

    12 September, 2020

  • Sir John Major’s Statement on the Death of John Hume – 3 August 2020

    The text of the statement issued by Sir John Major on 3 August 2020, following the death of John Hume.

    John Hume was an advocate for peace in Northern Ireland for the greater part of his life.

    Few others invested such time and energy to this search, and few sought to change entrenched attitudes with such fierce determination.

    Those whose communities have been transformed into peaceful neighbourhoods may wish to pay tribute to one of the most fervent warriors for peace.

    He has earned himself an honoured place in Irish history.

    London

    3 August, 2020

  • Sir John Major’s Comments to Alastair Campbell – 26 October 2019

    Below are the comments made by Sir John Major in an interview with Alastair Campbell in preparation for a video shown at the People’s Vote rally. The comments were published by the New European on 26 October 2019.

    When I became prime minister, the people of Northern Ireland found themselves living with bombings, shootings, murders, beatings, kneecappings, month after month. It was a way of life that would have been utterly intolerable in any other part of the United Kingdom. Murder was so routine that it was no longer headline news.

    Violence also came to the British mainland. In London, the City, Oxford Street, Knightsbridge were bombed. So was the House of Commons, and 10 Downing Street. Bombings in Manchester, Birmingham, Guildford and Warrington, where two little boys were murdered while buying cards for Mothering Sunday. For those who never lived through those times, it must be almost impossible to imagine. For those of us who did, it’s still difficult to comprehend.

    Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and I both shared a view that it was intolerable, that the 30 years of violence that killed 3,000 people simply could not be permitted to continue. We decided to look for common ground. We were working against a backdrop of tremendous support against the men and women of violence from whichever community they came. There was a genuine sense of people power and it grew.

    Bit by bit, culminating in the Good Friday Agreement, the peace process transformed the lives of all those on the island of Ireland, north and south. Violence ended, friendships were nurture, old hatreds faded. The relationship between London, Belfast and Dublin became better than at any time in history. A key part of this transformation was our mutual membership of the European Union. It broke down borders across Ireland. It increased and simplified trade. It brought north and south closer together. And London and Dublin became close allies, not least around the European table. Brexit will significantly weaken those links and damage the economies of both our countries.

    But the Good Friday agreement was about far more than trade or jobs or profits. It replaced violence with peace. That peace is still fragile. It cannot and must not be a mere afterthought. My fear and that of many others is that Brexit may put that peace at risk. Having been so hard won, and it is to Tony Blair’s eternal credit that it was, it must surely never be allowed to be lost. It is worth remembering that no one under the age of 20 would have any memory of the violence and deaths that once engulfed their neighbourhoods. I hope and pray they never do. It would be the most recklessly irresponsible act to risk losing what took so long to achieve. And a gamble that no British government should ever take, whatever political policy they wish to pursue.

    I totally supported Tony Blair in what he did and for the referendum we liaised. A fool could have seen the difficulties there was going to be with a border between the European Union and the United Kingdom, which would be on the southern end of Northern Ireland. We remembered that when the violence began. It began with the murder of customs officers at a customs border. We went to Ireland together to warn of the difficulties there would be. And I’m sad to say that many of the people in Northern Ireland just shrugged their shoulders and said, what did they know of Ireland? And that, I’m afraid, was also true of the of the then British cabinet. I was disappointed that people could not see the dangers that would be likely to arise.

    I am unsurprised at the end that the Democratic Unionists appear not to be able to support the agreement that has been reached. It was rejected by precisely the people who are now promoting this particular agreement. But I do think there is going to be a real difficulty in Northern Ireland being treated differently. I think there are many reasons for a confirmatory referendum and making sure that you have the support of the people in Northern Ireland is certainly one of them.

    A border down the Irish Sea splits Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. And that, of course, always plays on the inherent fears of Northern Ireland, that they’re being ignored, that they’re being maltreated. And those fears are very real. There is now not a shred of doubt in my mind that the integrity of the United Kingdom, both in terms of Scotland and in terms of Northern Ireland, is at greater threat. Leaving Europe, carrying Brexit through, will raise strains we know of and strains we haven’t yet thought of. That may well end up with dividing a United Kingdom that has been together for a very long time. It is a thoroughly bad idea.

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Inaugural Albert Reynolds Memorial Lecture – 10 December 2018

    The text of the speech made by Sir John Major at the inaugural Albert Reynolds Memorial Lecture held in Longford, the Republic of Ireland, on 10 December 2018.

    An invitation to deliver the Inaugural Albert Reynolds Memorial Lecture was irresistible to me, for Albert was a friend I cared about, an ally who mattered, and a man I miss.

    I’m so sorry that, due to ill health, Kathleen cannot be with us today, but I am delighted that so many members of the Reynolds family are here….

    I have to tell you that walking into Albert and Kathleen’s home in Dublin was like being wrapped into a warm and cosy blanket – while enjoying hot tea and cakes. It was always a treat. And delivering this lecture is a tribute to a very special man.

    Albert was never a run-of-the-mill politician. Some thought he’d strayed into politics by accident, but I don’t agree with that at all. Certainly, his background was atypical – for Taoiseachs.

    Albert ran dance halls, and thrived on the back of 1960s pop music – but he was always fully prepared, fully equipped for politics: he was a deal-maker supreme, a “bottom line man”, a man who demanded an outcome, a solution, to every problem.

    His background – far from being a drawback – was an asset. Albert knew people: how they lived, how they thought, what they cared about.

    And, in my experience, he liked people – forever an asset in a politician.

    He had no illusions about how some could go astray, but no doubt about what they could achieve if given the opportunity.

    And he was an optimist – far more inclined to say “we can do this”, than to rule anything out. To Albert, a deal not made was a failure.

    Some people in politics are no more than ambitious concoctions. But Albert was the real deal – in practice and in spirit. The world saw just how authentic he was at his funeral service at Donnybrook Church, when symbols of his life were carried to the altar by members of his family.

    The Downing Street Declaration was, of course, laid on the altar. But then so was a pack of cards, and a tin of dog food. Even in death, Albert could shock the politically correct. During that Service I may have had tears in my eyes, but I knew that – watching from afar – Albert was chuckling.

    At the very core of Albert was Kathleen and their family, about all of whom he was inordinately proud, and often spoke. I once teased him that “I know you love children because you have so many”, and he replied, “Not enough, John. Not enough.”.

    And that is true, too, of his time as Taoiseach. Not long enough. Not long enough by a long chalk.

    But Albert left an indelible mark on Irish history and will, I believe, be remembered long – and fondly. I know the memory of Albert will always bring a smile to my face.

    In five days’ time it will be the 25th Anniversary of the Downing Street Declaration, which led to paramilitary ceasefires and, ultimately, the Good Friday Agreement. It would never have happened without Albert.

    The Declaration didn’t come easily. In negotiation, you give to gain. Albert and I had a common objective, but came at it from different directions. There were many proposals, many drafts.

    There were advances and setbacks. Mini triumphs and mini disasters. There were frustrations and rows, gains and concessions. And, of course, we both had critical – often hostile – opponents to persuade or to cajole.

    But, with help and advice from many quarters – officials, politicians, the Church – we got there and, for Albert’s sake, I’m delighted you have remembered his own vital contribution to this document, and also honoured me by your invitation.

    It is one of the greatest disappointments of my life that I wasn’t able to complete the Peace Process, but I applaud Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern for doing so. They met all the challenges successfully.

    The Irish Ambassador to the UK, Adrian O’Neill – who is a superb representative of your country – quoted aptly from the Declaration in a recent speech.

    The Declaration had a range of objectives: to heal past enmity; to ensure a peace that lasted; and to encourage the economic and social co-operation that was, and is, and always will be, essential for mutual understanding and, with it, peaceful prosperity.

    The Declaration was born during a private conversation with Albert in the White Drawing Room of Downing Street. As I recall, we were talking of our respective children over a drink, and then – more widely – the children of the Troubles.

    Albert said, “No child should have to face this”, and I agreed, adding “If it were in Surrey or Sussex it would not be tolerated; nor should it be accepted in Northern Ireland.”. So, together, we agreed to try and end it, and I could never have had a more dedicated partner than Albert Reynolds.

    Were we together this evening, Albert and I would be concerned about Brexit; the Irish border; the protection of the Peace Accord; and – perhaps most important of all – the long-term relationship between our two countries.

    As the Peace Process advanced in the 1990s – and especially after the Good Friday Agreement was signed – the Anglo-Irish relationship blossomed.

    Our joint history is chequered, but it was put behind us: not forgotten, perhaps, but no longer used as a weapon with which to attack one another.

    In the last two decades, the Anglo-Irish relationship has been better – and closer – than at any time in our history. Now, once again – as the UK leaves the EU – there is reason to be concerned.

    The Republic – as well as the UK – needs the power-sharing executive to return to its duties in Northern Ireland. It needs to ensure that now – and in the future –there is no hard border dividing the island of Ireland; and it needs a future that embraces what Ireland and the UK have in common.

    Some opinion – including many who believe themselves to be Unionists – has shown a breath-taking ignorance of the likely impact that unsettling the Good Friday Agreement will have on Ireland, both North and South.

    To them, the Irish demand for a “backstop” is a bogus ploy to keep the UK in a Customs Union: in truth, a backstop is of vital national interest for Ireland and for the UK.

    As our own Prime Minister has said, this is not a demand imposed on the UK by Dublin or Brussels – it is an interest we all share.

    Furthermore, the Brexiteers claim that the backstop damages the Union is wholly misguided. The greatest danger to the Union would be a hard border that damaged jobs and prosperity in Northern Ireland, and undermined the Good Friday Agreement.

    If the people of Northern Ireland see a border returned – together with no power sharing at Stormont – will they not look once again at a United Ireland?

    The plain truth is this: the future of the Union is protected, not undermined, by avoiding a hard border.

    If the House of Commons defeats Mrs May’s plans tomorrow, the risk of a hard border once again becomes possible.

    Even if her plans are approved, the problem is not solved, but temporarily put on hold – until a “frictionless” border moves from myth to reality; or until a long-term deal is reached that removes the need for any border at all.

    A hard border – now, or at the end of a long transition period – would be disastrous. That said – whatever may happen at Westminster this week or later – I do not believe a majority of Members of Parliament will permit a hard border to become a reality.

    The reckless few, who are careless of its likely effect, are a clear minority. And with good reason.

    Of course, a new border would not remotely resemble its hated predecessor – with its barbed wire, its listening posts and its Army check-points.

    But any new border – however gentle its intent – would become a symbol, and thus a target. Both physically and emotionally it would present not only a barrier between North and South; between Unionist and Nationalist; but between the UK and her nearest neighbour.

    The fear – that must not be forgotten – is this: any border, be it now or in the future, risks creating an impediment to the excellent bilateral relations of recent years. That, truly, would be a tragedy.

    Peace is at risk if we erect barriers that remind people of ancient disputes: it will only be a way of life we can rely if we create a future in which old protagonists can live and work together.

    Peace is not secure – it never is – and any new border would be a focus for the wild men on the fringes to reactivate old disputes and hatreds that should be laid to rest – for good. Until sectarianism is ended, that will never be fully achieved.

    Some hardline pro-Brexit voices have claimed that European and Irish opposition to a “hard” border is merely a means of frustrating Brexit.

    Nothing could be further from the truth. They are blind to the reality.

    As Sir Hugh Orde, former Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, has said – the political consequences of Brexit “will play into the hands of those who are still determined to destroy the relative peace we have enjoyed”.
    “Customs Posts”, Sir Hugh added, “would be a target for dissident paramilitaries”. Sadly, such dangerous people are still around – in both communities.

    Those who mock and disparage the “backstop” should reflect on the risks of destroying it, and stop relying on uninvented, fanciful, technical alternatives that, for now, exist nowhere.

    At stake is not only community relations, but security – and, with it, lives as well. We should not forget that the “Troubles” began in the 1960s with the murder of Customs Officials at the North/South border.

    A “no deal” scenario would have many damaging repercussions for the UK and Ireland.

    If – by accident or design – the UK was forced to trade under WTO rules, both sides would be forced to apply customs tariffs on imports from the other.

    This would not be optional. Under WTO rules, the UK and Ireland could not reach a bilateral “sweetheart” deal of low tariffs – even if they wished to do so.

    The UK would have to charge the same tariffs to Ireland as to any other member of the WTO worldwide.

    And Ireland would have to reciprocate. The impact on business – and farming – would be instant and profound. This is no way for friends and neighbours to treat one another.

    But, once again – for what it is worth – I do believe wise counsel will prevent this outcome.

    I have made no secret of my own view that the UK leaving Europe is a colossal error. It is a lose-lose decision for both sides. It betrays the internationalist past of the UK, and undermines her future.

    Most of the world believes we have taken leave of our senses, and so, I believe, will future generations. However, that is an argument I would prefer to make in the UK – and not here this evening.

    But what of Europe? How are they affected? That is an argument for now – and for Ireland as a member of the European Union. Is the whole of Europe, including the UK, better off with a strong European Union or a weak one?

    Across Europe, some extreme nationalists believe it would be better if the European Union collapsed and we returned to a Europe of nation states. I believe they are profoundly wrong in that judgement.

    We live in a world in which America – so long the guarantor of European safety – is turning her interest increasingly towards Asia-Pacific.
    China – with the largest navy in the world – is now growing both in economic and military power, and is prepared to use that power for political gain. Russia is, once again, behaving as a rogue nation.

    In the light of these developments, is Europe better or worse off being united rather than divided? Undoubtedly, it is better united.

    Are we all at greater risk if Europe is weakened? Undoubtedly yes – both economically and militarily.

    Is the world order better balanced with America, China and a strong European Union broadly economically equal, or with the European Union minus Britain falling below the economic authority of their two rivals? The answer is obvious.

    And yet the British departure will not only weaken the UK but – certainly more important to the wider world – diminish the role of the EU.

    The EU will lose:

    Sixty five million citizens, and its fastest-growing economy; potentially, the largest economy in Europe;

    It will lose one of only two powers with a nuclear capacity and a significant military capability;

    It will lose the nation with the longest and deepest foreign policy reach; and

    It will also lose the only buffer the EU has had to hold back policies promoted by Germany and France in partnership.

    British pragmatism and caution will be sorely missed by smaller EU countries: on many occasions, the UK was their protector.

    Time and again, it has not been unusual for the UK, alone, to oppose a European policy – while other member states remained silent – and later be thanked for having done so.

    The UK’s departure means that, for the first time, the European Union is contracting and not expanding. This will weaken the EU – especially when set against the superpowers of America or China.

    The British departure is likely to hasten European reform – which will involve Ireland as a Member of the Eurozone.

    Over the next few years, I expect members of the Eurozone to further align fiscal policy to protect the Euro even though – at present – that is not politically acceptable.

    I do not believe – after the Greek experience – that the Eurozone will hurry to admit new members and, if that assumption is correct, a distinct inner and outer core is likely to take shape.

    Other changes – opting in to policies rather than opting out – may be sought by the less consensus-minded countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

    Nothing is certain but – ten years from now – the Union may look very different. Ironically, it may be a Union that would be much more amenable to the UK.

    The Anglo-Irish relationship will change when the UK leaves the EU – but we need to cherish it, and I will talk of that at greater length tomorrow.

    For now, let me simply assert that the relationship should remain precious to us both, and our duty is to ensure that it is.

    My working assumption is that the UK will leave the EU in good order and not in chaos. If so, she has a robust political and economic structure – and should be able to weather the almost inevitable economic turbulence upon leaving.

    However, as many independent assessments have set out – as well as the Bank of England and the UK Government itself – I do anticipate lower growth, lower inward investment, and – subject to the terms of any future trade deal with the EU – a range of practical (and costly) obstacles for British commerce.

    No-one can be certain how long such a trade deal will take to negotiate: or even if aggrieved nations will hold back – or refuse – their consent to any, or all, of it.

    What we can be sure of is that the right deal will be tough to get; and an imperfect deal will be hard to sell – and harder still to justify. But, as grievances cool, a deal is in the best interests of both sides.

    The City of London is powerful, innovative and pre-eminent. But, post-Brexit, we can assume other financial centres in Europe will wish to challenge its present dominance. That is an unavoidable consequence of the British exodus.

    Although I don’t believe the EU can hope to replicate the City in any foreseeable timescale, I do expect they will move towards focusing more financial activity within their own Borders – politics will dictate this as well as long-term self-interest.

    Dublin itself may be a beneficiary of this trend.

    The wider trade implication of leaving the EU is that the UK not only loses her free trade deal with the European market of 500 million people, but also free trade deals with 53 other nations that were negotiated by the European Union – but only for its Members.

    Over time these can be replaced, but, for now, there is a very, very long way to go – and the question arises: are 65 million Britons really likely to get the same favourable treatment as 500 million Europeans?

    The UK lives by her trade – so, we must try. But this process will not be swift – or straightforward.

    Let me summarise. Barring a sudden outbreak of common sense, and a reality check on national self-interest, the UK will be the first nation to leave the EU.

    This will be yet another irony, as the first proposal for a European Union came not – as is generally supposed – from the French cognac salesman, Jean Monnet, but from an Englishman.

    Three and a quarter centuries ago, in 1693, William Penn advocated a European “Diet or Parliament” as a policy to end perpetual military conflict on the Continent. It took 280 years and two world wars to convince his fellow Britons that unity was better than division.

    Forty three years later, the British people reversed that decision.

    It is in the interests of both Ireland and the UK that wise negotiators can now minimise the downside and maximise the opportunities.

    Let us hope they will – and they can.

    Many futures depend on it – both in my country and in your own.

    As I speak, I can hear Albert’s lilting voice pushing us on towards a sensible deal.

    We must all do everything we can not to let him down.