The Rt. Hon. Sir John Major KG CH

Tag: Northern Ireland

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Henry Grattan Lecture – 25 May 2023

    Sir John Major’s speech made at the Henry Grattan Lecture held at the Irish Embassy on 24 May 2023.

    It’s a great privilege to be here, and to have been invited to deliver this Lecture.

    I first became aware of Henry Grattan in the early 1990s when I was reading myself into the history of Ireland ‒ and particularly her relationship with England.

    For me, this was essential, to better understand the generations of hurt and grievance that lay in history as a backcloth to the violence of The Troubles.

    I soon learned that many of the heroes of Irish history earned their fame fighting for Irish interests ‒ most often in rebellion against the British.

    Rebellions were repetitive over hundreds of years.  The causes of them were bitter and the aftermath long-lasting.  

    History built scars into the relationship between England and Ireland ‒ and between Protestant and Catholic ‒ that were not easy to eliminate.

    Henry Grattan enters into this epic story in the late 18th Century.  

    Under the Declaratory Act of 1719, legislative independence for the Irish Parliament needed the assent of the British Parliament ‒ which was not given.  

    Grattan’s great contribution was ‒ against all expectations ‒ to obtain the repeal of this prohibition.

    One of the eternal truths of politics is that it can be contradictory, complex and confusing:  the simplicities of what we now call “Populism” betrays reality – as well as the nature of human behaviour.

    Grattan was not a man of detail, but he was a formidable orator:  a gift – in my experience – that is innately Irish.  And Grattan used this gift not to threaten, but to persuade, with a subtlety that was hard to deny.

    Grattan argued for Ireland to receive similar concessions to those granted to American colonists after the War of Independence.  As he put it:  

    “Can England cede with dignity?  I suspect she can;  for if she has consented to repeal all the laws respecting America, among which the Declaratory Act is one, she can with majesty repeal the Declaratory Act against Ireland.”

    Tellingly, he went on in a way that was both cunning and wise:

    “Ireland has declared her resolution to stand and fall with the British nation, and has stated her own rights by appealing not to your fears but your magnanimity.”

    It was an approach themed to appeal, and was accepted by Lord Rockingham during his brief second Administration.  

    It was that very approach:  of insight, of political genius, which earned Grattan a place in history.

    Most particularly, for the purposes of this evening, it illustrates a method of reaching across a deep divide, to obtain an outcome few believed possible.

    * * * * *

    I have been asked to speak about the history, legacy and future of Northern Ireland.  

    However, since – at least in part – that will depend on the future policy of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, I will stray a little beyond those narrow confines.

    Let me turn first to my own experience of the Peace Process.  The Good Friday Agreement is now in being, but the full dividends of peace are still a work in progress.  

    Legislation can change the law, but it takes time to build trust and heal emotions.

    I won’t reiterate all the twists and turns of the Joint Declaration (1993) and the Framework Agreement (1995) ‒ I have done that before.  

    This evening I will try to open my mind, and set out how events seemed – from my own perspective – as they unfolded.

    The “Troubles” began ‒ or, more accurately, were reignited ‒ in the late 1960s. On the day I became Prime Minister, they had plagued life in Northern Ireland for over twenty years.  

    Palliatives had been tried ‒ and were still being tried ‒ but none had worked.  The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 had imploded.  

    Several things seemed obvious to me.  No-one was going to “win” this conflict.  

    The British Government would neither give in to force, nor change the status of Northern Ireland – except at the express wish of the people of Northern Ireland.

    The IRA would not ‒ and, probably, could not ‒ give up their struggle for a united Ireland.  

    Nor, having embarked upon an armed struggle, was it easy for them to revert to a purely political struggle ‒ a Grattan struggle, if you wish – using blandishments and logic in place of guns and bombs.  

    Indeed, the IRA could not do this for as long as they were outside the political mainstream.

    I believed that, if violence was to be brought to an end, it would only be done by agreement – and any such agreement would have to embrace the wholly different ambitions of the Unionist and Nationalist communities.

    On a more hopeful note there were allies who could help secure agreement ‒ notably the churches, a wide swathe of public opinion, and brave individuals who had been arguing for peace over many years.

    For me, an essential prerequisite seemed to be a close partnership between Westminster and Dublin, and this fell easily into place.

    Charlie Haughey was Taoiseach in 1990, and he readily agreed to regular meetings between Taoiseach and Prime Minister to cover all Anglo-Irish issues.  

    I was then fortunate to have successive partnerships with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton.  Their ambitions for an end to violence mirrored mine.  

    Moreover, our joint membership of the European Union was an easy opportunity for wholly informal and private discussions.

    And there were other options in play.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke had opened an intelligence channel to carry messages to and from the IRA.  

    There was also the Hume-Adams dialogue that – although anathema to the Unionists – was an important part of the solution.  

    Hume-Adams revealed the nationalist appetite for peace.  It was their talks that first proposed a Joint Anglo-Irish Declaration as a route to peace.  And, if often unintentionally, it revealed IRA thinking.

    On the downside, Unionist hostility to the talks meant that proposals with a Hume-Adams label were treated with the utmost suspicion, and rejected by them almost without consideration.

    The whole route to peace resembled a jigsaw with missing pieces.  

    One further impediment was that all the principal actors had supporters to placate ‒ many of whom were instinctively suspicious of any move towards consensus.  Their fear was betrayal.

    The British Parliament had strong Unionist supporters in ‒ and beyond ‒ the Cabinet who feared that entering into a Peace Process was bound to end badly.  

    The Irish Government had the IRA watching them like hawks.  

    The IRA leadership had to convince their own “volunteers” they weren’t weakening or being tricked – either by one or both of the two Governments.  

    The Unionist Parties had suspicious minds within their Party ranks, and among their membership.

    All of this meant that everyone was having to watch their backs ‒ and convince their supporters of the actions they took.  This inevitably slowed progress – as mistrust always will.  

    Nonetheless, progress was made.

    The Joint Declaration, in December 1993, was a set of agreed principles.  The first, tentative, step towards peace.  

    But, 70 years after partition – and a quarter of a century of bombs, guns, punishment beatings and violence – it was an agreement that both the UK and Ireland could welcome.

    In a thousand years of history, such moments of unity were rare and left me confident that ‒ in due time ‒ an agreement could be fashioned that would last.  

    That said, I was less confident that it would be completed during my time in Government ‒ and so it was to prove.

    The Joint Declaration set out some essential building blocks to the Good Friday Agreement.

    The Unionists were reassured that a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    The Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    And – crucially – paramilitaries were offered a route into the political mainstream.  

    Everyone was given a persuasive case to put to dissenters among their supporters.

    As they did so, work was well underway on what a final settlement might look like.  The Joint Framework Documents ‒ in which John Bruton had a huge input ‒ were in three parts.

    Strand One set out a possible structure for internal Government in Northern Ireland which was of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast.  It proposed a new elected Executive and Assembly.

    Strand Two was concerned with relations between Belfast and Dublin, and foreshadowed cross border bodies.  

    Strand Three was concerned with relations between the UK and the Republic.  

    All three Strands were seen as a single entity – with nothing agreed until everything was agreed.  

    Without that caveat, we might not have been able to move forward.

    John Bruton and I put these proposals out for public consultation:  they did not have an easy birth.  

    During the negotiation ‒ which had been extremely hard pounding for Officials and politicians alike ‒ there had been leaks, both accurate and inaccurate, protests, near rebellions in the House of Commons, and sharp concern in Ireland.

    Unionists – as a matter of course – were suspicious, and uncertain what these constitutional proposals might imply:  was this a short cut to a united Ireland?

    Republican Bishops were unhappy.  

    Presbyterians were critical of proposals that were “too green” for their taste but, as the proposals settled and were studied, many of these fears fell away.  

    A document produced by Paddy Mayhew ‒ a true hero of the Process – together with innumerable meetings to re-assure worried groups, finally produced broad agreement.

    It seemed for a while that the “Frameworks” might fail but, in the end, they did not and – re-assembled – were to become a key part of the Good Friday Agreement.

    Ironically, this year of high concern – and many angry words ‒ was also the first year in a quarter of a century in which there were no terrorists killings.  Violence, yes.  But killings, no.  

    Painstakingly, progress was being made – step by step.  

    And we finally began to see a realistic hope for a better future.

    At this point I should make something clear.  The progress made was not simply due to the work of two governments and a handful of politicians.  

    The Peace Process profited from the spirit of a nation tired of old ills, who demanded something better.  

    It was the construct of many hands.  Talented and dedicated Officials in London, Dublin and Belfast ‒ too many to mention by name – each made an enormous and selfless contribution.

    Church Leaders carried reassurances to worried groups.  The public support for peace was overwhelming and constant:  in this, the Peace Women of Northern Ireland are one especial memory for me.

    Individual politicians on both the Nationalist and Unionist sides made significant contributions:  John Hume throughout the Process and, whilst he was Leader of the Ulster Unionists, Jim Molyneaux, too.  

    Jim’s successor, David Trimble ‒ once a leading opponent – became a courageous advocate.  

    All of these ‒ and so many more ‒ had a role to play.

    There is one key contributor I have not yet mentioned ‒ the leadership of the IRA.  

    Their years of violence had only hardened the heart of successive Westminster governments ‒ it was folly for the IRA to believe they could bomb their way to a settlement.

    When I first learned of the Hume-Adams talks I began to think that the Provisionals had realised that mis-judgement, and did not wish to condemn yet another generation to living through mayhem.

    But, whether I was right or wrong about the IRA’s motive, they did seem to be looking for a political settlement and – if that was indeed so – it was a difficult step for their leadership to take.  

    Many in their ranks would not have approved.

    That was, I began to believe, why – even as the Peace Process moved forward – the IRA returned to repeated violence.  It was to persuade their volunteers that they were not weakening in their armed resolve.  

    As the atrocities mounted ‒ Warrington, Shankill, Greysteel, Canary Wharf ‒ it was often uncomfortable to retain support for the Peace Process – both on a political and personal level.  

    But one reality sustained it:  if it failed, yet more people would be killed or maimed.

    It soon became apparent that ancient enmity – not least the hunger strikes – made it unlikely the IRA would conclude the peace with a Conservative Government.

    But we were lucky.  From the moment in the early 1990s when I first briefed John Smith of my hopes, the Labour Party was wholly supportive.  

    First under John, then ‒ in an interregnum ‒ under Margaret Beckett, before Tony Blair became Leader.  

    This was also true of the Liberal-Democrats.  

    The opposition – within Government and Parliament – came from impassioned supporters of the Union, who feared it would be sacrificed to gain an agreement.

    After Labour’s election victory in 1997, Tony Blair, and his team carried the Peace Process forward at speed, and with great success.  

    There were delicate issues to resolve:  the decommissioning of weapons and the treatment of IRA prisoners being foremost among them.  

    But they handled them all with skill and tenacity, and the Good Friday Agreement was a triumph.

    Twenty five years on, life in Northern Ireland is immeasurably better.  

    No longer is death and destruction a regular feature of the news.  

    Relations between North and South has been transformed ‒ although more can and, I hope, will be done.  

    Britain and Ireland are each other’s closest neighbours.  Over the centuries, where there should have been harmony, there has been antagonism.  

    Now, that is changing.  

    Apart from the turmoil of the Brexit years, when relations were disturbed, London and Dublin have become closer, perhaps, than at any time in our long joint history.  

    I hope we have the good judgement to build on that.

    At some time, the British and Irish Governments may wish to review the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and, perhaps, make some tweaks ‒ but not, I think, very many:  the Act has stood up well over a long infancy.  

    But it might be prudent to amend the legislation to protect the Executive and Assembly from being collapsed if one Party fails to take up its responsibilities.

    If the Leaders of the two main Parties do not accept their Ministerial role, the Executive cannot be formed, and the elected Assembly cannot meet.

    Northern Ireland cannot then be governed by its elected Government, and democracy falls away.

    This interregnum is harmful to Northern Ireland, and needs to come to an end.

    Other amendments may be needed to ensure the cross-border bodies act as originally intended, or to take account of the rising third party vote.

    In our world of autocrats, of divisions, of hardships, of many man-made evils, Ireland has fashioned a peace to last.

    To maintain that peace, there should be no tolerance of old grudges being used as a crutch for new bigotry.  There is no place for them if we are to build the future for which we all wish.  

    We need to focus ‒ not on the Ireland that was ‒ or even the Ireland that is ‒ but on the Ireland that can be.

    Northern Ireland, has changed for the better ‒ and, I hope, for good.

    Time is healing.  The killing has stopped.  The old feuds and hatreds are easing – even though in some minds, they might linger on.

    In the decade after the Good Friday Agreement, the potential for growth was proven – until the financial crisis, Covid and the war in Ukraine erected new barriers to prosperity.

    But – if Northern Ireland can continue to lay aside its quarrelsome past ‒ there is no reason why prosperity should not return … and soar.  

    Belfast is ranked only behind London as a UK Tech City, and has a growing reputation for green energy projects.

    There is a successful services sector to build on, and growth opportunities in cyber, Artificial Intelligence, life and health sciences, and the creative industries.

    All of this can thrive alongside traditional skills in aerospace, engineering, defence and manufacturing.

    As old grievances and lack of trust are put aside, the scope is there to capture and embrace prosperity.  

    If the will is there, the results will follow.

    The Republic is also perhaps, better placed than at any time in her history.  She is a respected country, firmly settled within the European Union.

    She has a reputation as a peacemaker that carries far and wide.  She is a close friend ‒ even protégé ‒ of the United States and, after much turmoil, has an increasingly close relationship with the United Kingdom.  

    Within the international community, she inspires friendship and co-operation.  She offends no-one and is welcomed by almost everyone.  

    Of course there are problems – most obviously in housing – but her economy is healthy.  So are her finances.  And her taxes are buoyant.

    It is an enviable position.

    For me, it will be of eternal regret that I was unable to bring the Peace Process to a conclusion.  BUT – and it is a BIG but – it is far more important that the lives of the people of Ireland – North and South – have been transformed over the past 30 years.  

    Throughout her long history, Ireland’s children emigrated to build a better life for themselves.  

    Looking into the future, they may still choose to do that – but, I believe – will no longer need to do so.  

    A better life – for Ireland North and South – is there to be found.

    And nothing could possibly bring me – or, I suspect, the shadow of Henry Grattan – greater or more eternal happiness than that.

  • Sir John Major’s Interview on BBC Radio 4’s Westminster Hour – 26 February 2023

    The text of Sir John Major’s interview on BBC Radio 4’s Westminster Hour on 26 February 2023. The interview was broadcast over the programme in two separate parts.

    PART ONE

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked Sir John Major for his views on the Northern Ireland deal]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    As far as trade is concerned, the deal that Mr. Johnson and Lord Frost did was pretty poor. It was a pretty poor negotiation and after having regarded it as a triumph and taking the plaudits for it, it was barely weeks before they were denouncing it, but of course blaming the European Union for it. So there is a need for some reform of the agreement. The European Union are offering a good deal of reform and the UK have made some helpful suggestions about red and green exit points for trade for example.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that the DUP wanted the protocol rewritten]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    It depends exactly what they mean by that, it’s not at all clear to me what they mean. But what is actually turning out to be a particularly difficult point is the question of what happens with trade disputes. The European Union insists that the European Court of Justice should be involved and that is a neuralgic point for many Members of Parliament in the UK, particularly the European Research Group wing of the Tory party, and also for the DUP. This neuralgic situation has left Northern Ireland without an executive and without a power sharing assembly for well over a year, and it could be a good deal longer.

    Trade isn’t the only problem in Northern Ireland, they’ve got real problems with health, with education, with all sorts of other things and they need that executive back in operation. The extent to which the European Court of Justice would be involved would be in determining disputes between companies, they’re not going to overturn the constitution. Their involvement would be tiny, partial and occasional. If we can get in a reform all the trade changes we need, for the easier access for trade into Northern Ireland, then the fact that there will be a minute occasional involvement of the European Court of Justice really ought not to stop an agreement being made. They talk of democracy, democracy is thrown away when that assembly is not sitting. We need them back.

    ———-

    PART TWO

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that she had joined Westminster as a very junior reporter back in 1989, seeing the last moments of Margaret Thatcher’s administration, but it was John Major who was the first Prime Minister she interviewed and it was nice to interview him again. She put to him that back in the 1990s, there was still a generation in Parliament who had been shaped by the Second World War]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    Those politicians had served in a war and it had been the biggest scar on their lives, as it was for everybody who was alive at that time. They saw the importance of the United Kingdom ensuring, with its partners across Europe, that there would never again be a war like that. That was the great impetus to join the European Union at the time. Now as the years have gone by that impetus has faded and different arguments took hold about Europe about bureaucracy and all sorts of things which are important in themselves but they’re not as important as peace. The 1980s became quite an ideological age on both sides of the political fence and that carried through into the 90s with those who came into Parliament, and it’s followed on. So even today you have, in both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, an ideological fringe to those two parties that are unduly significant and that is something that has changed.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that Sir John said Brexit was a mistake and asked is this a big difference in politics between now and then?]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    Beyond any shadow of doubt. It’s not just that we left Europe, it was the nature of the referendum, the divisions it created, the manner in which we left Europe and the way in which the public were fed promises which have proved to be wholly unfounded. I anxiously await for the benefits of Brexit as yet, except in small areas, been unable to find them. The land of milk and honey that was held out by the Brexiteers has so far proved to be sour vinegar, rather than milk and honey. I find it personally quite astonishing that those people who made so many promises about Brexit haven’t retreated in their corners and kept silent about it rather than boasting about the fact they got Brexit done.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked if they would be listening saying ‘there he goes again, things will get better’]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    I know, that’s their line. But how long, this life, the next life, my grandson’s life? Who knows? They cannot answer.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked about the current Conservative leader who is a Brexiteer and decided that Brexit would work]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    He did and we take a different view on that. But I think in other things he’s done a great deal to restore respect for our country and I think he is a serious politician. He seriously considers policy and policy is more important to him than publicity and that is a very welcome change. I think he’s honest and reliable, as indeed I think the Leader of the Opposition is and I think that is a very helpful development for Britain to recover.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked about public trust in politicians and whether there is a problem with integrity in politics]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    It’s an ongoing problem with integrity and politics. The public have always, and I think this is rather healthy, had a scepticism of politicians and authority generally, but not as seriously as we see it now. There is undoubtedly a real problem. I think it comes from two or three different things. Firstly, for 15 years people are disillusioned because since the 2007 financial crash, the vast majority of people have seen no increase in their net disposable income at all and that is unprecedented. At the same time, other people have made a great deal of money and that must really hurt to those who are now in work but having to go to food banks which is intolerable in a nation like ours.

    Then there’s the question you touched on of trust and integrity. I think that has been damaged by actions over the past two or three years, I don’t think I need to enumerate them as I think all your listeners will know exactly what I’m talking about. But it is damaging, if trust is not exercised where people are elected to look after the interests of others, then it will have a very bad effect on the perception of Parliament. You mentioned the word sleaze, there’s a distinction between sleaze in terms of things like the government’s behaviour on patronage or on party political donations, and sleaze if it is the individual misdemeanour of individual Members of Parliament and I think that was the predominant problem we had in the 1990s.

    Then there is one great gap in politics which I’m astonished nobody has pointed out. Many of the people on one wing of the Conservative Party argue very strongly for a low tax Singapore on Thames type economy and yet the Conservative Party are also fighting to keep hold of the red wall seats. The red wall seats want a vast amount of more public expenditure because that is the only thing that is going to cure grievances that have built up under governments of different parties and all parties over the last 40 or 50 years.

    We have to make a choice. It is appalling that some of the deprived areas of the United Kingdom, the fifth or sixth richest nation in the world, that some people are living in worse conditions that you can find almost anywhere in Europe. That is not a success for governments, not just this government, that is not a success for governments over the last 50 years. And it is incumbent upon the government to take levelling up seriously. I think I will put it this way, dealing with the people left behind. Dealing with that particular problem by levelling up is as big an issue as setting up the National Health Service. It will take more than a decade, more than two decades. The party that really puts its shoulder to that wheel will learn a great deal of credit for itself, for politics generally, for the country and also for what is right.

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons – 7 February 2023

    The opening statement made by Sir John Major to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 7 February 2023.

    OPENING STATEMENT

    I think it might be helpful if I spend a few minutes introducing the subject. I will do so only sketchily, and fill in more detail in answer to your questions.

    By the early ‘90s, life in Northern Ireland had not been free of terror for 25 years and – to me – violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    I spent a long time reading myself into the problem and its history. I did so to better understand the fears and ambitions of the opposing factions.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was open to politicians of mainstream Parties, as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    As to background, relations between London and Dublin were only spasmodic. Unionist and Nationalist opinion was far apart.

    Bombing, killings, paramilitary beatings, the murder of soldiers by Provisionals, were a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland – as was violent retaliation by Loyalist paramilitaries.

    Even when the Peace Process gained traction there were innumerable setbacks and perpetual suspicion. Distrust was rife. The political parties would talk to the UK Government, but not to one another.

    Throughout the Process violence re-occurred, as the IRA were determined to show their volunteers they were not weakening, even as progress was made.

    The Process was often slowed by Unionist suspicion of the process inflamed by partial “leaks” and unreal “fears”. John Bruton’s Government faced similar problems with Provisional opinion.

    All this was a perpetual frustration.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and also made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so.

    In early 1993, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    We asked ourselves, was this genuine or a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    – we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    – with no pre-determined outcome; and emphasised that

    – the result could be a united Ireland, but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the Peace Process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side. I was aware that the IRA Leaders had backbenchers more lethal than mine.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated, by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin, and asked when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    In reply we stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994.

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    We looked at text after text: from Hume-Adams; from Albert Reynolds ‒ but by October 1993 progress was stuck. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Greysteel moved us forward.

    We developed a text with Dublin ‒ and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and their “leaks”.

    We then made progress on the Draft. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition, and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. These were essential preliminaries to the Good Friday Agreement.

    In August 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an Investment Conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement, and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    At first the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents but, reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    After February 1995, action focused on decommissioning weapons. A “Working Group” had been set up in October 1994. (Chilcot and Dalton).

    It was a tortuous process of one step forward ‒ and then stalemate.

    I will spare you the litany of proposals, rejections, quarrels, grandstanding ‒ as the Provisionals refused to budge.

    John Bruton and I proposed an International Commission with Senator George Mitchell as its Chairman. The Provisionals tried to block it. Rows were sufficiently serious to cause an Anglo-Irish Summit to be postponed due to threats of violence.

    Paddy Mayhew had been developing a “twin-track” initiative of decommissioning and political progress. It was rejected. We re-drafted it as a “Building Blocks” Paper.

    In November, John Bruton and I agreed the “twin-track” initiative, and to establish the decommissioning body.

    President Clinton arrived in London and I briefed him. He was shocked that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists, 75. In London, Belfast and Dublin, he rammed home the peace message. This was timely and immensely helpful.

    By early 1996, it became clear the Provisionals were waiting for a General Election, with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The IRA exploded bombs in Canary Wharf killing two people and injuring over 100. Naturally, they blamed the British Government.

    Despite this setback, the UK and Irish governments agreed Rules for All-Party Talks and confirmed these could begin in June, with elections to the negotiating body in May.

    The elections took place – heralded by the IRA exploding a massive bomb in Manchester days after All-Party Talks began.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. I was confident Tony Blair and Labour would carry it forward.

    Labour did not bear the scars of 18 years of dispute with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, and the preparatory work on decommissioning weapons.

    To their great credit ‒ they did.

  • Sir John Major’s Witness Statement and Answers to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    The witness statement and answers given by Sir John Major to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on 26 January 2023.

    Text of session (in .pdf format)

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    Sir John Major’s opening statement to the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement of the Irish Parliament on 26 January 2023.

    It is a great pleasure to meet with you today, and I’m only sorry I can’t be with you in person.

    You were kind enough to invite me to make an opening statement.

    As I made clear before I accepted your invitation, I was only involved in the work that led up to the GFA. The negotiation of it was undertaken after I left Government. It is for others to respond to that.

    When I became Prime Minister in November 1990 I had no background in Northern Ireland issues and so, perhaps, the first question is ‒ why did I become so concerned about “The Troubles”?

    The answer is simple. Life in Northern Ireland over the previous 25 years had never been free of terror and, to me, violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    For that reason, between 1990/97 I visited Northern Ireland more often than anywhere else – at home or overseas.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and by November of that year he had made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    I spent a long time reading myself in to the problem and its history. I did so to get into the minds of the opposing factions so that I might better understand their fears and ambitions. It was clear the hopes of Unionists and Nationalists were far apart.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was always open to politicians of all Parties as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so. I will come to that later.

    In February 1992, Albert Reynolds became Taoiseach and, within a fortnight, we had a private supper at Downing Street. We discovered an empathy, and a shared ambition to end violence in Northern Ireland.

    Despite disagreements, rows, and frustrations, our friendship held until the day Albert died. His role in advancing peace should never be underestimated. He was a remarkable man who became a friend to cherish.

    Sometimes we disagreed. Many disagreements were trivial: others more substantial. Albert would have liked me to become a persuader for unification but that I could not ‒ and would not ‒ do. If I had done so, it would have broken the peace process – because the Unionist community would have never co-operated.

    It was clear that unification ‒ if it were ever to come about ‒ would have to be with the open consent of the Unionist community. Any attempt at duress would have failed and led to renewed violence. That was ‒ and remains ‒ true.

    At that time, the three stranded talks were often stalled because the political Parties would talk only to the UK Government and not to each other. Unionists were suspicious of the Hume-Adams talks in which there was no Unionist voice.

    In late 1992, Paddy Mayhew [new S/S NI] promised a “fair deal” to all who abandoned terrorism.

    Soon afterwards, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    It went on ‒ to point up a real problem for the Provisionals:

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    This fear helps explain why bombings went on even as the process advanced.

    The message ended:

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    But ‒ was the message genuine? I was assured that it came from Martin McGuinness (although he always denied it).

    Or was it a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We could lose our jobs ‒ or lose the Peace Process.

    Paddy and I consulted colleagues, and decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    with no pre-determined outcome and emphasised;

    the result could be a united Ireland but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the peace process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in the centre of Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side.

    So we continued with talks.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin: when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    This message set no conditions for such talks.

    I convened a meeting with senior colleagues, and we agreed to spell out in detail what we needed for talks, and what the IRA had to do.

    This we did on 5 November 1993. We stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994. This was the last message to go via the private route.

    * * *

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    Dublin had been discussing it with Adams in 1991: Charles Haughey had suggested it to me even earlier.

    In February 1992, John Hume offered a text ‒ presumably from Sinn Fein.

    Albert Reynolds knew the February text was unacceptable but could not shift the Provisionals. He presented it to us ‒ and we rejected it. In June, Irish officials offered a different text. The idea was sound but, in truth, both texts were dead in the water.

    Also, in June 1993, I met Albert Reynolds and Dick Spring. We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    I met Albert in Brussels by which time it was clear the Hume-Adams process would never be acceptable to Unionists. If any Declaration were to be widely accepted it would have to be negotiated by London and Dublin, and accepted by the British and Irish Parliaments.

    In October 1993, progress was stuck, and I reiterated publicly that if the IRA ended violence Sinn Fein could enter politics as a Democratic Party. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Graysteel moved us forward.

    We developed our own text ‒ with helpful advice from James Molyneaux and the Church of Ireland. Albert Reynolds initially rejected our text, but then suggested amendments – and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and Irish “leaks”.

    But we then turned to the Draft and made progress. Failure would have been disastrous but slowly and surely, we worked towards an agreement. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text by telephone.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done. So was Albert. A mini Rubicon had been crossed.

    The text was convoluted but served its purpose. It promised a fair outcome.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. This was all an essential preliminary to the Good Friday Agreement.

    On 31 August 1994, a ceasefire was announced by the IRA. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To accompany the ceasefire, IRA supporters came onto the streets to declare a triumph, which carried the flavour of a victory for them (which it wasn’t) and this destabilised the ever-fearful-of-being-betrayed Unionists.

    It was a smart, if cynical move by the IRA to cover the backs of their leaders. The outcome was welcome, but there was still no commitment to permanence or ‒ as events were to prove ‒ to disarmament. Nor did “punishment beatings” end.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    Our intention was to encourage the Provisionals into the political process.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an investment conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    They were suspicious of an IRA leadership apparently committed to peace while, at the same time, recruiting new volunteers.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    During 1994, Albert and I – together with Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring – had worked on the documents. It was hard pounding.

    Progress was on a knife’s edge.

    At this pivotal moment, what Paddy Mayhew called “black work at the crossroads” nearly derailed the whole Process.

    The London “Times” was leaked an extract from the text of the Framework Document, and wrote an incorrect report of it ‒ with the assertion that it “brought the prospect of a united Ireland closer than at any time since Partition in 1920”.

    We told them categorically their story was wrong – but they printed it anyway.

    At that moment, nothing could have been more damaging to the Peace Process.

    I called a midnight meeting of Parliamentary colleagues to brief them, in order to avoid outright rebellion in Parliament. It was a close run thing, but they accepted our word, not least because Robert Cranborne (now Lord Salisbury) – as an undoubted Unionist – supported us.

    After this we pressed ahead ‒ meeting Unionists to allay their fears.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast ‒ and put the proposals out for public consultation. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    The Unionists were hostile, the Republican Bishops complained, the Presbyterians said the documents were “too green” but ‒ as the proposals were examined more closely – vocal criticisms fell away.

    But the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents as a basis for progress.

    So, Paddy Mayhew produced an “Issues” Paper. Shorn of constitution prose, it helped ease the fears of a majority of critics.

    It seemed ‒ for a time ‒ the “Frameworks” might fail: there were no “inclusive” talks, nor renewed constitutional negotiations. But they did not.

    Reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    The problem of guns and explosives remained, which the British and Irish Governments agreed had to be addressed.

    The Provisionals sought entry to the negotiations – but stone-walled over weapons ‒ claiming (falsely) that decommissioning was a new issue.

    That was demonstrably untrue but, from their perspective, surrendering weapons ‒ especially to the British Government ‒ looked like a defeat.

    Gerry Adams said in terms: “we must take the gun out of Irish politics” with which I wholly agreed. But he then argued this included the army and the police ‒ who did not bomb, murder or knee-cap.

    During this convoluted discussion some progress was made – but then undermined.

    In October, 1994, we had set up a “Working Group” headed by Sir John Chilcot [PUS NIO) and Tim Dalton [PUS at Ireland’s DOJ].

    Its Report, in February 1995, suggested decommissioning should begin with “a worthwhile quantity of arms”, with parallel progress in relaxing security measures and release of prisoners.

    On 3 November, to further encourage progress, Michael Ancram met Martin McGuinness. A meeting between Paddy Mayhew and McGuinness followed. No movement on decommissioning resulted.

    In June 1995, John Bruton and I met at an EU Summit (in Cannes) and agreed to build on the idea of an International Commission (first suggested by Ken Maginnis, UUP).

    As Chilcot and Dalton worked up the idea, the US Ambassador to the UK, Admiral William Crowe, met Adams to protest at their refusal to move on decommissioning.

    I agreed more private Ministerial meetings with Sinn Fein ‒ which drew predictable opposition in and beyond the British Parliament. Critics were wary that Sinn Fein was allied to an armed militia.

    Patrick Mayhew was developing a “twin-track” initiative based on parallel progress on decommissioning and political progress.

    As the first anniversary of the ceasefire approached, on 31 August 1995 threats of a breakdown led to requests for concessions ‒ in essence for not returning to killing people.

    On 1 September 1995, the two governments reached agreement on a Summit to be held five days later to launch the proposed Decommissioning Body.

    The Provisionals did all they could to block it. The Irish Government was threatened with a return to violence ‒ and “bodies in the streets”.

    John Hume supported opposition to the “twin-track” agreement.

    John Bruton tried to hold the line but it became clear that postponement was a more prudent course.

    The Americans tried to revive the initiative in mid-September but were rebuffed by Gerry Adams.

    At a meeting of EU leaders in Majorca, John Bruton was resolute that he still wished to revive the twin-track proposals and ‒ days later ‒ both David Trimble and Ian Paisley proposed an elected Assembly where all Parties could meet.

    November brought setbacks. Unhelpful leaks from America suggested they wished to “knock heads together”. US proposals were rejected by the Provisionals.

    John Hume and Martin McGuinness suggested ideas that would undermine the International Commission, and set ultimata for All-Party Talks that ‒ as John Bruton commented – “had no hope of running”.

    To regain momentum, the Northern Ireland Office re-packaged the “twin-track” proposals into a “Building Blocks” Paper. Tortuous negotiations followed. Sinn Fein accused the British Government of insisting on surrender. To refute this we published the “Paper” in full.

    On 28 November 1995, John Bruton and I met at Downing Street and agreed both the twin-track initiative and to establish an international body to assess decommissioning.

    We announced a three-man International Body with Senator George Mitchell as its Head [General John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri], and asked them to report by mid-January 1996.

    I doubt if George or his colleagues realised how long they would be involved.

    President Clinton arrived in London the following day. He was shocked when I showed him evidence that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 so-called “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists 75.

    In speeches in Britain, and the North and South of Ireland, Bill Clinton rammed home the peace message, condemned “punishment beatings”, and attacked terror. It was a stellar performance.

    The IRA responded a week later saying there was “no question of meeting the demand for a surrender of IRA weapons”.

    But public opinion was moving against violence. Before Christmas 1995, I made my thirteenth visit to N. Ireland and was greeted (with John Bruton) in the South with tremendous public support for what we were doing.

    In 1996, the Provisionals dug in. They were waiting for a UK General Election with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The Mitchell Report (in January 1996) noted “nearly universal support… for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.”

    Mitchell noted: “The IRA will not decommission arms prior to All-Party negotiations. He added: “An elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.”.

    But the dilemma remained ‒ of how to bring all the parties together.

    “The IRA and other paramilitaries would not get rid of their weapons” and until they did “the Unionists would not enter talks”. It looked like stalemate.

    An elective body to bring all parties together seemed the only way forward but it attracted impassioned opposition from John Hume, who accused the Government of “trying to buy votes to keep themselves in power”.

    This was an unfair attack, uncharacteristic – and untrue.

    Matters worsened in February 1996, when the IRA ended their ceasefire by exploding a bomb at Canary Wharf killing 2 people and injuring over a 100. As a matter of course, they blamed the British Government.

    The Canary Wharf bomb broke the peace and lost support for the Provisionals in Ireland and America. It brought London and Dublin even closer together.

    On 28 February 1996, the UK and Irish Governments agreed Ground Rules for All-Party Talks, and confirmed they could begin on 10 June. Elections to the negotiating body would be in May.

    The elections took place (with Sinn Fein) but, a month later, the IRA exploded a massive bomb in Manchester, only days after the opening of the All-Party Talks under Senator Mitchell’s chairmanship.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. Tony Blair and Labour had been supportive throughout the Process, and I was confident they would carry it forward.

    They did not carry the scars of 18 years of dispute in Government with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, the united international support for the Peace Process, and the work of George Mitchell and his Committee.

    It is greatly to Tony Blair’s credit that they did.

    But, if I may, I would add one final point.

    The Peace Process did not progress simply because of the politicians and their officials. The Northern Ireland community, the Churches, individual clerics, groups such as the Peace Women – and so many others – all played an important part.

    I hope that no one person, no group, no political party – and no ideology – will now risk imperilling the peace so carefully constructed by so many, for so long.

  • Sir John Major’s Statement Following the Death of David Trimble – 25 July 2022

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 25 July 2022, following the death of the Rt Hon The Lord Trimble.

    When David Trimble became Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, he made a critical contribution to the Northern Ireland Peace Process.

    He shed his former opposition to the Process, and became an innovative advocate for a peaceful settlement.

    This was a brave and principled change of policy, and critical to the creation of peace in Northern Ireland.

    He thoroughly merits an honourable place amongst peacemakers.

  • Sir John Major’s Interview on BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme – 6 November 2021

    The transcript of the interview conducted by Nick Robinson on BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme on 6 November 2021.

    Nick Robinson

    Good morning to you.

    Sir John Major

    Good morning, Nick.

    Nick Robinson

    Sir John, what do you say to those listening who may be a little weary of the story? They may say, look, a mistake was made, a mistake was acknowledged, a u-turn was executed. The MP in question has now quit the House of Commons. There is nothing left to say.

    Sir John Major

    I really wouldn’t agree with that. A mistake certainly was made and I think rather a bad mistake. The problem is that it isn’t a mistake on its own. There have been a whole series of missteps, so I think it’s necessary to address them now in order to put them right in the future, because if it continues in the way it is now it’ll be very damaging for Parliament, for the country and certainly for the Conservative Government.

    I have been a Conservative all my life Nick and if I’m concerned about how the government is behaving, I suspect lots of other people are as well. It seems to me as a lifelong Conservative that much of what they’re doing is very unconservative in its behaviour. There are many strands to this that go way beyond the Standards Committee imbroglio over the last few days. There’s a general whiff of ‘we are the masters now’ about their behaviour and I think this is cutting through to the public. It has to stop and it has to stop soon.

    Nick Robinson

    Now, let me put to you this specific point made by Lord Evans, now chairman of that committee on standards in public life, he said Britain could slip into being a corrupt country. Do you believe that’s a possibility?

    Sir John Major

    Well, it depends on your definition of corruptness. If you mean necessarily financially corrupt on a large scale, well I think we have a long way to go before we do that. Standards in public life generally, I think, and I don’t just mean in the political sphere but across the whole of public life, are as high I think, as anyone in Europe or elsewhere. But if you mean in terms of other aspects of behaviour, then I have a considerable amount of sympathy with what Lord Evans has said.

    What has been happening is damaging at home and to our reputation overseas and that matters. Our reputation overseas matters to us and it should. Let me take a few illustrations, I’ll start with the Standard Commissioner’s report. I think the way the government handled that was shameful and wrong and unworthy of this, or indeed any, Government. It also had the effect of trashing the reputation of Parliament. A number of Conservative MPs rebelled and very well done them, I wish more had had the courage to do so and I suspect they will in future because they were put in a dreadful position by the Prime Minister.

    But there’s a bigger point. Parliament cannot be the plaything of any Prime Minister or indeed any government. This government has done a number of things that concern me deeply. They have broken the law, I have in mind the illegal prorogation of Parliament over which I went to the Supreme Court. They have broken treaties, I have in mind the Northern Ireland protocol, they have broken their word on many occasions. The one that I find most odious was the cut to overseas aid, which was a statutory requirement and was cut long before Parliament gave permission for it. Whenever they run up against difficulties with anybody, whether it is the Supreme Court, the Electoral Commission, the BBC, they react not with an understanding, not trying to placate what has gone wrong, but actually in rather a hostile fashion. That’s why I say it is profoundly unconservative and something I dislike intensely.

    Nick Robinson

    I want to come to some of the examples you’ve raised. I want to put to you in a second the fact that many people think you are still fighting an old battle, the battle over Brexit in what you’ve said. But before we move to those things, let me ask you specifically about this week, something you said was shameful and wrong. Do you blame the Chief Whip, do you blame the leader of the House of Commons, Jacob Rees Mogg. And if not, who?

    Sir John Major

    I don’t think it’s my responsibility to apportion blame. My understanding of what happened is that the instruction came direct from the Prime Minister, that is certainly what I’m told by backbench Members of Parliament. Where the Chief Whip and the Leader of the House are certainly to blame is it is their responsibility to make sure the Prime Minister understands the mood of Parliament and plainly either they told him the mood was wrong and he brushed their concerns aside, which may have happened, or alternatively, they were not in touch with Parliament, in which case they’re certainly culpable. But I don’t know which of those options is the correct one.

    Nick Robinson

    We are hearing now that there is a possibility that Owen Paterson could be offered a peerage by Boris Johnson, No. 10 have neither confirmed nor denied it. How would you feel if he was?

    Sir John Major

    There have been some extraordinary elevations to the peerage in recent years, quite extraordinary, quite apart from the over large number of peers that have been put there. I think it would be rather extraordinary if that happens. I’m not at all sure it would be approved by the House of Lords, or by those who vet peerages.

    Nick Robinson

    Our political system, as you know too well as someone who had a rather small majority, gives enormous power to Prime Ministers who have a decent or a big majority. Can restoring trust in the way that you want, in the way the public seem to want as an extraordinary poll in the Daily Mail today, carried out by JL Partners where 57% of people agree with the statement ‘Britain is in danger of becoming a corrupt country’, can tackling that be entrusted to this Prime Minister?

    Sir John Major

    This is the Prime Minister we have and he will have to tackle it. It can start with the way he treats Parliament. I’m afraid the government with its over large majority do tend to treat Parliament with contempt and if that continues it will end badly. They bypass Parliament at will, the Speaker has expressed his frustration about that on many occasions and rightly so, but they also behave badly in other ways that are perhaps politically corrupt. They brief the press, or a part of it, well in advance of any announcements to the public. They then make announcements to the public and then at that late stage after briefing their friends in the press and the public, they then tell Parliament, which completely diminishes the role of the House of Commons. Parliament must react to that.

    Parliament must make sure that the Government’s behaviour is responsible, because they have the power to do so. The Parliament at present has given the Prime Minister a very large majority, but he would be very unwise to forget that he got his extraordinary majority of 80 seats with less than 30% of the people who are entitled to vote, 29.3 or 29.7, I think is the actual figure. If he wishes to bring even the electoral system into total disrepute he has to recognise that he does not have the majority opinion at his side that the majority of 80 in the House of Commons would seem to imply, he has nothing like that and he should tread very carefully.

    Nick Robinson

    People listening to this will be in no doubt about your passion, no doubt I think about your anger. But I think there will be some who think this is personal animus, you lost the argument on Brexit, Boris Johnson won the argument on Brexit. And there will be plenty of people who voted leave, saying please don’t lecture us about standards, the establishment, of which they would see you as a part, tried to overturn the votes in a democracy. They tried to overturn the result of that referendum. And, yes, Boris Johnson broke the law or broke treaties. He had to do it because there was a conspiracy to overturn a democratic result in a referendum and you don’t like it?

    Sir John Major

    He had to break the law? That is absolute nonsense. Never in the history of British politics has a Government had to break the law and tried to justify it in the way this Government has attempted to do. I am very well aware that the extreme Brexiteers will say well there is a bitter old Remoaner. That old mantra will be repeated. And let me say it’s partly true, I am old and I’m most certainly a Remainer. But I’m not bitter – what I am is disappointed and angry at the way the Government has behaved. I’m angry about the trashing of our reputation, I’m angry because I care about the upholding of general decency by the Government and international law.

    As for ‘Remoaners’, to use that sneer against half the country, half the country that voted against leaving Europe, is pretty arrogant. When you consider what is happening with Brexit, even more arrogant.

    Nick Robinson

    In today’s Daily Telegraph editorial, time is running out and the Government should not hold back from doing what is necessary. They are calling for, as you will well know, the use of what is in that jargon called Article 16, which means in reality suspending large parts of the Brexit agreement as part of the row between the UK Government and the EU. How would you feel if they did that?

    Sir John Major

    I think it would be colossally stupid to do that. To use Article 16 to suspend parts of the protocol will be absurd. This protocol is being denounced week after week by Lord Frost and the Prime Minister. Who negotiated the wretched protocol? Lord Frost and the Prime Minister. They negotiated it, they signed it, and they now wish to break it. If they do that, firstly, it will be seen as very bad faith, it will be seen as irresponsible, there will undoubtedly be severe consequences. It would add to destabilisation in Northern Ireland, it would seriously damage relationships across the whole of Ireland, North and South, and the UK. It would erode relationships between Europe and the UK, it would damage relationships between Washington and London, because Washington, the United States is very much behind the protocol.

    At the moment, we are negotiating over the protocol with all the subtlety of a brick. What is happening week after week is that Lord Frost goes into the negotiations, he gives away nothing, he takes something from the European Union. He goes away, blames them for the fact that nothing at all has happened. They are preparing, I think, to trigger Article 16 after the COP meeting has ended and I think if they do, they will come to regret it because this runs alongside other things in Northern Ireland, like the possibility of the destabilisation of the power sharing executive if the DUP withdraw from it. This is a very difficult and dangerous road to go down, it’s not just a question of trade difficulties. It could – we’ve seen what’s happened in Northern Ireland before – it could become much worse. They should be very, very careful about this. This is silly politics to placate a few extreme Brexiteers, and the price will be paid by businesses, people in Northern Ireland and the reputation of the United Kingdom.

    Nick Robinson

    I think they would say if they were here, if Lord Frost was here, it works – the French back down on fish, the EU back down on lots of controls that were being used in Northern Ireland after Brexit, we have to, they argue, throw our weight around in order to be taken seriously and for people to listen. John Major’s nice diplomacy doesn’t get you anywhere.

    Sir John Major

    Well, if they think that the way of negotiating is to be a bully, then I think they will come adrift in due course, and it may be on this occasion. It’s certainly true that the European Union obeys the normal laws of diplomacy and this country wouldn’t seem to recognise them at all at the present moment. But there will come a moment when it will stop. There’s come a moment in the House of Commons in the last week when many missteps by the government have suddenly exploded into a general anger. The same thing may happen over Northern Ireland if they proceed down the route they’re going.

    Nick Robinson

    Now you talk about general anger, there will again be some people listening who say well, it’s a bit rich for Sir John Major to talk about sleaze, wasn’t that the thing that drove him from office in many ways, a cash for questions scandal I mentioned, arms for Iraq, Jonathan Aitken, not to mention a host of ministers who were forced to resign during your period in office. Are you really qualified to talk about this?

    Sir John Major

    I think that’s a perfectly fair point for you to put. We did face so called sleaze in the 1990s, it was immensely damaging, it was embarrassing, it hurt the government, it hurt Parliament. It involved a relatively small number of people who misbehaved, the worst of which was cash for questions. There was no excuse for that. A small number of MPs were paid for asking parliamentary questions, it was a form of paid lobbying, and completely unacceptable. But here’s the difference. When that happened, I set up the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life to stop it, which has been a huge success. The striking difference is this, in the 1990s I set up a committee to tackle this sort of behaviour. Over the last few days we have seen today’s government trying to defend this sort of behaviour. Sleaze is unacceptable, was unacceptable when I was there, and I suffered a great deal of pain and anguish over it. It’s as unacceptable today, and it needs to be stopped.

    Nick Robinson

    You have described the Prime Minister’s behaviour, the behaviour of this Government, as unconservative. Now, our votes are a private matter but do you ever have nights, do you ever have moments when you look in the mirror and think I’m not sure I can vote for this man to remain as Prime Minister?

    Sir John Major

    Well, I wouldn’t be, I would be voting for my local Member of Parliament. So in fact, it’s not quite as simple as that. But it will be a dilemma for many people. I mean, the Government cushions itself with this majority of 80: the 80 was partly a vote for the Conservative Party, but I fear in significant part it was a vote against the fact that the Labour Party did not seem credible to form a government. That is why I think a little humility would be entirely appropriate to the government in the present situation in which they find themselves.

    Nick Robinson

    Sir John Major, thank you for joining us.

  • Sir John Major’s Statement on the Death of Pat Hume – 3 September 2021

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 3 September 2021 following the passing of Pat Hume.

    Pat Hume was a huge support to John throughout his political career and, most especially, his remarkable efforts in helping to secure peace in Northern Ireland.

    All my thoughts and warmest wishes go out to the Hume family during this time of such sadness.

    3 September 2021

  • Sir John Major’s Speech – Middle Temple’s Treasurer’s Lecture: The State We’re In

    The speech made by Sir John Major at Middle Temple on 9 November 2020.

    THE STATE WE’RE IN

    It is a privilege to be invited to deliver this lecture and my only regret is that it is remote – with no live audience ….. nor the delights of a Middle Temple dinner.

    Given the date, my subject is appropriate. On this day in 1923, Hitler failed to seize power in Germany; in 1938, it marked Kristallnacht and the Nazi assault on Jews; and, in 1989, the Berlin Wall fell.

    Each of these events impacted on the wider world – and that wider world will now impact on “The State We’re In”.

    The future of that State requires plain speaking if we are to be honest with our nation.

    And, of course, with ourselves. The great powers of our age are the United States, China, and the European Union.

    The world they straddle is fractious. The values of liberal society are stalled, if not in retreat. America and China are in a Trade War and an embryonic Cold War. Europe and America are far apart on many issues, but both deplore China’s authoritarian direction under President Xi.

    Lesser powers like Russia – the Great Disrupter – and Turkey continue to subvert and to meddle.

    Free trade and globalisation are now widely questioned.

    Migration and radical Islam are an ever present problem.

    Populism continues to promote prejudice and racial intolerance.

    And, in many nation states, autocracy has grown – and democracy has fallen back.

    Our world seems ill at ease, at a moment when harmony and collective decision making seem more and more essential for our security and well-being.

    The post-War settlement is out of date.

    The United Nations is hamstrung by the rules of its own Security Council.

    The World Trade Organisation is paralysed, with no functioning resolution dispute procedure.

    The World Health Organisation is under-funded, under-powered and under attack.

    Despite all this, no nation seems prepared to lead the case for reform.

    The financial crash of 2007 weakened many countries and the lives of billions of people; and, in the year of Covid, trillions of dollars have been diverted from growth as the virus has increased hardship on every Continent.

    This is the wider context in which the United Kingdom must prepare for our future, whilst facing the added challenges of Covid-19 – and Brexit.

    Our country has many virtues but, if we are to be successful in this challenging environment, we need to be cruelly honest with ourselves about what needs to be done to ensure our political and economic wellbeing.

    If we’re complacent, we betray our own interests. If we see ourselves through rose-tinted spectacles, then we will deceive ourselves.

    Complacency and nostalgia are the route to national decline. So I favour reality and optimism – but with the warning that false optimism is deceit by another name.

    We are no longer a great power. We will never be so again. In a world of nearly 8 billion people, well under 1% are British.

    We are a top second-rank power but, over the next half century – however well we perform – our small size and population makes it likely we will be passed by the growth of other, far larger, countries.

    In recent decades, we have consoled ourselves that we “punch above our weight” in international affairs. I think that was true: but that was then, and this is now.

    Our hefty international influence rested on our history and reputation, buttressed by our membership of the European Union and our close alliance with the United States.

    Suddenly, we are no longer an irreplaceable bridge between Europe and America. We are now less relevant to them both.

    COVID

    At home, we must face Covid.

    Covid has already left many families bereaved and bereft. It has changed lives and work patterns, cost billions, increased national debt and annual deficits.

    It has destroyed public tolerance of austerity, and made tax rises inevitable – although not, if we are sensible, until the economy is more healthy.

    The virus also presents a formidable obstacle to one of the Government’s better instincts. Their intention is to level up the regions and help individuals “left behind”. The pernicious effect of Covid will be to level down.

    The problem is not so much the gap between rich and poor, but that the poor may become so indebted and destitute they are unable to maintain themselves – or their families.

    The classic response to tide people over – until the private sector returns to full capacity – is for social subsidy out of taxation.

    But billions upon billions have already been spent, and friction between the extent of need and the capacity to help is inevitable.

    And there are many in need of help – businesses forced to shut down, the unemployed, the self-employed, the care sector, health, the arts, sport: the demands on the Exchequer are beyond anything we have known in peacetime.

    The Government deserves credit for what has been spent so far, to set against criticism for unmet needs.

    But I do find it surprising that – in the midst of the Covid crisis – the Government appears to be fostering disputes with the
    Judiciary, where all Governments should tread carefully; the Civil Service, upon whose help the Government depends; and the BBC, still the most respected broadcaster on the planet.

    These are unmerited distractions from the issues the country needs them to focus on.

    BREXIT

    The core change in the New Britain being forged is – Brexit. It has been hidden behind Covid for a few months. It has not gone away. You have to be wilfully in denial not to see the damage already done, and not to be concerned at what it might mean.
    Brexit divided England and Wales from Scotland and Northern Ireland. It divided political parties and families; the young and their elders; business and trade unions; and friend from friend. As its full impact becomes apparent in the New Year, old wounds may re-open.

    There is no consensus on Brexit, and never has been. It was a bitterly divisive policy, and uncorked a populism that may be difficult to quell.

    The Referendum debate was unlike any I have known before. Emotion overcame reality. And, in the search for hearts and minds and votes, fiction defeated fact and fostered a belief in a past that never was – whilst boosting enthusiasm for a future that may never be.

    If that mode of politics takes root, it will kill all respect in our system of government.

    In the Referendum, Britons voted to leave the European Union. I have never hidden my view, nor have I changed it. To my mind – and I am no starry-eyed European – Brexit is the worst foreign policy decision in my lifetime.

    I have seen the EU from the inside and know its frustrations. But have no doubt we were better off in than we will be out.

    The decision to leave will damage our future in many ways, and the reassurances we are given are unconvincing.

    Brexit was sold to our electors on false premises.

    Promises made will not – indeed, cannot – be kept. To leave the EU – to separate ourselves from our neighbours – was sold as “regaining sovereignty”, but it is, and will prove to be, a long and painful ball and chain on our national wellbeing.

    After the Referendum, Brexiteers did not even bother to argue the merits of their case – why should they? – it was “the will of the people”.

    And once “the will of the people” was asserted as a repeated mantra – and the Brexit leaders claimed to speak for all “the people” – any opposition to Brexit became illegitimate, and any contrary view was howled down.

    Free speech for those who supported remaining in the EU came at a price. They were pilloried as “Remoaners”: sticking to long-held principles and policies, and warning of clear dangers ahead was depicted as “sour grapes by sore losers”.

    Even Judges were denounced as “Enemies of the People” for ruling on a Point of Law. Opponents of Brexit were cowed, and free speech was curtailed. It was shameful. No democracy should find itself in such a position.

    Overseas, the outcome of the Referendum delighted our enemies and dismayed our friends. As our nation voted against its history and its self-interest, a bemused world looked on, wondering why we had chosen to become poorer and less influential.

    Brexit was sold to the nation as a win-win situation. It is not. We were promised we would stay in the Single Market. We have not. We were told trade with the EU would be frictionless. It will not be.

    We were promised we would save billions in payments to the European Union: a bus was driven around the country telling us so.

    Not so: Brexit is costing billions – not saving them.

    We were told that our “liberated country” could cut back on bureaucracy and regulations. We now know they will increase – and dramatically.

    We were promised we would strike lucrative trade deals with America, India, China and others in quick time. Japan apart – we have not.

    More recently – and for the first time in our long history – Ministers have proposed legislation giving them powers to break the law. This is a slippery slope down which no democratic Government should ever travel.

    And, it was claimed, Brexit wouldn’t increase support for Scottish independence or a united Ireland. It has.

    It defies logic that intelligent men and women making such extravagant promises did not know they were undeliverable – and yet they continued to make them.

    It was politics. It was campaigning. It was for a cause.

    It was also unforgiveable.

    If that is how we are going to conduct our public affairs, then not only will our politics truly fall into a bad place, but our word as a nation will no longer be trusted.

    POST-BREXIT TRADE

    Trade has always been the life-blood of our prosperity.

    We were promised a comprehensive trade deal with the EU. We were told this would be “the easiest deal in history” because “we hold all the cards”. Apparently not.

    As the politics changed, the promises were ditched.

    We can now look forward to a flimsy, barebones deal – or no deal at all. This is a wretched betrayal of what our electors were led to believe.

    It now seems that on 1 January next year, Brexit may be even more brutal than anyone expected.

    Brexit is no friend of free trade with Europe. It may set up new tariff barriers. And it certainly will:

    • set up non-tariff barriers;
    • damage supply chains;
    • add to regulations;
    • demand new customs and security declarations;
    • require Rules of Origin to prove where spare parts came from; – require tens of thousands of customs agents to process new bureaucracy; – create huge stockpiling dilemmas; and
    • require new massive storehouses to hold supplies.

    These costs and complexities are the certain legacy of Brexit. This is as a result of our negotiating failure – and it is a failure.

    Because of our bombast, our blustering, our threats and our inflexibility – our trade will be less profitable, our Treasury poorer, our jobs fewer, and our future less prosperous.

    This is not hindsight wisdom: this outcome was not only foreseeable, it was foreseen. Unfortunately, in a brilliant mis-direction, all warnings were scorned as “Project Fear” and ignored. And, to add tragedy to farce, it was the people who were misled who will now lose out.

    The Government has not been frank about our negotiations with Europe.

    They say we are merely asking for a Canada deal, but that’s not so. We are asking for a deal without tariffs or quotas and for more on haulage, on energy, on aviation – and we are a bigger trading rival than Canada and nearer to the EU.

    The Canada comparison is – to put it kindly – disingenuous. And to refer to an Australian deal is absurd.

    There is no Australia deal. It is a fantasy: a euphemism for no deal at all – and the Government should say so.

    Its reputation will suffer if it is not honest with the British people about this.

    It is time to stop putting Ministers on the media who speak to a pre-prepared script and parrot misleading or pointless slogans.

    There are hopes of trade deals with America, China and India. They would be welcome but, once again, the promises are overdone.

    One day, I am sure, we will get the much-heralded trade deal with America, originally promised for last Spring, then Summer – now, who knows?

    When it does come, it will benefit America far more than us. It may be symbolically important, but it won’t be an economic game-changer.

    The promised trade deal with China is highly unlikely in any near timescale. Our ice-cold diplomatic relations with Russia rule out a trade deal with her, too.

    And, if we wish to have a trade deal with India, the Government must realise that we cannot seek it on a Monday, and restrict immigration from India on Tuesday – it is a poor optic and a worse negotiating strategy.

    The macro arguments against Brexit: the economic and social damage, our weaker position in the world, and the loss of trade advantages, may seem remote. They won’t prove to be.

    WIDER IMPACT OF BREXIT

    And lesser issues will impact directly:

    • the loss of freedom of movement in Europe;
    • higher food prices;
    • more expensive holidays;
    • the withdrawal of EU driving licences;
    • the cost of health insurance without the free cover of the European Health Card;
    • the loss of the Pet Passport Scheme and the expensive – and time consuming – effort to get approval for pets to travel;
    • higher roaming charges for mobile phones;
    • slower entry and more delays at European airports; and
    • the loss of the automatic right to work, live or study in the EU.

    Small irritations, some may say, but – collectively – a significant loss of freedom that will be an unwelcome surprise to many as Europe itself begins to “take back control”.

    When the present phase of Brexit is over, it is important we negotiate a more comprehensive relationship with the EU than is likely to emerge from the present negotiations.

    We should seek bilateral agreements in areas of trade and policy which have not been agreed in these rushed negotiations.

    We should work with the EU to address global problems.

    And we should recognise that the nations of the EU are bound with ourselves in ties of common interest, history and future destiny.

    To ignore this would be a dereliction of our national interests.

    SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE

    One deeply troubling effect of Brexit is the risk of breaking up the UK by increased support for Scotland to leave the Union, and Northern Ireland to unite with the South.

    Neither will do so immediately, but the combination of Brexit – and the unpopularity of our present Westminster Government in Scotland – has increased the likelihood of a breach.

    I remain a convinced Unionist. Every part of the UK is richer – and of more weight in the world – if they stay together.

    The most likely to leave is Scotland. If she does, it will not only weaken Scotland, but also undermine the rump of the UK.

    It will be a step into the unknown for us both.

    The problem is politics.

    The raison d’être of the SNP is an independent Scotland while – for many Conservatives – Unionism is at the heart of their philosophy. It is a challenge to see whether that chasm can be bridged.

    To keep the Union together will require consensus, consideration and consultation. The Government must engage, coax, encourage, and examine every possible route to find an arrangement that will obtain a majority for union.

    It will be difficult – and is made even more so by the posturing of English and Scottish nationalists.

    In law, the Scots require the approval of the Westminster Government before they can legally hold a new independence referendum.

    But refusing one might help the separatist case, by adding to the list of grievances the Scottish National Party exploit with such skill.

    The choice for the UK Government is either to agree the referendum can take place – or to refuse to permit it. Both options come with great risk. But the lessons of Brexit may offer a way ahead.

    The Westminster Government could agree for an Independence Referendum to take place, on the basis of two referenda. The first to vote upon the principle of negotiations, and the second upon the outcome of them.

    The purpose of the second referendum would be that Scottish electors would know what they were voting for, and be able to compare it to what they now have. This did not happen with Brexit: had it done so, there may have been no Brexit.

    Many Scottish voices – and especially business – may support the logic of this: it may focus minds away from a short-term reflex opposition to a perceived English Government, and back to the mutual and long-term virtues of the Union.

    NORTHERN IRELAND

    Brexiteers affected not to notice that Northern Ireland’s support for the European Union pulled the Six Counties more into the orbit of the Republic of Ireland.

    This was exacerbated when the Prime Minister’s renegotiation of Theresa May’s Withdrawal Deal left Northern Ireland more integrated with the Republic than the rest of the United Kingdom.

    It was sold as a triumph, but it was a surrender.

    These developments accompanied a third reality: the Nationalist population in Northern Ireland is growing faster than the Unionists, and is close to a majority.

    The conjunction of these events is to increase the future possibility of a border poll – already sought by Sinn Fein – to vote upon a united Ireland.

    I doubt that such a poll would be won at present. Not all Nationalists will vote for unity. The Republic would find it hard to absorb the weak economic structure of the North.

    The time for a poll is not yet come. But it will. And if – when it does – the Northern Irish vote for unification, then those who ignored the warnings that Brexit posed will have to answer for the dismantling of a further part of the United Kingdom.

    And, here in Middle Temple, one issue cannot be ignored. The Rule of Law.

    Earlier I referred – in passing – to the provisions in the Internal Markets Bill that empower a Minister to disregard aspects of the Treaty the Prime Minister agreed earlier this year.

    This action is unprecedented in all our history – and for good reason. It has damaged our reputation around the world.

    Lawyers everywhere are incredulous that the UK – often seen as the very cradle of the Rule of Law – could give themselves the power to break the law.

    Moreover, at a moment when we need to maximise our commercial activities, this Bill has had a corrosive impact on the reputation of English and Welsh jurisdiction.

    This may have a practical cost.

    International dispute resolution can be conducted anywhere overseas and the Bill could erode the present pre-eminent position of the UK and, perhaps, especially London.

    Was this considered when the Bill was drafted? Was there consultation with the legal profession? If not, why not? And if there was consultation – why was it ignored?

    Similar concerns apply to the clause that seeks to exclude Judicial Review in delegated legislation.

    I cannot believe it is compatible with the Rule of Law to protect executive Acts from judicial scrutiny: put simply, Ministers must be subject to legal restraints. They cannot be above the law.

    And all individuals must have access to the law. Our delivery of justice must be seen to be fair and impartial – access to the law must not depend upon the size of your bank account.

    Magna Carta promised:

    “To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice”.

    And yet, an individual – if denied legal aid – may not have the resources to right an injustice. That can deny justice: it cannot be right.

    Nor can it be right to denigrate our Judiciary. They are not the “Enemies of the People”: they are the guarantors of our liberties under the law.

    It is the responsibility of Parliament to uphold these liberties if they are threatened by any source: not to do so would be to curtail an essential freedom.

    I have set out some concerns about the present state of our country. But I wouldn’t wish to be misunderstood.

    SUMMATION

    Throughout my life I have travelled widely and – in the last 20 years – almost incessantly.

    In all my travels I have found nowhere I would wish to live, other than here in the UK.

    That said, I believe we have a duty to make life better for this – and future generations – to whom we will be passing a difficult legacy.

    In hard times, there is often an inflection point that changes minds, and compels policy that otherwise could not be easily implemented.

    The combination of hazards before us may be such a moment.

    To make it so, policy should be set to pave the way to a fairer, better, safer, and – in time – more prosperous future.

    We will all have to bear burdens for such aspirations to become a reality, but that is both our privilege and our responsibility.

    The very core of well-being is an expanding economy, efficient health provision and quality education.

    The Government’s “levelling up” strategy is essential. So is – sooner rather than later – a credible system of social care for the elderly.

    For future employment, we will have to focus increasingly on vocational education, and give such skills the respect they deserve.

    It is essential we remain a United Kingdom – and reinforce the values that have built our reputation. If we cannot again be a great power, we can be a great example.

    If we cannot compel, we can influence.

    We can build up our soft power to sustain our profile.

    We can use our diplomacy to raise issues that need multi-nation action.

    We can be “Global Britain” in more ways than trade. But, to be so, we must reject the narrow nationalism that some have imported into our politics.

    We must put aside the notion of “British exceptionalism”: it is a fantasy baked into the minds of those who do not know how the world has changed.

    But – we can be exceptional.

    All this – and more – can be achieved.

    We like to think of ourselves as the land of hope and glory. “Hope” is essential – most especially during the darkest of times.

    But I am ambivalent about the “glory”.

    I will settle for a land that is united and prosperous; which rises above challenges – as it has done so often in the past; whose word is trusted both near and far; and whose people are seen to be decent, fair and compassionate to all.

    In every corner of our United Kingdom that remains the instinctive heartbeat. And it is one which I hope will always prevail.

  • Joint Statement with Tony Blair on UK Withdrawal Treaty Breach – 12 September 2020

    The joint statement issued by Sir John Major and Tony Blair on 12 September 2020 and published in the Sunday Times on 13 September 2020.

    Last October, Britain concluded an international Treaty with the European Union for the terms of Britain’s exit from the EU. This subsequently passed into British Law. It contained a specific agreement for resolution of the terms of trade for Northern Ireland.

    It was described by the Government as a “negotiating triumph” which would lead to an “oven ready” trade deal between the UK and Europe.

    It was, of course, no such thing. Even so, a General Election – with this agreement very much centre stage – was fought and won by the Conservative Party.

    Last week, with the promise of a comprehensive trade deal with the EU long gone, and the Brexit negotiations in disarray, the Government published a Bill which it openly admits is a violation of that Treaty. This Bill contravenes the Treaty the UK ratified, and overrides the law that Parliament passed on the basis that the agreement over Northern Ireland – as reached by the Prime Minister himself – did, in any event, contain “unforeseen” ambiguities.

    We have become so inured to the unending Brexit saga of misinformation and misdirection that the hollow claims, empty promises and emptier threats have lost their power to shock.

    But what is being proposed now is shocking. How can it be compatible with the Codes of Conduct which bind Ministers, Law Officers and Civil Servants to deliberately break Treaty obligations? As we negotiate new trade Treaties, how do we salvage credibility as “Global Britain” if we so blatantly disregard our commitments the moment we sign them?

    Yet the Government seeks to do so by the extraordinary pretence that breaking international law is necessary to “save the Good Friday Agreement”, which has given us peace in Northern Ireland for over two decades, and utterly changed the relationship between the UK and its nearest neighbour, the Republic of Ireland.

    We disagree. The Government’s action does not protect the Good Friday Agreement, it imperils it.

    When the two of us travelled together to Northern Ireland during the 2016 referendum campaign, we warned that the open border between the North and South of Ireland – such a vital element of the Peace Process and the Good Friday Agreement – was inconsistent with the UK leaving the European Single Market. We warned that we would be faced with a choice of either abandoning that open border, or keeping Northern Ireland at least inside the Single Market. We warned that, if Britain left the Single Market and Northern Ireland stayed, a degree of separation would be created between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.

    At the time we were excoriated as out of touch and out of time “has beens” who didn’t understand the complexities of the Irish problem. We – and the British and Irish people – were assured it would be easy to negotiate a way around all this.

    Four years on – after Theresa May ended up accepting, as a “back-stop”, that Northern Ireland should stay closely tied into the rules of the Single Market and the whole of the UK in the Customs Union – Boris Johnson resigned as Foreign Secretary on the basis that her agreement was a “betrayal”. He subsequently succeeded Mrs May as Prime Minister, and promptly replaced the “back-stop” with a “front-stop” that keeps Northern Ireland tied to EU single market rules, which was exactly where we were always going to be.

    When the Government renegotiated the Withdrawal Treaty, and urged MPs to pass it into domestic law, it did so in full knowledge of the consequences of doing so. These were that Northern Ireland would have to comply with some EU rules to keep the border open, including those on state aid, and that, as a result, new barriers to trade would arise between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.

    That was the unavoidable price of Britain leaving the single market and customs union, while wishing to avoid the imposition of a new hard border on the island of Ireland.

    To claim now that the Government has only just discovered this consequence is a nonsense, for it was the Prime Minister himself who negotiated it.

    The overt repudiation of the Treaty – by seeking to unilaterally override the provisions agreeing to the application of certain EU rules to Northern Ireland strikes at the very heart of the Withdrawal Agreement.

    It puts the Good Friday Agreement at risk, because it negates the predictability, political stability and legal clarity which is integral to the delicate balance between the North and South of Ireland that is at the core of the Peace Process.

    If the Government has concerns about specific parts of the Withdrawal Treaty, there are ready mechanisms within it to resolve them amicably, in the first instance by negotiation between the UK and the EU and, if that fails, through independent arbitration.

    It has chosen to ignore these options. Instead, it has thrown the Withdrawal Treaty into uncertainty and given the EU genuine reason to question whether Britain can be relied upon in any future agreements they make for trade with the EU.

    This has wide-ranging ramifications. It will not only make negotiation with the EU more difficult, but also any trade negotiations with other nations – including the United States. Once trust is undermined, distrust becomes prevalent.

    If Parliament passes this Bill, the UK is bound to end up before the ECJ which, under the Northern Ireland protocol, retains jurisdiction over EU rules. What if the UK loses? Do we defy the ruling? What price our international word then? Has any of this been thought through?

    It is unlikely that the EU will respond in a way that prejudices the Good Friday Agreement, but it may well retaliate in areas of enormous significance to the UK, such as limiting the access of UK financial services firms to the Single Market.

    We both opposed Brexit. We both accept it is now happening. But this way of negotiating, with reason cast aside in pursuit of ideology, and cavalier bombast posing as serious diplomacy, is irresponsible, wrong in principle and dangerous in practice.

    It raises questions that go far beyond the impact on Ireland, the Peace Process, and negotiations for a trade deal – crucial though they are. It questions the very integrity of our nation.

    If the Government succeeds in its plans, what constitutional audacity will be beyond them? If Parliament deliberately passes legislation known to undermine international law, what will that do to the reputation of Parliament and our country?

    For a country which has for hundreds of years furthered the cause of law around the world, respecting treaty obligations is just as important as domestic law. The constitutional principle of the Rule of Law requires us to treat such obligations in international law in the same way as in national law. Sophistry cannot justify this behaviour, nor can sly interpretation of one particular clause over another.

    This Government has already played fast and loose with Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. It had its knuckles rapped last year by the Supreme Court, but this did not deter them.

    As the world looks on aghast at the UK – whose word was once accepted as inviolable, this Government’s action is shaming itself and embarrassing our nation.

    This latest ruse has spectacularly misfired, and must stop now – before any further damage is done. And, if the Government itself will not respect the Rule of Law, then the High Court of Parliament should compel it to do so.

    The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH

    The Rt Hon Tony Blair

    12 September, 2020