Category: 2015-

  • Sir John Major’s Statement Following the Death of Lord Brooke – 15 May 2023

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 15 May 2023 following the death of the Rt Hon The Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville.


    Peter Brooke was a dear friend and colleague for many years ‒ before and after our time in Parliament.

    In all he did, Peter was the first gentleman of politics, which he elevated with his calm, gentle, yet tenacious character ‒ not least with regard to his pivotal role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process.

    Honourable to the core, he was one of the most deep down decent people I have ever known. I was proud to call him my friend.

  • Sir John Major’s Prison Reform Trust Speech – 9 May 2023

    The text of the speech made by Sir John Major at the Prison Reform Trust event held at the Old Bailey in London on 9 May 2023.


    It’s a great privilege to be here this evening – and in such historic surroundings.  

    I’d like to thank Alistair King for making it possible – and Edward Garnier for encouraging me to enlarge publicly upon what I have said privately.

    Edward – apart from his legal and political career – is a Trustee of the Prison Reform Trust, now Chaired by James Timpson, whose actions match his family’s long concern for prisoner welfare.

    The Trust itself, until recently under the guidance of Peter Dawson and now, Pia Sinha has worked for reform with the same persistence as those early campaigners – John Howard and Elizabeth Fry.

    I would like this evening, to add a few thoughts of my own.

    One of the virtues of age is having the time to reflect on what you have left undone with – no doubt – some regrets along the way.  It is such reflections that have brought us together this evening.

    I am conscious that, where I criticise, many of the problems are long standing and I, together with predecessors and successors, must each take our share of the blame.

    Let me begin with some reassuring news.  Violent crime has been falling for nearly 30 years – although the extent of public interest when some horrific crime occurs makes this a deeply held secret for many people.

    Despite this long downward trend, legislators have been far more active in framing policy to punish crime than in action to minimise the cause of it.

    Many citizens who have faced ‒ or fear facing ‒ serious or violent crime strongly approve.  They are clear that they ‒ and their families ‒ are safer if criminals are taken out of society.  And, in one sense, they are entirely right.

    And yet this instinctive ‒ very human ‒ response ignores the obverse of punishment, which must be rehabilitation.

    Stern sentences for violent crimes are necessary, and the instinct to protect the public is laudable ‒ but we should beware that excessive zeal to be tough on crime does not lead us into unwise policy.

    We are told “prison works” and – to the extent it holds the worst of criminals in custody, it does – but I do not believe our justice system is well served if it also imprisons those who could better be punished by non-custodial sentences.

    Even to use the word “rehabilitation” is taken by many as code for being “soft” on crime;  for being gullible;  a “do-gooder” who cares more for the villain than the victim.

    I certainly do not intend it in that sense.  Indeed – as I shall argue shortly – I believe such an interpretation ignores the public interest.  

    When society sends people to prison we are, in reality, “shutting the door after the horse has bolted”:  the crime has been committed.  

    Retribution follows:  but, upon release, it is surely in the wider interest of everyone that the crime is never repeated.

    That is the purpose of rehabilitation ‒ together with turning around the life of the released prisoner.

    If we wish to live under a penal code of which we can be proud, then we must not only punish, but act to reform and re-educate offenders.  

    I don’t claim that is easy.  But I do say that it is sound policy to reduce the risk of re-offending upon release.

    We send people to prison ‒ most of them, deservedly, but some not.  Either which way, to prison they go.  And, to many, that is the end of the matter.  Justice is done and the victim has closure.

    But ‒ future victims do not  have closure if the prisoner re-offends.  Prison is at its best when it rehabilitates, and, at its worst if – instead of providing a route out of crime, it provides an education into it.  

    PRISONERS/EDUCATION:

    It is instructive to consider the overwhelming characteristics of adults committed to prison:  

    • nearly two-thirds of them have used Class A drugs;
    • many are illiterate, or innumerate, or both;  
    • almost half have no educational or vocational qualifications whatsoever;
    • the intellectual assessment of many prisoners equates to that of a primary school pupil.  

    Two-fifths of those in prison were either expelled or excluded from school;  three fifths were frequent truants;  many were taken into care as a child;  or observed violence in the home;  or suffered abuse;  sometimes even all of the above.

    All of this is a truly wretched preparation for adult life.

    We cannot be ignorant of the fact that failures in the early years of life are a serious driver towards crime, and anti-social behaviour.  

    There is education and training in prison, but its availability ‒ and value ‒ is mixed.  After the (Sally) Coates review in 2016 improvements were expected.  

    Yet, seven years on they have not materialised.  

    There are reasons.

    Poor education contracts;  lack of funding;  unsavoury prison conditions;  and – of course – the impact of Covid, have all stood in the way.  As has over-crowding, and the resultant churn of prisoners being moved from prison to prison.  

    If we wish to attack the causes of crime, better education – in and out of prison – is an essential component.

    PRISON POPULATION:

    Forty years ago, when Willie Whitelaw was Home Secretary, I was a humble Parliamentary Private Secretary to the two Ministers of State, Tim Renton and Patrick Mayhew.  

    They were shocked ‒ Willie was apoplectic actually ‒ when the prison population reached 40,000.  Today, it is more than double that.  

    A range of reasons contribute:

    • our national population has grown;  
    • indeterminate sentences boosted prisoner numbers;  
    • as has legislation increasing terms of imprisonment for many crimes;  and
    • a greater range of misdemeanours may lead to prison.

    Comparisons with overseas do not reflect well on our penal policy.

    The UK has the highest imprisonment rates in Western Europe ‒ and yet I find it hard to believe we British are uniquely criminal.

    So ‒ were our predecessors unduly lenient in sentencing ‒ or are we unduly harsh?

    And why ‒ since our prisons are heavily over-crowded ‒ have suspended sentences been declining?

    In the year to June 2022, 43,000 people were sentenced to a term in prison.  Of these, less than two in every five had committed a violent offence.  

    Was prison the correct (or fair) sentence for all the 26,000 non-violent offenders?  Some, perhaps … but all?  I am not sure that it was.

    The punishment of prison is to lose liberty, but the prisoner may lose much else besides:  their job, their home, their relationships.

    That is a high cost ‒ not only for the prisoner, but for society as a whole.  The full costs may not be justified.

    We might be wise to be more selective.

    When prisoners have served their punishment we don’t wish them to be so alienated that ‒ through spleen or necessity ‒ they return to crime.  That is in no one’s interest ‒ and especially not the public at large.

    Many prisoners ‒ far too many, I believe ‒ are sentenced to short-term imprisonment when other sentences would be preferable.  In some cases, care and medical attention are called for rather than prison.

    Should the mentally ill be imprisoned, or should they be treated in secure wings of mental hospitals?  Surely the latter.

    More radically, should non-violent mentally ill prisoners even be the responsibility of the Justice Department:  would not the Department of Health be more appropriate?

    I appreciate such a move would not be welcomed by the Health Department, but the Government’s responsibility is to provide the most effective and humane punishment.  

    Imprisoning people who may be incapable of self-control is simply wrong.  They require care, not incarceration.  

    Of course, mentally ill prisoners who are dangerous or violent must be held securely to protect the public, but they, too, require care as well as custody.

    Moreover, should low-level drug offenders ‒ street dealers for example ‒ who are highly likely to be of limited intelligence as well as being addicts themselves – be sentenced to prison, or given an appropriate community sentence?

    To be blunt ‒ my suspicion is that many short sentences are pointless and that a non-custodial sentence would be more effective and, perhaps, more fair.

    WOMEN:

    There are over 3,300 women in prison in England and Wales.  More than half will serve less than six months.  No doubt some are irredeemable, but I suspect most are not.  

    Over two-thirds of women sent to prison have committed a non-violent crime:  at present more are imprisoned for theft alone than for criminal damage, arson, drug offences, possession of weapons, robbery or sexual offences.  

    I do question whether prison for many of these women does not cause more problems than it solves.  

    Some have mental problems, or histories of trauma or abuse.  Some 50 babies a year are born to women in prison, and reports suggest women in prison are seven times more likely to suffer still birth.  

    That statistic alone should make us question present policy:  whatever the mother may have done, the baby is innocent.

    I accept – male or female – we are all equal under the Law, but commonsense and practicality suggests we should look very carefully at community sentence alternatives, before sending vulnerable women offenders to prison.  

    THE PRISON ESTATE:

    Reports by HM Inspectors on the state of our prisons do not make for happy reading.  Time after time, the conditions of prisons are found to be unsatisfactory.  In some they are intolerable.

    Many of the old Victorian prisons ‒ Wandsworth, Pentonville, Norwich, among others ‒ were built to hold one prisoner per cell.

    150 years later, these cells may hold two – or even three – prisoners, sleeping on bunk beds and essentially ‒ forgive my putting it this way – living in a lavatory.

    To have inmates held in worse conditions than in Victorian times is an indictment of policy that is hard to ignore.

    Last year, 301 prisoners died in custody ‒ 74 of them by their own hand.  This rate of suicide is six times higher than among the general population.  

    Many suicides are within the early days of custody.  It is hard to escape the conclusion that the sheer shock of imprisonment ‒ which, I reiterate, may be for a non-violent crime ‒ is a principal cause of the desperation that leads to self-destruction.

    Self-harm in prison has risen by two and a half times over the last decade ‒ most notably by women, but there is also a significant rise in the incidence of male self-harming.  I would like to know ‒ why?

    I would suggest that prisoners who kill or maim themselves are people in despair – not hardened villains.  

    Of course, the Government knows all this.

    In 2015, the Government announced a new prison reform programme to build nine new prisons – and committed £1.3 billion to create 10,000 new prison places by 2020.

    This well-meaning plan ‒ let me put it kindly ‒ faltered.  

    The Public Accounts Committee reported that, despite these pledges, only 206 new places were delivered with 3,500 places still underway.  

    Meanwhile, prisoners continued to be held in unsafe and over-crowded conditions.

    A revised plan followed in 2019 ‒ also to create a further 10,000 places.

    This was updated in 2020 when £4 billion was allocated to deliver a total of not 10,000 but 18,000 places ‒ in England and Wales – by the middle of this decade.  

    The plans included the expansion of four prisons;  the completion of building at two more;  and refurbishment of the Prison Estate.

    Last month, a Parliamentary Question revealed that only 3,100 of that 18,000 target had yet been provided, and only one new prison had been opened in Wellingborough – although I believe a second, Fosse Way, is due to open this year.

    Progress?  Yes.  But 2025 is only two years away, and there is still a very long way to go to turn what was promised into reality.

    Prison staffing is an allied and deep-rooted problem.

    The turnover of staff is a ruinous 15% a year – which delivers its own message about the job’s lack of appeal, and the toll it must take.  

    Despite efforts to attract people to become prison officers, there are over 700 fewer officers than there were 12 months ago, and front line staff are 11% below the staffing level of 2010.  

    This does not suggest a modern prison service is anywhere near delivery.

    REMAND:

    It is said that “Justice delayed is Justice denied”.

    And yet, the congestion in our Courts does delay justice.

    Consider the remand system.

    Remand may be used for accused people before their trial, or those convicted and awaiting a formal sentence for their offence.  Within that bland reality lie many complexities, and some injustices.

    At present ‒ partly as a result of Covid delays ‒ the number of people on remand is at its highest level for decades:  around 14,500.  

    Typically, two-thirds are awaiting trial, while the remainder are awaiting sentence after conviction.

    Of those awaiting trial, one in two are subsequently imprisoned – even though accused of non-violent offences.  

    Although individual circumstances will differ, I do not believe the case can be made that they should all be jailed.

    My belief is reinforced when I learn that – at their trials – one in ten remand prisoners are judged to be innocent of any crime, and a yet higher number are convicted – but sentenced only to a non-custodial sentence.  

    The need for reform seems evident.

    Other factors reinforce that judgement.

    Nearly one-third of remand prisoners are held longer than six months before trial, and an unlucky 5% for over two years.  That is over 700 remand prisoners held for over two years, before quite possibly being found to be innocent.  

    They not only lose their liberty but their reputation and their income too, which may well also punish their families.  This cannot be acceptable.

    Nor is it the fact that, last year over one-third of suicides in custody were by people on remand.  I do not think we can be proud of that.

    PAROLE BOARD:

    Parole for prisoners found guilty of serious and violent crimes is inevitably contentious.  

    In practice, the Parole Board deals only with a minority of prisoners ‒ less than 10% ‒ and decisions “for” or “against” their release or transfer to an “open” prison can be complex and controversial.  

    Thirty years ago, a House of Commons Select Committee advised that “release should be an entirely judicial decision ‒ independent of the Executive”.

    Although this was initially resisted, Parliament did subsequently accept that principle and ‒ in my view ‒ rightly so.

    Prisoners also gained the right to present their case for parole to the Board.  This ended years of parole decisions taken in secret as a result of evidence that was never challenged.  

    That was an approach which honoured neither democracy nor equity, and was a blot on our system.

    The present more open system does ensure that decisions are taken after a proper presentation of arguments.  This seems to have been effective.

    One quarter of those considered for release by the Parole Board were successful.  Of those, only 1 in every 200 prisoners released re-offended within the next three years. 

    This would suggest that the Parole Board is not a bunch of gullible “softies”.

    Over the years, the Parole Board has evolved from its modest beginnings in the 1960s:  with only a handful of Board members, no hearings to consider evidence, and with the final decision being taken by the Home Secretary.

    Today, the Board ‒ nominally at least ‒ is independent of Government, and has amassed years of experience and expertise, enabling a level playing field for decisions upon release, without the hype and pressure that would be bound to accompany political involvement.

    In the thousands of decisions to be made each year, there is no way that Ministers could possibly match the experience and knowledge of the 350 Parole Board Members.  

    It is therefore surprising ‒ and worrying ‒ that, over the last year, recommendations by the Parole Board to transfer prisoners to an “open” prison have suddenly, and sharply, been rejected by the Justice Secretary.  

    In 2021-22 – 94% of the Parole Board recommendations were accepted but, thereafter, that fell to 11%.  

    It is hard to believe that does not result from an unannounced change of policy that is instituting a harsher regime.

    VICTIMS AND PRISONERS’ BILL:

    The victims of crime have long needed more support than they receive, and there are elements of the proposed Victims and Prisoners’ Bill that are eminently sensible – and long overdue.

    As I understand it, the Bill was originally intended to cover the interest of victims only, and the prisoners’ element is a late addition.  

    I believe this addition is a political misjudgement that may put much needed reforms at risk, and will come to that in a moment.

    I welcome the proposal to enshrine the Victims’ Code in Law, which should ensure that greater support is delivered.  

    But, if theory is to become reality, funding will be needed for specialist support and, thus far, there is no evidence that this will be provided. 

    I can only hope the Justice Secretary has secured agreement for funding from the Treasury, or the Bill will fail to meet its purpose.

    I understand that the former Justice Secretary sought the power to veto decisions made by what is allegedly the independent Parole Board, to release prisoners convicted of serious crimes.  

    The problem with this is that I do not see how (or why) the Justice Secretary would be able to reach a more just decision than the Parole Board.  

    Any single Government Minister – however able or well-meaning – would be far more vulnerable to public campaigns and, under pressure, to make a harsher decision to appease them.   This is a very slippery slope.

    I do not think that any politician should have that power, and I hope the new Justice Secretary will reconsider or – if he does not – that Parliament will deny it.

    IPPs:

    There is one area of the penal code that is over-ripe for action to correct legitimate grievance. 

    Until 2003, the only indeterminate sentence available to Judges was a life sentence, which was only for the gravest of offences.

    But, that year, the Government introduced a new concept:  that of indeterminate imprisonment for public protection – so-called IPPs.  It was intended for people considered “dangerous”, but whose offence did not justify a life sentence.  

    It passes a minimum tariff but offers no stated maximum.  Release could only be authorised by the Parole Board.

    It seems that this scheme went wrong from the outset.  It was applied far more widely than expected (or intended), with lower level offenders receiving this harsh sentence.  

    The number of IPP cases far outstripped expectations, and amendments to the legislation were approved by Parliament in 2008.

    But shortcomings remained, and the power to issue IPP sentences was abolished in 2012.

    But – and it is a BIG “but”:  when it was abolished, no action was taken to determine a just ‒ and definitive ‒ sentence for the prisoners already serving for an indeterminate time.  

    This was an extraordinary omission, which remains the case eleven years after abolition.  

    Nearly 3,000 offenders, still imprisoned – including those who have never been released and those recalled back to custody – were sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment, but not a maximum.

    They are all serving sentences that have extended years beyond their minimum tariff and – without Ministerial action – may never end.

    This is soul destroying for prisoners and their families, and is emphatically not justice.  

    I believe that, without any further delay, justice should be served by Government agreement to the Justice Committee’s recommendation of a re-sentencing exercise – backed by the establishment of an expert committee to guide on the practicalities – for everyone still serving an IPP sentence.

    * * * * *

    I was brought up to believe that we, in Britain had one of – if not the – most just and civilised penal codes in the world.  Some of what I have learned in preparing this speech has truly shaken that belief.  

    People who commit crimes have deservedly forfeited much but ‒ in our country ‒ not, I hope, the right to be treated fairly. 

    There are many good causes that attract support, and hundreds of thousands of activists plead the case they most care about.

    But it is not so easy, or attractive, to plead for people who have committed crimes, and are responsible for their own misfortune.  They do not so easily attract sympathy.  

    Nor, very often, is it politically comfortable for “active” politicians to plead for convicted criminals.  In the rough and tumble of politics, compassion and consideration can too easily be derided as “soft” or “weak” – terms which can define as well as defame.  

    It has ever been thus.

    In many ways, it is odd to plead for a more empathetic penal code on the site of Newgate – one of the most notorious prisons in our long national history.  

    But views evolve.

    In pre-Christian days, prisons were not a place of lengthy incarceration but merely of safe custody until a more savage sentence than loss of liberty could be carried out.  Those days, thankfully, have gone.

    In Saxon times, prison was occasionally used as a means of punishment and – by the 13th Century – to facilitate a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Church, which was unable to pass a harsher punishment.  

    It was when offenders defaulted in payment of a forfeit to the Crown that prison became a convenient inducement to pay ‒ and then became of wider use as a punishment.

    I have argued that its use needs to evolve further if it is to become a better instrument to deliver justice and reduce crime.

    So, let me summarise my concerns:

    • We over-use prison and under value alternative sentences;
    • too many vulnerable people ‒ including the mentally-ill – are jailed;
    • education and rehabilitation in prison is inadequate;
    • much of the Prison Estate is out of date and unsuitable;
    • too many accused are remanded in prison pre-trial;
    • the Justice Secretary should not remove powers from the Parole Board;
    • IPP prisoners should be re-sentenced.

    These practices, these problems have grown up over many governments.

    In my layman’s view, it is time they were addressed – and put right.

  • Sir John Major’s Statement Following the Death of Lord Lawson of Blaby – 4 April 2023

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 4 April 2023 following the death of Lord Lawson of Blaby.


    Nigel Lawson was a commanding Chancellor and, together with Geoffrey Howe, one of the essential pillars of the 1980s Conservative Government.

    His influence was respected well after he left government, and he will be long remembered.

  • Sir John Major’s Comments at the 30th Anniversary of Warrington Bombing – 20 March 2023

    The comments made by Sir John Major at the 30th anniversary memorial service held in Warrington on 20 March 2023.


    I feel honoured to be with you in Warrington this morning:  commemorating that dark and desperate day exactly 30 years ago …. almost to the minute.  

    It was a day which affected so many – but none more so than the families and friends of Tim Parry and Johnathan Ball.  

    I have never forgotten the moment I received the call from No10.  I was in my garden in Huntingdon that weekend:  a sunny, early Spring day, when children were in shopping centres up and down the country buying cards and flowers for Mothering Sunday.  

    When Tim and Johnathan’s mothers waved their sons off on the morning of 20 March, 1993, they couldn’t possibly have known that what they were seeing was the last wave they would receive in return.  

    What they suffered is beyond the nightmare of any parent.  

    The two bombs here in Warrington brought me the closest I ever came to giving up on the Peace Process.  

    I felt that if the IRA could continue to plant random bombs, in random towns, randomly killing children and other innocent men and women, whilst we were trying to find a way through to peace, there really was no hope.  

    But I couldn’t give up.  I feared that – if we did – there would be even more bombs, even more children, and even more grieving families.

    And there is always hope.  As time has proved.  

    But there is more.

    There is also healing, forgiveness, and turning something so unimaginably painful into something so enduringly positive.

    As Colin and Wendy Parry did at the Peace Centre here in Warrington.  

    Established in memory of Tim and Johnathan, they created a meeting place and education centre, bringing together people from different religions to gain a better understanding of each other’s beliefs and cultures.  

    Many friendships – from historically opposing factions – have been forged and kept.  

    And hope got a helping hand.  

    The Peace Centre has also provided support and professional counselling to all victims of terrorism here in the UK – most recently to the families affected by the Manchester Arena bombing.  

    Since 1993, Colin and Wendy have devoted themselves to this cause.  Selfless and tireless in their determination to honour Tim’s memory, by helping others who have fallen victim to the same senseless violence that ended their own son’s life in this very place – 30 years ago today.  

    I cannot think of a greater legacy any parent could gift their child.

    Shortly, we will be hearing memories of Tim and Johnathan, from those who knew them best.  Tim’s nephew, Arthur, will read a poem. And the choir from Tim’s former school will sing one last song:  “Something Inside so Strong”.  

    I would like to end by touching on one particular line from that:  “My light will shine so brightly it will blind you – because there’s something inside so strong”.  

    Let us think about that for a moment.  

    There is a light too bright to be extinguished.  

    And that is hope.

    Let us hope that light will shine down on us all.  

    May it provide:

    • the strength we need to sustain us in times of trauma and grief;  
    • the forgiveness we must find within ourselves to heal;  
    • the tolerance to understand views that are different from our own;  
    • and the resolve to explore every conceivable  avenue – to turn what might seem the impossible, into the possible.

    It can be done.  It has been done.  It will be done again.

    With hope – there is always a way …..

    And, with that in-extinguishable beacon lighting our path, peace and reconciliation can and will be found.  

  • Sir John Major – 2023 Address at Oxford University – 8 March 2023

    The address made by Sir John Major at Oxford University on 8 March 2023.


  • Sir John Major’s Statement Following the Death of Betty Boothroyd – 27 February 2023

    The statement made by Sir John Major on 27 February 2023.


    STATEMENT BY THE RT HON SIR JOHN MAJOR KG CH ON THE DEATH OF THE RT HON THE BARONESS BOOTHROYD OM

     MONDAY, 27 FEBRUARY 2023

    Betty Boothroyd was a superb Speaker, easy to like and easier still to admire.

    As Speaker, she was full of commonsense, and utterly fair in her rulings.  She handled a fractious Commons with great skill.

    She set a standard for every future Speaker.

  • Sir John Major’s Interview on BBC Radio 4’s Westminster Hour – 26 February 2023

    The text of Sir John Major’s interview on BBC Radio 4’s Westminster Hour on 26 February 2023. The interview was broadcast over the programme in two separate parts.


    PART ONE

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked Sir John Major for his views on the Northern Ireland deal]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    As far as trade is concerned, the deal that Mr. Johnson and Lord Frost did was pretty poor. It was a pretty poor negotiation and after having regarded it as a triumph and taking the plaudits for it, it was barely weeks before they were denouncing it, but of course blaming the European Union for it. So there is a need for some reform of the agreement. The European Union are offering a good deal of reform and the UK have made some helpful suggestions about red and green exit points for trade for example.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that the DUP wanted the protocol rewritten]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    It depends exactly what they mean by that, it’s not at all clear to me what they mean. But what is actually turning out to be a particularly difficult point is the question of what happens with trade disputes. The European Union insists that the European Court of Justice should be involved and that is a neuralgic point for many Members of Parliament in the UK, particularly the European Research Group wing of the Tory party, and also for the DUP. This neuralgic situation has left Northern Ireland without an executive and without a power sharing assembly for well over a year, and it could be a good deal longer.

    Trade isn’t the only problem in Northern Ireland, they’ve got real problems with health, with education, with all sorts of other things and they need that executive back in operation. The extent to which the European Court of Justice would be involved would be in determining disputes between companies, they’re not going to overturn the constitution. Their involvement would be tiny, partial and occasional. If we can get in a reform all the trade changes we need, for the easier access for trade into Northern Ireland, then the fact that there will be a minute occasional involvement of the European Court of Justice really ought not to stop an agreement being made. They talk of democracy, democracy is thrown away when that assembly is not sitting. We need them back.

    ———-

    PART TWO

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that she had joined Westminster as a very junior reporter back in 1989, seeing the last moments of Margaret Thatcher’s administration, but it was John Major who was the first Prime Minister she interviewed and it was nice to interview him again. She put to him that back in the 1990s, there was still a generation in Parliament who had been shaped by the Second World War]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    Those politicians had served in a war and it had been the biggest scar on their lives, as it was for everybody who was alive at that time. They saw the importance of the United Kingdom ensuring, with its partners across Europe, that there would never again be a war like that. That was the great impetus to join the European Union at the time. Now as the years have gone by that impetus has faded and different arguments took hold about Europe about bureaucracy and all sorts of things which are important in themselves but they’re not as important as peace. The 1980s became quite an ideological age on both sides of the political fence and that carried through into the 90s with those who came into Parliament, and it’s followed on. So even today you have, in both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, an ideological fringe to those two parties that are unduly significant and that is something that has changed.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Commented that Sir John said Brexit was a mistake and asked is this a big difference in politics between now and then?]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    Beyond any shadow of doubt. It’s not just that we left Europe, it was the nature of the referendum, the divisions it created, the manner in which we left Europe and the way in which the public were fed promises which have proved to be wholly unfounded. I anxiously await for the benefits of Brexit as yet, except in small areas, been unable to find them. The land of milk and honey that was held out by the Brexiteers has so far proved to be sour vinegar, rather than milk and honey. I find it personally quite astonishing that those people who made so many promises about Brexit haven’t retreated in their corners and kept silent about it rather than boasting about the fact they got Brexit done.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked if they would be listening saying ‘there he goes again, things will get better’]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    I know, that’s their line. But how long, this life, the next life, my grandson’s life? Who knows? They cannot answer.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked about the current Conservative leader who is a Brexiteer and decided that Brexit would work]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    He did and we take a different view on that. But I think in other things he’s done a great deal to restore respect for our country and I think he is a serious politician. He seriously considers policy and policy is more important to him than publicity and that is a very welcome change. I think he’s honest and reliable, as indeed I think the Leader of the Opposition is and I think that is a very helpful development for Britain to recover.

    CAROLYN QUINN

    [Asked about public trust in politicians and whether there is a problem with integrity in politics]

    SIR JOHN MAJOR

    It’s an ongoing problem with integrity and politics. The public have always, and I think this is rather healthy, had a scepticism of politicians and authority generally, but not as seriously as we see it now. There is undoubtedly a real problem. I think it comes from two or three different things. Firstly, for 15 years people are disillusioned because since the 2007 financial crash, the vast majority of people have seen no increase in their net disposable income at all and that is unprecedented. At the same time, other people have made a great deal of money and that must really hurt to those who are now in work but having to go to food banks which is intolerable in a nation like ours.

    Then there’s the question you touched on of trust and integrity. I think that has been damaged by actions over the past two or three years, I don’t think I need to enumerate them as I think all your listeners will know exactly what I’m talking about. But it is damaging, if trust is not exercised where people are elected to look after the interests of others, then it will have a very bad effect on the perception of Parliament. You mentioned the word sleaze, there’s a distinction between sleaze in terms of things like the government’s behaviour on patronage or on party political donations, and sleaze if it is the individual misdemeanour of individual Members of Parliament and I think that was the predominant problem we had in the 1990s.

    Then there is one great gap in politics which I’m astonished nobody has pointed out. Many of the people on one wing of the Conservative Party argue very strongly for a low tax Singapore on Thames type economy and yet the Conservative Party are also fighting to keep hold of the red wall seats. The red wall seats want a vast amount of more public expenditure because that is the only thing that is going to cure grievances that have built up under governments of different parties and all parties over the last 40 or 50 years.

    We have to make a choice. It is appalling that some of the deprived areas of the United Kingdom, the fifth or sixth richest nation in the world, that some people are living in worse conditions that you can find almost anywhere in Europe. That is not a success for governments, not just this government, that is not a success for governments over the last 50 years. And it is incumbent upon the government to take levelling up seriously. I think I will put it this way, dealing with the people left behind. Dealing with that particular problem by levelling up is as big an issue as setting up the National Health Service. It will take more than a decade, more than two decades. The party that really puts its shoulder to that wheel will learn a great deal of credit for itself, for politics generally, for the country and also for what is right.

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons – 7 February 2023

    The opening statement made by Sir John Major to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 7 February 2023.


    OPENING STATEMENT

    I think it might be helpful if I spend a few minutes introducing the subject. I will do so only sketchily, and fill in more detail in answer to your questions.

    By the early ‘90s, life in Northern Ireland had not been free of terror for 25 years and – to me – violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    I spent a long time reading myself into the problem and its history. I did so to better understand the fears and ambitions of the opposing factions.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was open to politicians of mainstream Parties, as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    As to background, relations between London and Dublin were only spasmodic. Unionist and Nationalist opinion was far apart.

    Bombing, killings, paramilitary beatings, the murder of soldiers by Provisionals, were a part of everyday life in Northern Ireland – as was violent retaliation by Loyalist paramilitaries.

    Even when the Peace Process gained traction there were innumerable setbacks and perpetual suspicion. Distrust was rife. The political parties would talk to the UK Government, but not to one another.

    Throughout the Process violence re-occurred, as the IRA were determined to show their volunteers they were not weakening, even as progress was made.

    The Process was often slowed by Unionist suspicion of the process inflamed by partial “leaks” and unreal “fears”. John Bruton’s Government faced similar problems with Provisional opinion.

    All this was a perpetual frustration.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and also made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so.

    In early 1993, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    We asked ourselves, was this genuine or a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    – we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    – with no pre-determined outcome; and emphasised that

    – the result could be a united Ireland, but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the Peace Process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side. I was aware that the IRA Leaders had backbenchers more lethal than mine.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated, by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin, and asked when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    In reply we stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994.

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    We looked at text after text: from Hume-Adams; from Albert Reynolds ‒ but by October 1993 progress was stuck. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Greysteel moved us forward.

    We developed a text with Dublin ‒ and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and their “leaks”.

    We then made progress on the Draft. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition, and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. These were essential preliminaries to the Good Friday Agreement.

    In August 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an Investment Conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement, and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    At first the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents but, reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    After February 1995, action focused on decommissioning weapons. A “Working Group” had been set up in October 1994. (Chilcot and Dalton).

    It was a tortuous process of one step forward ‒ and then stalemate.

    I will spare you the litany of proposals, rejections, quarrels, grandstanding ‒ as the Provisionals refused to budge.

    John Bruton and I proposed an International Commission with Senator George Mitchell as its Chairman. The Provisionals tried to block it. Rows were sufficiently serious to cause an Anglo-Irish Summit to be postponed due to threats of violence.

    Paddy Mayhew had been developing a “twin-track” initiative of decommissioning and political progress. It was rejected. We re-drafted it as a “Building Blocks” Paper.

    In November, John Bruton and I agreed the “twin-track” initiative, and to establish the decommissioning body.

    President Clinton arrived in London and I briefed him. He was shocked that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists, 75. In London, Belfast and Dublin, he rammed home the peace message. This was timely and immensely helpful.

    By early 1996, it became clear the Provisionals were waiting for a General Election, with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The IRA exploded bombs in Canary Wharf killing two people and injuring over 100. Naturally, they blamed the British Government.

    Despite this setback, the UK and Irish governments agreed Rules for All-Party Talks and confirmed these could begin in June, with elections to the negotiating body in May.

    The elections took place – heralded by the IRA exploding a massive bomb in Manchester days after All-Party Talks began.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. I was confident Tony Blair and Labour would carry it forward.

    Labour did not bear the scars of 18 years of dispute with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, and the preparatory work on decommissioning weapons.

    To their great credit ‒ they did.

  • Sir John Major’s Witness Statement and Answers to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    The witness statement and answers given by Sir John Major to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on 26 January 2023.


    Text of session (in .pdf format)

  • Sir John Major’s Opening Statement to the Irish Parliament Joint Committee on the Good Friday Agreement – 26 January 2023

    Sir John Major’s opening statement to the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement of the Irish Parliament on 26 January 2023.


    It is a great pleasure to meet with you today, and I’m only sorry I can’t be with you in person.

    You were kind enough to invite me to make an opening statement.

    As I made clear before I accepted your invitation, I was only involved in the work that led up to the GFA. The negotiation of it was undertaken after I left Government. It is for others to respond to that.

    When I became Prime Minister in November 1990 I had no background in Northern Ireland issues and so, perhaps, the first question is ‒ why did I become so concerned about “The Troubles”?

    The answer is simple. Life in Northern Ireland over the previous 25 years had never been free of terror and, to me, violence was as unacceptable there as it would have been anywhere else in the UK.

    For that reason, between 1990/97 I visited Northern Ireland more often than anywhere else – at home or overseas.

    In 1990, Peter Brooke [S/S NI] had opened an intelligence channel to receive messages from the Provisional IRA, and by November of that year he had made the important statement that the British government had “no selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland”.

    I spent a long time reading myself in to the problem and its history. I did so to get into the minds of the opposing factions so that I might better understand their fears and ambitions. It was clear the hopes of Unionists and Nationalists were far apart.

    Throughout the years ahead, my door was always open to politicians of all Parties as well as the Churches and Community bodies. Later, I had innumerable meetings with Albert Reynolds and John Bruton ‒ often informal and private.

    One relationship was already in play: it was the Hume-Adams dialogue which had begun in 1988. This was in some ways helpful, but in others less so. I will come to that later.

    In February 1992, Albert Reynolds became Taoiseach and, within a fortnight, we had a private supper at Downing Street. We discovered an empathy, and a shared ambition to end violence in Northern Ireland.

    Despite disagreements, rows, and frustrations, our friendship held until the day Albert died. His role in advancing peace should never be underestimated. He was a remarkable man who became a friend to cherish.

    Sometimes we disagreed. Many disagreements were trivial: others more substantial. Albert would have liked me to become a persuader for unification but that I could not ‒ and would not ‒ do. If I had done so, it would have broken the peace process – because the Unionist community would have never co-operated.

    It was clear that unification ‒ if it were ever to come about ‒ would have to be with the open consent of the Unionist community. Any attempt at duress would have failed and led to renewed violence. That was ‒ and remains ‒ true.

    At that time, the three stranded talks were often stalled because the political Parties would talk only to the UK Government and not to each other. Unionists were suspicious of the Hume-Adams talks in which there was no Unionist voice.

    In late 1992, Paddy Mayhew [new S/S NI] promised a “fair deal” to all who abandoned terrorism.

    Soon afterwards, we received a “back channel” message from the Provisionals. It was dramatic:

    “The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close. We wish to have an unannounced ceasefire in order to hold a dialogue leading to peace.”

    It went on ‒ to point up a real problem for the Provisionals:

    “We cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion to the volunteers, because the press will misinterpret it as surrender.”

    This fear helps explain why bombings went on even as the process advanced.

    The message ended:

    “We cannot meet the Secretary of State’s public renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure we were not being tricked.”

    But ‒ was the message genuine? I was assured that it came from Martin McGuinness (although he always denied it).

    Or was it a trick?

    If genuine, and we ignored it, we would have lost a chance of peace.

    We could lose our jobs ‒ or lose the Peace Process.

    Paddy and I consulted colleagues, and decided to respond positively. In March 1993:

    we agreed to an exploratory dialogue;

    with no pre-determined outcome and emphasised;

    the result could be a united Ireland but only on basis of consent by the people of Northern Ireland.

    Despite this, violence continued. On the very day our reply was delivered two small boys were killed in Warrington. That atrocity nearly brought the peace process to a halt.

    Bombs at Bishopsgate and an explosion in the centre of Belfast soon followed.

    My judgement was that the IRA believed that continuing violence would reassure their members there was no weakness on the Provisional side.

    So we continued with talks.

    On 23 October 1993, 10 people were killed in Shankill Road by the Provisionals. A week later, the Loyalists retaliated by killing 8 and wounding 19 in Greysteel.

    Such outrages caused deep public revulsion. We then received a further message. It claimed the British Government couldn’t solve the problems talking only with Dublin: when would we open dialogue with the IRA “in the event of a total end to hostilities?”.

    This message set no conditions for such talks.

    I convened a meeting with senior colleagues, and we agreed to spell out in detail what we needed for talks, and what the IRA had to do.

    This we did on 5 November 1993. We stressed there could be no secret agreement with them. There could be dialogue, but only after a permanent end to violence.

    If that were obtained we would open dialogue “within one week of Parliament’s return” in January 1994. This was the last message to go via the private route.

    * * *

    The idea of a Joint Declaration ‒ a good one ‒ sprang from the Hume-Adams talks.

    Dublin had been discussing it with Adams in 1991: Charles Haughey had suggested it to me even earlier.

    In February 1992, John Hume offered a text ‒ presumably from Sinn Fein.

    Albert Reynolds knew the February text was unacceptable but could not shift the Provisionals. He presented it to us ‒ and we rejected it. In June, Irish officials offered a different text. The idea was sound but, in truth, both texts were dead in the water.

    Also, in June 1993, I met Albert Reynolds and Dick Spring. We liked the principle of a Joint Declaration. It could offer a way forward for Unionists, Nationalists and Paramilitaries.

    I met Albert in Brussels by which time it was clear the Hume-Adams process would never be acceptable to Unionists. If any Declaration were to be widely accepted it would have to be negotiated by London and Dublin, and accepted by the British and Irish Parliaments.

    In October 1993, progress was stuck, and I reiterated publicly that if the IRA ended violence Sinn Fein could enter politics as a Democratic Party. Ironically, public disgust at the violence in Shankill and Graysteel moved us forward.

    We developed our own text ‒ with helpful advice from James Molyneaux and the Church of Ireland. Albert Reynolds initially rejected our text, but then suggested amendments – and the chance of an agreement rose.

    We met at Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993. Albert and I had a fierce row over our back channel and Irish “leaks”.

    But we then turned to the Draft and made progress. Failure would have been disastrous but slowly and surely, we worked towards an agreement. If we had failed, the Peace Process might have become untenable. On 14 December, we agreed the final text by telephone.

    The next day, Albert came to London and we announced the agreed Joint Declaration. At last, we had the basis of an agreement that received overwhelming support.

    It was a basis only: a set of agreed principles. A beginning. But, after 70 years of partition and 24 years of bloodshed, it was an agreement both the UK and Ireland could accept.

    From then, I was confident a deal could be done. So was Albert. A mini Rubicon had been crossed.

    The text was convoluted but served its purpose. It promised a fair outcome.

    The Unionists were reassured a united Ireland would only come about with their consent.

    Nationalists were promised their interests would be protected.

    The paramilitaries were offered a route into political life. This was all an essential preliminary to the Good Friday Agreement.

    On 31 August 1994, a ceasefire was announced by the IRA. I made clear publicly that if it were irreversible we would respond positively.

    To accompany the ceasefire, IRA supporters came onto the streets to declare a triumph, which carried the flavour of a victory for them (which it wasn’t) and this destabilised the ever-fearful-of-being-betrayed Unionists.

    It was a smart, if cynical move by the IRA to cover the backs of their leaders. The outcome was welcome, but there was still no commitment to permanence or ‒ as events were to prove ‒ to disarmament. Nor did “punishment beatings” end.

    To encourage movement towards a settlement I:

    (i) committed the Government to a referendum on the eventual outcome of constitutional talks;

    (ii) lifted the ban on broadcasting the voices of spokesmen for the Provisionals;

    (iii) relaxed some security measures.

    Our intention was to encourage the Provisionals into the political process.

    On 13 October 1994, the Loyalist paramilitaries also halted violence, and hopes rose that we might move into a permanent ceasefire. I announced a new package of measures on the “working assumption” the ceasefire would hold.

    I also promised talks with paramilitaries on both sides to include “how illegal weapons and explosives could be removed from life in Northern Ireland”. I promised, also, we would convene an investment conference to inject money into the North.

    Throughout all this, the Unionists remained nervous, always fearful there could be a “sell-out”.

    They were suspicious of an IRA leadership apparently committed to peace while, at the same time, recruiting new volunteers.

    At this point, in December 1994, Albert Reynolds resigned as Taoiseach ‒ which was a great disappointment to me ‒ personally and politically.

    I was lucky that John Bruton succeeded Albert. He, like Albert, was keen to move forward.

    1994 ended positively. British officials met Sinn Fein (for the first time in 25 years) and also met the Loyalists. The Investment Conference I promised met in Belfast (Europa Hotel).

    Officials from the NIO and their counterparts in Dublin were working on what became the “Framework Documents”.

    Strand One ‒ the internal government of Northern Ireland ‒ proposed a new Executive and Assembly (which was, of course, the sole responsibility of London and Belfast).

    Strand Two covered relations between Belfast and Dublin; while Strand Three covered relations between the UK and the Republic.

    All three strands needed agreement. “Nothing is agreed until all is agreed” remained our mantra.

    During 1994, Albert and I – together with Paddy Mayhew and Dick Spring – had worked on the documents. It was hard pounding.

    Progress was on a knife’s edge.

    At this pivotal moment, what Paddy Mayhew called “black work at the crossroads” nearly derailed the whole Process.

    The London “Times” was leaked an extract from the text of the Framework Document, and wrote an incorrect report of it ‒ with the assertion that it “brought the prospect of a united Ireland closer than at any time since Partition in 1920”.

    We told them categorically their story was wrong – but they printed it anyway.

    At that moment, nothing could have been more damaging to the Peace Process.

    I called a midnight meeting of Parliamentary colleagues to brief them, in order to avoid outright rebellion in Parliament. It was a close run thing, but they accepted our word, not least because Robert Cranborne (now Lord Salisbury) – as an undoubted Unionist – supported us.

    After this we pressed ahead ‒ meeting Unionists to allay their fears.

    In February 1995, John Bruton and I reached agreement and launched the Joint Framework Documents in Belfast ‒ and put the proposals out for public consultation. I would like to pay tribute to John for his skilled and constructive commitment to getting us over the line.

    The Unionists were hostile, the Republican Bishops complained, the Presbyterians said the documents were “too green” but ‒ as the proposals were examined more closely – vocal criticisms fell away.

    But the Unionists would not accept the Joint Framework Documents as a basis for progress.

    So, Paddy Mayhew produced an “Issues” Paper. Shorn of constitution prose, it helped ease the fears of a majority of critics.

    It seemed ‒ for a time ‒ the “Frameworks” might fail: there were no “inclusive” talks, nor renewed constitutional negotiations. But they did not.

    Reassembled, they became the basis for the Good Friday Agreement.

    1995 was the first year in a quarter of a century without any terrorist killings in Northern Ireland ‒ although there was occasional violence.

    The problem of guns and explosives remained, which the British and Irish Governments agreed had to be addressed.

    The Provisionals sought entry to the negotiations – but stone-walled over weapons ‒ claiming (falsely) that decommissioning was a new issue.

    That was demonstrably untrue but, from their perspective, surrendering weapons ‒ especially to the British Government ‒ looked like a defeat.

    Gerry Adams said in terms: “we must take the gun out of Irish politics” with which I wholly agreed. But he then argued this included the army and the police ‒ who did not bomb, murder or knee-cap.

    During this convoluted discussion some progress was made – but then undermined.

    In October, 1994, we had set up a “Working Group” headed by Sir John Chilcot [PUS NIO) and Tim Dalton [PUS at Ireland’s DOJ].

    Its Report, in February 1995, suggested decommissioning should begin with “a worthwhile quantity of arms”, with parallel progress in relaxing security measures and release of prisoners.

    On 3 November, to further encourage progress, Michael Ancram met Martin McGuinness. A meeting between Paddy Mayhew and McGuinness followed. No movement on decommissioning resulted.

    In June 1995, John Bruton and I met at an EU Summit (in Cannes) and agreed to build on the idea of an International Commission (first suggested by Ken Maginnis, UUP).

    As Chilcot and Dalton worked up the idea, the US Ambassador to the UK, Admiral William Crowe, met Adams to protest at their refusal to move on decommissioning.

    I agreed more private Ministerial meetings with Sinn Fein ‒ which drew predictable opposition in and beyond the British Parliament. Critics were wary that Sinn Fein was allied to an armed militia.

    Patrick Mayhew was developing a “twin-track” initiative based on parallel progress on decommissioning and political progress.

    As the first anniversary of the ceasefire approached, on 31 August 1995 threats of a breakdown led to requests for concessions ‒ in essence for not returning to killing people.

    On 1 September 1995, the two governments reached agreement on a Summit to be held five days later to launch the proposed Decommissioning Body.

    The Provisionals did all they could to block it. The Irish Government was threatened with a return to violence ‒ and “bodies in the streets”.

    John Hume supported opposition to the “twin-track” agreement.

    John Bruton tried to hold the line but it became clear that postponement was a more prudent course.

    The Americans tried to revive the initiative in mid-September but were rebuffed by Gerry Adams.

    At a meeting of EU leaders in Majorca, John Bruton was resolute that he still wished to revive the twin-track proposals and ‒ days later ‒ both David Trimble and Ian Paisley proposed an elected Assembly where all Parties could meet.

    November brought setbacks. Unhelpful leaks from America suggested they wished to “knock heads together”. US proposals were rejected by the Provisionals.

    John Hume and Martin McGuinness suggested ideas that would undermine the International Commission, and set ultimata for All-Party Talks that ‒ as John Bruton commented – “had no hope of running”.

    To regain momentum, the Northern Ireland Office re-packaged the “twin-track” proposals into a “Building Blocks” Paper. Tortuous negotiations followed. Sinn Fein accused the British Government of insisting on surrender. To refute this we published the “Paper” in full.

    On 28 November 1995, John Bruton and I met at Downing Street and agreed both the twin-track initiative and to establish an international body to assess decommissioning.

    We announced a three-man International Body with Senator George Mitchell as its Head [General John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri], and asked them to report by mid-January 1996.

    I doubt if George or his colleagues realised how long they would be involved.

    President Clinton arrived in London the following day. He was shocked when I showed him evidence that ‒ since the 1994 ceasefire ‒ the IRA had carried out 148 so-called “punishment” beatings, and the Loyalists 75.

    In speeches in Britain, and the North and South of Ireland, Bill Clinton rammed home the peace message, condemned “punishment beatings”, and attacked terror. It was a stellar performance.

    The IRA responded a week later saying there was “no question of meeting the demand for a surrender of IRA weapons”.

    But public opinion was moving against violence. Before Christmas 1995, I made my thirteenth visit to N. Ireland and was greeted (with John Bruton) in the South with tremendous public support for what we were doing.

    In 1996, the Provisionals dug in. They were waiting for a UK General Election with polls indicating the probability of a Labour Government.

    The Mitchell Report (in January 1996) noted “nearly universal support… for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.”

    Mitchell noted: “The IRA will not decommission arms prior to All-Party negotiations. He added: “An elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.”.

    But the dilemma remained ‒ of how to bring all the parties together.

    “The IRA and other paramilitaries would not get rid of their weapons” and until they did “the Unionists would not enter talks”. It looked like stalemate.

    An elective body to bring all parties together seemed the only way forward but it attracted impassioned opposition from John Hume, who accused the Government of “trying to buy votes to keep themselves in power”.

    This was an unfair attack, uncharacteristic – and untrue.

    Matters worsened in February 1996, when the IRA ended their ceasefire by exploding a bomb at Canary Wharf killing 2 people and injuring over a 100. As a matter of course, they blamed the British Government.

    The Canary Wharf bomb broke the peace and lost support for the Provisionals in Ireland and America. It brought London and Dublin even closer together.

    On 28 February 1996, the UK and Irish Governments agreed Ground Rules for All-Party Talks, and confirmed they could begin on 10 June. Elections to the negotiating body would be in May.

    The elections took place (with Sinn Fein) but, a month later, the IRA exploded a massive bomb in Manchester, only days after the opening of the All-Party Talks under Senator Mitchell’s chairmanship.

    This bomb convinced me we would not reach a settlement before the next election.

    It was clear that a new Government would need to pick up the talks. Tony Blair and Labour had been supportive throughout the Process, and I was confident they would carry it forward.

    They did not carry the scars of 18 years of dispute in Government with the IRA, and I believed they would be able to build on the Joint Declaration, the Framework Document, the united international support for the Peace Process, and the work of George Mitchell and his Committee.

    It is greatly to Tony Blair’s credit that they did.

    But, if I may, I would add one final point.

    The Peace Process did not progress simply because of the politicians and their officials. The Northern Ireland community, the Churches, individual clerics, groups such as the Peace Women – and so many others – all played an important part.

    I hope that no one person, no group, no political party – and no ideology – will now risk imperilling the peace so carefully constructed by so many, for so long.