The Rt. Hon. Sir John Major KG CH

Tag: Northern Ireland Peace Process

  • Mr Major’s Doorstep Comments on Northern Ireland – 29 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s doorstep comments in Bangkok on Thursday 29th February 1996 on the subject of Northern Ireland.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked about how Sinn Fein could re-enter the peace process]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well the choice now is with Sinn Fein. We have set out, with the Irish government, the way that we believe matters should now proceed. There is an option for Sinn Fein. They can decide that they are going to opt into the democratic process, call a ceasefire, meet with the other parties, decide to meet the Mitchell principles and deal with decommissioning, or they can decide to opt out of the democratic process. That is a choice for Sinn Fein and the IRA, they must make that choice, I cannot make it for them and neither can anyone else. But if they decide to opt out of the democratic process, they cannot stop it, it will proceed without them, and that position is now I think entirely clear. They must make their choice.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked about the IRA Army Council’s comments]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    From what I have heard of it thus far it seems, frankly, rather like a sick joke. For the last 25 years the IRA have murdered people, they have bombed people, they have knee-capped people, they have dealt with people in a quite disgusting and disgraceful way. And for them to claim that anybody is responsible for what has happened in Northern Ireland over the last 25 years, except them, will be received with incredulity by anyone who knows anything about Northern Ireland and by the people who have lived in Northern Ireland. I think most people will be fed up to the back teeth with these comments of this sort that we get so repeatedly from the IRA. It is time for them to realise that for 25 years they have behaved in an appalling fashion. Nobody is going to give way to them, not now, not in the future, not ever. They either decide to behave properly and get into democracy or democracy will go on without them. The sort of nonsense we had from them this evening is a pathetic response to the hopes and dreams of the people of Northern Ireland. They owe it to the people who live in Northern Ireland to make a proper response and they owe it to them to do it speedily.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked what he now wanted to hear from Sinn Fein]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    There is no doubt about the words everyone wants to hear. They want to say unequivocally, without any doubt at all, that they have given up violence and they have given up violence for good; that they are seeking to ensure that Sinn Fein becomes a properly democratic party with the same democratic rights and obligations of the other political parties, and it will then join in the democratic process. People have waited a quarter of a century to hear that from the IRA. I think they have waited long enough. The IRA had better tell us that is what they are going to do or the rest of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom had better realise we have to proceed without them. The time for waiting is gone.

  • Mr Major’s Commons Statement on Northern Ireland – 28 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s statement to the House of Commons on the situation in Northern Ireland, made on 28th February 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    With your permission, Madam Speaker, I will make a statement on the Anglo-Irish summit earlier today and its implications for the peace process in Northern Ireland.

    The Taoiseach and I met in Downing Street this afternoon and agreed a way forward set out in our communique, copies of which I hope by now will have been placed in the Library of the House. Let me summarise the main points of the approach.

    First, both Governments condemn unreservedly the IRA abandonment of the ceasefire and subsequent acts of terrorism, and call for the immediate and unequivocal restoration of that ceasefire.

    Secondly, we have confirmed that the two Governments will have no ministerial dialogue with Sinn Fein until the ceasefire is restored.

    Thirdly, we and the Irish Government will conduct further intense consultations with the parties between now and mid-March. After that, this Government will bring forward for consideration by this House appropriate legislation for the elective process and we will take other decisions necessary for the peace process to take place. As the communique makes clear, the Irish Government can support an elective process that is broadly acceptable.

    Fourthly, both Governments reaffirm their commitment to all-party negotiations with a comprehensive agenda. These will be convened on 10 June, following a broadly acceptable elective process. Whether those negotiations will include Sinn Fein will depend on whether the ceasefire has been restored. Fifthly, we have agreed that, at the beginning of the negotiations, in order to build confidence, all participants, including Sinn Fein if the ceasefire has been restored, will need to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Mitchell report, and to address also at the beginning of the negotiations Senator Mitchell’s proposals on decommissioning of weapons.

    I believe that these agreements and commitments represent a balanced approach, to which I hope all the parties in Northern Ireland will feel able to subscribe. No one will find in there all that he may have asked for; equally, no one need fear that his basic interests and requirements are being overlooked.

    The approach that the Taoiseach and I agreed marks out a clear route to all-party negotiations. We believe that this route is viable and direct. That is why we have set a firm date by which the negotiations will be launched. There is still the detail to be filled in, and some important issues to be settled. That is the purpose of the intensive consultations due to start next week and last until mid-March. But we now have the framework and a time scale to address and to decide these matters.

    We are ready to meet all the parties in whatever format best suits them, but I repeat that there can be no dialogue between Ministers and Sinn Fein until the ceasefire is unequivocally restored. That, I must tell the House, is the position of the Irish Government as well.

    The issues still to be settled include, first, the nature of the electoral system to be used in the elective process. There are strong views for and against different systems. Although the decision is for us, the British Government, we first intend to explore and test all the options in discussions with the parties before coming to our decision on what seems most broadly acceptable. The second issue is the nature and role of an elected body that will come out of the elections. Again, there are strongly held views, although many believe that such a body has a role to play as a forum for peace. The third issue is the format, structure and agenda of the negotiations themselves.

    We have been discussing these issues intensively with the Northern Ireland parties and with the Irish Government for some time. I should have liked to be in a position to announce agreement on these issues and to be able to publish detailed proposals today. There are, however, still gaps to be filled in.

    If I judge that it would be helpful, I may put forward to the parties, and perhaps publish, specific written proposals during the consultations. At the end of that period, the two Governments will review the outcome. Whether or not final agreement on all issues can be reached during that period, let me make it clear that, at the end of it, the Government will put forward to the House legislative proposals for elections in Northern Ireland. Decisions on the other outstanding arrangements will also be announced.

    These decisions will be taken on the basis of a judgement of what is most likely to be broadly acceptable to the parties and to the people of Northern Ireland. We have decided to act in this way to make it clear that the process cannot be held up further if, in the end, there is still a complete lack of agreement.

    We are taking these decisions upon ourselves–together, where appropriate, with the Irish Government–because we do not believe that the overwhelming desire of the people of Northern Ireland for lasting peace will brook further delay. We are ready to fulfil our responsibilities.

    There is one other aspect of the communique that I should bring to the attention of the House–the suggestion that there could be referendums in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. These could be held on the same day as the proposed election in Northern Ireland. The aim would be to give the people of Northern Ireland the opportunity to speak clearly about their own commitment to peaceful democratic methods and rejection of violence.

    The Government will consider further with the parties whether such a referendum would be valuable or not. There is clearly room for debate about what the question or questions should be in such a referendum, but we will listen to the views of the parties, and make our own views clear at the end of the consultation period.

    Meanwhile, let there be no doubt on three points. The first is that there is no place whatsoever for violence or the threat of violence in the peace process or in the negotiations themselves. Those who advocate violence, or who do not dissociate themselves clearly from its use or the threat of its use by others, cannot expect others to go on sitting at the negotiating table with them.

    Senator Mitchell’s report sets out clear principles on democracy and non-violence, makes clear the priority to be attached to the decommissioning of illegal weapons, and makes proposals on how that can be tackled. These issues, however difficult, cannot be dodged. They will be on the table at the beginning of negotiations. If it becomes clear that any party is not committed to these principles and this approach, either at the beginning of negotiations or subsequently, in our view there will be no place for them at the negotiating table.

    The second point is that there has never been any justification for terrorism or violence in Northern Ireland. These proposals and the firm commitment to all-party negotiations by a fixed date will remove any lingering thread of obfuscation and pretence about that.

    The third point is that the battle against terrorism is being intensified. Co-operation between the British and the Irish Governments has never been better than it is at the moment. We will hunt down those responsible for the bombings and killings, and maintain security at whatever level is necessary to protect the citizens of this country as they go about their daily business. The people of this country and of the Irish Republic have made clearer than ever before their demand for an end to violence. That demand must now be met, and the people have the right to expect the violence to stop for good.

    The search for peace has been much complicated by the resumption of terrorism on 9 February; but the Government said that we would not be deflected from our efforts, and we have not been. I am grateful for the support for our efforts that we have received from all parts of the House and across all parties. We and the Irish Government are united in our determination to stamp out terrorism and to bring a lasting peace. With the support of this House, I believe that we will succeed. But I must warn the House that the road ahead may yet be long and stony. The men of violence will not give up lightly. Among them are people who do not truly want peace as we in this House understand it.

    As we go through the process leading to the negotiations, and as we take the difficult decisions that lie ahead, concerns will be raised from this or that side, and this or that interest. We will take account of all views, but we will not be deflected from our central objective, because the men, women and children of Great Britain and Northern Ireland demand no less of us. Their lives and their futures must be our first concern. I commend to the House this approach to negotiations and, ultimately, to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

  • Mr Major’s Doorstep Interview in London – 23 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s doorstep interview in London on Friday 23rd February 1996.

    QUESTION:

    Prime Minister, what is your reaction this morning to Mr Thurnham’s resignation?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well I am surprised, to be honest. I had a lengthy conversation with Peter and Sarah last evening and we had a very friendly conversation, a very amiable conversation and we were going to meet again next week. So I am a little surprised, I don’t quite know what happened after I finished my meeting with him.

    QUESTION:

    What will this mean for the debate on Monday on Scott?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t know that it makes any difference to the debate at all on Monday, I wasn’t sure what Peter was going to do, I don’t know what Peter is going to do now, but I expect that we will win the vote on Monday.

    QUESTION:

    Are you confident that you can win that vote?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes, I think we will win the vote on Monday.

    QUESTION:

    And will you ensure that there is indeed a division on that subject?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It is not for me to ensure there is a division, I think the Opposition will probably ensure there is a division and I think we can rely upon them to do that. There is a capability for division. If the Opposition are entirely satisfied and don’t wish to divide, that is a matter for them.

    QUESTION:

    Is there a danger now, as Sir Teddy Taylor was saying this morning, of an election before the end of the year?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t believe so. I have always expected to go through to the spring of 1997 and I still expect to go through to the spring of 1997.

    QUESTION:

    This has been described as a betrayal by his own Constituency Association people, do you feel betrayed by what he has done?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Peter will have worked very closely with his constituency and his constituency will have worked very closely with him and very hard for him over the years, so I can understand that people feel very worried about this. I don’t think that is the sort of language that I am in the business of using. Peter has been a parliamentary colleague for a very long time. I am very saddened and disappointed at his decision. I am not quite sure what temporarily resigning the Whip means, but I am sure Peter will be in touch to say what it means.

    QUESTION:

    Is your door still open to him to come back?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    My door is open to every Member of Parliament almost all the time, I spend a lot of time talking to Members of Parliament.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Are you concerned about further defections?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I am not expecting any.

    QUESTION:

    What would you say to any Tories who may be considering doing something similar?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I don’t think there are any, so I don’t think the situation arises.

    QUESTION:

    On Ireland, you will be seeing George Mitchell today, we understand you have had a number of meetings in the last 24 hours, are you hoping that the peace process in a meaningful way can be put back together in the next few days, with a summit perhaps?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I have said repeatedly that I am not prepared to give up on the process, neither is John Bruton. We had a further conversation this morning. As you say, I will be seeing George Mitchell later on today, that is not to negotiate, it is to discuss what has happened and to update him on our thinking. And then I expect to be speaking to the Taoiseach again over the weekend. We are working towards a summit, we are not going to call a summit until we have done some further work. There is a huge amount of discussion and negotiation going on at the moment.

    QUESTION:

    Do you think you will meet him before you go to Bangkok?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    It would be my hope to meet him before we go to Bangkok, I can’t be certain that that will be the case but that would be my wish if it is achievable.

    QUESTION:

    Sinn Fein were saying last night that the package that appears to be being put together, they were interested in and certainly wanted to look at. Do you feel that there is any realistic prospect at this stage that they can be brought back in, from what you are hearing?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    From what we have heard from Sinn Fein in the past, there ought never to have been a breach of the ceasefire. So I am a little sceptical about what I hear Sinn Fein saying, I think it is actions from now on we will wish to see from Sinn Fein and the IRA. I think we would be cautious about any words, we have been in the past, we now have every reason to be more cautious. It is actions we will wish to see from them. But we will continue and I hope we will be able to have a summit before the European Union/Asia Conference in Bangkok. I cannot be certain about that yet, and neither can John Bruton be certain about that. If we can achieve it, we will.

    QUESTION:

    What would Sinn Fein have to do, in your view, to get back into the process?

    PRIME MINISTER:

    These are matters that will become apparent over the next few days. Let us finish the discussions we are having and then we will make it quite clear.

  • PMQT – 20 February 1996

    Below is the text of Prime Minister’s Question Time from 20th February 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

     

    Engagements

    Q1. Mr. Martyn Jones: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 20 February.

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.

    Mr. Jones: Does Prime Minister accept Sir Richard Scott’s judgement that the Attorney-General was personally at fault? Given the collapse in public confidence in him, is it not time that the right hon. Gentleman started referring to him as unassailable?

    The Prime Minister: I have to say that I believe that the Attorney-General acted perfectly properly throughout this whole affair.

    “How the narrative of fairness can be fabricated into an indictment of the Attorney-General, I fail to follow.”

    Mr. Mackinlay: It is because he is an awful lawyer.

    The Prime Minister: I am sorry to hear what the hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Mackinlay) below the Gangway says because I was quoting the defence counsel at the Matrix Churchill trial.

    Mr. Matthew Banks: On a different point, does my right hon. Friend recall the dark days of nationalised industries when they cost the taxpayer £50 million a week? Is he able to contrast that with the position now where, in the private sector, they contribute £50 million to the national coffers? Is that not about five new schools a week? Is that not something that the Labour party simply has not grasped?

    The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend about the advantages of private ownership over public ownership. We have seen this in a wide range of areas over many years. I have no doubt that, wherever appropriate, things are better handled in the private sector and should be in the private sector rather than in the public sector. That is so in terms both of the experience that we have of the way in which the private sector operates and of the general demand to make this country competitive, with the lowest possible tax regime consistent with that.

    Mr. Blair: Does the Prime Minister agree with the specific finding of Scott that Ministers agreed to the sale of non-lethal weapons to Iraq, and agreed not to inform Parliament and the public, and that that failure was deliberate and in breach of their duty of ministerial accountability? Does he agree with those specific findings of Scott or not?

    The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman takes time to read the whole of Sir Richard Scott’s report, he will see that Sir Richard accepts that Ministers regarded not that there was not a change of the guidelines but that there was an interpretation of the guidelines against changing circumstances. Sir Richard accepts explicitly that Ministers regarded the relaxed interpretation

    “as being a justifiable use of the flexibility believed to be inherent in the Guidelines.”

    [Interruption.] I am sorry that hon. Members are laughing. That is Sir Richard’s view and I agree with him on that point.

    Mr. Blair: The point that I am asking the right hon. Gentleman about comes before that about whether the guidelines were changed; it is whether he is prepared to accept the specific findings in D4.42 of the Scott report that Ministers agreed to the sale of non-lethal weapons to Iraq, that they agreed specifically not to tell Parliament, and that that agreement in Sir Richard’s words was “deliberate” and in breach of their duty of ministerial accountability. Rather than the general, will he answer that specific? Will he tell us whether he agrees with that paragraph of the report–yes or no?

    The Prime Minister: What Sir Richard says is that the reason for the decision not to inform Parliament was because of a concern that to do so

    “might be detrimental to British trading interests”–

    that is to say, jobs. That is a direct quotation from what Sir Richard had to say.

    Mr. Blair: That is simply not the case. Sir Richard gives specifically the reason why Ministers did not tell Parliament and the public. He said:

    “the overriding and determinative reason was a fear of strong public opposition”.

    That is a quite different matter. [Interruption.] Does not the matter go to the very heart of parliamentary democracy? On virtually every page of the report there are details of answers that are inaccurate, untrue, misleading. Is no one going to take responsibility for that? Have no Conservative Members got the courage? Does none of them want to hold Ministers to account? If the Prime Minister cannot answer and say whether he agrees with the paragraph–it is his report, which he set up, on which he spent money–the Conservative party and the Conservative Government will remain knee deep in dishonour.

    The Prime Minister: On the question of defence exports, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman–he may not like it–of what the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) said when he was a Minister. That spokesman for a Labour Government said:

    “It has been the policy of successive Governments not to reveal information on the supply of arms to individual countries.”–[Official Report, 10 June 1974; Vol. 874, c. 396-97.]

    Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that that was the Labour Government’s position? He huffs and puffs with false indignation. If he had a shred of honesty himself, he would admit that the two central charges levied at the Government repeatedly by the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) and his hon. Friends have been found to be untrue and should be withdrawn.

    Sir Michael Marshall: Does my right hon. Friend agree that in an increasingly competitive and turbulent world, this or indeed any Government must take great care in the way in which they balance national interest and the promotion of British exports? Is it not clear that my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General are honourable Members and that they should be given some degree of trust and flexibility, as the Labour party would give its Ministers if it were in government? The right hon. Member for Sedgefield (Mr. Blair) should have a care.

    The Prime Minister: I think that there are some substantive points, which tend to get lost amidst these exchanges, and I shall tell the House what the important ones are. We did not export lethal weapons to Iraq, unlike many other countries. No British troops in Kuwait faced British weapons, and our guidelines for the export of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq were at least as strict as, and probably stricter than, those of any other country. That is the reality that the British nation needs to understand, and that the Opposition seek to hide.

    Mr. Ashdown: Can the Prime Minister think of any other organisation in Britain, except perhaps British Gas, in which senior executives who had been criticised by an independent inquiry in the terms in which his Ministers have been criticised by Scott would be allowed by the boss to hang on to their jobs?

    The Prime Minister: Again, the right hon. Gentleman resorts to partial understanding. Whether that is a tactic or whether the right hon. Gentleman really understands only partially, is something that neither I nor the House has ever been able fully to understand. If the right hon. Gentleman reads the whole report, he will realise that the central charges levied, the charges that required me to set up the report so that they could be impartially examined and laid to rest, have been impartially examined, and have been laid to rest.

    Mr. Peter Ainsworth: Did my right hon. Friend see the report in The Sunday Telegraph this week about the relative competitiveness of British industry? It was entitled, “Britain advances, Germany retreats”. Does my right hon. Friend agree that our vital interests lie in free trade, free markets, free enterprise policies and freedom from the social chapter and from the other Euro-meddling so beloved by the Labour party?

    The Prime Minister: I am entirely happy to agree with my hon. Friend about the economic circumstances that we now face, as a result of the difficult and often unpopular decisions that we have taken to put the British economy on an even keel. We now have the best platform for sustained prosperity, and for sustained growth with low inflation, that we have seen for many years. Nobody doubts that, except those who are professionally inclined to wish to doubt it, because it conflicts with their interests–and they sit on the Opposition Benches.

     

    Q2. Mr. Alan W. Williams: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 20 February.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Williams: Does the Prime Minister agree with Sir Richard Scott that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury again and again, in letter after letter to hon. Members, misled Parliament about the arms sale policy to Iraq, and consistently failed to discharge his duty of ministerial accountability to Parliament?

    The Prime Minister: No; I have made the point before, and I shall reiterate, that I do not believe that my right hon. Friend deliberately misled Parliament. [Hon. Members: “Oh!”] I do not believe that. The requirement to inform Parliament is clearly set out in “Questions of Procedure for Ministers”–and the reason why the House knows that is that I arranged for its open publication for the first time. Unlike previous Governments, who were asked to publish it by their own backbenchers, I published it without being asked. Previous Governments were asked, and declined to publish.

    Mr. Butcher: Does my right hon. Friend agree that, as well as having the fullest support of the British people, both in Ulster and on the mainland, in pursuing the peace initiative, he also has the widespread support of the British people both in Ulster and on the mainland in vigorously pursuing those who wish to damage the civil liberties of the people of London and elsewhere, through a bombing campaign? Does he further agree that those who wish to damage the civil liberties of our people should not be too surprised if their own civil liberties are damaged in the pursuit of justice?

    The Prime Minister: We are determined to maintain law and order and democratic principles and we shall continue to seek and hunt down those responsible for the recent attacks. We give the highest priority to the security of citizens on the mainland and in Northern Ireland. Each of the three bombs in the past 10 days or so has been the act of men callously unconcerned about the death or injury of innocent people–perhaps people who have had no connection whatsoever with the ancient feuds and disputes of Northern Ireland. I do not believe that they either deserve or will receive sympathy and understanding from any decent citizen, either here or in Ulster.

     

    Q3. Mr. Foulkes: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 20 February.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave a few moments ago.

    Mr. Foulkes: Does the Prime Minister agree that, since the Chief Secretary has repeatedly given inaccurate and misleading information to Parliament and to the public, he is the ideal man to present the Tory party’s tax plans at the next election?

    The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman may be interested to know that my right hon. Friend will be presenting tax plans from this Dispatch Box after the election also.

     

    EU Unemployment

    Q4. Sir Teddy Taylor: To ask the Prime Minister if he will raise at the next meeting of the European Council the level of unemployment in the EU.

    The Prime Minister: I shall take every opportunity to protect the United Kingdom’s flexible labour market and falling unemployment against the damaging effects of the social chapter. No other significant European country has an unemployment rate lower than ours.

    Sir Teddy Taylor: As high unemployment is becoming a tragic nightmare on the continent of Europe– by comparison with the UK, where unemployment has been falling consistently–will the Prime Minister do all in his power to persuade his colleagues in Europe to abandon illogical policies such as fixed exchange rates, which are simply a recipe for job destruction?

    The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is quite right about the relative levels of unemployment. While unemployment fell here last week to a five-year low, in most similar large European countries it is either growing or remaining static at a much higher level than here in the United Kingdom. As the president of the European Monetary Institute said just the other day, other member states should use the United Kingdom as their economic model. I am delighted to have his support–that is what I have been saying to my colleagues on the European Council for several years now.

  • John Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process – 12 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process.The statement was made in the House of Commons on 12th February 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Madam Speaker, I will make a statement on the bomb explosion in the South Quay area of London last Friday, the declared end to the IRA ceasefire and the implications for security and the peace process in Northern Ireland.

    There is no doubt that the evil act in London was the work of the IRA. It has all the hallmarks of its operations, with the callous sacrifice of innocent lives. The bomb followed shortly after an IRA statement, given to the Irish broadcasting organisation on the evening of 9 February, that the complete cessation of hostilities ordered in August 1994 was now at an end. The IRA admitted its responsibility for the bomb on 10 February.

    The facts of the incident are briefly these. Around 5.45 pm last Friday, warning calls were made that a large bomb had been placed at South Quay station, Marsh Wall, in London. Local police arrived at the scene shortly after 6 o’clock, and anti-terrorist branch officers shortly after that.

    At around 6.30 pm a suspect vehicle, a Ford flat-backed lorry, was identified, and the immediate area was cleared. While the area was being evacuated, the vehicle exploded, causing extensive damage to buildings in the area, and a large number of casualties. Two people were killed and 43 injured, two of them critically. Three police officers were among the casualties. I know that the House will join me in extending our deepest sympathy to all the innocent victims and their families. It is little short of a miracle that the casualty list was not much longer.

    I should like to pay tribute to the efforts of the emergency services. Despite being hampered by a fractured gas main at the scene, they responded magnificently and they richly deserve all our thanks.

    I must say to the House that this may not be the last such atrocity. More may follow, both here on the mainland and in Northern Ireland, if the IRA ceasefire is not renewed. We will do all that we can to prevent that and to catch those responsible. The protection of the public will remain our first priority.

    In Great Britain, security has immediately returned to pre-ceasefire levels. In Northern Ireland itself, we had been careful from the very first moment of the ceasefire to take no irreversible steps to downgrade our security capability. All necessary measures to cope with the present situation are now in place. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is on full alert. We have sought to make an appropriate and proportionate response to the increased threat without disrupting daily life more than absolutely necessary.

    The IRA has brought the 17-month-old ceasefire to an end. There is no shred of an excuse for this return to violence, least of all now, when all-party negotiations were clearly in sight. After the August 1994 ceasefire declaration, we called repeatedly on the IRA to make it clear that it was permanent, despite criticism by some for doubting the good faith of the IRA. We did doubt its good faith and the IRA did not say that it was a permanent ceasefire. None the less, after a prudent period, in order to move the process forward we were prepared to act on the working assumption that the ceasefire would last.

    In the months that followed, we reduced the more visible and inconvenient aspects of security. We took soldiers off the streets and opened all the border crossing points. We did everything possible to create new jobs in Northern Ireland through renewed inward investment, and we helped to produce a remarkable economic upsurge. We talked to Sinn Fein leaders at official and at ministerial level. We constantly sought to move the peace process forward towards the all-party negotiations that everyone knows are necessary.

    No one took more risks for peace than the Government over the past two years, but we never lost sight of the fact that the IRA commitment had not been made for good. No responsible Government could have done otherwise. That was why we and many others saw a start to the decommissioning of illegal arms as a way of creating confidence in Sinn Fein’s acceptance of democratic peaceful methods, and showing that the violence had really ended. But all the time that Sinn Fein was calling for all-party talks, we knew that the IRA continued to train and plan for terrorist attacks. Punishment beatings and killings continued, as the House well knows. It remained ready to resume full-scale terrorism at any time. We could never be confident that its behaviour was that of an organisation that had decided to renounce violence for ever. The IRA peace was not a true peace.

    I regret to say that the events of last Friday showed that our caution about the IRA was only too justified. The timing of the return to violence may have been surprising: the fact that violence could resume was not. We must now continue the search for permanent peace and a comprehensive political settlement in Northern Ireland. Let there be no doubt that the Government’s commitment to that is as strong as ever, and will remain as strong as ever.

    We will work for peace with all the democratic political parties and with the Irish Government. But a huge question mark now hangs over the position of one of the parties–over Sinn Fein. Its leaders have spoken often of their commitment to peace and peaceful methods, but they have always ducked and weaved when they have been questioned about the IRA and its methods. After the events of last Friday, their ambiguity stands out starkly. The test for eligibility to take part in all-party negotiations was set by the British and Irish Governments in paragraph 10 of the Downing Street declaration. They should be democratically mandated parties, which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process.

    Sinn Fein’s leaders claim that they did not know about the bomb at South Quay and the IRA’s ceasefire statement, but they have refused either to condemn or to dissociate themselves from either. Sinn Fein must decide whether it is a front for the IRA or a democratic political party that is committed to the ballot and not the bullet. Meanwhile, one thing is clear: in the absence of a genuine end to this renewed violence, meetings between British Ministers and Sinn Fein are not acceptable and cannot take place.

    That is also the position of the Irish Government. They have made it clear to Sinn Fein that their attitude and willingness to meet at political level will be determined by whether the IRA ceasefire is restored. We and the Irish Government are at one on this: the ball is in the court of Sinn Fein and the IRA, if indeed that distinction means anything. It is for them to show through their words and actions whether they have a part to play in the peace process. I am not in the business of slamming doors, but the British and Irish peoples need to know where Sinn Fein stands.

    The people of a democracy are not passive spectators to events. They have the right to make their views clear on these issues, and the people of Northern Ireland, from both communities, have consistently done so. The popular will for peace has never been clearer or more coherently expressed than in recent months. The peace process will go on. I commend all those who have had the courage and the sense, in the face of this latest atrocity, to work to prevent a wider return to violence.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and I have met all the parties in the past two weeks. That process will be intensified with the parties that have not, for the present, disqualified themselves. The aim is, as it has always been, to establish the necessary confidence to enable negotiations between all the parties to begin. I want everyone to be absolutely clear on that point. The objective of all our actions and policies, before and since the ceasefire, has been to get to a position in which all the constitutional and democratic parties can get around the table together. Everything else is a means to that essential end.

    On 24 January, I told the House that, if the paramilitaries would not start decommissioning their illegal arms, one alternative way forward was through elections, to give the electoral mandates and confidence that could lead straight, and straight away, to negotiations. As proposed by the Mitchell report, decommissioning could go ahead in parallel with those negotiations. The proposal has been consistently misrepresented by Sinn Fein, and it has been misunderstood more widely. I repeat now that its purpose is to lead directly and speedily to negotiations between all the parties that are committed to peaceful and democratic methods, and it is aimed at reaching a comprehensive political settlement.

    An elected body would have to be broadly acceptable and it would be strictly time limited. I am not proposing–as I have made clear on many occasions–an assembly with legislative and administrative powers. Any suggestion of a return to old-style Stormont rule is manifest nonsense on the basis of the proposals that we have put forward. The proposed elections are a door to full negotiations, and I continue to believe that they provide the most promising available opening. We will pursue that proposal and seek to persuade all concerned that it is indeed a way forward and not a means of delaying progress.

    Our ideas are still being discussed with the parties. I should like to reassure the House that there are ways forward to negotiations with all the parties, which could include Sinn Fein–but only, of course, if there is an unequivocal return to the ceasefire. Others, including the Irish Government, have ideas, too. Our minds are not closed, and neither, I know, are theirs. I have talked to the Taoiseach twice since the bombing, and we plan to meet soon in London to discuss all the possibilities. I intend to find a way through to the negotiations, with all those who are committed to democracy.

    The peace process in Northern Ireland has received a serious setback from the men of violence, but the process is not over–not by any means. We have seen the benefits of what has been achieved since the ceasefire: the freedom to live and to work normally; the freedom to enjoy life; increased prosperity and new jobs; and new hope for the future of the people of both communities in Northern Ireland. Those benefits must not lightly be thrown away.

    This Government will not be deterred by terrorism. The people of Northern Ireland have tasted peace–a peace that has changed their lives. I have told the House before that I will leave no stone unturned in the search for peace. That is true today, and it will remain true in the future. The people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deserve no less than that.

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Mitchell Report – 24 January 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the Mitchell Commission Report, made during an interview held in London on Wednesday 24th January 1996.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if peace was closer now that the Mitchell Report had been published].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes, I hope we are. I think the very broad welcome that has been received for the outcome of the Mitchell Report does put us closer. What has been crucial right from the outset has been the pressure of people in Northern Ireland for this process to move forward, and I think that pressure will continue both in Northern Ireland and in the south, so I think yes we are.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked what he thought of the Report suggesting that the paramilitaries would not decommission before talks started].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think it is worth being clear precisely what the Mitchell Report said. The Mitchell Report said they would not decommission. They emphatically did not say they could not. So what it has done is highlight the intransigence of Sinn Fein / IRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries. Everyone in Northern Ireland, and southern Ireland, now knows that it is their intransigence that has held up the possibility of all-party talks. That is clear. What we have said, very well, if you are going to block the talks in this fashion, here is another route, a route that we know has the overwhelming support of people in Northern Ireland. And that is to go down the route of having an election to a body that would not have powers, this is not the old Stormont, but to a body that would then nominate people with a democratic mandate to meet in all-party talks, then negotiations, and that the decommissioning of weapons would take place in parallel with those discussions.

    As the talks proceeded, there would be decommissioning; as the talks move forwards, more decommissioning. There are now two options for the paramilitaries, they can decommission and go into talks or they can go through the elected route. But if they turn down both of those options then I think the people of Northern Ireland, and of the Republic of Ireland, will ask – why are they seeking to hold up a process they claim to be in favour of?

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if he had given up hope of decommissioning before talks].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No, I haven’t entirely given up hope. I think events in Northern Ireland often are surprising. That option remains open. I propose to leave that option on the table. There is no justification for not taking it. We are not saying to Sinn Fein / IRA, decommission every weapon you have got before there are talks. We have never said that. What we have said is that we need people to have confidence to get around the table. You – Sinn Fein / IRA – can give them confidence by decommissioning, taking out of use, some of the weapons that you have, not all of them, but some of them. I don’t think the reasonable man in Ireland, north or south, can really find any credible reason why they ought not to do that. So that option remains open and perhaps they will take it. But if they do not, there is now a second option.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if he could accept talks with no decommissioning].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    You see there is a lacuna there, isn’t there? You can’t go on with all-party talks unless you have all parties at the table. That has been the problem right from the start. And it is perfectly clear that the community in Northern Ireland, and indeed the community in southern Ireland, have made it perfectly clear in opinion polls that they believe there should be decommissioning, many of them complete decommissioning, before any talks. It is not just the Unionist politicians who take that view, it is the population, Unionist and Nationalist, north and south of the border who take that particular view. So the reality is it would not be possible for the Unionist parties to sit down and have all-party talks unless that air of confidence is achieved. The question is how to achieve the confidence, and we have now set out a second option.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked how he could reassure nationalists than unionists wouldn’t lead any elected body].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well we will address their fears, of course we will address their fears. But what they fear really is, and always has been, is that there would be a body like this that had the powers of the old Stormont, the legislative and administrative powers of the old Stormont. That is now what is proposed. What we are proposing is an election that would legitimise with a democratic mandate people to sit round the table and negotiate and then freely reach an agreement. Now the parties work together in local councils in Northern Ireland, often all of the parties in the same council, the Unionist parties, the Alliance Party, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, they work together and they reach agreement. That is the nature of democratic politics. And the truth is, as it always has been, that if each party just stands in its traditional trench and doesn’t given an inch then there won’t be an agreement. What I have said consistently to all parties, and have practiced myself, is that we are going to have to find a concordat that everybody can accept. That is what I am asking them to do in going down this process and in the talks that will follow it.

  • John Major’s Commons Statement on the Mitchell Report – 24 January 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the publication of the Mitchell Report. The statement was made in the House of Commons on 24th January 1996.

    PRIME MINISTER:

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Madam Speaker, I shall make a statement on the report of the international body on the decommissioning of illegal arms, which was published earlier today.

    The key to progress in Northern Ireland is confidence–confidence to enable the parties to sit down together without threat of force. The retention of arms by the paramilitaries on both sides is the biggest single factor in holding back that confidence. It has so far prevented the holding of all-party talks. That is one of the reasons why we and the Irish Government established the international body, to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue as one track of the twin-tracks initiative that John Bruton and I launched last November.

    The body’s remit was to identify and advise on acceptable methods of verifiable decommissioning, and then to report on the commitment of the paramilitaries to work constructively to achieve that. We set the body the challenging target of reporting by mid-January. I am extremely grateful to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, the former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri, and General John de Chastelain, for the energy and determination with which they have completed this difficult task.

    The body’s main conclusions are: first, that the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations has nearly universal support and must continue to be a principal objective; secondly, that to reach an agreed political settlement and take the gun out of politics, all parties should commit themselves to, and honour, six principles embodying the path of democracy and non-violence. These principles include the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; the renunciation of force and the threat of force; agreement to abide peacefully by whatever agreement is finally reached; and an end to so-called punishment killings and beatings.

    Thirdly, the body concludes that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of illegal arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all- party negotiations. The body makes a series of recommendations on the modalities of decommissioning of illegal arms. It emphatically declares that there is no equivalence between such arms and those held by the security forces. It rightly emphasises the need for independent verification.

    Fourthly, the body concludes that other confidence- building measures are needed, such as an end to targeting of potential victims by the paramilitaries, information on missing persons and the return of those previously intimidated out of their homes.

    The body also records its conclusion, on the basis of its discussions, that the paramilitaries will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. The House will note that the body did not conclude that they cannot decommission; the body concluded that they will not, and the House will draw its own conclusions. Although the body makes no formal recommendation on this point, it suggests an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.

    The Government welcome the body’s endorsement of the seriousness of the decommissioning issue. We welcome and fully endorse the six principles that it sets out. We call on each and every one of the parties to do the same, speedily and unequivocally.

    If all concerned were to accept those principles, and honour them, as the international body also rightly emphasised, that would be a significant step forward. Even more significant would be if, in addition, all parties, particularly Sinn Fein, also joined the two Governments in supporting the wide principles of consent set out in the Downing street declaration.

    The Government also welcome the body’s broad recommendations on the modalities of the decommissioning process. We are ready to implement them. It is now for those in possession of illegal arms to say whether they will accept and act upon them. We look forward to an early and definitive response from the paramilitaries on both sides.

    We welcome, too, the emphasis on other confidence-building measures. If the paramilitaries give up their present practice of keeping themselves ready for a return to action, that will be a most welcome sign of real commitment to peaceful methods. Otherwise, gun law continues to hang over the heads of the people in Northern Ireland.

    There is therefore much in the report that we can welcome and endorse. But the practical problem remains–how to bring all the parties together. Self-evidently, the best way to generate the necessary confidence is for the paramilitaries to make a start on the decommissioning process. We see no reason why they should not do so.

    There can be no justification for the maintenance of private armies by those who claim to be committed to exclusively peaceful means. Opinion polls in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have shown overwhelming public support in both communities for decommissioning before talks. We shall therefore keep up the pressure for an immediate start to the process.

    However, I am not prepared to accept that any one group should, through its intransigence, stand in the way of peace and a comprehensive settlement for the people of Northern Ireland. We will not be deflected from our aim. It is now apparent that there may well be another way forward, consistent with the basic principles to which we have always adhered.

    One of the confidence-building measures taken up by the international body is the idea of an election. The body made it clear that a broadly acceptable elective process, with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure, could contribute to the building of confidence.

    The Government believe that such an elective process offers a viable alternative direct route to the confidence necessary to bring about all-party negotiations. In that context, it is possible to imagine decommissioning and such negotiations being taken forward in parallel.

    The election proposal originated in Northern Ireland and, as recent opinion polls have shown, has widespread cross-community support there. A number of parties, including those led by the hon. Members for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley), as well as the Alliance party, have put forward proposals for some form of elected body as a means of getting all parties talking together, even if the paramilitaries persist in their refusal to decommission prior to negotiation.

    It is true that other parties have registered their concerns; they will certainly need to be addressed. We will discuss urgently with all the parties how to overcome them. But, in a democratic system such as ours, I cannot see how elections could be regarded by any of the parties either as a side issue or as a block to progress.

    As the Mitchell report says:

    “Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will”.

    So let me make it quite clear to the House that we are ready to introduce legislation, and to seek both Houses’ urgent approval for it, in order to allow such an elective process to go ahead as soon as may be practicable. I hope that this will attract support right across the House.

    To sum up, we believe that, in the light of the Mitchell report, there are two ways in which all-party negotiations can now be taken forward. Both are fully consistent with the six principles set out in the report. The first is for the paramilitaries to make a start to decommissioning before all-party negotiations. They can–if they will. If not, the second is to secure a democratic mandate for all-party negotiations through elections specially for that purpose.

    Those are two routes to all-party negotiations and to decommissioning. The choice between them is ultimately for the parties themselves. I believe that the people of Northern Ireland have every right to expect that one or other of those routes will be taken, and taken soon. For our part, we, together with the Irish Government, will intensify our discussions with the parties. I intend to meet the Taoiseach again in the middle of February to review progress.

    The people of Northern Ireland are enjoying today’s peace. They wish it to be permanent. They also want and deserve political progress. It is time to put the old enmities to one side, and to allow the people of Northern Ireland and their representatives once again to have a normal say in their future and their affairs.

    The proposals that I have put forward today require all concerned to take risks for peace. We have done so before, and we will do so again. Consistent with our principles, we will pursue this process. That is what is needed if we are to build on the achievements of the past two years.

    Let us never forget that we are dealing here with the lives of innocent men, women and children. We are dealing with their future, and with the future of Northern Ireland. In the end, our obligations as politicians–as the House of Commons–are to the people whom we govern.

    I pledge that I will leave no stone unturned to deliver to the people of Northern Ireland, on a permanent basis, the precious privilege of peace that they have enjoyed for the past 17 months.

  • Text of the Mitchell Commission Report – 22 January 1996

    Below is the text of the Mitchell Commission Report, published on 22nd January 1996.

    I Introduction

    1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communique which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a “twin track” process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.”
    2. One track was “to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.” This has become known as the political track.
    3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communique:

    “5) In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

    6) Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

    7) In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

    – identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

    – report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

    8) It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.”

    1. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgment. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.
    2. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.
    3. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions.

    Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of the troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

    II Discussion

    1. Our examination of the issues and the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
    2. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.
    3. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.
    4. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
    5. Notwithstanding reprehensible “punishment” killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to “work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.
    6. Since the ceasefires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists – so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
    7. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
    8. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked “to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.” It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
    9. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue – or any other issue – will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
    10. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strive can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.
    11. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context – indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body – but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a principal objective.
    12. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

    III. Recommendations; Principles of democracy and non-violence

    1. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.
    2. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
    3. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
    4. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
    5. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;
    6. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
    7. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,
    8. To urge that “punishment” killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
    9. We join the Government, religious leaders and many others in condemning “punishment” killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.
    10. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations to do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.
    11. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the threat of violence.
    12. Commitment to decommissioning
    13. The second of the specific questions in paragraph of seven of the Communique asks us “to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.
    14. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
    15. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.
    16. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need for prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.
    17. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief that they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such allegations. In this view, the cease-fires have been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.
    18. We believe that each side of the argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.
    19. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.
    20. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.
    21. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.
    22. Decommissioning during all-party negotiations
    23. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party talks can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.
    24. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome, While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.
    25. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on all political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.
    26. Recommendations; guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning
    27. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique asks us “to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.”
    28. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.
    29. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.
    30. The ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission
    31. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
    32. The commissioning should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.
    33. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call up on the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a matter that contributes to public safety.
    34. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional weapons disposal.
    35. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:

    The transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction.

    The provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

    The disposing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

    Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

    1. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

    The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

    1. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the satisfaction of the commission.
    2. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

    The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

    1. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.
    2. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, eg, groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

    The decommissioning process should be mutual.

    1. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

    VII. Further confidence-building

    1. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning to taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.
    2. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.
    3. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
    4. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building up mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communique, “to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.”
    5. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.
    6. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of a Communique to “whether and how an elected body could play a part.” Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.
    7. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

    VIII Concluding remarks

    1. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the “peace line,” is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.
    2. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.
    3. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.
    4. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the “peace line” requires a willingness to take risks for peace.
    5. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

    George J Mitchell

    John de Chastelain

    Harri Holkeri

    22 January 1996

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Northern Ireland Peace Process – 29 December 1995

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the Northern Ireland peace process, made in an interview in Huntingdon on Friday 29th December 1995.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if the Northern Ireland peace process was at a stage of both danger and opportunity].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think you could probably have said that at any stage since the peace process began. It has always been part of a process where there was always the opportunity that something would go wrong and it would stop. Now clearly what people have their eyes focused on at the moment is the outcome of the Mitchell Commission that we will have some time in January or February. I don’t see any great reason for concern about that, I think there is a clear remit for them. Once we have the report we can decide how best to go forward.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if there might be new thinking on the arms decommissioning issue].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That isn’t their remit. Their remit is to determine whether the paramilitaries, not just the IRA by the Loyalist paramilitaries, whether they are prepared to decommission and if so how they are prepared to decommission. That is the remit that the Mitchell Commission have.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if there was a need for new ideas from the Commission].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That is a matter for the government. We will have to decide how to deal with that matter and in due course we will. But there is more than one way of dealing with it. The most obvious way of dealing with it of course is for the IRA to decide that they will begin to decommission their weapons. The standard IRA line upon this is that that is the British simply putting an obstacle in the way, but that is patently absurd for anyone who examines the matter for a moment. For example, if you look at an opinion poll in the Republic of Ireland, 3 out of 4 people in that poll felt that there should be decommissioning before the talks began, so it certainly isn’t just a matter of the British government.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked whether he would consider new ideas from the Commission if they were offered].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We are all looking at different ways to deal with the present circumstance. The whole purpose of this exercise from the beginning has been to get all the political parties sitting down together, including Sinn Fein. But the point at issue is this, and it is not a British government point particularly, though we happen to agree with it, the point at issue is that the other political parties, the Unionist parties in particular, will not sit down with Sinn Fein until they are clear in their minds that Sinn Fein are determined upon peace. Well they are not clear in their minds and they make the view, I don’t think the unreasonable view, that you cannot negotiate for peace with an armalite in your hand held at the negotiators’ heads. That is a position that has applied from the beginning.

  • Mr Major’s Joint Press Conference with John Bruton – 21 December 1995

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s joint press conference with John Bruton, held in Dublin on Thursday 21st December 1995.

    PRIME MINISTER JOHN BRUTON:

    The Prime Minister and I have had a very useful meeting. We reviewed the progress that has been made since the Downing Street communique. We are very pleased with the speed and application of the international body to its task and also the speed with which the preparatory meetings in the political tract have been put in place. We believe that every participant is showing commitment to making the process work.

    We had the opportunity here tonight to receive and approve a report from our officials on east-west cooperation. This covers cooperation between Britain and Ireland across the Irish Sea in the matter of joint planning of infrastructure, the development of science and technology, cooperation in the areas of health and education and broadcasting, a whole range of matters in which the two countries, both speaking the same language, both sharing much common history, have not cooperated as fully in the past as it would be mutually beneficial for both of us that we should and we are very happy that we have been able to commission this report, which we did at our meeting in Majorca; we have been able to receive it here today in Dublin and we now are looking forward to an intensive series of meetings between our respective members of government to put this into effect over the next year or so.

    In the course of the meeting, we also covered a number of European issues. We discussed the intergovernmental conference, we discussed the question of economic and monetary union, we looked at a number of the foreign policy challenges facing the European Union, the positions in Bosnia and Russia were also touched upon or will be touched upon later on in our further discussions.

    It was a meeting that was very useful from an Anglo-Irish point of view but certainly from my point of view I found it extremely useful in terms of the preparation that is to be done for the Irish Presidency of the European Union commencing in the middle of next year where obviously Britain is a very important player and it is very important for us to understand British thinking on the whole range of issues that are coming before Europe in that period and between now and then.

    PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR:

    There is very little to add. Let me confirm that I found it a very useful and very enjoyable meeting as our meetings have tended to be over the years.

    As far as the substance is concerned, I would like to say a word about the work that has been done about the Anglo-Irish relationship generally by our officials over the last few weeks.

    We have produced a more comprehensive examination of the Anglo-Irish relationship than I think there has possibly been at any stage in the past. We are close neighbours and yet over the years the relationship has not taken a fraction of the opportunities that it could have done. I find that almost inexplicable in logic. I think the reason for that is locked in history. It ought to remain in history and we ought to take advantage of the bilateral opportunities that occur and I think the work that we put in hand will begin that process. Certainly, both the Taoiseach and I expect a significant increase in bilateral exchanges and bilateral examinations of matters interest and I think that can only be good for two nations that have many interests in common; there are areas where we will perhaps even differ from time to time but there are many areas where we won’t and I think the work that has been done will assume greater importance when people begin to examine it over the months and years ahead.

    Let me confirm what the Taoiseach has said about the start that has been made by the international body. They have had a number of meetings already, they have behaved very impressively from the point of view of the participants who have reported to me on their discussions; they will continue with their work; what they have finished, I look forward to reviewing the outcome with the Taoiseach and I very much hope we can take matters forward.

    I spent the morning in Northern Ireland visiting Nationalist communities and Loyalist communities and what strikes me yet again is the universal feeling across the communities that they do not want any of the troubles to reoccur. There is a passionate commitment amongst the people you meet on the streets to ensure that this process can be carried forward. I find that immensely refreshing because in my judgement the biggest single impetus towards peace in the last few years has been the very effective demand for it from the people who suffered so many difficulties for so long so I was glad to see that that feeling was as deeply entrenched this morning as I have found it on every previous occasion I have been to Northern Ireland.

    The Taoiseach has set out the other matters we discussed. I won’t elaborate upon that except to say that I too found them extremely useful. The Irish Presidency of the European Union will come at an important time, a difficult time. It will be a very full time job to manage that as well as Ireland. We had a very useful series of exchanges and I hope we can have more before the Presidency begins.

    QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

    [Questions mostly inaudible]

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible, but relating to potential disagreements over the Washington Three and other plans]

    PRIME MINISTER BRUTON:

    We both agreed that this is a matter that can be discussed in the political track and we encourage discussion not only of this idea but of other ideas that may be put forward to ensure that we, on an agreed and understood basis, can get all the relevant people talking to one another.

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    It is not the case that it is a bilateral government difference as you expressed it just a moment or so ago. If I might elaborate the point, as far as decommissioning is concerned, the key point is that what we are both seeking is to get all the parties sitting down together. Without that, it is extremely difficult to see how the parties will sit down together and I seem to recall seeing an opinion poll I think here in the Republic saying that the vast majority of people in the Republic – I think 75/76% of the people – felt that some decommissioning should start immediately so I think there is a widespread view that that would be desirable.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible, but relating to the Taunista’s comments on a seriously flawed idea]

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    I read very carefully what the Taunista said and I notice he described some of the details in that fashion. I don’t think he felt that the idea of using that as a forum from which there might be negotiators produced is seriously flawed but at the end of the day, it is going to be a matter that is going to have to be examined by the parties and is being examined by the parties, all of them I hope, and I think people who don’t examine it would perhaps be closing off an option for proceeding that an increasing number of people find attractive.

    Of course, a whole Assembly can’t of itself negotiate and I think that was the point that Mr. Spring was making yesterday but from that, many options may themselves be delivered and I very much hope that would be the case.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible, but relating to a small body chosen from an elected body, and what is meant by that?]

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    It could be either. It is not for me to determine, it is not for me to impose. If these agreements are going to be reached it has to spring out of the discussions – forgive me no pun intended! It has to come out of the discussions that people are reaching. The point I made about everyone meeting together works both ways and it would also apply to whatever agreements were reached on that front.

    QUESTION:

    [Inaudible].

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    Let us hope we don’t have to.

    QUESTION:

    Yesterday, the parole board in Britain decided not to allow two prisoners who are serving 20 years to apply for parole, one who had been arrested while only 17 years old, Paul Nauny. I am not asking you to comment on this particular case because that would not be sensible but are you satisfied that the British establishment is showing enough sensitivity of the prisoners’ issues?

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    It is a sensitive issue here in the Republic, it is a sensitive issue in the United Kingdom as well. There have been discussions between the two governments and I think both of us realise the sensitivity in the other country. I hope we can reach a satisfactory way forward in a number of cases but I am not going to comment on any individual one.

    QUESTION:

    [Indistinct] view expressed earlier today that it would be a fiction to see Sinn Fein and the IRA as separate organisations and whether the recent killings made you think on the British line that there should be some hand-over of guns before talks rather than afterwards?

    PRIME MINISTER BRUTON:

    It is a fact of history that Sinn Fein’s ability to persuade the IRA to cease violence was a very important factor which has enabled us to have more than a year and a half without violence. It is also a fact that Sinn Fein has stated that they will speak authoritatively to the Commission on the matter of IRA weapons and on other matters concerning weapons but not on every other question but it is also a fact equally that Sinn Fein is a political party whereas the IRA is an illegal organisation.

    As far as the Irish Government is concerned, we deplore the killings that occurred in Belfast in recent times. We are not in a position to make any judgement as to where organisational responsibility for those barbarities rests but we do see these developments as an attempt to enforce control on an unaccountable basis in a particular area of a city where people who are not elected by anybody or accountable to anybody in any way enforce their law through punishment procedures of one kind or another. We believe that that is not consonant with any understood principle of civil rights or of freedom or of any of the democratic principles which we in this country and all political movements in this country hold dear and that is why, apart from the individual tragedy that is represented by these killings, it is for these wider reasons that we condemn then so strongly and both the Prime Minister and I discussed this here today. We joined together in condemning these appalling barbarities and we want them to stop.

    QUESTION:

    Taoiseach, are both governments satisfied with the extent to which the Ulster Unionists have engaged the political track of the twin-track process?

    PRIME MINISTER BRUTON:

    I think at this early stage in the process it is very premature to make any judgements about the contribution of any political party. Obviously, we are talking about long-held views and widely divergent views and we are talking about a very tight time frame within which we are asking these parties to come closer together in their views and after the first round of meetings, it would obviously be very surprising if agreement had been reached but we believe that all of the parties are approaching these discussions in a serious and workmanlike way and for that reason we are very hopeful of the outcome.

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    It is only a few weeks ago that people were saying the parties wouldn’t enter into any talks, that this twin-track process wouldn’t start; it is not all that long ago that people said there wouldn’t be a framework document or there wouldn’t be a Joint Declaration.

    What people need to do occasionally I think is to stand back and see where we were and where we are and I think if you do that you see the grounds for hope. Those people who think we are suddenly going to rub our eyes one morning and it will all have gone away and it will all be settled I think are deluding themselves. We are making steady progress, we will continue to make steady progress, it will often require painstaking work but that work is being done and I am very grateful for the cooperation we have had from the Irish Government over many years on that work. It is proceeding and I don’t think people ought to look at a particular incident, a particular setback, a particular problem that may sometimes occur and overlook the wider progress that has been made because it has been quite remarkable.

    QUESTION:

    Mr. Major, you commended the international decommissioning body for the impressive manner – to use your words – in which it is conducting its work. Will you accept its findings?

    PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

    Its remit is quite clear. We have said we will examine its findings. It is an advisory body, it is not a body that it going to tell either the Irish Government or the British Government what to do, that is not its remit. Its remit is to produce its report in accordance with its mandate and then to advise us as to what it thinks. We will then examine it and we will discuss with the Irish Government what we think is the right way forward. It is not for them to impose anything upon us, it is for them to advise and for us to determine.