Tag: Northern Ireland

  • PMQT – 2 May 1996

    Below is the text of Prime Minister’s Question Time from 2nd May 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

     

    Engagements

    Q1. Mr. Jacques Arnold: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning, I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.

    Mr. Arnold: During his busy evening, did the Prime Minister have an opportunity to watch television last night, as an interesting broadcast demonstrated conclusively that people get better value for their council tax from Conservative councils? Does he not think that people will get better value by voting Conservative today?

    The Prime Minister: They can certainly see that, by voting Labour in the past, they have had to pay high council tax. Southwark, Islington, Wellingborough and probably any Labour authority one can mention has had a significantly higher council tax in the previous year, and a higher tax than a comparable Conservative authority. That is the nature of the Labour beast–vote for it, and then pay for it.

    Mr. Blair: What most people recall is that they did vote for the Conservative party and they did pay for it, with 22 tax increases.

    However, is the Prime Minister aware that the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food said yesterday that the cattle slaughter scheme would be fully operational today? In view of the widespread reports of confusion from all around the country today, can he give a factual account of what is happening?

    The Prime Minister: Yes, I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the information should now be available to people. My right hon. and learned Friend wrote to the National Farmers Union with details of the scheme, and information was published in the farming press last week. Guidance on the scheme was distributed on Monday evening to the abattoirs and markets that have been designated to operate it. As my right hon. and learned Friend made clear yesterday, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food will issue detailed guidance to farmers, and that will be sent out tomorrow. In the meantime, the Intervention Board and MAFF are operating a helpline to provide information to farmers, and that will continue throughout the weekend.

    Mr. Blair: Is not the difference between theory and practice the problem here? The scheme is supposed to be operational today, but does not appear to be operational in many parts of the country. In particular, people are saying, first, that there are insufficient collection centres; secondly, that there may be inadequate capacity for incinerating the carcases; and, thirdly, that many farmers appear to be in the dark both about the details of compensation and how it will operate. I know that this is difficult, but can the Prime Minister ask the Agriculture Minister to respond with even greater urgency to the situation, because at the moment the response appears pretty inept?

    The Prime Minister: I have already made my own inquiries to ensure that such information as is necessary is distributed and made available to farmers speedily. The scheme is large and will involve the slaughter of 15,000 to 20,000 animals a week. The scheme has been finalised and we moved immediately to ensure that farmers had the information they needed. Most of them should have. If some have not, the matter is now being examined and investigated, and I hope that farmers will have the information speedily.

    Sir Cranley Onslow: Has my right hon. Friend seen the letter about the EC ban on British beef exports which a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends sent yesterday to all the EC ambassadors in London? Will he ask the Foreign Secretary to call in those ambassadors to ensure that they report accurately to their Governments on the great damage that is being done in terms of British confidence in the European Union as a result of the way in which the EC is handling the matter?

    The Prime Minister: I shall certainly draw that interesting suggestion to the attention of my right hon. and learned Friend, who is already in touch with his fellow Foreign Ministers across the European Union. I share the view expressed by my right hon. Friend. The evidence shows that British beef is safe, as both the Commission President and the Agriculture Commissioner have acknowledged. I am delighted to see this afternoon that the Wimpy chain has lifted the ban on British beef with immediate effect and I have no doubt whatever that that is the right decision.

     

    Q2. Mrs. Bridget Prentice: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mrs. Prentice: Three times on Tuesday the Prime Minister failed to give a direct answer to questions about discussions he had had with the Deputy Prime Minister. I ask him now whether he has ever discussed with the Deputy Prime Minister the possibility–[Interruption.]

    Madam Speaker: Order. The House must listen to the hon. Lady.

    Mrs. Prentice: Has the Prime Minister ever discussed with the Deputy Prime Minister the possibility that he would stand aside and allow his deputy to take over if, by tomorrow, Conservative party fortunes have not improved?

    The Prime Minister: The last Labour politician who was that smug about elections is now earning his living elsewhere in Europe.

     

    Q3. Mr. Carrington: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Carrington: Does my right hon. Friend agree that another vital election is about to take place–the one in Northern Ireland leading to negotiations on 10 June when the people of Northern Ireland will be able to decide their future for themselves through peaceful and democratic means? Does he agree that the time has come for the IRA to stop trying to coerce and blackmail the people of Northern Ireland and to abandon terrorism?

    The Prime Minister: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. There is no absolutely no credible reason for the IRA not to stop its violence immediately. The all-party negotiations will be serious and they will start on 10 June. Sinn Fein can play a part in them if there is an unequivocal IRA ceasefire. In that case, Sinn Fein will find itself in the same position as other political parties. As I have said many times, the choice is for the IRA to make and I hope that it will make it. It will certainly gain nothing by waiting, still less by more violence, which can only call even further into question its readiness to adopt peaceful methods. Whether there is a ceasefire or not, the talks will go ahead.

    Mr. Soley: Is the Secretary of State for Scotland right to refuse to distribute European Union posters on Europe day?

    The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend is a very proud Scot and the flag that he wishes to see flying in Scotland is the Union flag–so do I.

     

    Q4. Mr. Spring: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Spring: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the satisfaction in my constituency that unemployment has fallen to 4.5 per cent? Is he aware that there is particular satisfaction this week because Labour lost control of St. Edmundsbury borough council? Does my right hon. Friend share the view of the Labour councillor who defected to the Conservatives that, underneath a thin veneer, all those tawdry old socialist instincts of Labour remain alive and well?

    The Prime Minister: Clearly, the lady concerned is a councillor with great insight. There is no doubt about what the fate is of those parts of the country that are unfortunate enough to have Labour councils: they pay higher council taxes. The 10 councils with the highest council tax are all Labour-controlled, and that is the message that every voter should remember. If voters want to pay an extra £225 a week on band D, all they have to do is to vote Labour, and it will be guaranteed.

     

    Q5. Mr. Gapes: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Gapes: Does the Prime Minister agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that economic and monetary union is no threat to the nation state?

    The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman should look carefully at what my right hon. and learned Friend has said–he would then not misrepresent him.

    Mr. Cash: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is a misrepresentation to allege that Euro-realists urge that Britain leave the European Union? Does he agree that we have now reached a position at which we should be having a proper discussion in the intergovernmental conference on all the fundamental issues? As I said at the end of last year’s leadership contest, we should be talking to one another–in Europe and in the United Kingdom–rather than at one another.

    The Prime Minister: I am very much in favour of that type of dialogue. There is no doubt that it is the right position for the United Kingdom to play a leading role in the European Union, but it is equally right to say that that does not mean that we shall necessarily agree with our colleagues on many issues. We are as entitled to fight our corner and disagree as any other nation state in Europe.

    I intend to stay at the centre of the European debate, assessing, on each issue, what is best for the British national interest–in precisely the same way in which other heads of Government will assess what is right for their countries–and always arguing for the sort of Europe that the Government believe is right for the whole of Europe.

     

    Q6. Mr. Chisholm: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Chisholm: Given the unsatisfactory replies given on bovine spongiform encephalopathy earlier to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and to my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley), is it not time that we have a Government who are taken seriously in Europe? Will he condemn the infantile and counter-productive gesture politics of the Secretary of State for Scotland in refusing to allow the European flag to fly for one day next week?

    The Prime Minister: I answered that question some moments ago. I do not know quite where the hon. Gentleman was then, but the answer I gave then still stands.

    Mr. David Atkinson: Will my right hon. Friend accept the appreciation and thanks of my constituents because the Government went further than they were originally prepared to go on the Housing Bill, which received its Third Reading earlier this week, in giving special control provisions to local authorities to deal with the seedy bedsits and squalid landlords that were threatening our towns with decline and decay? Does he agree that those provisions will need political will and determination to be implemented effectively, and will he remind our voters of that as they go to the polls today?

    Mr. Mackinlay: He is not one of us.

    The Prime Minister: That is certainly true, nor, as my hon. Friend is a man of taste and discretion, would he wish to be one of them. As for the legislation that my hon. Friend mentioned, there has been a problem in recent years with many people moving, particularly to seaside towns. It is right to have taken the measures that we have. I hope that those measures will stop the abuse of the social security system and the difficulties faced recently by many seaside towns.

     

    Q7. Mr. Beggs: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Beggs: Does the Prime Minister share the view of Fergus Finley, who thinks for Dick Spring, that if Sinn Fein does not attend the talks in Northern Ireland, the talks will be a waste of time? Can the Prime Minister confirm to the House that the participation of democratic parties in the forthcoming talks will have influence?

    The Prime Minister: I can certainly give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. What we need to see in the forthcoming talks is the democratic parties meeting, talking and seeking to reach a position that will enable there to be agreement in Northern Ireland. I emphasise the point that it is for the democratic parties. If there is no credible, clear-cut and certain ceasefire, Sinn Fein in no sense can claim to be a democratic party and it will not be there, as other parties will.

     

    Q10. Mr. Luff: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 2 May.

    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Luff: Will my right hon. Friend seize this opportunity to remind the House once again that the superior management and policies of Conservative councils deliver better services and lower taxes for council tax payers–some £225 lower, I believe, for the average band D household?

    The Prime Minister: I can certainly confirm that. One only has to see the performance of Labour councils to illustrate it. I see that the shadow Environment Secretary is not here. If he were, he could explain why bad debts cost Camden tax payers £2.95 for every dwelling every week. Perhaps Opposition Members can explain why the highest band D council tax is in Labour Liverpool and why the highest amounts of council tax are in Labour Lambeth. I could stretch the list from here until next Tuesday, so bad and so inefficient are Labour councils.

  • Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the Elective Process in Northern Ireland – 21 March 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s statement to the House of Commons on the elective process in Northern Ireland, made on 21st March 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

    With permission, Madam Speaker, I shall make a statement on the arrangements leading to all-party negotiations in Northern Ireland.

    In my statement to the House on 28 February,I announced that all-party negotiations would commence on 10 June. In a communique issued on the same day, the British and Irish Governments also agreed on intensive multilateral consultations with the Northern Ireland political parties. The purpose of those was to help the British Government to draw up proposals for a broadly acceptable elective process, including the possibility of a referendum, and to try to reach agreement on the format and agenda of all-party negotiations.

    During those consultations, the Government have met all the major parties and most minor parties in Northern Ireland on several occasions. Sinn Fein has of course excluded itself. There have been several meetings between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Tanaiste, Mr. Spring, including a review of the outcome of the consultations. The Irish Government have also had a number of meetings with the Northern Ireland parties.

    In some areas, we have seen encouraging signs of convergence between the parties’ views. In others, sharp differences have remained. The form of elections has been one of the main areas of disagreement between the parties.

    Three main systems have been proposed: an election in 18 constituencies, each electing five members by single transferable vote; an election on a party list system across one single Northern Ireland constituency; and a single constituency election across Northern Ireland with votes for parties, but not for named candidates. None of those systems has secured the clear support of major parties representing each of the main communities. Some parties have even threatened not to participate in the process and thus abort the possibility of all-party negotiations should one of the other systems be chosen.

    I made it clear in my statement on 28 February that,if no agreement proved possible, the Government would come forward with proposals based on a judgment of what is most likely to be broadly acceptable to the parties and to the people of Northern Ireland. Whatever the merits of each of the three main systems, it is clear that none, on its own, meets that criterion of broad acceptability.

    We have therefore considered how to proceed. We have decided to propose a new system, including the most attractive elements of other proposals. We will therefore introduce legislation, immediately after the Easter recess, providing for an election on 30 May using a list system rather than individual candidates, organised in 18 constituencies, but not by single transferable vote, and supplemented by Northern Ireland-wide party preference.

    Briefly, electors will have to register just one vote which they will cast, in the constituency, for the party of their choice. Five seats in each of the 18 constituencies will be allocated from party constituency lists of candidates, published in advance, in proportion to each party’s share of the vote. In addition, the votes in all the constituencies will be aggregated and the 10 most successful parties across the whole of Northern Ireland will secure two elected representatives each, from party lists published in advance.

    I believe that this is a fair and balanced system that will produce a representative outcome. The Province-wide element should help to achieve the widely shared objective of making the negotiating process as inclusive as possible through representation of the smaller parties.

    The elections will create a pool of 110 elected representatives. The successful parties will be invited by the Secretary of State to select, from among their representatives, negotiating teams for the negotiations to begin on 10 June. The transition from the elections to the negotiations will be automatic and immediate.

    Our aim is to see inclusive negotiations. Sinn Fein has, however, currently excluded itself from negotiations by the ending of the IRA ceasefire. That is its choice. But it can make itself eligible to participate through the unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire. That, too, is its choice.

    The negotiations need to take place in an atmosphere of confidence. As I told the House on 28 February,all parties will need to make clear at the beginning of negotiations their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Mitchell report and to address, also at the beginning of negotiations, Senator Mitchell’s proposals on decommissioning. There can be no backing away from that. Equally, there must be confidence that, as the negotiations proceed, they will be comprehensive and address all legitimate issues.

    As well as furnishing negotiating teams, the elected representatives will be members of an elected forum to meet in Belfast on a regular basis when negotiations are not in session. The purpose of discussion in that forum will be to promote dialogue and mutual understanding within Northern Ireland.

    The forum will not engage in the negotiations, which will be free-standing, but could interact with and inform the process at the request of the participants in negotiations. For example, the negotiators might agree to commission discussions, studies or reports from the forum. The legislation will also provide for the forum to be able to conduct hearings at which public submissions by relevant bodies or individuals can be made.

    The forum’s life will be time limited to 12 months, renewable for up to a maximum of a further 12 months. It will not continue in existence if negotiations are no longer in process. In its procedures, it will be required to proceed by broad consensus.

    We have also looked at proposals for referendums.We agree that the people of Northern Ireland must have full ownership of the negotiation process and its outcome. The electoral legislation will give the Government powers to hold referendums in Northern Ireland. That will enable us to meet our undertaking to put the outcome of negotiations to the people of Northern Ireland before submitting it to Parliament.

    It has also been argued that a referendum now could be valuable, for example, on the use of violence for political ends. Our judgment at present is that the case for such a referendum has not yet been conclusively made, but we have not ruled out the option of holding a referendum with an appropriate question or questions on the same day as the elections.

    There is one other important area that needs to be settled before negotiations can begin: the ground rules for the negotiations. At the end of last week, a consultation paper was issued to the parties. It sets out what an acceptable approach might be, drawing on the experience of the 1991-92 talks round and preliminary consultation with the parties. Further consultation with the parties will continue to ensure that the maximum common ground can be identified.

    I have outlined today what I believe to be a viable and a reasonable way forward. Everyone in this process has had to make compromises, some of them difficult compromises. Everyone has needed to exercise patience, and I am grateful to those who have done so. But the basis of our approach has remained unchanged–namely, the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Downing street declaration, and the need for an approach that can build confidence and lead to an agreement capable of winning the allegiance of both main communities.

    I therefore urge the Northern Ireland parties to look carefully at the announcement that I have made today, and the short paper giving more detail which we are publishing in parallel. No party has got all that it wanted. Equally, I see no issue of principle that could reasonably cause any party to walk away from the democratic process that I have set out. I do not believe that the people of Northern Ireland would understand if any party did.

    Let us also not forget that the threat of terrorism continues to hang over the process. That is why the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence, and parallel decommissioning, remain so important. The IRA used the lack of a fixed date for all-party negotiations as an excuse to break its ceasefire. There was never any justification for its actions. Now, its excuses are running out.

    What I have set out today represents a clear and direct route to all-party negotiations. The prospects for a just and lasting settlement are better than they have been for a generation if all parties take advantage of the opportunities that lie before us. Let me make it clear yet again that, while we want to see all parties round the table, the process will go on with or without Sinn Fein. If it excludes itself from taking part in democratic negotiations, it will not be able to exercise a veto against others doing so.

    Once again, the people of Northern Ireland are watching the latest steps along the road to negotiations with bated breath. Their hopes for peace could not be clearer or more overwhelming. We need to move beyond procedures to the substance of negotiations as speedily as we can. The chance is there–no one who stands unreasonably in the way of a settlement will be readily forgiven.

    I therefore commend to the House the approach that I have set out and the hope that the House will today send a clear signal of support for this democratic process. That would be the best answer to the terrorists who continue to threaten it and the people of every part of our islands.

  • Mr Major’s Doorstep Comments on Northern Ireland – 29 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s doorstep comments in Bangkok on Thursday 29th February 1996 on the subject of Northern Ireland.


    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked about how Sinn Fein could re-enter the peace process]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well the choice now is with Sinn Fein. We have set out, with the Irish government, the way that we believe matters should now proceed. There is an option for Sinn Fein. They can decide that they are going to opt into the democratic process, call a ceasefire, meet with the other parties, decide to meet the Mitchell principles and deal with decommissioning, or they can decide to opt out of the democratic process. That is a choice for Sinn Fein and the IRA, they must make that choice, I cannot make it for them and neither can anyone else. But if they decide to opt out of the democratic process, they cannot stop it, it will proceed without them, and that position is now I think entirely clear. They must make their choice.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked about the IRA Army Council’s comments]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    From what I have heard of it thus far it seems, frankly, rather like a sick joke. For the last 25 years the IRA have murdered people, they have bombed people, they have knee-capped people, they have dealt with people in a quite disgusting and disgraceful way. And for them to claim that anybody is responsible for what has happened in Northern Ireland over the last 25 years, except them, will be received with incredulity by anyone who knows anything about Northern Ireland and by the people who have lived in Northern Ireland. I think most people will be fed up to the back teeth with these comments of this sort that we get so repeatedly from the IRA. It is time for them to realise that for 25 years they have behaved in an appalling fashion. Nobody is going to give way to them, not now, not in the future, not ever. They either decide to behave properly and get into democracy or democracy will go on without them. The sort of nonsense we had from them this evening is a pathetic response to the hopes and dreams of the people of Northern Ireland. They owe it to the people who live in Northern Ireland to make a proper response and they owe it to them to do it speedily.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked what he now wanted to hear from Sinn Fein]

    PRIME MINISTER:

    There is no doubt about the words everyone wants to hear. They want to say unequivocally, without any doubt at all, that they have given up violence and they have given up violence for good; that they are seeking to ensure that Sinn Fein becomes a properly democratic party with the same democratic rights and obligations of the other political parties, and it will then join in the democratic process. People have waited a quarter of a century to hear that from the IRA. I think they have waited long enough. The IRA had better tell us that is what they are going to do or the rest of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom had better realise we have to proceed without them. The time for waiting is gone.

  • Mr Major’s Commons Statement on Northern Ireland – 28 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s statement to the House of Commons on the situation in Northern Ireland, made on 28th February 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

    With your permission, Madam Speaker, I will make a statement on the Anglo-Irish summit earlier today and its implications for the peace process in Northern Ireland.

    The Taoiseach and I met in Downing Street this afternoon and agreed a way forward set out in our communique, copies of which I hope by now will have been placed in the Library of the House. Let me summarise the main points of the approach.

    First, both Governments condemn unreservedly the IRA abandonment of the ceasefire and subsequent acts of terrorism, and call for the immediate and unequivocal restoration of that ceasefire.

    Secondly, we have confirmed that the two Governments will have no ministerial dialogue with Sinn Fein until the ceasefire is restored.

    Thirdly, we and the Irish Government will conduct further intense consultations with the parties between now and mid-March. After that, this Government will bring forward for consideration by this House appropriate legislation for the elective process and we will take other decisions necessary for the peace process to take place. As the communique makes clear, the Irish Government can support an elective process that is broadly acceptable.

    Fourthly, both Governments reaffirm their commitment to all-party negotiations with a comprehensive agenda. These will be convened on 10 June, following a broadly acceptable elective process. Whether those negotiations will include Sinn Fein will depend on whether the ceasefire has been restored. Fifthly, we have agreed that, at the beginning of the negotiations, in order to build confidence, all participants, including Sinn Fein if the ceasefire has been restored, will need to make clear their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the Mitchell report, and to address also at the beginning of the negotiations Senator Mitchell’s proposals on decommissioning of weapons.

    I believe that these agreements and commitments represent a balanced approach, to which I hope all the parties in Northern Ireland will feel able to subscribe. No one will find in there all that he may have asked for; equally, no one need fear that his basic interests and requirements are being overlooked.

    The approach that the Taoiseach and I agreed marks out a clear route to all-party negotiations. We believe that this route is viable and direct. That is why we have set a firm date by which the negotiations will be launched. There is still the detail to be filled in, and some important issues to be settled. That is the purpose of the intensive consultations due to start next week and last until mid-March. But we now have the framework and a time scale to address and to decide these matters.

    We are ready to meet all the parties in whatever format best suits them, but I repeat that there can be no dialogue between Ministers and Sinn Fein until the ceasefire is unequivocally restored. That, I must tell the House, is the position of the Irish Government as well.

    The issues still to be settled include, first, the nature of the electoral system to be used in the elective process. There are strong views for and against different systems. Although the decision is for us, the British Government, we first intend to explore and test all the options in discussions with the parties before coming to our decision on what seems most broadly acceptable. The second issue is the nature and role of an elected body that will come out of the elections. Again, there are strongly held views, although many believe that such a body has a role to play as a forum for peace. The third issue is the format, structure and agenda of the negotiations themselves.

    We have been discussing these issues intensively with the Northern Ireland parties and with the Irish Government for some time. I should have liked to be in a position to announce agreement on these issues and to be able to publish detailed proposals today. There are, however, still gaps to be filled in.

    If I judge that it would be helpful, I may put forward to the parties, and perhaps publish, specific written proposals during the consultations. At the end of that period, the two Governments will review the outcome. Whether or not final agreement on all issues can be reached during that period, let me make it clear that, at the end of it, the Government will put forward to the House legislative proposals for elections in Northern Ireland. Decisions on the other outstanding arrangements will also be announced.

    These decisions will be taken on the basis of a judgement of what is most likely to be broadly acceptable to the parties and to the people of Northern Ireland. We have decided to act in this way to make it clear that the process cannot be held up further if, in the end, there is still a complete lack of agreement.

    We are taking these decisions upon ourselves–together, where appropriate, with the Irish Government–because we do not believe that the overwhelming desire of the people of Northern Ireland for lasting peace will brook further delay. We are ready to fulfil our responsibilities.

    There is one other aspect of the communique that I should bring to the attention of the House–the suggestion that there could be referendums in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. These could be held on the same day as the proposed election in Northern Ireland. The aim would be to give the people of Northern Ireland the opportunity to speak clearly about their own commitment to peaceful democratic methods and rejection of violence.

    The Government will consider further with the parties whether such a referendum would be valuable or not. There is clearly room for debate about what the question or questions should be in such a referendum, but we will listen to the views of the parties, and make our own views clear at the end of the consultation period.

    Meanwhile, let there be no doubt on three points. The first is that there is no place whatsoever for violence or the threat of violence in the peace process or in the negotiations themselves. Those who advocate violence, or who do not dissociate themselves clearly from its use or the threat of its use by others, cannot expect others to go on sitting at the negotiating table with them.

    Senator Mitchell’s report sets out clear principles on democracy and non-violence, makes clear the priority to be attached to the decommissioning of illegal weapons, and makes proposals on how that can be tackled. These issues, however difficult, cannot be dodged. They will be on the table at the beginning of negotiations. If it becomes clear that any party is not committed to these principles and this approach, either at the beginning of negotiations or subsequently, in our view there will be no place for them at the negotiating table.

    The second point is that there has never been any justification for terrorism or violence in Northern Ireland. These proposals and the firm commitment to all-party negotiations by a fixed date will remove any lingering thread of obfuscation and pretence about that.

    The third point is that the battle against terrorism is being intensified. Co-operation between the British and the Irish Governments has never been better than it is at the moment. We will hunt down those responsible for the bombings and killings, and maintain security at whatever level is necessary to protect the citizens of this country as they go about their daily business. The people of this country and of the Irish Republic have made clearer than ever before their demand for an end to violence. That demand must now be met, and the people have the right to expect the violence to stop for good.

    The search for peace has been much complicated by the resumption of terrorism on 9 February; but the Government said that we would not be deflected from our efforts, and we have not been. I am grateful for the support for our efforts that we have received from all parts of the House and across all parties. We and the Irish Government are united in our determination to stamp out terrorism and to bring a lasting peace. With the support of this House, I believe that we will succeed. But I must warn the House that the road ahead may yet be long and stony. The men of violence will not give up lightly. Among them are people who do not truly want peace as we in this House understand it.

    As we go through the process leading to the negotiations, and as we take the difficult decisions that lie ahead, concerns will be raised from this or that side, and this or that interest. We will take account of all views, but we will not be deflected from our central objective, because the men, women and children of Great Britain and Northern Ireland demand no less of us. Their lives and their futures must be our first concern. I commend to the House this approach to negotiations and, ultimately, to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

  • John Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process – 12 February 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process.The statement was made in the House of Commons on 12th February 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Madam Speaker, I will make a statement on the bomb explosion in the South Quay area of London last Friday, the declared end to the IRA ceasefire and the implications for security and the peace process in Northern Ireland.

    There is no doubt that the evil act in London was the work of the IRA. It has all the hallmarks of its operations, with the callous sacrifice of innocent lives. The bomb followed shortly after an IRA statement, given to the Irish broadcasting organisation on the evening of 9 February, that the complete cessation of hostilities ordered in August 1994 was now at an end. The IRA admitted its responsibility for the bomb on 10 February.

    The facts of the incident are briefly these. Around 5.45 pm last Friday, warning calls were made that a large bomb had been placed at South Quay station, Marsh Wall, in London. Local police arrived at the scene shortly after 6 o’clock, and anti-terrorist branch officers shortly after that.

    At around 6.30 pm a suspect vehicle, a Ford flat-backed lorry, was identified, and the immediate area was cleared. While the area was being evacuated, the vehicle exploded, causing extensive damage to buildings in the area, and a large number of casualties. Two people were killed and 43 injured, two of them critically. Three police officers were among the casualties. I know that the House will join me in extending our deepest sympathy to all the innocent victims and their families. It is little short of a miracle that the casualty list was not much longer.

    I should like to pay tribute to the efforts of the emergency services. Despite being hampered by a fractured gas main at the scene, they responded magnificently and they richly deserve all our thanks.

    I must say to the House that this may not be the last such atrocity. More may follow, both here on the mainland and in Northern Ireland, if the IRA ceasefire is not renewed. We will do all that we can to prevent that and to catch those responsible. The protection of the public will remain our first priority.

    In Great Britain, security has immediately returned to pre-ceasefire levels. In Northern Ireland itself, we had been careful from the very first moment of the ceasefire to take no irreversible steps to downgrade our security capability. All necessary measures to cope with the present situation are now in place. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is on full alert. We have sought to make an appropriate and proportionate response to the increased threat without disrupting daily life more than absolutely necessary.

    The IRA has brought the 17-month-old ceasefire to an end. There is no shred of an excuse for this return to violence, least of all now, when all-party negotiations were clearly in sight. After the August 1994 ceasefire declaration, we called repeatedly on the IRA to make it clear that it was permanent, despite criticism by some for doubting the good faith of the IRA. We did doubt its good faith and the IRA did not say that it was a permanent ceasefire. None the less, after a prudent period, in order to move the process forward we were prepared to act on the working assumption that the ceasefire would last.

    In the months that followed, we reduced the more visible and inconvenient aspects of security. We took soldiers off the streets and opened all the border crossing points. We did everything possible to create new jobs in Northern Ireland through renewed inward investment, and we helped to produce a remarkable economic upsurge. We talked to Sinn Fein leaders at official and at ministerial level. We constantly sought to move the peace process forward towards the all-party negotiations that everyone knows are necessary.

    No one took more risks for peace than the Government over the past two years, but we never lost sight of the fact that the IRA commitment had not been made for good. No responsible Government could have done otherwise. That was why we and many others saw a start to the decommissioning of illegal arms as a way of creating confidence in Sinn Fein’s acceptance of democratic peaceful methods, and showing that the violence had really ended. But all the time that Sinn Fein was calling for all-party talks, we knew that the IRA continued to train and plan for terrorist attacks. Punishment beatings and killings continued, as the House well knows. It remained ready to resume full-scale terrorism at any time. We could never be confident that its behaviour was that of an organisation that had decided to renounce violence for ever. The IRA peace was not a true peace.

    I regret to say that the events of last Friday showed that our caution about the IRA was only too justified. The timing of the return to violence may have been surprising: the fact that violence could resume was not. We must now continue the search for permanent peace and a comprehensive political settlement in Northern Ireland. Let there be no doubt that the Government’s commitment to that is as strong as ever, and will remain as strong as ever.

    We will work for peace with all the democratic political parties and with the Irish Government. But a huge question mark now hangs over the position of one of the parties–over Sinn Fein. Its leaders have spoken often of their commitment to peace and peaceful methods, but they have always ducked and weaved when they have been questioned about the IRA and its methods. After the events of last Friday, their ambiguity stands out starkly. The test for eligibility to take part in all-party negotiations was set by the British and Irish Governments in paragraph 10 of the Downing Street declaration. They should be democratically mandated parties, which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process.

    Sinn Fein’s leaders claim that they did not know about the bomb at South Quay and the IRA’s ceasefire statement, but they have refused either to condemn or to dissociate themselves from either. Sinn Fein must decide whether it is a front for the IRA or a democratic political party that is committed to the ballot and not the bullet. Meanwhile, one thing is clear: in the absence of a genuine end to this renewed violence, meetings between British Ministers and Sinn Fein are not acceptable and cannot take place.

    That is also the position of the Irish Government. They have made it clear to Sinn Fein that their attitude and willingness to meet at political level will be determined by whether the IRA ceasefire is restored. We and the Irish Government are at one on this: the ball is in the court of Sinn Fein and the IRA, if indeed that distinction means anything. It is for them to show through their words and actions whether they have a part to play in the peace process. I am not in the business of slamming doors, but the British and Irish peoples need to know where Sinn Fein stands.

    The people of a democracy are not passive spectators to events. They have the right to make their views clear on these issues, and the people of Northern Ireland, from both communities, have consistently done so. The popular will for peace has never been clearer or more coherently expressed than in recent months. The peace process will go on. I commend all those who have had the courage and the sense, in the face of this latest atrocity, to work to prevent a wider return to violence.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and I have met all the parties in the past two weeks. That process will be intensified with the parties that have not, for the present, disqualified themselves. The aim is, as it has always been, to establish the necessary confidence to enable negotiations between all the parties to begin. I want everyone to be absolutely clear on that point. The objective of all our actions and policies, before and since the ceasefire, has been to get to a position in which all the constitutional and democratic parties can get around the table together. Everything else is a means to that essential end.

    On 24 January, I told the House that, if the paramilitaries would not start decommissioning their illegal arms, one alternative way forward was through elections, to give the electoral mandates and confidence that could lead straight, and straight away, to negotiations. As proposed by the Mitchell report, decommissioning could go ahead in parallel with those negotiations. The proposal has been consistently misrepresented by Sinn Fein, and it has been misunderstood more widely. I repeat now that its purpose is to lead directly and speedily to negotiations between all the parties that are committed to peaceful and democratic methods, and it is aimed at reaching a comprehensive political settlement.

    An elected body would have to be broadly acceptable and it would be strictly time limited. I am not proposing–as I have made clear on many occasions–an assembly with legislative and administrative powers. Any suggestion of a return to old-style Stormont rule is manifest nonsense on the basis of the proposals that we have put forward. The proposed elections are a door to full negotiations, and I continue to believe that they provide the most promising available opening. We will pursue that proposal and seek to persuade all concerned that it is indeed a way forward and not a means of delaying progress.

    Our ideas are still being discussed with the parties. I should like to reassure the House that there are ways forward to negotiations with all the parties, which could include Sinn Fein–but only, of course, if there is an unequivocal return to the ceasefire. Others, including the Irish Government, have ideas, too. Our minds are not closed, and neither, I know, are theirs. I have talked to the Taoiseach twice since the bombing, and we plan to meet soon in London to discuss all the possibilities. I intend to find a way through to the negotiations, with all those who are committed to democracy.

    The peace process in Northern Ireland has received a serious setback from the men of violence, but the process is not over–not by any means. We have seen the benefits of what has been achieved since the ceasefire: the freedom to live and to work normally; the freedom to enjoy life; increased prosperity and new jobs; and new hope for the future of the people of both communities in Northern Ireland. Those benefits must not lightly be thrown away.

    This Government will not be deterred by terrorism. The people of Northern Ireland have tasted peace–a peace that has changed their lives. I have told the House before that I will leave no stone unturned in the search for peace. That is true today, and it will remain true in the future. The people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deserve no less than that.

  • PMQT – 25 January 1996

    Below is the text of Prime Minister’s Question Time from 25th January 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

     

    Engagements

    Q1. Mr. Sheerman: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 25 January.

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning, I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.

    Mr. Sheerman: Will the Prime Minister join me in congratulating the director general of the Confederation of British Industry, who said today:

    “It is blindingly obvious that we must develop a framework”–

    Madam Speaker: Order. There should be no quoting during questions.

    Mr. Sheerman: The director general said that we must develop a framework for involving employees at every level–dare I say it, a stakeholder economy. If it is blindingly obvious to the director general of the CBI, why is it not blindingly obvious to the Prime Minister that the reason why his Government are so deeply unpopular is that they have failed to give the British people a proper stake in their own country?

    The Prime Minister: If I may say so to the hon. Gentleman, he should be cautious about quoting the CBI at me. The CBI opposes the social chapter, the minimum wage and most of the policies advocated by the Opposition. When we and the director general of the CBI talk about stakeholders, we do not mean what the hon. Gentleman means. We know who Labour’s stakeholders are. We know who owns 50 per cent. of the votes at the Labour party conference. We know who pays 50 per cent. of the money that the Labour party gets. We know what has been said by senior trade unionists. They have made it clear. While they continue to fund the party they will have a say. It is simple–no say, no pay. They are Labour’s stakeholders.

    Mrs. Ann Winterton: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the continuing campaign of violence by the IRA and Sinn Fein has betrayed the peace process? Will he urge them now to accept the Mitchell report’s recommendation and cease their heinous actions immediately? Furthermore, does he agree that if peace is to continue long term in Northern Ireland, the IRA and Sinn Fein have two clear options open to them? They can either begin immediately to decommission weapons or they can agree to take part in the democratic process, as outlined by my right hon. Friend yesterday.

    The Prime Minister: Yes, of course, my hon. Friend is right in all she says. The point made by the Mitchell Commission about the decommissioning of weapons was that Sinn Fein-IRA would not decommission, not that they could not decommission. We still look forward to hearing from Sinn Fein-IRA whether they accept the other elements of the Mitchell report–whether they accept the six principles and the fact that they must condemn and stop for good punishment beatings and punishment killings. We still await a comprehensive response from them on those matters. I should like to start all-party talks as speedily as possible, but I cannot be clearer to the House than this–the impediment to all-party talks is and has been the unwillingness of Sinn Fein-IRA to begin the decommissioning of their arms. If they would begin the decommissioning of their arms, there would be no justification for any party not to attend and join in all-party talks leading to negotiations.

    Mr. Blair: Does the Prime Minister agree that the test results for 11-year-olds in English and maths are appalling? May I put to him the following proposals for improvement? I propose an end to the delay in base-line assessment for five-year-olds, a reduction in class sizes for five-to-seven-year-olds, a register of national head teachers, the use of associate teachers in classrooms and a reinstatement of the reading recovery programme for primary school children which was so wrongly scrapped. Will the Prime Minister at least consider those proposals?

    The Prime Minister: Let me say first that we have looked very carefully at the test results. Those of 11-year-olds are disappointing; those of other age groups are better. The point that the right hon. Gentleman and the House need to bear in mind–I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has apparently changed his policy on this–is that, as he will recall, the Labour party opposed the introduction of the tests, and he personally voted against it. We introduced the tests precisely to throw up the shortcomings that we believed were probably in the education system. The test results are very useful: they tell us where the shortcomings are so that we may deal with them, and we shall consider a range of measures with which to deal with them.

    I do not intend to respond immediately to the ideas that the right hon. Gentleman has produced, but we established the tests so that we could identify shortcomings and then put them right. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman now acknowledges–better late than never–that we were right to introduce those tests.

    Mr. Blair: Was that not a complacent reply? Will the Prime Minister confirm that the problem does not relate merely to 11-year-olds? The GCSE results a few weeks ago also showed a decline. May I put it to the Prime Minister that, although the Secretary of State for Education and Employment may boast about the results for 14-year-olds today, those results still show an appalling level of failure in key curriculum subjects?

    May I remind Conservative Members that these are children who were born under a Conservative Government, sent to school under a Conservative Government and educated under a Conservative Government? The failure is not theirs, but the Conservative Government’s.

    The Prime Minister: If it is the Conservative Government who have failed, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman could explain why some of his right hon. Friends remove their children from Labour education authorities and have them educated under Conservative education authorities. While we are on the subject of the 16 years, perhaps he would also register the fact that in 1979 fewer than a quarter of pupils obtained five GCSEs; today the figure is 43 per cent. In 1979, 14 per cent. obtained two A-levels; now the figure is twice as high. In 1979, one in eight young people went to university; now, one in three do so.

    The right hon. Gentleman referred to class sizes. I will tell him about class sizes. The Office of Standards in Education has itself recognised that the quality of teaching is the important issue. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but parents agree. I shall give him an illustration. For example, for children up to the age of 16, the average class size in secondary schools in Islington is lower than at the London Oratory. [Interruption.]

    Madam Speaker: Order.

    Mr. Blair: There it is. The Government do not want to answer questions about the test results, and now we see the reason why they want to focus attention on one 11-year-old child–[Interruption.] The reason why they want to focus attention on one 11-year-old child is to conceal the damage that they have done to millions of our children.

    The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman will really have to learn to keep cool under pressure. If he casts his mind back, he may remember the episode of Jennifer’s ear before the last election, and if he wants to talk about records and standards in education, he may remember that his deputy leader said that school performance tables are “political propaganda”. Test results are “virtually worthless”, said the hon. Member for Dewsbury (Mrs. Taylor). Tests encourage “a climate of failure” said the hon. Member for Dewsbury. They say that grant-maintained schools are wrong, but they are perfectly happy to use them. The fact of the matter is that Labour Members enjoy choice themselves, but they wish to deny it to other people.

    Sir Hector Monro: Is my right hon. Friend aware, which I am sure he is, that today is the anniversary of the birth of Robert Burns who lived the latter part of his short and remarkable life in Dumfries? [Interruption.]

    Madam Speaker: Order. The House must come to order. I cannot hear the right hon. Gentleman, nor can the Prime Minister.

    Sir Hector Monro: Is my right hon. Friend further aware that, this year, Scotland and countries further afield will be commemorating the 200th anniversary of the great poet’s death? Will he send to Scotland, to the Burns Federation and to his drouthy cronies in the House a message of good will on his important bicentenary?

    The Prime Minister rose–[Interruption.] The deputy leader of the Opposition is heckling again. I must explain to the House that, despite occasional differences between us, the Leader of the Opposition and I have one thing in common: neither of us invites the deputy leader to meetings.

    As to the remarkable anniversary referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Sir H. Monro), he is wise to mention it. I am a great admirer of Rabbie Burns and I should like to explain why by quoting what he said. His view on the constitution, for example–to be wrecked by the Labour party, if it came to power–was clear:

    “As to Reform Principles, I look upon the British Constitution . . . to be the most glorious Constitution on earth, or that perhaps the wit of man can frame.”

    That was Rabbie Burns’s view. The Scottish National party might remember that and so might the Leader of the Opposition and his party.

     

    Q2. Mr. Jamieson: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 25 January.

    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Jamieson: During national empty homes week, in a fortnight’s time, what advice will the Prime Minister be giving to the Ministry of Defence about the 552 empty married quarters in his own Huntingdon constituency?

    The Prime Minister: At the moment, I should tell the hon. Gentleman two things. First, we shall be looking at the ways in which we can dispose of empty Ministry of Defence properties–we are determined to do that. Secondly, if the Labour-controlled authorities in London filled up their empty accommodation, they could wipe out homelessness in London at a stroke. In Southwark, Islington, Hackney and right across London, Labour-controlled authorities have an appalling record of keeping homes empty and then complaining about homelessness–as the hon. Gentleman has done. That is another illustration of Labour’s hypocrisy. They make claims about something–they have the power in their hands to put it right, but don’t.

    Mr. Sheerman: On the ropes again, John.

    The Prime Minister: I now have a definition of hope over optimism.

     

    Q3. Mr. Hendry: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 25 January.

    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave some moments ago.

    Mr. Hendry: Does my right hon. Friend agree that GP fundholding has brought enormous benefits to doctors and patients alike, especially in my constituency, in which they cover some 90 per cent. of the population? Is not it typical of the say one thing, do another Labour party that, while many of them take advantage of GP fundholding for themselves and their families, at a moment’s notice, they would abolish it? Is not that typical of the hypocrisy of the modern Labour party?

    The Prime Minister: I think that there is now overwhelming evidence that fundholders are able to get a better deal for their patients from hospitals. It makes sense to build on what has been achieved and induce more and more GPs to join the system–[Interruption.] I am sorry to hear cries of objection from the Opposition Benches. Those are not my words but the words of the vice-president of the Fabian Society and former adviser to Barbara Castle.

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Mitchell Report – 24 January 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the Mitchell Commission Report, made during an interview held in London on Wednesday 24th January 1996.


    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if peace was closer now that the Mitchell Report had been published].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Yes, I hope we are. I think the very broad welcome that has been received for the outcome of the Mitchell Report does put us closer. What has been crucial right from the outset has been the pressure of people in Northern Ireland for this process to move forward, and I think that pressure will continue both in Northern Ireland and in the south, so I think yes we are.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked what he thought of the Report suggesting that the paramilitaries would not decommission before talks started].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think it is worth being clear precisely what the Mitchell Report said. The Mitchell Report said they would not decommission. They emphatically did not say they could not. So what it has done is highlight the intransigence of Sinn Fein / IRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries. Everyone in Northern Ireland, and southern Ireland, now knows that it is their intransigence that has held up the possibility of all-party talks. That is clear. What we have said, very well, if you are going to block the talks in this fashion, here is another route, a route that we know has the overwhelming support of people in Northern Ireland. And that is to go down the route of having an election to a body that would not have powers, this is not the old Stormont, but to a body that would then nominate people with a democratic mandate to meet in all-party talks, then negotiations, and that the decommissioning of weapons would take place in parallel with those discussions.

    As the talks proceeded, there would be decommissioning; as the talks move forwards, more decommissioning. There are now two options for the paramilitaries, they can decommission and go into talks or they can go through the elected route. But if they turn down both of those options then I think the people of Northern Ireland, and of the Republic of Ireland, will ask – why are they seeking to hold up a process they claim to be in favour of?

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if he had given up hope of decommissioning before talks].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    No, I haven’t entirely given up hope. I think events in Northern Ireland often are surprising. That option remains open. I propose to leave that option on the table. There is no justification for not taking it. We are not saying to Sinn Fein / IRA, decommission every weapon you have got before there are talks. We have never said that. What we have said is that we need people to have confidence to get around the table. You – Sinn Fein / IRA – can give them confidence by decommissioning, taking out of use, some of the weapons that you have, not all of them, but some of them. I don’t think the reasonable man in Ireland, north or south, can really find any credible reason why they ought not to do that. So that option remains open and perhaps they will take it. But if they do not, there is now a second option.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if he could accept talks with no decommissioning].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    You see there is a lacuna there, isn’t there? You can’t go on with all-party talks unless you have all parties at the table. That has been the problem right from the start. And it is perfectly clear that the community in Northern Ireland, and indeed the community in southern Ireland, have made it perfectly clear in opinion polls that they believe there should be decommissioning, many of them complete decommissioning, before any talks. It is not just the Unionist politicians who take that view, it is the population, Unionist and Nationalist, north and south of the border who take that particular view. So the reality is it would not be possible for the Unionist parties to sit down and have all-party talks unless that air of confidence is achieved. The question is how to achieve the confidence, and we have now set out a second option.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked how he could reassure nationalists than unionists wouldn’t lead any elected body].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    Well we will address their fears, of course we will address their fears. But what they fear really is, and always has been, is that there would be a body like this that had the powers of the old Stormont, the legislative and administrative powers of the old Stormont. That is now what is proposed. What we are proposing is an election that would legitimise with a democratic mandate people to sit round the table and negotiate and then freely reach an agreement. Now the parties work together in local councils in Northern Ireland, often all of the parties in the same council, the Unionist parties, the Alliance Party, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, they work together and they reach agreement. That is the nature of democratic politics. And the truth is, as it always has been, that if each party just stands in its traditional trench and doesn’t given an inch then there won’t be an agreement. What I have said consistently to all parties, and have practiced myself, is that we are going to have to find a concordat that everybody can accept. That is what I am asking them to do in going down this process and in the talks that will follow it.

  • John Major’s Commons Statement on the Mitchell Report – 24 January 1996

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s Commons Statement on the Northern Ireland Peace Process and the publication of the Mitchell Report. The statement was made in the House of Commons on 24th January 1996.


    PRIME MINISTER:

    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): With permission, Madam Speaker, I shall make a statement on the report of the international body on the decommissioning of illegal arms, which was published earlier today.

    The key to progress in Northern Ireland is confidence–confidence to enable the parties to sit down together without threat of force. The retention of arms by the paramilitaries on both sides is the biggest single factor in holding back that confidence. It has so far prevented the holding of all-party talks. That is one of the reasons why we and the Irish Government established the international body, to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue as one track of the twin-tracks initiative that John Bruton and I launched last November.

    The body’s remit was to identify and advise on acceptable methods of verifiable decommissioning, and then to report on the commitment of the paramilitaries to work constructively to achieve that. We set the body the challenging target of reporting by mid-January. I am extremely grateful to Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, the former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri, and General John de Chastelain, for the energy and determination with which they have completed this difficult task.

    The body’s main conclusions are: first, that the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations has nearly universal support and must continue to be a principal objective; secondly, that to reach an agreed political settlement and take the gun out of politics, all parties should commit themselves to, and honour, six principles embodying the path of democracy and non-violence. These principles include the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; the renunciation of force and the threat of force; agreement to abide peacefully by whatever agreement is finally reached; and an end to so-called punishment killings and beatings.

    Thirdly, the body concludes that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of illegal arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all- party negotiations. The body makes a series of recommendations on the modalities of decommissioning of illegal arms. It emphatically declares that there is no equivalence between such arms and those held by the security forces. It rightly emphasises the need for independent verification.

    Fourthly, the body concludes that other confidence- building measures are needed, such as an end to targeting of potential victims by the paramilitaries, information on missing persons and the return of those previously intimidated out of their homes.

    The body also records its conclusion, on the basis of its discussions, that the paramilitaries will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. The House will note that the body did not conclude that they cannot decommission; the body concluded that they will not, and the House will draw its own conclusions. Although the body makes no formal recommendation on this point, it suggests an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.

    The Government welcome the body’s endorsement of the seriousness of the decommissioning issue. We welcome and fully endorse the six principles that it sets out. We call on each and every one of the parties to do the same, speedily and unequivocally.

    If all concerned were to accept those principles, and honour them, as the international body also rightly emphasised, that would be a significant step forward. Even more significant would be if, in addition, all parties, particularly Sinn Fein, also joined the two Governments in supporting the wide principles of consent set out in the Downing street declaration.

    The Government also welcome the body’s broad recommendations on the modalities of the decommissioning process. We are ready to implement them. It is now for those in possession of illegal arms to say whether they will accept and act upon them. We look forward to an early and definitive response from the paramilitaries on both sides.

    We welcome, too, the emphasis on other confidence-building measures. If the paramilitaries give up their present practice of keeping themselves ready for a return to action, that will be a most welcome sign of real commitment to peaceful methods. Otherwise, gun law continues to hang over the heads of the people in Northern Ireland.

    There is therefore much in the report that we can welcome and endorse. But the practical problem remains–how to bring all the parties together. Self-evidently, the best way to generate the necessary confidence is for the paramilitaries to make a start on the decommissioning process. We see no reason why they should not do so.

    There can be no justification for the maintenance of private armies by those who claim to be committed to exclusively peaceful means. Opinion polls in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have shown overwhelming public support in both communities for decommissioning before talks. We shall therefore keep up the pressure for an immediate start to the process.

    However, I am not prepared to accept that any one group should, through its intransigence, stand in the way of peace and a comprehensive settlement for the people of Northern Ireland. We will not be deflected from our aim. It is now apparent that there may well be another way forward, consistent with the basic principles to which we have always adhered.

    One of the confidence-building measures taken up by the international body is the idea of an election. The body made it clear that a broadly acceptable elective process, with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure, could contribute to the building of confidence.

    The Government believe that such an elective process offers a viable alternative direct route to the confidence necessary to bring about all-party negotiations. In that context, it is possible to imagine decommissioning and such negotiations being taken forward in parallel.

    The election proposal originated in Northern Ireland and, as recent opinion polls have shown, has widespread cross-community support there. A number of parties, including those led by the hon. Members for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley), as well as the Alliance party, have put forward proposals for some form of elected body as a means of getting all parties talking together, even if the paramilitaries persist in their refusal to decommission prior to negotiation.

    It is true that other parties have registered their concerns; they will certainly need to be addressed. We will discuss urgently with all the parties how to overcome them. But, in a democratic system such as ours, I cannot see how elections could be regarded by any of the parties either as a side issue or as a block to progress.

    As the Mitchell report says:

    “Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will”.

    So let me make it quite clear to the House that we are ready to introduce legislation, and to seek both Houses’ urgent approval for it, in order to allow such an elective process to go ahead as soon as may be practicable. I hope that this will attract support right across the House.

    To sum up, we believe that, in the light of the Mitchell report, there are two ways in which all-party negotiations can now be taken forward. Both are fully consistent with the six principles set out in the report. The first is for the paramilitaries to make a start to decommissioning before all-party negotiations. They can–if they will. If not, the second is to secure a democratic mandate for all-party negotiations through elections specially for that purpose.

    Those are two routes to all-party negotiations and to decommissioning. The choice between them is ultimately for the parties themselves. I believe that the people of Northern Ireland have every right to expect that one or other of those routes will be taken, and taken soon. For our part, we, together with the Irish Government, will intensify our discussions with the parties. I intend to meet the Taoiseach again in the middle of February to review progress.

    The people of Northern Ireland are enjoying today’s peace. They wish it to be permanent. They also want and deserve political progress. It is time to put the old enmities to one side, and to allow the people of Northern Ireland and their representatives once again to have a normal say in their future and their affairs.

    The proposals that I have put forward today require all concerned to take risks for peace. We have done so before, and we will do so again. Consistent with our principles, we will pursue this process. That is what is needed if we are to build on the achievements of the past two years.

    Let us never forget that we are dealing here with the lives of innocent men, women and children. We are dealing with their future, and with the future of Northern Ireland. In the end, our obligations as politicians–as the House of Commons–are to the people whom we govern.

    I pledge that I will leave no stone unturned to deliver to the people of Northern Ireland, on a permanent basis, the precious privilege of peace that they have enjoyed for the past 17 months.

  • Text of the Mitchell Commission Report – 22 January 1996

    Below is the text of the Mitchell Commission Report, published on 22nd January 1996.


    I Introduction

    1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communique which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a “twin track” process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations.”
    2. One track was “to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent.” This has become known as the political track.
    3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communique:

    “5) In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

    6) Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

    7) In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

    – identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

    – report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

    8) It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits.”

    1. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgment. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.
    2. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.
    3. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and institutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions.

    Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of the troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

    II Discussion

    1. Our examination of the issues and the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
    2. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.
    3. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.
    4. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
    5. Notwithstanding reprehensible “punishment” killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to “work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.
    6. Since the ceasefires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists – so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
    7. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
    8. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked “to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.” It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
    9. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue – or any other issue – will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
    10. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strive can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.
    11. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing and context – indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body – but they should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a principal objective.
    12. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

    III. Recommendations; Principles of democracy and non-violence

    1. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.
    2. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
    3. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
    4. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
    5. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;
    6. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
    7. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,
    8. To urge that “punishment” killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
    9. We join the Government, religious leaders and many others in condemning “punishment” killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful society.
    10. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations to do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principles we recommend address those concerns directly.
    11. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the threat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the threat of violence.
    12. Commitment to decommissioning
    13. The second of the specific questions in paragraph of seven of the Communique asks us “to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve” full and verifiable decommissioning.
    14. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
    15. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.
    16. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need for prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.
    17. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief that they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such allegations. In this view, the cease-fires have been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.
    18. We believe that each side of the argument reflects a core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.
    19. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is genuine and irreversible and that the threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.
    20. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.
    21. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.
    22. Decommissioning during all-party negotiations
    23. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party talks can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.
    24. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome, While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.
    25. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on all political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.
    26. Recommendations; guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning
    27. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique asks us “to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning.”
    28. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided by the Governments and their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.
    29. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.
    30. The ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party be seen to surrender. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission
    31. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
    32. The commissioning should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.
    33. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call up on the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a matter that contributes to public safety.
    34. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional weapons disposal.
    35. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:

    The transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction.

    The provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

    The disposing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

    Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

    1. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

    The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

    1. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the satisfaction of the commission.
    2. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

    The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

    1. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.
    2. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, eg, groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

    The decommissioning process should be mutual.

    1. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

    VII. Further confidence-building

    1. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning to taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.
    2. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.
    3. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
    4. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held by security forces. However, in the context of building up mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communique, “to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.”
    5. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.
    6. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of a Communique to “whether and how an elected body could play a part.” Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.
    7. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

    VIII Concluding remarks

    1. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the “peace line,” is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.
    2. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present opportunity.
    3. This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.
    4. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the “peace line” requires a willingness to take risks for peace.
    5. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland.

    George J Mitchell

    John de Chastelain

    Harri Holkeri

    22 January 1996

  • Mr Major’s Comments on the Northern Ireland Peace Process – 29 December 1995

    Below is the text of Mr Major’s comments on the Northern Ireland peace process, made in an interview in Huntingdon on Friday 29th December 1995.


    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if the Northern Ireland peace process was at a stage of both danger and opportunity].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    I think you could probably have said that at any stage since the peace process began. It has always been part of a process where there was always the opportunity that something would go wrong and it would stop. Now clearly what people have their eyes focused on at the moment is the outcome of the Mitchell Commission that we will have some time in January or February. I don’t see any great reason for concern about that, I think there is a clear remit for them. Once we have the report we can decide how best to go forward.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if there might be new thinking on the arms decommissioning issue].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That isn’t their remit. Their remit is to determine whether the paramilitaries, not just the IRA by the Loyalist paramilitaries, whether they are prepared to decommission and if so how they are prepared to decommission. That is the remit that the Mitchell Commission have.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked if there was a need for new ideas from the Commission].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    That is a matter for the government. We will have to decide how to deal with that matter and in due course we will. But there is more than one way of dealing with it. The most obvious way of dealing with it of course is for the IRA to decide that they will begin to decommission their weapons. The standard IRA line upon this is that that is the British simply putting an obstacle in the way, but that is patently absurd for anyone who examines the matter for a moment. For example, if you look at an opinion poll in the Republic of Ireland, 3 out of 4 people in that poll felt that there should be decommissioning before the talks began, so it certainly isn’t just a matter of the British government.

    QUESTION:

    [Mr Major was asked whether he would consider new ideas from the Commission if they were offered].

    PRIME MINISTER:

    We are all looking at different ways to deal with the present circumstance. The whole purpose of this exercise from the beginning has been to get all the political parties sitting down together, including Sinn Fein. But the point at issue is this, and it is not a British government point particularly, though we happen to agree with it, the point at issue is that the other political parties, the Unionist parties in particular, will not sit down with Sinn Fein until they are clear in their minds that Sinn Fein are determined upon peace. Well they are not clear in their minds and they make the view, I don’t think the unreasonable view, that you cannot negotiate for peace with an armalite in your hand held at the negotiators’ heads. That is a position that has applied from the beginning.