Tag: European Union

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at Chatham House – 14 February 2013

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech held at Chatham House on 14th February 2013. The speech was entitled “The Referendum on Europe : Opportunity or Threat?”. A PDF version of the speech is also available.


    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    A short while ago, the prime minister offered the nation a referendum on whether to remain in the European Union – or leave it, and I believe he was right to do so.

    As a general principle, I don’t like referenda in a parliamentary system. But this referendum could heal many old sores and have a cleansing effect on politics. It will be healthy to let the electorate re-endorse our membership, or pull us out altogether. At present, we are drifting towards – and possibly through – the European exit. We need a renegotiation – and a referendum endorsement of it, and if that is denied, the clamour for it will only grow.

    But it is a gamble – for the country and for the Conservative Party. The relationship with Europe has poisoned British politics for too long, distracted Parliament from other issues, and come close to destroying the Conservative Party. It is time to resolve the matter.

    If the referendum were held now, some polls suggest electors may vote to leave. In 2017, their decision may depend upon the outcome of the negotiations, and success in those might involve repatriation of powers, or opt-outs, or reform of existing policies, or safeguards against unwelcome developments. It will, most likely, be a combination of all these – and perhaps more besides. None of this will be easy. On many issues, there will be no natural meeting of minds.

    To what the French call the Anglo-Saxon mind, the case for reform is very strong: unanswerable, even. To many Continental minds, there is a very different perception. The French already believe that sterling has a competitive advantage over the euro. They now fear that the UK will opt out of social and employment provisions to give our economy a further competitive boost. They will not readily concede that in negotiations. We need to prepare our own proposals without delay, negotiate courteously and with understanding and the manner in which these negotiations are conducted will be vital.

    If we enter them without appreciating the position of each of our European partners, we will fail.

    If we enter them without engaging with each of our European partners, we will fail.

    If we enter them with the aggressive attitude of ‘give us our way or we quit’, we will fail.

    We British would regard any such approach from our European partners as a threat, an attempt to bully; and, just as we would take a dim view of that, so would they.

    When the end game approaches, the prime minister will need to conduct the negotiations personally – and when he does he will find that more concessions will be won in relaxed, personal face-to-face discussion than in formal talks. But long before that, much preparatory work must be done, and that preparatory work is so substantial it wouldn’t be physically possible for the prime minister himself to do it.

    I believe therefore that he should appoint a lead negotiator who sits in the cabinet. And if the Liberal Democrats oppose such an appointment – which is possible, since they oppose a referendum – then the prime minister should over-rule them. On a matter of this national importance, the tail must not wag the dog.

    It is essential that this negotiator is seen as the prime minister’s personal emissary. He, or she, must visit and re-visit every European capital to explain our case, seek allies, set out our aims, and – crucially – emphasize the damage to the European Union as a whole if the negotiations fail and the referendum is lost.

    The prime minister cannot afford to ignore the home front. He must carry public opinion with him. In Parliament, I have no doubt he will continue to receive unsolicited ‘advice’ about what powers he must repatriate. Some of his colleagues in offering this advice will think it’s helpful, and that our partners will hear the strength of feeling – and immediately capitulate. That is quite wrong. They will not. Such advice – given publicly – will undermine, not strengthen, the prime minister’s negotiating position. And it will do so, because he will be seen to be acting under political duress, rather than principle and conviction – and his hand will be correspondingly weakened. And I know that because I have been there: advice, yes – that is a proper role for parliamentarians – but the truly well-meaning will give that advice in private.

    Many colleagues will be instinctively loyal, but not everyone. Rebellion is addictive, and some members may be getting a taste for it. I learned 20 years ago that the parliamentary party includes irreconcilables who are prepared to bring down any government or any prime minister in support of their opposition to the European Union.

    Some have softened their views with age. Others have not. The present Parliament contains members whose opposition to the European Union is fundamental.

    Members with Conservative heads and UKIP hearts cannot be placated. Whatever is offered to them will be insufficient. They will demand more. They will only be satisfied by withdrawal. It is, therefore, essential for the prime minister to rally the persuadable majority of the parliamentary party.

    And if the negotiations fail, and the referendum is lost, we could slip out of the EU in frustration and by default. The prime minister should be prepared for the likelihood that the irreconcilable amongst his parliamentarians, including perhaps some ministers, will campaign for a British withdrawal.

    I am neither a Eurosceptic nor a Europhile. As prime minister, I vetoed the appointment of the president of the Commission because the candidate – an able man in every way – held views inimical to our national interest.

    At Maastricht, I obtained opt-outs from the Single Currency and the Social Chapter. And I did so by explaining in innumerable private meetings why I could not accept those policies and that, without an opt-out, I would have no choice but to veto the whole treaty.

    I judge our membership of the European Union upon one overriding criterion: is it good for Britain?

    Is it good for our economic well-being? For competition, and jobs? For our general quality of life? Is it good for our security, our diplomacy and our standing in the world? All of these elements are relevant to the value of our membership. And now, after 40 years, the referendum raises new questions:

    • What would it cost us to leave?
    • What would we lose if we left?
    • And, if we stay, how can we carve out a leadership role?

    Firstly, some process. We cannot – legally – simply walk out of the European Union. We are obligated by Treaty to negotiate our exit, and also to meet liabilities that will crystallize at a later date. The costs could be substantial. No-one knows how substantial.

    If we left, a swift glance suggests we’d be freed of budgetary contributions, regulations, directives, interminable meetings, unwanted lectures and multiple frustrations. Sounds pretty attractive. But closer examination returns us to the world of realpolitik.

    One presumption from those who advocate leaving the European Union is that we could remain in the Single Market of 500 million consumers. That is, probably, true: but there would be a price. Norway – as a non-member – pays two-thirds as much per head for access to the Single Market as the UK pays as a full member of the European Union. We could accept similar terms if outside and that price would be likely to rise with every opt-out we achieve that our partners believe would give us a competitive advantage.

    Moreover, trade policy is a European Union prerogative: as a non-member we would have no national trade policy in place, and would need to negotiate our own free trade agreements. At worst, this could take years. At best, we might be able to piggy-back on existing European Union agreements. Either way, we are likely to face tariffs.

    And one example, I think, will suffice. At present, we export five out of every six cars made in the United Kingdom but – as a non-member – we may have to pay a 10 per cent external tariff on exports to the European Union, and a 5 per cent tariff on components. And that raises a question: would Nissan, I wonder, and BMW, Honda, Toyota, Ford continue to build at Swindon, Deeside, Dagenham, Bridgend or Oxford – or would they relocate and place future investment inside the European Union with no tariff on their cars? Many livelihoods in the UK depend upon that answer.

    And then tariffs are not the only – or even the worst – threat to competitiveness. Most trade barriers are regulatory and – for us to continue to sell in Europe – UK exporters would have to conform to European regulations. As a non-member, we would have no input into them, but if we wish to export we would have to meet them.

    Now, would this hurt us? Certainly. In the crucial area of financial services, we can anticipate that regulations could – and would – be designed to undermine UK competitiveness. Many would argue that in some areas this is already happening – and I would agree: but, whilst inside the European Union, we can mitigate the worst of the excesses. Outside, we could not.

    The European Commission, generally, is very unpopular in the United Kingdom – sometimes, rightly so. It can be insensitive and seem bullying. But we shouldn’t ignore its virtues. In alliance with the Commission, the UK has driven policy on the Single Market for many years. And in the negotiations to come, the European Commission may often be our ally. They know that a Europe without Britain would be more vulnerable to a move towards protection – and they know how damaging that would be.

    And then, of course, there is inward investment. Inward investment may also be at risk. Another question: would companies from around the world who invest over £30 billion a year in the United Kingdom be more – or less – likely to do so without unfettered access to the European market? To me, the answer is self-evident, but any doubters should ask those foreign investors – and then reflect upon the half a million jobs those same investors have created in the United Kingdom in the last decade alone.

    The impact of a withdrawal goes beyond trade and investment. In a world of global markets, countries are increasingly banding together. It would be a brave decision for Britain to go it alone. I bow to no-one in my pride of our country, but we should see ourselves as others see us. We are 70 million in a world of 7 billion, with countries like China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia all rising in economic and political importance. Do we wish to become less relevant in their eyes, or face the future as a leading voice in a block of 500 million people? To leave would be to march against history.

    Many of those who wish to withdraw from Europe do so on the assumption that we could enhance our relationship with existing allies: most obviously, the United States and the Commonwealth. They are mistaken.

    Economically, the United States looks increasingly to the East, where the market is growing. Politically, every American president I have known wishes to see the United Kingdom at the heart of Europe, because that is what is in America’s own interests. Outside, we would be of far less relevance: we could no longer advance the argument for free trade in Europe or – as recently – help develop sensible rules on data protection, or digital rules that accommodate American counter-terror objectives. Nor could we push for sanctions on Iran – a policy largely driven by the United Kingdom.

    So, be certain of this if nothing else: America does not want the UK to cut her ties with Europe. As for the Commonwealth, two facts suffice: we sell more to North Rhine-Westphalia than to India, and more to France and Germany than the whole of the Commonwealth added together. And incidentally, overall, we export four times as much to Europe as we do to the United States.

    Being inside the European Union can often be frustrating; but outside, we would be at a serious competitive disadvantage. The tens of thousands of UK companies who trade with the European Union should think long and hard about the consequences of exit. And so should their employees, numbered in millions. To leave would be a jump into a void.

    Now of course, the argument with Europe isn’t all one way. The prime minister’s negotiating hand is by no means empty. A British exit would seriously diminish the European Union itself. It would have suffered its greatest reverse. And this reality – well understood by our partners – strengthens our position, but must be deployed with care and sensitivity: clumsily handled, it could be counter-productive.
    If we left, Europe would lose one of her biggest economies. Her role as a global power would be diminished. So would her diplomatic reach. Her foremost free marketeer would have gone. Her main bridge with the United States would be broken. The Transatlantic Alliance would weaken. Even now, America, rightly in my view, complains that she contributes disproportionately to European defence: without the United Kingdom, the Continental European contribution – to their own defence in NATO – would be pitiful. Departure might be a leap into a void for Britain, but her loss to Europe would be palpable.

    None of the risks of separation mean the status quo is acceptable. Nor does it mean that it cannot be changed. I believe it should be – and I personally believe that it can be. What it does mean is that Britain and Europe must work to accommodate one another with goodwill and tolerance. Tolerance was once a great political virtue, and one that I would love to see restored to the body politic everywhere. With goodwill and tolerance, a deal can be done.

    At present, the eurozone is changing its relationship with the rest of the European Union: against that background I see no reason why we should not seek to do so, too. It’s not anti-European to fight for the British national interest. But we should not over-estimate what can be achieved.

    The prime minister can probably deliver safeguards for the City, less regulation, less bureaucracy, no more social legislation, enhancement of the Single Market and more besides. Beyond that, there are many areas ripe for reform, including a full repeal of the Working Time Directive, which a number of countries in Europe would welcome. We should also focus on tackling the democratic deficit and giving real muscle to subsidiarity. And we should do that because reforms that help Europe will also help the United Kingdom.

    Other European Union policies – CAP, fisheries, structural funds – are a constant frustration to the United Kingdom. But even if the prime minister were able to gain exemptions from these policies – does anyone imagine hard-pressed farmers and fishermen would welcome the loss of subsidy from Europe and not demand its replacement from the British Treasury? Does anyone assume for a second we would not need to replace the subsidies lost to poorer regions in our own country from our own resources?

    We know the answer to those questions: I daresay we could improve on European Union policies, but the net gain would be far more marginal than many people imagine. And whenever we out-competed Europe, they would react to offset our competitive advantage. And how do I know that? Because that is precisely what we did when we put tariffs on Norwegian salmon to protect our own industry in Scotland. As we did, so will they. And in our negotiations, it would be more productive in many areas for us to seek allies to reform core policies for everyone, than just to seek a British exemption from them.

    We will also improve the outcome if we take a proactive role in developing future policy: it would be fatal just to sit on the side-lines sniping. Many in Europe, rightly or wrongly, feel that we have lost interest in them: we should make it clear that we have not. We can – and should – carve out a leadership role.

    And some will say well – how can this be? Sterling isn’t in the eurozone, nor likely to join. Well nine other nations are not in the euro nor – although some have ambitions – are many likely to be admitted for many years. Denmark has an opt-out; Sweden and the Czech Republic don’t wish to join; others are far less enthusiastic than once they were. And their interests are often our interests. The Eastern Europeans for example were admitted to the European Union because we British – together with Germany – championed enlargement against the opposition of some others. We are a natural ally for their ambitions and for the reforms they seek. President Giscard d’Estaing has said our negotiation, and I quote, ‘opens the way for the indispensable reform of the European machinery’. He is right. There is an opportunity here and we should lead it in the negotiations to come.

    We must seek further reform of the budget, where we will have allies in Holland, Denmark and Sweden and, in many areas, would be able to make common cause with Germany.

    We should reengage the argument for completion of the Single Market. I’d like to see us advocate the appointment of a Single Market Commissioner to oversee this work across the whole range of services: financial, retail, medical, digital – the list is very long, and the potential gain is very large.

    We could seek to interconnect the energy market. We could widen trade agreements. We could try and create a true European venture capital market. There’s no lack of areas where we can seek to lead, and change, and improve European policy.

    We should continue to work with France in particular to develop policy on the Middle East and the North African rim. Stability in that region – with its trade and investment potential as well as its proximity to southern Europe – is crucial to Europe, and Britain and France are well-placed to lead policy. We have had successes with action against Libya and sanctions against Iran, but there are many more options.

    I believe a proactive role in Europe would pay rich dividends in policy and perception – both at home and overseas. It would also highlight our British value to the European Union, and by highlighting our value encourage acceptance of our demands. Our case is logical and can change minds, but it will require time and patience and commitment.

    What of the future?

    Why are so many of the British – perhaps especially the English – so cool towards the EU?

    Some blame Eurosceptic opinion, and that has been a powerful factor. As pro-Europeans have remained silent, anti-Europeans have become more vocal – and less tolerant.

    But that is far from the whole story. Europe is also culpable. Year after year, Continental leaders have told us that Britain is an essential and valued member of the European project. That is flattering, but their soft words are offset when they pursue policies they know to be anathema to us. For years, Continental leaders have denied a federal ambition, while their policies have moved us closer towards it. They have introduced a single currency, job-destroying legislation and excessive regulation. There has been a wilful refusal to complete the Single Market. Some have flirted with protection. All of these policies are against British advice and British interests. If we are seen to be unreasonable by some, we do have some cause for that stand.

    And emotion matters too, in this debate. Our electorate doesn’t like to see Britain dragged along at the tail of the cart: they’d much prefer to see us to be in the driving seat. I suspect that if Britain were seen to be proactive in policy, it would revolutionize British public opinion.

    And that is necessary: because at present, public frustration is very deep. Perhaps deeper with Europe than I can ever recall it being at any time in the past.

    We don’t know where ‘more Europe’ will end. Or how we can stop an ever increasing bureaucratic power grab into what Douglas Hurd memorably called ‘the nooks and crannies of our national life’. People fear: will we eventually be submerged in an undemocratic United States of Europe? For most of us, that is simply unacceptable.

    We need an end point, and we need to know what it is. And we need to be confident that it will not be breached. These are all matters for the negotiations to come.

    Let me summarize.

    When we come to the referendum, the public will decide. At present, affection for the European Union is minimal. Its virtues are denied, even ridiculed. Its drawbacks are emblazoned in debate. Years of negativity have sunk deep into the British psyche. Ill-feeling between pro and anti factions is worn by some like a badge of honour. Debate over Europe tends to be conducted at the extremes of opinion, with most of the country uninvolved. A single-issue party, dedicated to withdrawal, has grown in public popularity. Public scepticism about Europe feeds on an intense patriotism, and has become a reality our political system cannot ignore.

    Some see the referendum as merely a piece of party political management – but it is much more than that.

    It can be cathartic.

    It can end 40 years of political squabbles.

    It can allow our Parliament, undistracted, to put vital issues – such as the growing underclass and the disregard into which politics has fallen – where they should be: at the very forefront of our national debate and national agenda.

    The referendum can help reform the European Union, and for the better.

    It can resolve both justified – and unjustified – fears about our membership.

    And it can encourage the United Kingdom to take a more positive leadership role in the development of future policy.

    All this is possible.

    Let me close with a vignette. In 1990, in an attempt to head off a Single Currency, I advanced the concept of the ‘hard ecu’: a parallel currency that was market-driven and would co-exist with national currencies. Our proposal failed. It was – first – too late; but the more pertinent reason was explained to me by President Mitterrand. His response was simple. ‘Right policy – wrong country.’

    ‘Right policy – wrong country.’ All too often, that sums up how Britain has been regarded in Europe. The referendum gives us an opportunity to change that perception. It is in Britain’s interests – and Europe’s interests – that we take this opportunity and that we do so.

    Thank you very much.

  • Sir John Major’s Interview on the Andrew Marr Show – 16 September 2012

    The text of Sir John Major’s interview on the BBC’s Andrew Marr show, broadcast live on 16th September 2012.


    ANDREW MARR:

    Back here, twenty years ago to the day Black Wednesday blew a hole through the Conservative Government of Sir John Major – a man who had one of the most unusual family backgrounds of any modern Prime Minister. His mother and father – a man born during Queen Victoria’s reign – were music hall artistes, and Sir John grew up on tales of their unconventional life. Well music hall is in many ways a lost world, killed off by the cinema and by television and radio, but perhaps its spirit lives on. Sir John Major’s written a book about it all. We’ll be talking about that, today’s politics, and much more. Sir John, good morning. Thanks for joining us.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Morning, Andrew.

    ANDREW MARR:

    You called this book My Old Man. And that really is where it starts, because your father wasn’t just a music hall artiste; he topped the bill in some of the great music halls of the time. He was a substantial figure in his way.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well he was in music hall for about thirty years, from 1900 to 1930, and he certainly topped the bill at the second tier theatres. I wouldn’t claim at all he was one of the greats of the music hall, he plainly wasn’t, but he and his then wife, Kitty, very dependable, very good, always working, on the bill with most of the greats at some time or another; and then formed their own show and then they topped the bill for a long time. So yes, he passed on many stories about those days.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Now it is a lost world, we’ll never know quite what it was like to hear these people because they weren’t recorded, or most of them weren’t recorded, until very late on. But just give us a sense of the range of performers who you describe in this book.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I learned quite a lot about it at my father’s bedside when he was very old and ill. I was his audience as a small boy, he was in mid-sixties when I was born. He would talk to me about his life on the stage and all the greats both that he had worked with and that perhaps he’d seen and not worked with. But music hall had a huge range. It might be singing comic songs – that’s the staple part of it – comedians, animal acts, monologists, black-face acts. Almost anything you could think of as variety today would have been part of music hall then.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And you argue that quite a lot of what we think of as quintessentially British humour from the age of sort of radio and television – you know The Goons and Monty Python and all the rest of it – has its origins in people like Dan Leno, some of those patter merchants on the musical stage?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. I mean if you actually look how they performed, what they did and what we know of it, a great deal of it has been handed down. Humour is continuous – what amuses the British psyche a hundred years ago tends to tickle it today – and, yes, it has been handed down. And they were astonishing characters, if you look at their background and their life stories, some of them are full of pathos, they came from nowhere. Some never got anywhere and their lives were full of hardship. Others had huge success, earned vast sums of money, perhaps spent it and then ended up dying young and often destitute. These stories are very remarkable stories of pretty remarkable people.

    ANDREW MARR:

    It struck me that they were quite like the stories of so many kind of would-be rock stars touring the country, hoping to make it, a few of them make it and maybe take too many drugs and drink and so on later on. But it’s also a bit like the sort of popular culture you see in so much television even now, the sort of dance shows and so on.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Nothing’s new and a great deal of it is repetitive. What I think is different was in those days music hall was the entertainment. There was very little to compete with it, as there is so much today, and it sunk deep into the British psyche. In the 1840s, for example, when it began, that was a terrible decade when the country might well have come to revolution. It turned revolution, potential revolution in the 1840s, into a patriotic roar of joy twenty years later. And of course it had its great days at the height of empire – hugely proud, hugely patriotic, hugely pro-British – but it fed mainly upon the lives of the people who actually attended those, and the great artists reflected those lives and sang back to them their lives and talked about their lives. It was empathetic across….

    ANDREW MARR:

    So quite hard-edged actually a lot of it, yes?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Very hard-edged. I mean some of the social commentary has the force of a pile driver, particularly artists we don’t remember today like Jenny Hill – very early feminist, talked very much about the lives of people who were downtrodden and why they were downtrodden. Well worth reading about her.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Revisiting her?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Absolutely worth revisiting her.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Okay. Let’s turn to politics rather more recently. I mentioned Black Wednesday.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    The music hall is much more fun.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Much sunnier perhaps than Black Wednesday. Nonetheless, that was a sort of existential crisis really in many ways for this country. Twenty years on, we are still looking at Europe and are particularly concerned about what is happening to the Euro project now. How dangerous do you think things remain because it’s you know the longest, most boring crisis I can remember?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well there are two things that are inextricably linked of course. Firstly there is Europe and the Euro crisis, and then there’s the state of the British economy. You can’t regard those as wholly separate entities, you have to look at the two of them. If you take Europe first, Europe has continually evolved. It’s evolved a good deal further towards centralisation because of economic failure in Europe over recent years than anybody imagined in this timescale; and what you’re now seeing out of failure, not success, is the Euro core looking to integrate further, much more towards a federal structure.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Which this country, in your view, could have nothing to do with really?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well if you recall you mentioned Black Wednesday. You might also have mentioned that at Maastricht, I opted sterling out of the Eurozone because I didn’t think the Eurozone would work without fiscal union as well as economic union, and so we are apart from that, thank goodness, and we will stay apart from it. But if the Eurozone, as I believe, continue to integrate over the next ten years, you’re going in essence within ten years – this isn’t going to happen overnight – within ten years you’re going to have a Euro core that is to all intents and purposes federal. Now if that happens to a portion, a core of the European Union, it changes that core’s relationship with the rest of the European Union. And if they do that, the rest of the European Union may feel that it is appropriate to change their relationship with the core and with the European Union as a whole. I think that offers an opportunity for us to clean up one of the long running sores of British politics, which is the nature of our relationship with Europe.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And that would have to be a referendum and so on if it was a treaty and all the rest of it?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well if it was a treaty, of course it would.

    ANDREW MARR:

    It would have to be, right.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    And it would be a treaty in due course.

    ANDREW MARR:

    So therefore. Let me ask about the British economy directly at the moment because these are grim times. I mean this is the third quarter of technical recession, the Chancellor incredibly unpopular. You’ve been through a period where you know you are just buffeting through a hard time. What’s your analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy; and what’s your advice?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well, firstly, it would be very surprising if the Chancellor wasn’t unpopular. The Chancellor has to do unpopular things. But I think it’s worth making the point that David Cameron, George Osborne and Nick Clegg aren’t imposing these cuts out of some malign wish to hurt people. They’re imposing these cuts because the last Government left the cupboard bare. The money was gone, the gold was gone. They had no choice but to take tough medicine, and I think people need to understand that is why they are doing it. That said, of course it’s unpopular and you must expect the Chancellor to be unpopular. Nothing surprising at all about that.

    But since I’m no longer in politics, I can say something that perhaps as a politician I wouldn’t. You mentioned Black Wednesday. Around about that time, Norman Lamont was taken to pieces by commentators for suggesting there were green shoots, but in retrospect, we can see that Norman was right. Recovery begins from the darkest moment. I’m not certain but I think we have passed the darkest moment and I will tell you why. There are some oddities in the figures at the moment. Why in the depths of this recession is employment growing, why is industrial production going up, why has the stock market risen? I could list a number of other things.

    There are things happening out there that will become apparent and we don’t quite know why or how. My guess – and this is something a minister can’t say but I can – my guess is in due course we will find that we pass the bottom, that that last revision of GDP when we had a 0.5 per cent reduction is less bad than we thought it was, and that we are starting on what will be a slow road to recovery. I think that is beginning to happen and I hope that is the case, but I believe it is going to turn out to be so for a vast range of reasons.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Meanwhile, party conference season, you don’t have to be involved in it anymore, but there is another Conservative Prime Minister, there are more kind of whisperings and challenges and so on. Of course he’s got Boris Johnson bouncing around, which you never had. Do you think the Conservative Party needs to calm down and settle down or do you think this is an inevitable part of you know the bad year?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well, there’s nothing surprising about people being critical when times are tough. That is true in the Conservative Party, is true in the Liberal Democrat Party, it’s been true in the past. You saw those divisions in the 80s in the Conservative Party with wets and dries. You saw it in the 90s between, well, on the general issue of Europe. You’re seeing it again, it is an inevitability of politics. But I would have thought if the Conservative Party has learned anything in the last twenty years, it’s learned that regicide is not a good idea.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Well has it? That’s the question.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it has and I think the concept of people challenging David Cameron is an extremely good newspaper story, fills huge numbers of columns. And Boris is a very attractive and able and intelligent politician doing a supremely good job I think in London, but Boris isn’t in Parliament. Boris hasn’t said he wishes to become Prime Minister, quite the reverse.

    The belief that suddenly everything is going to change – you’re going to have a leadership challenge and you’re going to have a replacement of Prime Minister – I just think that isn’t in the real world. We aren’t. David Cameron is Prime Minister, he’s going to remain Prime Minister and he’s going to contest the next election and I very much hope he’s going to win it.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And so your message to all of those backbenchers who are constantly contacting newspapers and saying they want to kill the Prime Minister, they’re getting names on bits of paper, all the familiar stuff – your message to them?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    My message to them is look at history. Disunity costs votes. Unity helps a Government achieve the changes in our economy that we wish to see. There’s good for the nation, good for the economy, good for them and good for the next election.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And they should belt up?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Your words, not mine.

    ANDREW MARR:

    All right. After the death of Princess Diana, you were guardian for the Princes. Now they’re both back on the front pages again. These pictures have caused an absolute furore in this country and it seems that St. James’s Palace, the Prince is actually going to go to court in France to take action against the publishers and, who knows, also the photographers concerned. Do you think that’s an overreaction or do you think that’s fair enough?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it’s absolutely right. I think it’s absolutely right, so that people in future know where the boundaries should be. I mean the boundaries have plainly been crossed. I mean I don’t think we need mince words about these photographs. The way they’ve been obtained is tasteless. It is the action of a Peeping Tom. In our country, we prosecute Peeping Toms. That’s exactly what they’ve done and they’ve been peeping with long lenses from a long way away. They’re very distasteful and I’m absolutely delighted. I have often in the past been critical of the British media. I thoroughly applaud the fact that they won’t touch these pictures with a barge-pole. I think they deserve credit for not doing so and it’s a pity that other people overseas have lower standards.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And if you bumped into Mr Berlusconi this morning, you’d presumably have a few words for him too?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It’s very unlikely and it might not be a very good conversation.

    ANDREW MARR:

    It might not be a very good conversation. The more general media climate of course, the British papers are waiting for the outcome of the Leveson Inquiry and so on. What would you like to see?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well I gave my evidence to Leveson, I considered it carefully, I prepared it carefully, I gave lengthy evidence. I’ve no intention of either adding or subtracting to it.

    ANDREW MARR:

    All right.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Leveson heard evidence from every conceivable point of view. I didn’t hear it all. I’m content to wait and see what he recommends.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Prince Harry is obviously in a place of danger, Camp Bastion in Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed that they are attacking that camp and they have killed considerable numbers of people to try and get at him. Do you think it’s right that he is out there? The danger is always that he’s putting other people’s lives at risk. You know we understand that he wants to get out there and fight and do his duty, but is there a danger that by putting him into such a place we’re unnecessarily endangering others?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think there are several points to consider. The first is that Prince Harry trained with his colleagues, he will wish to serve with his colleagues. He most emphatically would not wish to move. The second point, I think it would be a huge propaganda triumph for the Taliban if Prince Harry were to be moved. And, thirdly, I think there’s a great deal of an attempt to create public relations in the posturing of the Taliban at the present time. The army knows what it’s doing. It will determine whether there is a risk to those serving with Prince Harry, as well as Prince Harry, and it will make its judgements based on that. I don’t think advice from external quarters on that will either be well informed or valuable.

    ANDREW MARR:

    And there’s been some talk about pulling out troops early from Afghanistan. Would that help the situation in any way?

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Well I don’t think it’s related. I don’t think you can relate that point …

    ANDREW MARR:

    Sure, to the Harry one. Sure.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    … to the question of Prince Harry. I think there is a credible case for looking at when we actually withdraw troops. The moment that President Obama said he was going to withdraw troops in 2014, the Taliban were on notice as to when the NATO troops would leave and a large part of the Taliban, if they have any sense, probably moved into North West Pakistan and are sitting there in that lawless wild west part of Pakistan waiting to come back after the troops have left. Having given notice of a date upon which we leave.

    ANDREW MARR:

    That’s difficult.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think you have changed the game and changed it totally.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Sir John Major, for now thank you very much indeed.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    My pleasure.

    [Break for news. Andrew Marr asked if the spirit from the Paralympics could be bottled].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it would be marvellous if we could. I mean, we saw some things at the Olympics that I think we thought we’d lost from the British character, the extent of the volunteers. The sheer, and I know it’s an old-fashioned word, the sheer patriotism of the British nation for the British athletes.

    I was fortunate enough to see a lot of the Olympics, and I think the moment I remember most was when the Paralympians came on in the opening ceremony, there had been an hour and a half of athletes parading. Suddenly the British team appeared, and as soon as the first British athlete appeared the whole of that 80,000 stadium were on their feet cheering. I freely confess that I had tears in my eyes and I don’t think I was the only one.

    ANDREW MARR:

    Were you surprised, because the Paralympics has always been, in the past, a slight downbeat after the main Olympics. This time the enthusiasm continued at the same level.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Absolutely. You will have forgotten this, but 27 years I was Minister for Disabled People.

    ANDREW MARR:

    I had forgotten it, you’re quite right.

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    And I was absolutely thrilled to see it and there was a little vignette. I was talking to a foreign Paralympian athlete and he said “we have never seen anything like this. Who asked all these people to come?” and I said, “nobody asked, they came and they paid”. And they were thrilled with the size of the audience.

  • Sir John Major’s Article on Fiscal Union – 26 October 2011

    The text of Sir John Major’s article on fiscal union, published by The Financial Times on Wednesday 26th October 2011.


    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    The crisis in the eurozone was inevitable but has been accelerated, and worsened, by the banking collapse. It will not be solved easily or quickly. When it is, it may lead to a very different European Union.

    The root of the present chaos can be traced back to bad politics taking precedence over sensible economics. At Maastricht, which I attended as prime minister, the assumption was that – before the euro was born – the economies of member states would converge: that is, operate at broadly the same levels of efficiency. Safeguards were set: it was agreed national fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of gross domestic product. Later, a Stability & Growth Pact was enacted to ensure sound fiscal policies. Yet, when the founder members launched the euro in 1999, the wise preconditions were ignored.

    After the birth of the euro, some southern states over-indulged on low interest rates and racked up debts. So did their citizens, without hindrance from their governments who basked in the popularity of the boom. When Germany and France over-stepped the criteria on debt without any penalty by the commission, the criteria became toothless. Debt soared. This would have led to a crisis on its own, but it was hastened by the 2008 meltdown.

    Hindsight is often graceless. But it is a fact that sterling did not enter the euro because we foresaw flaws in its structure. We believed monetary union without fiscal union was risky; that convergence of the powerful northern economies with southern Europe was unlikely (especially once Germany had absorbed her Eastern lender). I had a political objection as well: that entry into the euro, and the abolition of sterling, would remove key policy options from the British government. That is why, at Maastricht, I opted out of the euro.

    It was not easy. The opt-out was only obtained by threatening to veto the treaty. Our European partners were unhappy. Some thought we were acting in bad faith: they had agreed to the British initiative of a single market, and argued that monetary integration was necessary to accompany trade integration. They were upset that we had implicitly endorsed monetary union in the Single European Act of 1986 and, in 1988, had appointed the Governor of the Bank of England to help the Delors Committee examine it. All this was true. But, on the euro, our interests diverged from theirs which caused a policy schism. That may be about to happen again, with far-reaching consequences.

    As I write, the eurozone has an immediate dilemma. Policymakers must stabilise the eurozone banks, permit Greece to default and remove market fears of other defaults. Agreement on this is essential, but insufficient. The euro’s flaws will remain. The powerful German economy is still locked within the same currency as weaker economies. She racks up huge trade surpluses within the eurozone while others have comparable deficits. Since Germany has an estimated 30 per cent currency advantage within the euro, this seems likely to continue. It is undesirable and unsettling.

    In a sensible world, the southern states would devalue to become competitive – but they cannot. They are locked in a single currency. And because they cannot devalue their currency, they must devalue their living standards and promote reforms to enhance efficiency. This will take years. Meanwhile, wages must fall, unemployment will rise and social unrest will increase. The severity of this medicine may not be bearable in a liberal democracy.

    Most obviously, this has an impact on Greece. Of course, it has behaved foolishly. But that does not mitigate the present pain. As salaries are cut, new taxes are imposed and other taxes rise. It is no wonder people are frightened. Some ask: why is Greece in the eurozone at all? The ease of her entry exemplifies the follies of the founders. France insisted: “You cannot say no to the country of Plato.” Maybe not, but every European is now paying the price for admitting an economically unfit nation to compete in the eurozone.

    To safeguard the eurozone in the longer term requires a fundamental change of policy. It must become a fiscal union; a union of transfer payments to off-set regional disparities; or it must shrink. The latter option – essentially expelling Greece – has political consequences.

    There is no mechanism to do it. What would Greece’s future be? Would she remain democratic in the chaos that might follow? Pushing Greece out is not a risk-free option.

    Nor is a transfer union. Germany would hate it and transfer payments would institutionalise inefficiencies. That leaves fiscal union as the most likely destination. But it has huge political consequences. It implies a far greater level of integration, and is an escalator to a federal eurozone. This may be sensible economically, but it is profoundly undemocratic. It would drive voters and decision-makers dangerously far apart. More top-down Europe imposed by a remote elite could provoke a powerful antipathy.

    A more integrated eurozone will also provoke non-euro members of the EU by driving them further away from core decision-making. They will react adversely – which is why an early announcement of fiscal union is unlikely. Instead, judicially enforceable controls over deficits, early harmonisation of corporate taxes and a permanent chairman of the eurozone are likely early moves. We are drifting towards full fiscal union: only the timescale is flexible.

    This has consequences: non-euro members will not wish to be marginalised and may sniff suspiciously at euro-core proposals, rendering decision-making even more of a hurdle. If the eurozone integrates and co-ordinates policy, non-euro members may co-ordinate too. Confrontation looms. Deeper eurozone integration may encourage non-euro member states to seek to repatriate key policies they can’t influence. The UK will not be alone in this. In the next decade, a federal eurozone will change Europe’s mosaic. Within the eurozone it will become more prescriptive; outside, a looser union could emerge. A pattern of variable alliances is likely. EFTA countries may move closer to non-euro members. One thing is certain – the EU will not remain the same.

    In the UK, and elsewhere, many are pressing for their nation to leave the EU. This is an extreme option that would throw up far more problems than it would solve. For the UK it would be a dangerous mistake but, even so, our relationship within the EU will shift. Cool heads and clear minds are needed: our future depends on it.

  • Sir John Major’s Comments on the Financial Situation – 9 October 2011

    The text of Sir John Major’s comments on the financial situation, made in an interview on 9th October 2011.


    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the economy was in a serious state].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it’s pretty serious, but I think if you can reach a conclusion to the Eurozone crisis you’ll change the level of confidence and I think that will make a material difference. But at the moment you have the Eurozone pretty flat as an economy, you have American flat, you have the Chinese economy slowing and we don’t know how much it will slow, and you have the British economy teetering between no growth and tiny growth, so plainly it’s serious. And it is a different sort of recession from before because of the debt overhang.

    So yes, I do think it’s very serious.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the Bank of England Governor was right in saying the recession was worse than in the 1930s].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think he’s looking at the scale of debt, if you actually look at the United Kingdom as an example, in 1997 – to pick a date at random – we had a national debt of about 350 billion, by 2010 it was 900 billion and on unchanged policies by 2014 it would be 1.4 trillion. So you begin to see the scale of the problem, and the fact it is absolutely unavoidable that you make changes in order to bring down that level of debt, because that overhang could be with us otherwise for generations.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if everyone would have to work harder and cut back].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Certainly for a while, I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. There’s no point in pretending that the situation is suddenly going to magically come good with a bit of growth. I’m afraid we need a good deal more than that. And we’re going to have to restructure a great deal of what has happened, not least in the Eurozone which is crucial to us because we are not part of the Euro because, as you rightly say, I opted out in the Maastricht Treaty, but the Eurozone is 40% of our exports and the rest of the European Union as a whole is 50% of it, so their health is crucial to our health.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the Germans would transfer more money in].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it’s very unlikely, and the Germans have expressly been told that they won’t move towards a transfer union which is essentially what is being talked about.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the Eurozone would fracture].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it’s extremely unlikely that the European Union will fracture with nations dropping off the edge.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if Greece would default].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It’s conceivable.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if Greece would default within the Eurozone].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think that is exactly what will happen and should happen. But I think that it is unlikely that the Eurozone will toss out a member, it’s conceivable that it could happen, but it would certainly be against their wishes.

    I think by far the most likely proposition, firstly you have to look at the short-term problem and then the longer-term problem. In the short-term the banks needs to be recapitalised and Greece needs to default. The sooner that happens and Greece defaults, the sooner you remove something, the overhang in the markets.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked what would happen if Greece defaulted].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    What would happen is that if Greece defaulted and couldn’t pay its debts, all the Greek bonds that are held in other banking systems across Western Europe would suddenly have no value. You could, as a knock-on effect, create a banking crisis in Western Europe and French and German banks have most of the bonds. That would be absolutely catastrophic if that happened. So the Greeks mustn’t default until the Western European banks are in a position to absorb any losses that there might be without creating a banking crisis.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if banks would be given money to fund this loss].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think the way they may do it, I think there are two things that they could do, the first thing I think they could do is turn the European structural facility from a structural facility into a bank, give it a banking licence, let it leverage.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if this would mean a new European Central Bank].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    No, it would be quite separate from the European Central Bank, let it borrow money as banks normally can from the European Central Bank and either buy up the Greek bonds to remove the danger, the contagion from the Western banks, or use the resources to recapitalise the banks so they can bear the losses.

    That seems to me to be the first thing that has to happen, and then it would be thoroughly desirable, in my view, to get the Greek default out of the way. It’s a terrible overhang in the market, it’s partly priced-in, let’s get it done and then we can move on to the longer term.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked why he didn’t join the Euro].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    There were three arguments, the first was that if you had a monetary union without a fiscal union it’s like a two-legged dog.

    The second argument, at Maastricht we produced some safeguards – although I opted out at Maastricht, we produced some safeguards – one of them was that no European nation would have a fiscal deficit of more than 3%, and the second was that before the Euro was formed the economies of those nations going into the Eurozone should converge, and by that piece of jargon we meant that they should operate at broadly the same level of efficiency. That didn’t happen.

    In the late 90s the French and Germans began to worry whether the Eurozone would ever happen, so they went into the Euro without the convergence. That was the tragic mistake, it shouldn’t have happened.

    Thirdly, when the Germans and the French went beyond the 3% deficit, the Commission took no action against them and everybody else did too, so you got this burgeoning level of debt that began to spread everywhere.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the Euro would change].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It will have to change, I think it will have to change.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked about the flapping of white coats].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    No, the flapping of white coats was on a quite separate matter – and I don’t withdraw the remark. The substance of the argument is exactly the same as I advanced at Maastricht.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked whether the Euro-sceptics had been right].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    They were partially right, but only partially right, and I will come to the situation as I saw it. The need for fiscal union is something we foresaw at Maastricht, which is why we opted out at Maastricht, that was right and is right.

    What is now I think going to happen, albeit in a crab-wise fashion, I think the Eurozone members will have to move towards a fiscal union. I don’t think they will suddenly say they are going into full-scale fiscal union, it would need a treaty and all sorts of other things.

    What I think they will do is produce legislation within the European Union that makes the control of fiscal deficits, the harmonisation of tax and matters like that, much more controlled from the centre. So they will be moving towards a federal state within the Eurozone and they will be moving to it out of failure and not out of success, that is the point.

    It then gets to the position where you have an inner-core within the Eurozone that is operating much more deeply and closely together than the rest of the European Union. And if you remember in the 1990s, Douglas Hurd and I, we called it variable geometry, and we saw a much looser European Union in which people opted in instead of opting out, and it wasn’t such a tremendously prescriptive union which everybody had to be a part of.

    That is the direction over the next decade, slowly, in which I think we will be going.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if there would be a referendum on a new treaty].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    There won’t necessarily have to be a treaty in this country for fiscal union. In terms of fiscal union it is conceivable that there will be a treaty just among the members of the Eurozone, so don’t overlook that possibility.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if the referendum could be about a federal Europe that Britain wasn’t a member of].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think that is conceivable. There are a dozen different ways in which this could unwind and frankly nobody can be certain which way it will go at the present time.

    But it is possible that there will be a fiscal union amongst the Eurozone members, they would have their own treaty. But at some stage there will be another treaty because if there’s fiscal union in Europe, it changes our relationship with Europe. That is the fundamental point.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if powers should be transferred].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I think it gives an opportunity for two things, firstly, it gives us an option to negotiate for the looser form of Europe that I would like to have seen in the 1990s and we got no traction when Douglas Hurd and I argued for that then. I think it presents that opportunity. And secondly, I think there are some areas that are worth looking at, and this isn’t anti-Europeanism or Euro-scepticism. There are some areas which it would be worthwhile to repatriate.

    Fishing is one. There are elements of employment law, it used to be in the Social Chapter and has now spread, you will recall that I opted out of that in 1992 because I saw it as a job destroying mechanism. Now it has changed but the things like the working time directive, which I think is a very foolish piece of legislation, we could look at repatriating part of it.

    Clearly, financial services is another area. There has been a lot of talk about the financial transactions tax, I don’t think that will happen, for a range of complex reasons, but even so, financial services are crucial to the well-being of the British nation, it is what drove our growth – over-drove it as it happened – over the last twenty years or so.

    We really don’t want a whole series of restrictive notions damaging our financial structure in this country.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked if this was a new opportunity for Britain].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Europe changed fundamentally when the Europeans ignored the safeguards in the Maastricht Treaty and proceeded to an unsafe Eurozone, which they did in 1999 without any bark of protest from the United Kingdom. That changed it, that changed everything, because the Eurozone was no longer going to be a stable instrument, we were going to be outside it, but it could have been stable and it wasn’t. And that was a significant change and now I think there is an opportunity.

    I don’t see this as a Euro-sceptic attack on Europe, I see that with 27 nations within the European Union it has to change. It cannot be the same as with 15 nations or with 6.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked whether quantitative easing was right].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It isn’t George who has just quantatively eased as it happens, it’s the Governor of the Bank of England, and I think the Governor is right to do so.

    When you consider how much of our economy is driven by exports and you then see what is happening to our markets overseas, I think the Bank of England are right to quantatively ease. I think he is right. But more valuable might be the proposals put forward by the Chancellor himself to direct money specifically to parts of industry.

    QUESTION:

    [Sir John was asked about Liam Fox and what the Prime Minister should do].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    It’s extremely difficult to handle these, either natural justice requires that you have to wait a long time and you’re then said to be incapable of making decisions if you operate under natural justice. Or you move too speedily and you’re said to be ruthless, so I don’t know what the situation is, the Prime Minister has asked for the facts to have a first look on Monday, and I think that is right.

    From the Prime Minister’s perspective he has to balance natural justice and the truth, rather than the gossip, the rumour and things that may be true, but I’ve no idea whether they are or not.

    QUESTION:

    [Thank you].

    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Thank you, my pleasure.

  • Sir John Major’s Ditchley Annual Lecture Speech (Ditchley Foundation) – 9 July 2011

    The text of Sir John Major’s Ditchley Annual Lecture speech, made at Ditchley Park in Oxfordshire, on Saturday 9th July 2011.


    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    First, let me add my welcome to Jeremy and Anne Greenstock and John and Penny Holmes.

    Jeremy and Anne have been great servants of Ditchley; John and Penny are already showing they will be. We are lucky to have them.

    When John invited me to speak to you today, I was very reluctant to accept. I was dismayed that, once again – with impeccably bad timing – the Ditchley Lecture clashes with a Test Match. I also recalled some outstanding Lectures at Ditchley over recent years. I nearly said – No.
    I didn’t, because there are things to be said, questions to be asked – and ideas to be floated – that can more easily be done by a former politician than a current one. And where better than Ditchley – for so long a home for rational thought and considered debate? An oasis of calm in a world of frenzy.

    Every time I come here I am reminded of our debt to David Wills – and now, Lady Wills and Catherine.

    I just want to say to Eva and Catherine: we owe you more than we can repay.

    In preparing for today, I took to heart GH Hardy’s observation that one ought never to waste time stating a majority opinion. I will try and follow that advice.

    Accepted opinion is often wrong. Even more often, out of date. And, frequently, complacent.

    Let me say at the outset that nothing I say should be taken as a trial balloon for anyone else. I speak for myself alone and – reluctantly but possibly – will offend political friend and foe alike. Nevertheless, I shall set out what I believe Western Governments must do to secure our well-being, in a world that is moving faster than we are.

    This world is digitalising, urbanising and ageing. It is also migrating. The age of the single language, single culture state is over. Medicine, science and technology are carrying us where we have never been before. Social networks can elect Presidents and foment revolution. Global markets have outstripped the control of nation states.

    The world of 20 years ago, let alone 50, has long since vanished. In every field of human endeavour – and nearly every aspect of life – yesterday’s certainties are today’s imponderables and tomorrow’s dilemmas.

    The future raises uncomfortable questions, and even more uncomfortable answers. Some challenges are domestic, others can be resolved only by collective action. And, even if they are faced, and even if there are successful outcomes – and these are two big “ifs” – they will merely head off future problems.

    Pain now for gain later has never been an easy sell for politicians and, in a social climate that expects instant gratification, it becomes even harder. It was easier being a politician yesterday than today. And it is easier today than it will be tomorrow.

    The core question is: what must our Governments do to ensure our future prosperity? Must we change our policies, our expectations, our tribal politics – or all of these? It simply defies logic that the whole world can turn upside down, while we meander on in the same old way.

    At stake is our material well-being – and our status in the world – in 20, 40, and 50 years’ time.

    Some may say the battle is lost – that this will be China’s – and Asia’s – Century. I don’t believe that is pre-ordained. China, in particular, has many problems. The Communist philosophy is discredited. Her Government is not elected. Its only legitimacy is growth.

    In China and Asia, we are already seeing that rising living standards will bring greater demands – for social welfare, pension and much else besides – that will eat away at their present competitiveness.

    So this economic triumph of the East isn’t assured, but we do know they will be formidable competitors. So how are we placed to respond?

    Our present position, to put it mildly, is uncomfortable. It is axiomatic that every generation has an obligation to pass on to its successor something better than they themselves inherited. In recent times, we have failed.

    We have spent tomorrow’s money on yesterday’s gratification, and there is something immoral in that. And we have presided over a systemic financial collapse that has forced the prudent to bail out the reckless. There is something unjust in that.

    This is a sharp reminder that our democracy doesn’t guarantee efficiency. The democratic checks and balances we so cherish can become roadblocks. The tyranny of the electoral cycle can push politicians to short-term decisions.

    Equality replaces quality. Sound-bites stand in for home truths. It feels odd to point up the short-comings of democracy, when it has achieved so much – but if we don’t recognise them, we can’t correct them.

    Democracy has entrenched an enviable liberty of thought and action and presided over a quality of life our forebears could not have imagined. We are safer and, until now, richer. It has had a civilising influence. We have learned that decent people come in all colours. We abhor racism and bigotry. We have developed good human instincts of care and compassion.

    In due time, electors can vote Governments out and mostly they depart peacefully into Opposition. No wonder it is widely admired and copied. It has served us well but, on its own, democracy will not secure our place in tomorrow’s world.

    ECONOMY

    The financial crisis has highlighted a reality the West can no longer ignore: our days of easy economic supremacy are over.

    The drift is undeniable. The West has lost its competitive edge against China, India, Indonesia and Brazil as well as many smaller countries, notably in Asia and Latin America. Financial firepower is moving from West to East. Thirty five years ago, the fifteen core countries of the EU accounted for broadly 36% of global GDP, and Asia only 16%. Projections suggest that, in twenty years’ time, that will almost precisely have reversed. As we stutter, the rest of the world grows.

    America has, largely, held decline at bay: but, even so, her share of global GDP has fallen from 26% to 23%. Economically, in one lifetime, the world will have turned on its head.

    It’s easy to see why. Where ambition confronts complacency, ambition wins. In countries that are one generation away from poverty I see a passion and drive for success that sweeps away barriers. Even if we are aware of the tidal wave of competition that is coming, we have not prepared for it. We are falling behind and at risk of falling further.

    We shouldn’t deceive ourselves this is simply the fall-out from the financial crisis. It is a long-term trend.

    Some see no danger. They argue that the West can be sanguine about Eastern competitiveness because our quality of life is so far ahead.

    Such people should get out more. Let me cast an unforgiving eye on that complacency: the UK first.

    In terms of GDP, the UK is the sixth most wealthy country in the world. But our national Balance Sheet carries many liabilities. Our physical infrastructure is old. Our health service is creaking. Whilst the best of our education – especially higher education – is world-class, some of it is unforgivably awful.

    We are up to our ears in debt. The Exchequer is empty. The Gold is gone. The post-dated cheques are accumulating interest. We are over-taxed. We have an under-class: poorly educated, poorly housed and unmotivated.

    We are no longer an Empire, nor will be ever again. Today, we are a shrinking military power. By choice, and with majority public approval, we are semi-detached members of the EU. And even America – for so long our closest ally who generally sees the world as we do – is turning her face to the East, as self-interest determines she must.

    There is absolutely nothing here to be complacent about.

    America faces many similar problems – most obviously debt, which was 40% of GDP in 2008, 69% in 2011, and is projected to be 85% by the end of the decade – and rising. Yet only about one-half of the population pays federal income taxes.

    The risk remains of the US Treasury defaulting on its debt as it runs up against the legal limit it can borrow. I daresay a compromise will be reached, but this flirting with brinkmanship is dangerous. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was catastrophic. A Treasury default could be as bad. I hope those playing political games realise that the effect of their actions could spread far beyond America.

    In the foremost free market economy in the world, average household debt comfortably exceeds average annual income. And a rising proportion of that income now comes from the State.

    About 45 million Americans now receive food stamps: the modern equivalent of bread lines. Medical costs threaten to spiral out of control.

    Huge housing debts held by Banks are not written off: if they were, there would be lower profits, and lower bonuses. Total mortgage debt has quadrupled in 20 years. Today, there are two million mortgages not being paid.

    And so the merry-go-round continues: Banks are still lending 95% mortgages on a falling market at a multiple of income: admittedly now – they say – only to more credit worthy customers. No one should assume the financial crisis cannot be repeated: it certainly can. But, if it is, it will be unforgiveable.

    EUROPE

    As for Europe – the word is engraved on my heart. Northern Europe is healthy but Southern Europe is sunk in debt and uncompetitive. The EU as a whole is divided on how to handle budget deficits, the crisis in the Eurozone, control of the Central Bank, nuclear policy, as well as how to react to Libya, Afghanistan and the Arab/Israeli conflict.

    Twenty years ago, led by France and Germany, a confident EU was paving the way for the Euro. The assumption in the European Council was that, before the Euro could be launched, the economies of nations wishing to be part of it would converge: by that piece of jargon, we meant operate at broadly the same level of efficiency.

    But that didn’t happen. It was politics – not economics – that launched the Euro in the late 1990s. Sterling did not join because, in 1992, I had opted out of the Euro at Maastricht. I didn’t do that out of sentimentality for the Pound – nor to placate sceptic opinion. If I’d wished to do that – with my Party or the Press – my life would have been much more comfortable. I didn’t. It wasn’t – because I thought then, and argued then, that the concept had flaws.

    Today, Germany – with its powerhouse economy – is locked within the same currency, at the same exchange rate, as the weaker economies of the Southern European States.

    In a sensible world, the Southern States would devalue but – of course – they can’t and so, to become competitive and stay in the Eurozone, they must devalue internally. Unemployment will rise, wages must fall, and so must living standards.

    This threatens Greece, Portugal, and – possibly Spain and Ireland – with many years of austerity. As we see in Greece, the scale of that austerity may not be acceptable in a liberal democracy. Meanwhile, others power ahead.

    It is not immediately clear how Europe will resolve this dilemma. But the present position is unsustainable. Either the EU becomes effectively a Union of transfer payments to offset regional disparities (as happens in Canada), or it creates a mechanism to shrink the Eurozone. Nothing else makes long-term sense.

    Germany and France will not permit – cannot afford to permit – a reprise of the present crisis. In Germany, in particular, it is causing immense political agony. When the President of the ECB proposed a European Ministry of Finance with power to intervene in national economic policies, he caused commotion. But something will have to be done. Somehow, binding rules will be imposed on debtors.

    Despite Eurozone members insisting they will not surrender fiscal sovereignty, it is not hard to look ahead and imagine a Eurozone with fiscal – as well as economic – union, in practice if not in name. I don’t like this – it was a prime reason for not joining the Euro – but, if it happens, it may have the effect of pushing the UK further away from the mainstream of the EU.

    The UK is often accused of being half-hearted over its commitment to Europe. Continental politicians bemoan our caution. “If only the UK took up its responsibilities” … it is a familiar theme, and we will hear more of it.

    Let me respond. I am not anti-European. I am not a sceptic in the accepted sense. I never have been. I see the nobility of intent in binding together nations that fought one another over many centuries.

    I see the economic advantages of the single market, and the political advantages of extending democracy to nations that were locked in the Soviet embrace. But I am wary of many European policies. If they are flawed, or unworkable, or alien to our instincts, our Government has a duty to question them.

    Where we can work together, let us do so. That is sensible. But the Union cannot succeed if nations are – sullenly and resentfully – bound into policies they believe are damaging to their national interest. Far better to plan for a multi-speed Union, with nations opting-in to policy rather than opting-out. In a 27 Nation Union, I believe we will come to that, although it is far from the ambitions of some of our partners.

    If the UK is semi-detached, that is only, in part, because of British scepticism: it is also because the EU has chosen, time and again, to go in a direction they know Britain cannot follow. Every recent Prime Minister has ended up less European than he – or she – began.

    As to the future – it is difficult to see where Europe is going. Some would like to break away entirely from the EU. In a world in which many policies need collective action, that would be folly. If we are drifting apart, there is cause to beware: it is time to take stock.

    GOVERNMENT/POLITICAL SYSTEM

    In the search for future well-being that is true of our political system as well. At the moment, neither American nor British politics is in a state of grace. It has become too inward-looking. Too short-term. Our systems embrace politicians, and carry them off to a world the rest of us don’t inhabit. It’s time to bring them back. And focus them on the far distance as well as tomorrow.

    There is a fault line in our national policy-making processes:

    When do politicians have time to think?

    There is time to do, based on advice.

    There are policies to advocate, based on conviction.

    There are people to placate, based on necessity.

    But, in Government, too often, senior politicians are fire-fighting yesterday’s problems instead of thinking how to fore-stall tomorrow’s.

    Would it not be better to carve out sufficient time so that – routinely – they can frame policies to safeguard our future in 20/50 years from now?

    And – if they did think and plan far ahead – it would give them time to explain, to cajole and to carry electorates with them in controversial policy. That’s never easy – as we see today.

    To help bring this about, we should encourage governments to devolve more and do less: in some areas, we are ludicrously over-governed. The nanny state may be well-meaning, but it is also stifling.

    I am one-quarter American, so I hope I might be forgiven for speaking bluntly. At the moment, the American political system is dysfunctional.

    It is easier to stop good policy than to pass it. Bi-partisan co-operation is grudging and limited. Moreover, it is getting worse as re-warding of congress and district boundaries makes seats safer for Republicans or Democrats: the inevitable effect is fewer “middle of the road” candidates being elected. The first loser is compromise. The ultimate loser is sensible, non-ideological policy.

    The power of special interest lobbies is excessive. There have been 27 Bills affecting Energy over recent years where the representatives of six States, irrespective of Party affiliation, have voted for the Coal lobby position on over 80% of votes. In the Senate, this has been sufficient to block anything the industry does not favour. This is not in the national interest. It is naked self-interest. Sadly, it is not the only example (in domestic or foreign policy).

    I remember former Presidents bemoaning the introspection of Congress – my expression, not theirs – and their concern that only a minority of its Members travelled overseas to see the world for themselves. Since American foreign policy affects us all, this is lamentable.

    But it’s easy to see why. A competitive election contest in New York, or New Jersey, home to the most expensive media markets, could cost a candidate $10 million. On average, candidates must raise over $1.3 million to fight each campaign. And campaigns come every other year.
    To fight these elections, the average candidate must raise over $50,000 each and every month. No wonder they don’t travel. Such frequent elections also create obligations to donors – and lobbies. They put a premium on short-term populist policies.

    It would make for far better decision-making if elections were less frequent and there were limits on spending. This might also cut down on negative campaign advertisements, the net effect of which is simply to damage the reputation of politics.

    I claim no superiority for the British system.

    For generations, Britain has basked in the glory of our Parliamentary system. Much of the world flatters it as an example of a mature democracy, a supreme Parliament, an independent Judiciary and an impartial civil service.

    I cherish the traditions that add majesty to Parliament. Yet even I, who look at Parliament with affection, can see it must be made more efficient.

    We could begin by widening the pool of talent prepared to enter politics, by removing some of the disincentives to do so.
    I would pay MPs a fixed and generous salary, and cut out all living allowances. This is not entirely fair to Members with remote constituencies, but life is not fair – and such a system would avoid the recent scandals that have done so much harm to Parliament.

    We need, also, to attract to the Commons men and women at the top of their profession. It is one of the oddities of democracy that fundamental policy choices are made by men and women who, apart from the legitimacy of election and a native intellect, have no qualifications to make them.

    How many MPs can bring direct knowledge to how banks should be regulated? Or how hedge funds work? Or are familiar with e-money? Or nuclear energy? Or the social and medical implications of embryology?

    We would benefit from our legislators having more practical knowledge.

    Of course we can hire specialist advisers, but that can never be as effective as influential, knowledgeable voices speaking with expertise in the Chamber, in the Committees, in the tea rooms, in Party meetings.

    There is no solution to this dilemma that doesn’t cut across our traditions, and so I would do just that. Why not elect fewer Members of Parliament and appoint, on a basis pro rata to votes cast in the General Election, a similar number of Members without constituencies?

    I know the familiar arguments against this – a few years ago I would have used them myself forcibly – but, on reflection, I now believe enhancement of the talent pool is so vital it justifies the changes.

    If the Commons baulks at a further reduction in its Members then, as Douglas Hurd and I have argued before, let us appoint unelected Ministers, answerable to Parliament, but without being Members of it. Or, of course, let us do both. Douglas and I have argued also for fewer Ministers and fewer PPSs: we have far too many of each: they could be severely cut back.

    At the moment, all three major Parties are committed to an – at least partly – elected House of Lords. The Lords does need reform. It has too many inactive Members. It is too big and unwieldy. But election is the wrong reform.

    The case for election is democratic legitimacy. However, if we want an efficient legislature, the case against is far more compelling.

    An elected Upper House would cease to be a revising Chamber and would demand more powers that could only come from the Commons.

    There would be confusion and conflict. We should be reducing the number of politicians and adding to their quality. An elected Lords would add more politicians and reduce their quality. That is a bad bargain.

    Does anyone imagine that Chiefs of the General Staff, Cabinet or Permanent Secretaries, Captains of Industry, Chancellors of Universities, Professors of Medicine would stand for election?

    Of course they wouldn’t, and elected replacements could never bring such a depth of knowledge to the scrutiny of legislation. If the answer is more elected politicians, we are asking the wrong question.

    A better reform would be to improve Parliamentary procedures. Cut the number of whipped votes. And reform PMQs to discourage its vaudeville element.

    I offer only one further of many options. Parliament’s workload leads to legislation being poorly scrutinised, and often shown to be defective. In Criminal Justice alone, 68 sections and 25 schedules of 19 Acts remain unimplemented: many because they are unworkable.

    Why not subject all mainstream Bills to Select Committee scrutiny and public evidence before final drafting? If we did so, we would get better, more relevant, and more coherent, new laws.

    And must the Westminster Parliament oversee so much? I think not. It would be more efficient if it were less over-burdened.

    DEVOLUTION OF POWER

    There are options:

    Pass fewer laws – which is attractive, and to be hoped for: though I’m not holding my breath.

    But we could contract more to local government and devolve more to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies. In a cautious and incremental way, the Coalition is taking action to do this. I welcome that and encourage them to go further.

    Some years ago, I opposed the creation of local Mayors. I was wrong. Mayors do put in place a dynamic and – as successive Mayors of London have shown – they can be effective megaphones for our big cities. But under present plans, Mayors will only inherit the existing powers of Council leaders: in future, I hope their remit can be widened.

    There is one caveat: their power of decision should be real, not illusory, and this implies a funding responsibility to pay for – at least the majority of – their policies. When next we look at local authority finance that should be the objective.

    Devolution can also reduce the Westminster workload. But there is some groundwork to be cleared first. The present quasi-federalist settlement with Scotland is unsustainable. Each year of devolution has moved Scotland further from England. Scottish ambition is fraying English tolerance. This is a tie that will snap – unless the issue is resolved.

    The Union between England and Scotland cannot be maintained by constant aggravation in Scotland and appeasement in London. I believe it is time to confront the argument head on.

    I opposed Devolution because I am a Unionist. I believed it would be a stepping stone to Separation.

    That danger still exists. Separatists are proud Scots who believe Scotland can govern itself: in this, they are surely right. So they point up grievances because their case thrives on discontent with the status quo. But even master magicians need props for their illusions: remove the props, and the illusion vanishes.

    The props are grievances about power retained at Westminster. The present Scotland Bill does offer more power to the Scottish Parliament.

    But why not go further? Why not devolve all responsibilities except foreign policy, defence and management of the economy?

    Why not let Scotland have wider tax-raising powers to pay for their policies and, in return, abolish the present block grant settlement, reduce Scottish representation in the Commons, and cut the legislative burden at Westminster?

    My own view on Scottish independence is very straightforward: it would be folly – bad for Scotland and bad for England – but, if Scots insist on it, England cannot – and should not – deny them.

    England is their partner in the Union, not their overlord. But Unionists have a responsibility to tell Scotland what independence entails.

    A referendum in favour of separation is only the beginning. The terms must then be negotiated and a further referendum held.

    These terms might deter many Scots. No Barnett Formula. No Block Grant. No more representation at Westminster. No automatic help with crises such as Royal Bank of Scotland. I daresay free prescriptions would end and tuition fees begin.

    And there is no certainty of membership of the EU. Scotland would have to apply, meet tough criteria, await lengthy negotiations and would find countries like Spain – concerned at losing Catalonia – might not hold out a welcome for Separatists. And, even if Scotland were admitted, they would find their voice of 5 million is lost and powerless in a Union of 500 million.

    But it must, ultimately, be their choice.

    SOCIETY

    Reforms within politics can – I believe would – improve policy-making, but it is the guts of policy that really matters. I simply observe that in considering future policy every Minister should ask one question: does this improve our long-term ability to compete and grow? If it does – good; if it doesn’t – think again.

    Growth is not just a matter of economic policy. Social policy is a part of the competitive structure – not apart from it. To grow, we need to improve our human infrastructure.

    EDUCATION

    Education and skill attainment are as crucial to economic success as cash investment. In the ancient world, Plato taught Socrates who taught Alexander.

    Rather more recently, Tony Blair famously declaimed “Education, Education, Education”. I had the same priorities but in a different order.

    Neither of us was original. Lenin first said it in 1917.

    And we were all right – except that we failed. And among the alienated and the under-educated, how much talent is lost? How many lives are wasted and unfulfilled? How high is the social and economic loss? Money has been put into education but the return on investment has been disappointing.

    It is a reproach to every Government over the last 40 years that employers routinely bemoan the numeracy and literacy of far too many school-leavers. As a Nation, we can’t afford that.

    A recent OECD survey, based on science, maths and literacy, put America – once top – at 26th, and the UK even lower: eight of the top ten performers were emerging Asian States. This isn’t some remote trend we can ignore: our children and grandchildren will be in direct competition with these young Asians.

    One reason for Asian success seems to be that they have invested heavily in teachers. Paid them well. Trained them well. And built up their prestige and social standing. As a result, they have attracted their brightest and best into the profession.

    Parents, too, have a responsibility for their child’s education. Too many opt out – none should.

    Events in California, in 1996, are suggestive. After positive discrimination had resulted in low graduation results and high drop-out rates, “Proposition 209” banned any reference to race, sex or ethnicity in University admissions.

    Students were selected purely on their Grades. Admissions from Asian Americans soared. The only explanation for this was parental influence. There is a lesson here. However good teachers may be, the role of parents remains the single most important input into any child’s life opportunity.

    If, as most of us accept, the economic future of the West lies, in part, with maintaining a technological advantage, we must produce the relevant skills. But we are just not doing so. China is producing over three times as many engineering, science and IT graduates as the United States. And over three times as many Chinese graduates at the top-most level with PhDs.

    In the UK, in the decade to 2007, there was a fall of nearly one-third in single honours chemistry courses, and 14% in physics. The West had better focus on the fact that Asian manufacture is already moving up the value chain.

    No Government is always right. Or wrong. In the UK, I applaud warmly the high ambition of Ministers in the previous Government who argued for long-term social reform. My only regret is that others, more senior and less far-sighted, sometimes over-ruled their efforts.

    “Thinking the unthinkable” was ditched. That was a pity.

    I welcomed their early ideas – as indeed I should: many of them were my ideas long before they were theirs, and – in some cases – Margaret’s before they were mine.

    That doesn’t matter. In a good cause, I welcome policy kleptomania. As someone who was opening Academy Schools 20 years ago, I was genuinely delighted when Andrew Adonis developed the policy and successfully carried it forward.

    Education is not our only social policy failure over decades. In our broadly prosperous country, there are still far too many graffiti-ridden slums, on soul-less Estates, in run-down areas, that dis-incentivise those who live there.

    There are too many neighbourhoods where unemployment has become a way of life; where an existence on social benefits seems normal.

    For too many people, self-determination has morphed into a belief in self-entitlement, where no-one is responsible for anything, and welfare is a legitimate career choice. America has problems that are similar in character.

    The Coalition is now embarked on reforms to health, education and social security that are long overdue, controversial and necessary. As Labour built on Conservative policy, now Conservatives will build on Labour’s.

    I hope everyone, irrespective of Party, who agrees with these reforms will support them publicly when Ministers face the inevitable protests that are to come. It will be a lost opportunity if they are sacrificed to our adversarial political system.

    Within the compass of my direct experience, I have tried to look forward. I have focused on what is not working well. But I am optimistic.

    The Western democracies always over-estimate what they can do in the short-term and under-estimate what they can achieve in the long-term. If we accept what needs to be done – we can do it. But – as Goethe noted – “until one is committed, there is hesitancy”. We must be committed.

    I would like to see a senior Minister, of Cabinet rank, given responsibility for “The Future”. His or her role would be to cast an independent eye on what needs to be done that is not being done; and what is being done that could be harmful in the future.

    Such a Minister would be the voice of the next generation. The conscience of the Government. The guarantor of the legacy. To do the job well, he or she should be an enormous irritant to Departmental Ministers and the Treasury but, with the backing of a committed Prime Minister, would ensure the interests of the next generation are not sacrificed on the altar of immediate consumption.

    Mr. Chairman, time is a tyrant and I have only skimmed the surface of policy for tomorrow.

    I have not touched on traditional foreign policy issues – much as I wished to: that must await another occasion. On that, and on so much else, there is a great deal to be said and – as my Grace Note – let me observe that those of us gathered here are well-placed to say it.

    CONCLUSION

    We are, or were, the Establishment – or part of it. Some still are. We are winners in the Ovarian lottery. Gathered here are intelligent, civilised men and women, skilled at diplomacy and dispassionate judgement. If the late John Osborne were to categorise us, it would not be as “Angry Young Men or Women”, but as “Mellow Old Achievers”.

    We are, many would say, the past: Neanderthals from the pre-internet age. But we have one huge advantage: we have seen the world as few others have seen it. So I want to end with a plea. It is that – in an age that glorifies youth – we should use our collective experience to help signpost a path for the future.

    We may have a shorter lease on that future than the young, but they are our young, and we have an obligation to care about their future.

    Whether British, or American, or Continental European, the task facing our respective Governments is herculean. We can stand aside, shrug our shoulders and smile benignly on their efforts, our own work done. Or we can pitch in and help them.

    That, surely, is the right thing to do.

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at the Tory Reform Group Dinner – 25 November 2009

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech at the Tory Reform Group Dinner, held at the Cavalry and Guards Club in London on Wednesday 25th November 2009.


    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    Here at Cavalry & Guards Club: moment to remember contribution of Cavalry, Guards and Services generally in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere as we sit here over dinner. We owe them a lot.

    You may think “British Foreign Policy in a Changing World” is an odd subject for someone who was Foreign Secretary for a mere 94 days.

    I partly agree: except – it seems to me – those 94 days were a golden age. We were at war with no-one. There were no “dodgy dossiers”. All was serene. A period on which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office looks back with great nostalgia. All was serene. A period on which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office looks back with great nostalgia.

    This evening, I want to focus on the world as it is – only then can we make policy with a clear-eyed appreciation of what is happening elsewhere and where the British national interest lies. This means shedding the nostalgia and fantasies that so often bedevil British attitudes.

    Fifty years ago, no-one could have predicted the present social or geo-political landscape.

    The Soviet Union and the United States were the two super-powers. China was isolationist and something of an enigma. Japan had barely begun her post-war rise. Central and Eastern Europe fell under Soviet control. Germany was still divided. Latin America was a Continent of revolutions. The EU was in its infancy. Much of Africa was still colonised. Oil was $3 a barrel and no-one imagined an Islamic Revolution. Little of that world now survives. Huge changes – and yet the pace of change is accelerating.

    But old attitudes linger. Often, very old attitudes. Beneath a thin veneer, there are still strands of opinion that hanker for the days when Palmerston sent a gun boat. These days, there are no Palmerstons and – as it happens – not all that many gunboats.

    As we look forward, more than ever our military power will need supplementing by diplomacy, by soft power, by the intelligent use of foreign policy.

    Here, history helps us. Old alliances can be invoked. Old friendships re-asserted. But, self-interest suggests we should use the international institutions with more commitment. Our membership of NATO, of the Security Council, of the Commonwealth and of the EU can all help us. Some may dispute the last assertion but they are wrong – the EU is crucial to our foreign policy clout. Every American President I have known wants the UK to be a power inside the EU and would see us as diminished if we were outside it. America does not want us as the 51st State, but as a powerful ally within Europe.

    Of course, many recoil at shared authority within Europe but, often, intelligent policy can shackle our partners to policies we advocate. The Single Market is a case in point. So is enlargement to the East. These are two of the biggest changes in European policy since the birth of the Common Market – and both were British initiatives. Let me offer a further example.

    After the first Gulf War the Iraqis were murdering Kurds. It was genocide. I advocated a ‘Safe Havens’ policy and persuaded the EU and the Commonwealth to back it. Faced with this alliance, the US, initially reluctant, signed up to this too: troops were put in the field and hundreds of thousands of lives were saved. On these occasions others accommodated British priorities. Sometimes we must accommodate theirs.

    The Lisbon Treaty is now law. Some of it is sensible. Some of it I don’t like. In particular, I am hostile to the idea of a President and a High Representative for Foreign Policy and – to judge from the appointments made – others have reached have reached the same view. Even so, David Cameron is right to accept that despite the denial of a referendum – our economic interests require us to remain an active Member.

    Some don’t agree. Britain, they proclaim, has surrendered so much power it has the status of a Parish Council. This is absurd, of course – what Parish Council runs its own tax policy, monetary policy, defence policy and foreign policy? None, of course. Nor ever will.

    But the ‘Better Off Out’ advocates – UKIP and their sympathisers, some within our own Party – magnify the frustrations of Europe and minimise its achievements. A war between European nations is now inconceivable and yet the sceptics see no relationship between that self-evident truth and the advent of the EU. Nor do they see that, if they achieved their aim of withdrawal they would downsize our role in the world. Less important to America. Detached from our European market. A less attractive home for investment from the East. The world would not applaud our Bulldog independence: they would think we had taken leave of our political senses. And – soon – we would, no doubt, take leave of our membership of the Security Council and our influence within the international financial institutions. We would not be seen as a serious nation: we would have emasculated our future. A Little Britain not a Great Britain. A stifled voice in a big and noisier world.

    It would be folly. A march towards irrelevance at precisely the moment we need all our confidence to compete in a world that is, perhaps, changing faster than it has ever done.

    The present economic crisis may slow down the exuberant change of the last decades but it won’t stop it. For sound economic reasons the East will outgrow the West for the foreseeable future: it has a lower cost base, more – and less expensive – labour, and it can build anew without first demolishing what existed before.

    In 1700, China and India were the greatest economic powers in the world: in terms of GDP they will once again – sometime in the next few decades – sometime in the next few decades – outstrip everyone, even the US and the EU. And, since economic power leads to political authority, it will pose an increasing challenge to Western diplomacy. Also, until science develops alternative fuels, nations rich in oil and gas will flourish. Over recent years, the world has looked enviously at energy rich nations – especially in the Gulf, but also Russia, of course, and the spending power of their Sovereign Wealth Funds. At an oil price of $75 – and it will soon exceed that once again – the Gulf alone adds $140 billion a year to their war chest for investment.

    We have a Government in the UK in the UK that inherited the best economy in Western Europe yet – in 12 years – has managed to near-bankrupt the nation. We are now the most indebted industrial nation in the world. Our fiscal deficit is – unbelievably – three times that of Italy and twice that of Japan.

    Labour bought the last two elections with a reckless economic policy and now the electorate that was deceived must pick up the bill. Labour now promise to halve the deficit in four years: but even if they did so – and it is unlikely – the deficit would still be twice as high as we have ever known before. And that relative poverty impacts on our foreign policy as well as our pockets.

    Since 1997, much of Labour’s foreign policy has been thoughtless and short-term. As for Afghanistan – which was embarked upon with the false promise that “not a shot will be fired” – no conflict in our modern history can have been sanctioned with less consideration.

    We had no objective. No idea of the scale of the commitment. No plan. No exit strategy and – for years – our servicemen and women have been in harm’s way with poor equipment and inadequate numbers. There is a case for this war but the political management of it has been shameful. I believe that was true, also, of the second Iraq War. Soon, the responsibility may devolve on a new Government.

    They must ask:-

    What is the aim of this war?

    What is the cost of failure?

    Can it be won by force of arms alone?

    What is the political/diplomatic strategy?

    And why – after eight years – is this still not apparent- after – is this still not apparent?

    Can a credibly non-corrupt Afghan Government be formed?

    How many troops are necessary?

    Does the use of unmanned drones which kill more civilians than terrorists aid or hinder the cause of winning hearts and minds?

    These questions – and others – should have been asked – and considered carefully – before the conflict began and it is a failure of commonsense, let alone good government, let alone good government, that they were not. The Nation is as right to be proud of the role of our Servicemen and women as it is to be hostile at the ineptitude of our Government.

    Good foreign policy also looks at inter-generational policy. One aspect of that is overseas aid – traditionally under the bailiwick of the under the bailiwick of the Foreign Office.

    One-half of the world will go to bed hungry tonight. They live on less than $2 a day while the rich nations spend many times more on agricultural subsidies for the already well-fed as they contribute to aid for 3 billion people who often have no food in their belly at all.

    And this will get worse. In the last 50 years, world population has grown from under 3 billion to over 6.5 billion. At the birth of Christ, world population was – probably – 300 million. By 1900 – 19 centuries later – it had grown by something over one billion. We now grow by nearly one billion every decade.

    World population is projected to reach 8 or even 9 billion by 2050 and over 95% of growth is in the developing world. This is like absorbing two more nations the size of China. We ignore this at our peril.

    The plight of the poorest is made worse by an issue that will impact on everyone: the price of food.

    Here, there is a real irony. As some nations grow and improve living standards, they drive up prices beyond the reach of the poorest. If one billion Indians – one-sixth of the entire world population – together with millions of Chinese, Brazilians and Malaysians – now eat two meals a day, instead of only one, the demand for food soars.

    That puts up prices – provoking panic and moving the politics of food to the front burner of controversy. The days of cheap food are gone.

    In the future the world will need all the food we can grow – even if nations such as Ukraine and Zimbabwe once again become the agricultural bread-baskets nature designed them to be.

    It is hard to overstate the importance of a cogent foreign importance of a cogent policy, and its wider impact, and its wider impact. Apart from those issues I have touched on it must deal with:

    The hotspots of Iran and Iraq;

    The Middle East Peace Process;

    The risks of nuclear or biological terror;

    The insecurities created by the arc of uncertainty from Syria to Pakistan;

    The enigma of Russian policy-making; and much else, not least the trade promotion of Great Britain PLC.

    We must make sure the Foreign Office is equipped for these tasks. It needs to be strengthened – not weakened. We need to stop cutting overseas posts and manpower. And we need to end the absurdity of requiring HM Ambassadors to become bloggers for Government PR purposes, and advisors on media handling for every report they submit. For Heaven’s sake, they are highly trained diplomats – not under-qualified publicists.

    There is an old sneer that the Foreign Office exists for foreigners. It is often trotted out to the applause of the ignorant and the ill-informed.

    Nothing could be further from the truth. The Foreign Office exists to represent British interests overseas in diplomacy and trade. Its job is to negotiate, to persuade, to identify a identify a problem before it becomes a crisis, before it becomes a crisis, and prepare the ground for solutions. In an increasingly inter-dependent world, its role will become ever more crucial.

    Let us hope we are soon returned to a Government that will re-establish Britain’s role in this new world and a British Foreign Secretary who will, once again, carry the weight of that Office as elegantly and intelligently as Peter Carrington, Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind.

    The world is in a constant state of change – and we need to put Britain back where she should be – ahead of the game rather than trailing in the wake of bigger beasts. The Foreign Office has the experience and the talent to do that. William Hague has all the qualities of leadership to deliver.

    But – first – we have an election to win. If we do so, we will return to serious Government.

    And then we can return to serious policy.

  • Sir John Major’s Speech at Foreign and Commonwealth Office Association Event – 29 November 2006

    The text of Sir John Major’s speech made at an event run by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Association, held at the Locarno Suite at the Foreign Office in London on the morning of Wednesday 29th November 2006.


    SIR JOHN MAJOR:

    I’m delighted to be back at the Foreign Office this morning.

    Foreign Secretary 94 days: golden age: went to war with no-one.

    My time here was too short: I wish it had been longer. Today I can speak as an individual – nothing I say should be regarded as anyone’s policy other than my own.

    We live in a world that is changing comprehensively and rapidly. There are short term imperatives that cannot be ignored: and long term issues that should not be ignored.

    Today – nothing is as it was: nothing will be as it is.

    Economically, the world is turning to the East which – for the first time since 1820 – now produces the majority of world growth. No-one should be surprised at this return to the past: for 1800 years, China had the largest economy in the world: then in the early 19th century, the West had an industrial revolution – and the East did not.

    Now, China is re-asserting the old order.

    Some people worry that China will be a threat to the West. Economically, of course, she already is. Politically, she is becoming more influential. But neither politically nor militarily is China a threat in the sense of the former Soviet Union. China’s focus will be on internal problems – widespread unemployment, pollution, water scarcity, public resentment of the growing disparity of wealth; demands for a social welfare system; the appetite for more self-government.

    Their hands are full.

    INDIA

    Behind China – perhaps 10-15 years behind – comes India, who once had nearly one-quarter of the output of the whole world.
    Today, once more, she is in the midst of an explosion of ambition and has cornered a large part of the market in knowledge-based industries; in R&D; in IT; in Bio-technology and Molecular Biology. But India’s potential for manufacturing and engineering is also enormous and she is now more cost competitive than China.

    LATIN AMERICA

    Nor is Latin America the “old” Continent of lost opportunities.

    Between 1986-96 – inflation in Latin America was 180%.

    Today – between 6-7%.

    Budget deficits and country debts are falling.

    AFRICA

    Even Africa – poor, forgotten, disregarded Africa – is benefiting from high commodity prices and growing faster than for many years.

    For the last quarter of a century, the principal engines of world growth have been the US, Japan and the EU. Soon, China, non-Japanese Asia and India will join them.

    Moreover, over the last two years, every emerging economy in the world has out-performed every mature economy. As a result, growth in the world economy is becoming better balanced than ever before – which is excellent news for future economic stability – but the price for the democracies of the West is that political power will be more widespread. As the world economy re-configures, so does politics.

    So, too, has the mode of political thinking. In the last 25 years – in the UK and the US – political thought has seemed to move away from the gravity-based centre and become more ideological.

    I am suspicious of ideology. Policy is often at its best when compromise and pragmatism are seen as virtues – not a betrayal of the true path.

    The tabloid certainty of ideologues is a fiction for the ignorant.

    Before I turn to some pressing problems, let me make some brief assertions that, hopefully, may stimulate questions.

    Britain is a medium-sized, relatively rich country, in a world whose growth is outstripping ours. To protect our future political and trading interests, alliances and diplomacy will be vital.

    I, therefore, consider it an extremely bad policy to cut our overseas representation at a time when we should be increasing it. If that seems like special pleading to this audience – then so be it. It is what I believed as Prime Minister. Budget cuts for the Foreign Service mean people. We should be increasing our profile not preparing to diminish it. I travel 4 months in every year to every part of the world and I don’t like the reductions I see. They are not in Britain’s interest.

    Secondly, international bodies.

    There is a mode of neo-thinking that dismisses the UN as if it were an irrelevance. Frankly, this is madness. If we didn’t have the UN we would have to invent it. Our British interest is to make it more efficient, eliminate its short-comings – not pander to the mode of thinking that undermines it. The UN is our servant: it can be as relevant as its Members choose to make it.

    EUROPE

    On Europe, I’m not sure what British policy is at the moment. Certainly it is in flux.

    For over 30 years – with a few exceptions such as the Single Market and Enlargement – we have been on the back foot in Europe. The growth to 25 – soon 27 – Members offers an opportunity to put that right. Our great phobia over too-deep-an integration seems less likely now.

    I think we should be looking for policies to help Europe work more efficiently – at a time when we are not under pressure over a new currency or a new Constitution (although the latter, I think, will come back in diluted form after the French Presidential Election). Greater economic competitiveness is vital for all Europe: we should be developing the case – and arguing for it.

    Some issues are very pressing now.

    Much of the Middle East is in conflict. Our task in this generation is to ensure that future generations do not have to re-live the extra-ordinary number of problems that have come together in our own time: terror, Iraq, Iran, MEPP, Afghanistan, Lebanon. North Korea is a dilemma too, but of a different nature.

    We need a dose of reality, too. We had better accept that may be no ideal solution. We may have to compromise.

    And we should recognise that every situation will require diplomacy and statesmanship to be enlisted alongside military power.

    Our preferred outcome may be un-achievable. But, sometimes, even compromise solutions are a triumph.

    It may be unfashionable – and dare not even be spoken of in some quarters – but it still seems to me that the core issue remains the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of a serious peace process has left a vacuum which has been filled by bloodshed and mayhem. A Peace Process – however difficult – offers hope and we badly need that. If benign neglect remains the policy, then this problem can only get worse.
    It is unprovable – of course – but I suspect that neglect of a credible peace process has done more to encourage Muslim militancy than Iraq.
    In Iraq and Afghanistan, we need to be clear about the mission, and we need an exit strategy. If I asked everyone in this room to write down what they thought that mission was, I would get a wide variety of different answers.

    Iraq is messy and getting messier. Those who predicted the coalition would be greeted as liberators on flower-strewn paths are wiser now.

    We are not – alas – remotely where we had hoped to be.

    Both casualties and civil violence are mounting especially in the 30 miles radius of Baghdad. As American soldiers clean up districts, the insurgents move to neighbouring areas. As the troops move on, the insurgents move back in, because the Iraqi armed forces cannot hold the ground. This failure to hold the territory gained, means that to some extent, policy is simply chasing its tail.

    At the same time, the Iraqi Government refuses permission for troops to enter the most violent areas, on the grounds that it would be inflammatory. This is an Alice-in-Wonderland decision, that provides a haven for militancy.

    Decisions that are fundamental to the future of Iraq are not yet made. We do not yet know how oil revenue will be shared. The boundaries of the future Federalist system are not known. The future of Kirkuk is still uncertain. The new Police Force is – to put it kindly – inefficient and with divided loyalties.

    For the average Iraqi, life is dire. Many are killed each month. Unemployment is huge. Inflation is at 70%. Electricity supplies – in Baghdad for example – fluctuate wildly during every 24 hour period: a few weeks ago it was 3-4 hours only; more recently, I believe they had the luxury of 10 hours power. All of this, in turn, creates instability – and a deep resentment of the coalition forces on the ground.

    Many Iraqis are arrested and detained a long time without charge. You will never build a democracy without rule of law and due process is badly needed. So is money. The Chancellor’s £150 million is welcome – but petty cash: General Dempsey has US$5 billion a year to spend.
    In the US and Britain there is pressure to leave.

    Yet – if we did so prematurely – our departure would create a double-dilemma: not only would it be humiliating for us to leave without stability, but if Iraq was then torn apart by civil war, the implications of a militant Islamic Government emerging scarcely need to be spelled out.

    From where we are today there are no simple solutions, but it is clear we need diplomacy and statesmanship alongside military power. And – it would help in the future – if we factored in the lessons of history.

    AFGHANISTAN

    Much of this is relevant to Afghanistan.

    To promote democracy and destroy terror is a noble mission but the justice of the cause doesn’t lessen the need for a clear-cut objective, good planning and adequate resources.

    The Afghan mission is uncertain.

    Is it a peacekeeping mission?

    Or a nation-building one?

    Is it to catch Bin Laden?

    Or to defeat the Taliban; drug barons; warlords; Iraqi infiltrators; Pakistani bandits; and the local population fearful of their poppy crop being destroyed?

    Or is it all of the above – and more?

    History tells us Afghanistan is a very tough place to be. In the Afghan Wars – during the height of the British Empire – Britain did not even come a poor second. And, more recently, between 1979-1989, the Red Army was defeated in Afghanistan: 120,000 troops, ten years on the ground – and then defeat.

    We have 5,500 soldiers in Helmand Province of whom less than 2,000 are – in the terminology – men with bayonets. Most are logistical support. We are under-resourced in men and equipment. We are bastardising helicopters to make others airworthy. We are short of armoured vehicles. Our NATO allies are slow to help and have different “rules of engagement”. This is lamentable.

    It is a woeful tale for young soldiers who – when we sent them there – were told they may not have to face a shot! Now, they find themselves in a shooting war.

    The conclusion I draw is that there must be a political as well as a military strategy. A senior British General warned recently of the danger of an aggrieved population turning back to support the Taliban.

    From our perspective of the Taliban – as a brutal force with a medieval culture – that seems absurd. But the local population see the UK and America painted each day as invading interlopers – much like the Russians over twenty years ago. It is a crude untruth – but an effective one.

    Moreover, as we destroy the poppy crop – an evil trade, but the only way of earning a livelihood for many Afghans – we need to put in place alternative sources of income. If we fail to do this, we will simply turn the population against us – and back into the arms of the Taliban.

    There is a common thread that runs through Iraq and Afghanistan: both are ideological conflicts that must be fought by intellectual as well as martial force.

    TERROR

    One continuing problem is terror. It pre-dated Iraq and it will post-date present conflicts. It has been rising for a long time – Iraq is a focus but not the cause although I suspect it has been a recruiting tool. If we are to render terror impotent – we must win the hearts and minds of those into whose ears radical poison is poured.

    Without an intellectual victory, there will be no lasting military victory, and no respite. If we are to safeguard our way of life we must mobilise our best instincts as well as our military might.

    The West must counter the malign way in which it is misrepresented. We will not be able to persuade the hard-line militants but we can siphon off their support. We can dry up their recruitment. We can isolate them. We can ensure our allies are active in our support, and not passive.

    All around the world, even in the grimmest of circumstances, people hope for something better. Hope for something better is the most powerful antidote to anti-Western propaganda. And to gain the allies necessary to isolate and defeat terror, we must offer that hope.

    This is not some impossible dream. We saw hope triumph when the free market defeated communism. Now it must do so again, to help democracy defeat terror.

    We have one great advantage. The on-rush of the free market is delivering material benefits to nearly every part of the world. Politics must offer hope too.

    This will mean dialogue. It will mean enlisting other nations. It will mean working with regimes of whom we strongly disapprove.

    Some say this can’t be done. I say it can. Tough – yes. Long-term – yes. But it can be done.

    Sixteen years ago, I began a dialogue with the IRA when they were still bombing Northern Ireland and the British mainland. Many in our own Party opposed this. More doubted it would ever succeed. Some said it was folly. Others were less kind.

    And yet it began a peace process that has transformed Northern Ireland.

    The same principles apply, even to the core disputes in the Middle East, and the ideological divides that are so dangerous today. Dialogue can be productive. But that dialogue cannot be with a megaphone. It must be face-to-face.

    The alternative – a lack of dialogue – enables an enemy to distort our motives and mis-represent our policies. This is folly.

    CONCLUSION

    I know it sometimes seems as if there are a vast array of insurmountable and daunting problems.

    Well, there are – but we should put all of them into context.

    None is as dangerous as the nuclear confrontation that preceded the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Today, the free market has comprehensively won the battle of philosophies that scarred most of the last century.

    Our long-term ally, America is – and will remain – the most powerful political, economic and military power in the world.

    Future generations will see the growth of democracy in Europe as a huge achievement.

    The growth of emerging economies will give more nations of the world a greater stake in a peaceful future.

    Ahead of us is a new world, with many intractable problems. We must see this new world as it really is if we are to help shape how it could be.

  • Mr Major’s Article on Europe – 20 October 2004

    The text of Mr Major’s article in the Conference Magazine – Conservative Group for Europe, published in October 2004.


    JOHN MAJOR:

    The Prime Minister and the Chancellor are at odds over Europe. There are Cabinet splits about the offer of a referendum. Dissent lurks on the backbenches. An anti-European fringe party threatens to elevate European policy into Party warfare while a largely hostile-to-Europe Press licks its lips, hungry to magnify the fall-out. This is European policy under a Labour Government in 2004. How hauntingly familiar.

    There are essentially three contrasting points of view upon Europe:

    (i) It can do no right – which is the view of extreme sceptics such as UKIP and the former Referendum Party – whom we might call the Ultras to distinguish them from those of more moderate scepticism;
    (ii) It can do no wrong – Federalists, extreme euro-philiacs; or
    (iii) That it is, on balance, favourable to the UK but that elements of policy frustrate and irritate. Like most of the British nation, I belong to the third – and majority – school of thought. I for one would like to make the EU more popular: but can it be done?

    Nothing, I suspect, will change the views of the Ultras – who are beyond arguing with over Europe: the worry is that they have begun to shift the centre of gravity towards arch-scepticism. This has the potential both to divorce the UK from Europe – which, for the Ultras, is the ultimate goal of their scepticism – and wreak havoc upon the British political system (especially the Conservative Party). Much the Ultras care: even those who call themselves Conservatives subordinate the Conservative Party’s interests to those of their anti-European cause.

    Indeed, some of the most prominent UKIP Members are former Conservative MPs who helped ferment the rebellions that crippled the last Conservative Government. No Conservative should expect help from them – and no Conservative should do any deals with them. Since nothing can be done with this group it is necessary to ignore their shrill message and direct policy to reassure the bulk of the electorate.

    What can be done to achieve this? It would be beneficial to have an honest debate among adversaries, but that is unlikely.

    It would be desirable to have a fair and balanced media, but that is unobtainable. The written Press especially, is as deeply entrenched in the dispute as the political adversaries. The pro-EU Press has an air of sanctimony in which all dissenters – and their arguments, even when valid – are grandly dismissed. And the anti-EU Press is relentless in its campaign and careless of the implications of it.

    If reason and commonsense could heal the rifts over Europe they would have been mended long ago. But words alone cannot do it; suspicion and unease have grown continually since the Single European Act in 1986 and nothing has assuaged it. Indeed, it has worsened since most European Treaties are the natural father of the successor Treaty.

    I recall that, throughout the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, I was constantly reminded that Margaret Thatcher had signed up to “ever closer Union” and a large extension of qualified majority voting (thus reducing the British veto). So why, I was asked, was I so obstinate over the Euro, the Social Chapter and a further extension of QMV?

    As a result of the growing collective influence of successive Treaties, the public tend to see European policy as a juggernaut that cannot be stopped and which tramples over every sensitivity. This is the most damaging perception of all and the root of much suspicion over Europe.

    Europe has now enlarged its membership to 25 Nation States, and when Giscard D’Estaing’s Committee was established to make recommendations that would update the practices and administration of the EU, I welcomed it. Europe needed reform to accommodate enlargement and many prizes loomed: consolidation of existing complex treaties; a more effective form of European administration and – above all – whispers that the recommendations would finally set out in Treaty form the limits of European imposition upon the authority of National Government. Against this yardstick, the European Constitution makes some helpful moves, but overall it is a lost opportunity for those of us who wished to minimise the existing suspicions about the direction of policy.

    Pro-Europeans should not fool themselves. It will not be easy to turn around the present hostility to the EU. For too long foolish myths have been, if not unchallenged, at least undestroyed. The reality is our European Partners are not concerned with “doing Britain down”; they do not all have a federalist agenda; they are less and less in the Franco-German camp. All this is true, but it’s hard to persuade a majority to agree. Indeed, among Member States, the Anglo-Saxon view of the EU has more supporters now than ever before, Margaret Thatcher and I would have warmly welcomed such reinforcements in earlier disputes. Europe can be made more acceptable to the British view, but only if the Ultras are put to flight. Since their myths are often the stuff of tabloid fancy, this will be hard pounding. Nor is it made easier by those criticisms of the EU that are well justified.

    What is the case for Europe for those prepared to be persuaded? It remains powerful. The EU is the largest, richest free trade area in history and spreads from Ireland in the West to the very borders of Russia in the East. In years to come, one can see those borders increasing ever further – to take in Turkey and, perhaps, other nearby States, and possibly even to reach an accommodation with Russia herself.

    But it is not just valuable for free trade. It has made a major European war inconceivable as the entangling of trade and investment build up common interests. It can provide an economic counter-weight to the power of the United States and the potential power of China. It offers opportunities to the rising generations that their forbears never enjoyed. These may be grand themes but they are indispensable to the well-being of individual Europeans.

    The fundamental problem, it seems to me – as a wellwisher who believes there is a limit to integration and that we are close to it – is that Europe’s true failings and its over ambitious agenda encourage any myth about it to gain currency.

    The wise European would be cautious about entering the Euro zone (which is plainly not in our short-term interest); very sniffy about parts of the new “Constitution” (which is a step too far in its present form – although it does have some good aspects); and would be determined to make an onslaught on fraud and mismanagement.

    Much is going our way in Europe and we need to rebuild domestic confidence in our membership of the European Union. To do so, we must neither fear to build upon developments in tune with our British instincts nor to resist those that go too far.

  • Mr Major’s Article on Europe – 15 October 2004

    The text of Mr Major’s article in the Conference Magazine – Conservative Group for Europe, published in October 2004.


    JOHN MAJOR:

    The Prime Minister and the Chancellor are at odds over Europe. There are Cabinet splits about the offer of a referendum. Dissent lurks on the backbenches. An anti-European fringe party threatens to elevate European policy into Party warfare while a largely hostile-to-Europe Press licks its lips, hungry to magnify the fall-out. This is European policy under a Labour Government in 2004. How hauntingly familiar.

    There are essentially three contrasting points of view upon Europe:

    (i) It can do no right – which is the view of extreme sceptics such as UKIP and the former Referendum Party – whom we might call the Ultras to distinguish them from those of more moderate scepticism;

    (ii) It can do no wrong – Federalists, extreme euro-philiacs; or

    (iii) That it is, on balance, favourable to the UK but that elements of policy frustrate and irritate. Like most of the British nation, I belong to the third – and majority – school of thought. I for one would like to make the EU more popular: but can it be done?

    Nothing, I suspect, will change the views of the Ultras – who are beyond arguing with over Europe: the worry is that they have begun to shift the centre of gravity towards arch-scepticism. This has the potential both to divorce the UK from Europe – which, for the Ultras, is the ultimate goal of their scepticism – and wreak havoc upon the British political system (especially the Conservative Party). Much the Ultras care: even those who call themselves Conservatives subordinate the Conservative Party’s interests to those of their anti-European cause. Indeed, some of the most prominent UKIP Members are former Conservative MPs who helped ferment the rebellions that crippled the last Conservative Government. No Conservative should expect help from them – and no Conservative should do any deals with them. Since nothing can be done with this group it is necessary to ignore their shrill message and direct policy to reassure the bulk of the electorate.

    What can be done to achieve this? It would be beneficial to have an honest debate among adversaries, but that is unlikely.

    It would be desirable to have a fair and balanced media, but that is unobtainable. The written Press especially, is as deeply entrenched in the dispute as the political adversaries. The pro-EU Press has an air of sanctimony in which all dissenters – and their arguments, even when valid – are grandly dismissed. And the anti-EU Press is relentless in its campaign and careless of the implications of it.

    If reason and commonsense could heal the rifts over Europe they would have been mended long ago. But words alone cannot do it; suspicion and unease have grown continually since the Single European Act in 1986 and nothing has assuaged it. Indeed, it has worsened since most European Treaties are the natural father of the successor Treaty.

    I recall that, throughout the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, I was constantly reminded that Margaret Thatcher had signed up to “ever closer Union” and a large extension of qualified majority voting (thus reducing the British veto). So why, I was asked, was I so obstinate over the Euro, the Social Chapter and a further extension of QMV?

    As a result of the growing collective influence of successive Treaties, the public tend to see European policy as a juggernaut that cannot be stopped and which tramples over every sensitivity. This is the most damaging perception of all and the root of much suspicion over Europe.

    Europe has now enlarged its membership to 25 Nation States, and when Giscard D’Estaing’s Committee was established to make recommendations that would update the practices and administration of the EU, I welcomed it. Europe needed reform to accommodate enlargement and many prizes loomed: consolidation of existing complex treaties; a more effective form of European administration and – above all – whispers that the recommendations would finally set out in Treaty form the limits of European imposition upon the authority of National Government. Against this yardstick, the European Constitution makes some helpful moves, but overall it is a lost opportunity for those of us who wished to minimise the existing suspicions about the direction of policy.

    Pro-Europeans should not fool themselves. It will not be easy to turn around the present hostility to the EU. For too long foolish myths have been, if not unchallenged, at least undestroyed. The reality is our European Partners are not concerned with “doing Britain down”; they do not all have a federalist agenda; they are less and less in the Franco-German camp. All this is true, but it’s hard to persuade a majority to agree. Indeed, among Member States, the Anglo-Saxon view of the EU has more supporters now than ever before, Margaret Thatcher and I would have warmly welcomed such reinforcements in earlier disputes. Europe can be made more acceptable to the British view, but only if the Ultras are put to flight. Since their myths are often the stuff of tabloid fancy, this will be hard pounding. Nor is it made easier by those criticisms of the EU that are well justified.

    What is the case for Europe for those prepared to be persuaded? It remains powerful. The EU is the largest, richest free trade area in history and spreads from Ireland in the West to the very borders of Russia in the East. In years to come, one can see those borders increasing ever further – to take in Turkey and, perhaps, other nearby States, and possibly even to reach an accommodation with Russia herself.

    But it is not just valuable for free trade. It has made a major European war inconceivable as the entangling of trade and investment build up common interests. It can provide an economic counter-weight to the power of the United States and the potential power of China. It offers opportunities to the rising generations that their forbears never enjoyed. These may be grand themes but they are indispensable to the well-being of individual Europeans.

    The fundamental problem, it seems to me – as a wellwisher who believes there is a limit to integration and that we are close to it – is that Europe’s true failings and its over ambitious agenda encourage any myth about it to gain currency.

    The wise European would be cautious about entering the Euro zone (which is plainly not in our short-term interest); very sniffy about parts of the new “Constitution” (which is a step too far in its present form – although it does have some good aspects); and would be determined to make an onslaught on fraud and mismanagement.

    Much is going our way in Europe and we need to rebuild domestic confidence in our membership of the European Union. To do so, we must neither fear to build upon developments in tune with our British instincts nor to resist those that go too far.

  • Mr Major’s Letter to the Daily Telegraph – 15 September 2003

    The text of Mr Major’s letter to the Daily Telegraph on the subject of the Single Currency, published in September 2003.


    JOHN MAJOR:

    Sir,

    The Swedish rejection of the Euro re-emphasises the unlikelihood of our Government holding an early Referendum on the same subject. They will not do so for they know they will lose.

    In 1991, at Maastricht, I obtained an opt-out from the Euro. Later, I persuaded Cabinet to offer a Referendum prior to membership – a commitment the Blair Government had no choice but to inherit. I am therefore – at least in part – responsible for Sterling not yet having been abolished and the Euro adopted. It has always been my view that circumstances might arise in which it would be in our interests to join, but I have yet to see any that are imminent.

    The belief of the euro-sceptics that I offered a Referendum to appease them is both fatuous and wrong (as official documents will reveal in time). I did so because entry to the Euro would have a personal impact on every citizen and was therefore an issue upon which I felt they should have the opportunity to express an opinion.

    The same principle applies to the proposed European Constitution. The Government are resisting a Referendum on the specious grounds that Margaret Thatcher did not have one on the Single European Act and nor did I on the Maastricht Treaty. This line of defence does not stand up to examination.

    In neither instance was such a clear and fundamental point at issue. Moreover, at Maastricht, I opted out of the two greatest concerns – the single currency and the Social Chapter. I also agreed a negotiating position with Parliament and held to it in every particular. The present Government are not in this position with the proposed European Constitution.

    Another difference is relevant too: in the 1980s and 1990s, referenda were not commonplace, hence my difficulty in getting Cabinet to agree to one since many colleagues did not like the wider constitutional implications. Labour, however, have used referenda frequently.

    The Government should stop hiding behind a half-truth and offer a public poll on the European Constitution without further delay.

    Yours faithfully,
    JOHN MAJOR.